Elections: Voters, Parties, and Electoral Competition (sessions 8-10) Flashcards
Sessions 8-10
Why does Putnam argue that social capital can also induce cooperation within groups?
- Repeated interactions
- Credible commitments
- Providing information about other individual’s preferences & utilities
- Fluid communication (Ostrom)
Why the role of horizontal networks (sports clubs, neighborhood clubs) involving agents of equivalent status & power is important
- Can encompass broad segments of the society
The networks foster trust, cooperation, and reciprocity a the community/ social level - Trust becomes transitive (I trust her and she trust you so I trust you)
- Can help overcome the collective action problem by fostering cooperation
- no need for an external enforcer
Why the role of vertical networks (Mafia, catholic church) involving agents of unequal status & power doesn’t work
- These networks do not generate mutual trust & reciprocity, but dependence & exploitation
- Therefore making them less useful for boosting cooperation & overcoming the collective action problem
Importance of Social Capital according to Putnam
Social capital is key for Putnam for political stability, government effectiveness, and economic progress. Perhaps even more important than physical or human capital
More development = Trust
Less development = No trust
What is a virtuous cycle in social capital?
Societies can be trapped in good (cooperate, cooperate) or bad (defect, defect) equilibria
- Patterns are self-reinforcing
What’s an example of a country captured in a virtuous cycle?
Italy
North (republics, city-states, mutual aid societies)
- Prevalence of horizontal networks
- high social capital
South (large centralized, hierarchical kingdoms dominating local social networks)
- Social & political relations have historically been vertically structured
- Less social capital
According to Putnam has TV and media hindered or helped social capital? Why
Media has hindered social capital, people would rather be inside watching TV than engage with the community therefore declining collaboration
Social capital is a “type” of capital that requires investment: No investment leads to depreciation
Anthony Downs’s theory of voting:
Elections involve the interaction between
1) voters trying to maximize the personal utility derived from having their preferred party/ candidate selected
2) parties trying to maximize their chance of being elected
Assumptions under Downs theory:
1) Full information
- Each voter knows the position of each party
- Each party knows where voters stand
2) Voting is voluntary
- no compulsory voting
3) Two parties compete for the voter’s choice
- Mainly focused on the US system
4) Voters are either on the right or left of the electoral competition
5) Voters have “single peaked” preferences
3-5 are a fundamental role when it comes to analyzing voter choice
Calculus of voting equation version 1
(B): benefits
(C): costs
(i): Individual
(U): Utility
(Ui): Vote
Ui(vote)=Bi-Ci>0
This will help if your preferred candidate’s chance of winning is pivotal by 1 vote
Calculus of voting equation version 2:
(B): benefits
(C): costs
(pi): the probability that i’s vote decides the election
(U): Utility
(Ui): Vote
Ui(vote)=piBi-Ci>0
This accounts for the probability that i’s vote is pivotal
What is the paradox of voting?
The probability of deciding an election in large electorates is essentially 0 for any voter
Ui(turn out) = piBi-Ci=0-Ci
Hence the “calculus of voting” indicates that no rational individual should turn out to vote
What are the arguments to try to “solve” the calculus of the voting problem?
1) The costs of voting arent high
- People can vote based on their parents, friends and relatives
- Parties can reduce the monetary cost of going to polls
2) people wildy over-estimate their probability of being pivotal
Does this solve the problem? No, even tiny costs would discourage rational individuals from voting
Why don’t we just abandon rational choice theory?
Riker & Ordershook
Benefits not related to outcome:
- Affirming allegiance to the political system
- Affirming a partisan preference (e.g I’m a proud Democrat)
- Civic duty
Calculus of Voting Equation version 3
Now we can put an additional term that goes into Ui, the “expressive” component D
Ui(turn out)=piBi-Ci+Di>0
so, it doesn’t matter if piBi=0 as long as Di>Ci, Ui(turn out)>0
What are other explanations for high turnout rates that we haven’t talked about?
- Laver: social pressures & sanctions
- Laver: reputation building
-Castanheira: voters care not only about helping their party win, but to provide a mandate
The calculus of voting under compulsory voting
The costs of voting will be the same regardless of whether a voter wants to cast a valid or invalid vote, although the cognitive/ informational demands will be different so we distinguish this between (valid) CVi and (invalid) CIi
under compulsory voting people can go to the polls and put a valid vote (DVi), or they can go to the polls and put an invalid (DVI) ballot
in sum the utilities associated with showing up to the polls casting a “valid” and “invalid” vote can be written as
UVi=piBi-CVi+DVi
and
UIi=-CIi+DIi
Theres more to this on slide 45 of session 9 but I give up
What conclusions can we make about voting?
- less educated and informed citizens are especially likely to stay home
-if they show up to polls they are more likely to cast a invalid vote
-unlike staying home, invalid voting also has a political disenchantment with elections and democratic performance
Why do we care about the median voter?
Median voter theorem:
If the space of alternatives in uni-dimension and ordered and the preferences of all voters are single-peaked then
1) a Condorcet winner always exists
2) the Condorcet winner is the median of the distribution of peaks in the population of voters
What is the intuition behind the median voter theorem (MVT)?
a CW is an alternative that defeats all other alternatives in pair-wise majority comparisons, so, by definition, if a CW exists it is unique
All the voting rules (majority, plurality, borda) and others commonly used in elections (plurality with runoff) are equivalent and come down to a simple majority. All commonly used electoral rules are Condorcet consistent (they all select the CW whenever it exists)
Relaxation of the assumptions behind the MVT
1) Voters vote for the party closest to them in the political space
- Voters can abstain from alienation: the closest candidate may be too far away
- Alienation pulls parties to the mode
-If the distribution is symmetric the MVT still prevails but if the distribution is not symmetric the MVT no longer holds
2)Political space is one-dimensional
-crucial assumption to obtain an equilibrium prediction
-the MVT does not work in two dimensions
-multiple dimensions likely lead to cycles even if preferences are single-peaked on each issue
