Eksamensforberedelse (Mellem Bismarck og Hindenburg)

Question 1

Kunne rigspræsidenten nægte at underskrive en lov?

Answer 1

Nej, ikke hvis loven var blevet vedtaget efter de korrekte procedure, men han havde mulighed for at sende loven til folkeafstemning. (Promulgation of the law: The president was responsible for signing bills into law. The president was constitutionally obliged to sign every law passed in accordance with the correct procedure but could insist that a bill first be submitted to the electorate in a referendum. Such a referendum could, however, only override the decision of the Reichstag if a majority of eligible voters participated.)

Question 2

På hvilke to måder kunne Reichtag intervenere vis-a-vis rigspræsidenten?

Answer 2

1. Sende hans embede til folkeafstemning. Krævede 2/3 og RT ville blive opløst hvis han blev genvalgt
2. Kunne slæbe ham til Staatsgerichtshof (men kun hvis han vitterligt havde brudt gældende tysk lov). Krævede også at 2/3 af RT’s medlemmer stemte for.

The Weimar constitution provided that the president could be removed from office prematurely by a referendum initiated by the Reichstag. To require such a referendum the Reichstag had to pass a motion supported by at least two-thirds of votes cast in the chamber. If such a proposal to depose the president was rejected by voters the president would be deemed to have been re-elected and the Reichstag would be automatically dissolved.

The Reichstag also had authority to impeach the president before the Staatsgerichtshof, a court exclusively concerned with disputes between state organs. However it could only do this on a charge of willfully violating German law; furthermore the move had to be supported by a two-thirds majority of votes cast, at a meeting with a quorum of two-thirds of the total number of members.

Question 3

I hvilke to måneder var der valg til Reichtag i 1932? Og hvorfor opløste Hindenburg Reichtag de to gange?

Answer 3

Juli og november. NSDAP går frem til 37 pct. i juli, men går nogle få procent tilbage i november. Hindenburg opløste Reichtag for at få arbejdsro til at kunne regere på dekretbasis. In June he replaced Brüning as chancellor with Franz von Papen and again dissolved the Reichstag, before it could adopt a vote of no confidence. After reconvening it was again dissolved in September.

Question 4

Spillede retspositivismen en fremherskende stilling i forbindelse med rigsgrundlæggelsen i 1871?

Answer 4

Afgjort ja. Mere info: Retspositivismen kom frem ved revolutionen i 1848 og fik sit endelige gennembrud med det tyske riges grundlæggelse i 1871. “For this reason it is not deemed necessary to engage in derailed historical research before the failed revolution of 1848-the date of conception for legal positivism and the Allgemeine Staatsl.ehre. Legal positivism marked its ‘hour of birth’ with the founding of the German Empire in 1871”

Question 5

Vil en forfatning altid have samme betydning uanset hvilket politisk årti man læser den i?

Answer 5

Nej! Husk: forfatningsret er ikke noget statisk begreb. Det er også (altid) udtryk for den herskende magtpolitiske holdning.
o However, it also needs to be appreciated that constitutional law cannot fully be postulated in abstract and general terms, but is also characterized by irs close nexus to national politics: constitutional law is constitutive of, and constituted by, political power. Constitutional law does not operate with concepts that are objective, neutral, or desCflptive, and any meaningful analysis has to embrace the official legal texts (law) as well as the interpretacion of constitutional law (scholarship), which is always controversial, contested, and contingent upon meta-constitutional values

Question 6

Hvad er hovedpointen i Crosby’s: bog: “The Making of a German Constitution: A Slow Revolution”?

Answer 6

The author argues that the German idea of sovereignty grew out of a dual conception of law not only as the product of socio-political transformation, but also as a means to it.

In the short term, a modern social and political system in Germany was attained through non-violent means and the domestic authority of the Kaiser was severely limited by law. However, the exclusive bourgeois socio-political arrangements that were installed in this era led to considerable discontent in German society, particularly with regard to gender and class tensions. The “slow Bürgerliche Revolution” thus contributed to the traumatic ruptures that mark German history in the first third of the twentieth

Fra konklusion:

This book has sought to argue that the gradual consolidation of law, especially civil law, in Germany during the last quarter of the nineteenth century was the chosen means to a fundamental constitutional transformation, and that by liberal design, this process was both slow and nonviolent. The Constitution of 1871, in fact, was changeable, and it left many matters to be settled through the legislative process, a process that for a while Bismarck himself used adeptly.

Fra konklusion:

Fra review:
“Reconnecting the socio-political history of modern Germany with legal history, Crosby offers an extraordinarily perceptive and methodologically innovative analysis of the covert constitutional transformation that was tantamount to the Kaiserreich’s ‘bourgeois revolution’.” – V.R. Berghahn, Columbia University

“This book combines German constitutional and social history with legal history of the 19th century up to the German codification of civil law (1896/1900). The viewpoints are original and the book includes the socialist criticism of the codification in favour of women. A new and not yet sufficiently discussed perspective.”

Question 7

Er Kolb enig med Erdmann i at, at Weimarrepublikken ikke blev ødelagt af dets modstandere, men af sig selv?

Answer 7

Nej. Kolb uenig med Karl Dietrich Erdmann “We can hardly agree with K. Erdmann that ’the Weimar democracy was not destroyed by its adversaries, but by itself”. Det VAR modstandere, der per exallance fik republikken til at falde.

Question 8

Hvorfor har forskere kun givet en forholdsvis lille bevågenhed til forfatning?

Answer 8

Ifølge Kolb: forskere har kun givet lille bevågenhed til forfatningen. Mærkværdigt når man påtænker hvor vigtig forfatningen var for republikkens fald; men man skal bide mærke i, at for de samtidge var republikkens konstruktion ikke noget, de var kontroversielt.
o “This was because when the National Assembly convened in Feburary 1919, the pricnipal constituional decisions had already been taken: for a republic and parliamentary democracy, for a federal as against a centralized system, and for a storng persidential power as against purely parliamentary rule”

Question 9

Hvilken holdning havde de liberale og socialisterne til forfatningsudkastet (hvad angår en stærk præsidentmagt)?

Answer 9

Ifølge Kolb: det ironiske i at det især var de liberale, der var primus motor bag skabelse af en stærk folkevalgt præsident (hvilket skal ses som udtryk for et dybt mistilidsforhold til ren parlamentarisme. Nok kunne man gå med til parlamentarisme, men der skulle holdes hånd i hanke med den – så at sige.
o Om de liberale […] they were deeply mistrustful of purely parliamentary rule and desired a system based on the separation and lance of powers instead of constitutional monarchy, there was to be a “constitutional democracy.
o Og videre siger han om socialisterne: [The Majority Socialist did not take a determined stand against this fateful mixture of the presidential and the parliamentary system]

Vigtigt at have in mente, at da Nationalforsamlingen udtænkte art. 48, så var oprørsforsøgene fra kommunisterne i frisk i erindring – og derudover var der også regionale seppratistbevægelse

Question 10

Svagheder i Weimarforfatningen ifølge Kolb. Nævn to punkter?

Answer 10

1) magten havde ikke et entydigt udspring (dualistisk natur)
2) RP’s magtbeføjelser (art 48)

Når man skal diskutere svagheder i WR-forfatningen, så er der to afgørende problemstillinger; 1) den dobbelthed der ligger i demokratiets magt + 2) RP’s magtbeføjelser, og især den ildevaslende art. 48.
o Punkt 1: problematisk at der opstod to veje til magt, der begge havde indflydelse på dannelsen af regeringer – så opstod der et ansvarsløst tomrum for parlamentarikere, der ikke var tvunget til at tage ansvar. Det var muligt at at være polemisk og være ukonstruktiv, fordi man så nemt kunne smide ansvaret fra sig. Så eftersom partierne kunne smide ansvaret fra sig, så var det med til at starte en norm for præsidentielle regeringer.
o Citat af Bracher: “These possible consequences escaped the enthusiasm of the creators of the constitution. They believed they had to fuse together basic elements of several political systems (and traditions) without considering sufficiently the divergent aspect of the constitution, which could lead to weakening or én to conflict, especially between the two powers elected by the people, parliament and the president” [1977]
o Argument:
• etableringen af præsidentielle regeringer var kun mulig fordi partierne, eller deres repræsentanter, ikke længere havde even eller viljen til at danne koallitionsregeringer. Dette gav naturligvis et større manøvrerum for RP til at tage affære og udøve.
o Modargument:
• partierne var fra start svækket, fordi forfatningen placerede RP “supervisor and provider of help in an emergency”
• “When the parliamentary system failed to function, the President stepped forward. ’Thus the flight from responsibility was made easier for the parties. The weak operation of the parliamentary system was simultaneously cause and effect of the Presidents adbundace of power’” (Winkler)

Question 11

I hvilken grad gjorde rigspræsident Ebert brug af art. 48?

Answer 11

Ebert gjorde brug af art. 48

“Indeed, in the first three years of the Republic, this article was used chiefly to quell unrest and rebellion”. Men så sker der et skifte efter de første tre år, hvorefter art. 48, parafraf 2 også blev brugt til at give konstituonel grundlag for at styre Tyskland gennem den økonomiske krise. Fra 1. januar 1920 → December 1924: 400 dekreter udsendt sammenlignet med 700 formelle love af RT.
o Kolb konkluderer: “Thus, already during Ebert’s presidency, the extensive use of the presidental power to dictate reached a climax” og skønt man ikke kan sætte spørgsmålstegn ved Eberts demokratiske sindelag + hans loyalitet til forfatningen, så viser empirien at: “that some of the decrees already pushed outwars the boundaries of art. 48 and that the clear tendency to use emergency measures anticipated the later development under Brüning”[Kilde: Oberreatuer]
o Kolb sammenfatter forsvaret for Ebert:
• Eberts brug af art. 48 = i udstrakt enighed med RT. RP + RR + parlamentariske flertal
• Kolb: “Under Ebert, art. 48 was used less as a direct means of strengthenig the President’s position than for the accelerated passing of the goverment’s intended legislation[…]” + Ebert nægtede konsekvent at bruge art. 48 til at gennemtrumfe love, som var faldet i RT.
• Kolb sammenfatning qua anden forfatter (Gusy): “The use of the same instrument, which saved the Republic under Ebert, destroyed it under Hindenburg. It depended, therefore, how the emergency authority was used. Precisely because it was suppoes to be so effective and had, therefore, so few limations, it was at the same time easy to abuse. Here, strengths and moral weakness of the Republic lay side by side”

Question 12

Var der uenighed om indførsel af forholdsvalg? Og var det valgsystem medvirkende til at vælte republikken?

Answer 12

Nej og nej. Se mere info. spørgsmålet om forholdsvalg → ingen knaster
o forholdsvalg blev uden nogen større debat inkorporeret i forfatningen. “The Assembly, without any fundamental debate on electoral methods, incorporated proportional representation in the constitution. This was generally expected and was in no way considered to be ’revolutionary’.
o SPD havde kæmpet for det i årtier – men nu var borgerlige også med på vognen. Derudover: forholdsvalg blev også inkorporeret overalt i andre lande (fx Danmark 1915)
o nTs: vær OBS på den typisk angelsaksiske kritk af forholdsvalg → splinter parties.
o stærk kritik post-1945: fik skylden for Weimar-demokratiets sammenbrud
o én af de stærkeste kritikere (Hermens) skriver, at hvis flertalsvalg havde været gældende, så havde: “the NSDAP would certainly not have been a factor of national importance in 1932 and would probably have long since died of political anaemia”
o “selv” Bracher hoppede (lidt) med på den bandwagon
o Kritikken af forholdsvalg blev mere og mere fåmælt; især efterhånden som det viste sig hvor godt BRD klarede sig med det system.
- p. 165: Kolbs kritik af anti-forholdsvalg-forskerne.
o 1) At omskrive Weimars historie ud fra den forudsætning at man havde haft flertalsvalg er ren og skær fiktion
o 2) Et flertalsvalgs-system kunne ikke have reddet republikken fra de farer, der lå i den eskalerende højreradikale success på stemmefronten. Sandt nok sikrede forholdsvalg-systemet at mange radikale småpartier fik fodtræde for RT – men så havde NSDAP bare kunnet få endnu flere stemmer ved at støvsuge og vinder mandatter i valgkredsene.
• […] … with a different electoral system, the NSDAP and its potential allies would have acheived an absolute majoirty as early as 1932, in which case the death kneel of the Weimar Republic would have souned even earlier.” Kilde: Falter: Hitler’s Wähler
o 3) Overdreven fokus på småpartierne. Langt større problem at de store partier ikke formåede at kunne nå til konsensus og/eller tage de nødvendige kompromisser for at kunne danne koalliationsregeringer. Især den stigende anti-marxisistiske på højrefløjen, ikke bare hos konservative, men også hos nationalliberale og deres afstand til at indgå i samarbejde med SPD var af langt større skæbnesvrangre betydning for WR end småpartierne.

Question 13

Nævn nogle kontinuiteter fra Reichtag i kejserriget til Reichtag i republikken

Answer 13

• det tyske partisystem kunne fortsætte næsten uændret fra den gamle forfatning. Derfor når det parlamentariske system svigtede, så kunne RP træde til henover partierne. Dermed var det nemmere for partierne at flygte fra ansvaret, når det brændte på.
• Kejstertidens partisystem forblev essentielt uforandret under de revolutionære måneder i 1918 - 19; nok skiftede nogle af partierne navn og det politiske venstre blev splittet i to rivaliserende partier. Men de fire vigtigste partier, nemlig De Konservative, Zentrum, De Liberale og SPD var repræsenteret i 1919 med ca. samme styrke som i RT-valget 1912. Kontinuitet. (

Question 14

Hvad giver art. 25 rigspræsidenten mulighed for?

Answer 14

Artikel 25: RP har retten til at opløse RT, but kun én gang med samme begrundelse. Ny valg: senest 60 dage efter opløsningen.

Question 15

Hvilken potentielle magt havde Reichtag over for Reichpresident via art. 43?

Answer 15

• Artikel 43: 7 års periode. Kan genvælges. RP kan afsættes ved en folkeafstemning, som skal foreslås af RT med 2/3 flertal. Hvis det forkastes, så er RP genvalgt for en ny 7 års periode + at RT må tage konsekvensen og blive opløst.

Question 16

Hvad er den grundlæggelse pointe i Verhey’s “The Spirit of 1914”?

Answer 16

• This book, first published in 2000, is a systematic analysis of German public opinion at the outbreak of the Great War and the first treatment of the myth of the ‘spirit of 1914’, which stated that in August 1914 all Germans felt ‘war enthusiasm’ and that this enthusiasm constituted a critical moment in which German society was transformed. Jeffrey Verhey’s powerful study demonstrates that the myth was historically inaccurate. Although intellectuals and much of the upper class were enthusiastic, the emotions and opinions of most of the population were far more complex and contradictory. The book further examines the development of the myth in newspapers, politics and propaganda, and the propagation and appropriation of this myth after the war. His innovative analysis sheds light on German experience of the Great War and on the role of political myths in modern German political culture.

Question 17

Nævn den grundlæggelse pointe med The Bismarck myth:?

Answer 17

In particular, it investigates the ways in which that myth was used to undermine parliamentary democracy in Germany after the Great War, paving the way for its replacement by authoritarian rule under an allegedly ‘Bismarckian’ charismatic leader, Adolf Hitler. As one of the most powerful weapons of nationalist agitation against the Weimar Republic, the Bismarck myth was never contested. The nationalists’ ideologically charged interpretation of Bismarck as the father of the German nation-state and model for future political decision-making clashed with rivalling - and thoroughly critical - democratic and communist perceptions of the Iron Chancellor. The quarrel over Bismarck’s legacy demonstrates how the clash of ideologies, particularly between 1918 and 1933, resulted in a highly political fight for the ‘correct’ and universal interpretation of the German past. Essential reading for anyone interested in modern German history, this book sheds new light on the Weimar Republic’s struggle for survival and the reasons for its failure.

Question 18

Hvad hedder kansleren der efterfulgte Bismarck? Hvor mange år sad han? Og hvilken politik stod han for?

Answer 18

1. Leo von Caprivi. 2. 1890-94. 3. Stod for mere liberalistisk handelspolitik hvor han ville fremme eksporten af tyske industrivarer ved at sænke toldmurerne. Dette medførte stor modstand fra Junkers og tyske bønder. + Han stod for et politisk parløb med Zentrum (skræmte også mange konservative væk).

Question 19

Hvilket label kunne Bismarck bruge til at delegitimere sine politiske modstandere?

Answer 19

Reichfeindlichkeit

Question 20

Hvornår udgav Fisher “Griff nach der Weltmacht”

Answer 20

1961

Question 21

Ifølge G. Ritter, hvordan så industrialisterne så deres muligheder for at påvirke den økonomiske politik i Weimarrepublikken fra ca. 1928?

Answer 21

The industrialists now openly challenged the state authority and prepared for a frontal attack on the socio-political compromise of Weimar. ‘Important business circles, especially in heavy industry, from 1928 onwards increasingly took the view that the German economy could not be put on a sound basis unless the influence of the workers’ movement was curbed; they called for an authoritarian revision of the constitution and an acknowledgement of the primacy of economic interests’ (Gerhard A. Ritter).

Question 22

Var der ifølge G. Ritter en ren og skær kontinuitet i partisystemet fra KR til WR? Eller har han en balanced view?

Answer 22

Balanced view. It is generally accepted today that the structure of the party system hardly suffered any change in the transition from the monarchy to the Republic, so that we can speak of a continuity of the party system. G. A. Ritter, differentiating somewhat, refers to the ‘continuity and re-forming of the German party system in 1918–20’ [549].

Question 23

Hvor mange NSDAP medlemmer kom der ind i regeringen i januar 1933?

Answer 23

januar 1933: kun to var NSDP-medlemmer. At resten skulle være konservative var garanten for, at det ikke skulle løbe løbsk

Question 24

Hvad hed Weimar-kol. “para-militære” styrke?

Answer 24

The Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold (English: “Black, Red, Gold Banner of the Reich”) was an organization in Germany during the Weimar Republic, formed by members of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the German Centre Party, and the (liberal) German Democratic Party in 1924. Its goal was to defend parliamentary democracy against internal subversion and extremism from the left and right, to teach the population to respect the new Republic, to honor its flag and the constitution. Its name is derived from the Flag of Germany adopted in 1919, the colors of which were associated with liberal parliamentary democracy and the republic.

While the Reichsbanner was set up as a multiparty organization, it came to be strongly associated with the Social Democratic Party and viewed as their paramilitary force.

Question 25

Nævn nogle karakteristikker ved “völkish” som begreb?

Answer 25

The völkisch “movement” was not a unified movement but “a cauldron of beliefs, fears and hopes that found expression in various movements and were often articulated in an emotional tone,” Petteri Pietikäinen observed in tracing völkisch influences on Carl Gustav Jung.[2] The völkisch movement was “arguably the largest group” in the Conservative Revolutionary movement in Germany.[3] However, like “conservative-revolutionary” or “fascist”, völkisch is a complex term (“schillernder Begriff”).[3] In a narrow definition it can be used to designate only groups that consider human beings essentially preformed by blood,[3] i.e. by inherited characteristics.

[…] The völkisch movement had its origins in Romantic nationalism,

[…] The movement combined sentimental patriotic interest in German folklore, local history and a “back-to-the-land” anti-urban populism with many parallels in the writings of William Morris. “In part this ideology was a revolt against modernity,”

[…] Facisme >< NS
Vigtig iøjnefaldende forskel: på det ideologiske område; NS var völkish dvs. radikalt nationalistisk, racistisk og antisemitisk, hvilket ikke var tilfældet med den italienske fascisme, der var mere nationalimperialistisk.

Question 26

Hvad siger Kershaw om 1. verdenskrig indvirkning på Hitlers karriere?

Answer 26

Ian Kershaw: 1. Verdenskrig der gjorde Hitler muligt. Den skabte ham og forudsætninger for, at han kunne lykkes, p. 39

Question 27

I hvilket år var der folkeafstemning om fyrsternes ejendomsbesiddelser?

Answer 27

1926. A referendum to expropriate the property of the former ruling houses was held in Germany on 20 June 1926.[1] Although a majority of those who voted voted in favour, the voter turnout of 39% was too low for the proposal to pass into law.[2]

Question 28

Hvad siger AB, der opstår i de agrar-konservative miljøer, som man ikke tidligere har set?

Answer 28

AB: Hvad er det, som opstår i det agrar-konservative miljø, som man ikke har set tidligere ?
- Udpræget politisk aktivisme; kommer til udtryk i massemobilisering. (inspiration fra socialistiske miljøer)

Question 29

Hvor søgte især de arbejdsløse hen rent politisk?

Answer 29

• Arbejdsløse: udgjorde op til 80 % af KPD’s medlemmer. Forsimplet sagt: SPD tog sig af dem, der var i arbejde - KPD opsamlede de arbejdsløse, der ikke havde nogen andre steder at gå hen.

Question 30

Hvad var Deutsche Flottenverein - og hvornår blev det stiftet?

Answer 30

The Navy League or Fleet Association (German: Deutscher Flottenverein) in Imperial Germany was an interest group formed on April 30, 1898 on initiative of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz through the German Imperial Naval Office (Reichsmarineamt) which he headed (1897–1916) to support the expansion of the Imperial German Navy (Kaiserliche Marine). Specifically it was intended to develop popular pressure on the German parliament (Reichstag) to approve the Fleet Acts of 1898 and 1900, and the attendant expenses.

(…)

Influential circles in the German government, headed by state secretary for foreign affairs Bernhard von Bülow supported the foundation of the league. It aimed to mobilize popular sentiment in favor of a more powerful German navy and to work on behalf of its expansion. The early propaganda of the Navy League contained an array of economic slogans which were aimed at gaining the support of industry and commerce. Soon, the threat of the working class movement was added to the arguments.

(…)

Beside the influence on political decisions, the league’s aim was to strengthen the understanding and interest of the German people for the importance and duties of the fleet. It was also to be pursued by the dissemination of the information through the written and spoken word.[3] These efforts aroused a widespread enthusiasm for the navy, reflected by several magazines and adventure books right up to collectible cards and sailor suits for children. In 1898, the Navy League had over 300,000 fee paying members and 770,000 affiliated through other organizations. This became the largest organization of its kind in Germany and incomparably one of the largest of all naval organizations elsewhere. At the eve of World War I it had attracted more than one million members, including individuals as well as numerous corporations and companies like Krupp.

The Navy League was influential in other causes....
By 1912, the Social Democrats had managed to win a third of all votes cast. As in the rest of Europe, Germany's rising working class became more militant, with union-led strike movements and class tension arising. The rise of the Social Democrats led to fears in middle class circles of a breakdown in society, a weakening of government and general anarchy. As a reaction, groups like the Pan-German League and the German Navy League tried to curb the influence of the Social Democrats.

Question 31

Hvad var Bund der Landwirte? Og hvornår blev den stiftet? Og fik BdL indflydelse på det etablerede konservative parti?

Answer 31

Ja til det sidste spørgsmål.

The Bund der Landwirte (Agarian League) (BDL) was a German advocacy group founded 18 February 1893 by farmers and agricultural interests in response to the farm crisis of the 1890s, and more specifically the result of the protests against the agrarian policies of Chancellor Leo von Caprivi, including his free trade policies.

1913: over 330k medlemmer

Baggrund:
The Reichstag was dissolved in June 1878 because it refused Bismarck’s Anti-Socialist Law. Chancellor Bismarck in the newly elected parliament relied on a broad agro-conservative majority with the slogan: Agriculture is owed by the state the same attention as industry; if both do not go hand in hand, the strength of one will not suffice for a lack in the other. Bismarck helped foster support from these conservatives by enacting several tariffs protecting German agriculture, and incidentally industry, from foreign competition. Men fra 1894: Caparri: frihandelstraktateter - søgte at sikre eksportrammerne for Tysklands boomende industri

(…)

The inaugural meeting of the Bund der Landirte was held in the Berlin Tivoli Brewery and was attended by some ten thousand people.[6] It drew its support from the most Protestant areas of the empire, northern and central Germany, and particularly from Prussia. In May 1893, just three months after its establishment, it campaigned for farmers’ rights and managed to win over 140 of the deputies who were elected in July, or about one-third of the members of the Reichstag

Politisk set: As a result they worked closely with the political parties most aligned with that interest, but most especially with the Conservative Party (DKP).

The goal of the BDL was to preserve the leading position of agriculture in the economy and politics of Germany. In one of the founding documents it says: “German agriculture is the primary and most important industry, the strongest support of the empire and of the several states. To protect and strengthen agriculture is our first and most serious task because by the blossoming and flourishing of agriculture, the welfare of all professions is secured

The most major demand of the BDL was the restoration of protective tariffs on food stuffs.[13] Other major demands were:

the introduction of a state monopoly on foreign grain cereal with guaranteed minimum prices for domestically produced cereals.
the introduction of a dual currency. In addition to the gold and silver, bank notes should be reinstated. It was hoped that the associated inflationary effects would help relieve the burden on rural borrowers.
stock market reform - specifically to abolish grain futures trading and the Commodity Exchange.

…

BDL members, rural, conservative and generally Protestant, in general despised the immorality of city life, and often associated it with Jews

As the BDL grew in strength, the Conservative Party depended upon them more and more for the defense of conservative positions in the Reichstag and in regional assemblies. However, this dependence ultimately changed the character of the party. The goals of the old-time conservatives, empire and enforced morality, defense of “throne and altar”, became less important, while higher income for agroproducers gained in importance. Sometimes conflicts arose between the BDL and the party, and the BDL would withdraw its support from a troublesome conservative candidate, or throw its weight on a parliamentary vote over to the minority parties. However, the BDL’s attempt to act independently of the Conservative Party did not always work. Thus in the Reichstag elections of 1903 the BDL attempted to run their own candidates, however only four were elected to the Reichstag. After this failure, Conservatives and the BDL recognized their need for each other, and there was greater unanimity

…

The BDL met with some successes and some failures. After several years they brought down the Caprivi government over the question of tariffs. But they never got the strict import restrictions on grain that they desired.

….

During World War I, the BDL, consistent with its conservative position, had expansive war aims. At the beginning of the Weimar Republic, it merged with the Deutschen Landbund (German Agricultural League) and others to form the Reichslandbund (RLB) (German Empire Agricultural League) in 1921

Question 32

Nævn de … politiske partier under kejserriget:

Answer 32

• SPD (–> SPD)
• Zentrum (–> Zentrum)
• Deutschkonservative Partei (–> DNVP)
• Freikonservative Partei (–> DNVP)
• Nationalliberale Partei (–> DVP - men også nogle til DDP og DNVP)
• Fortschrittliche Volkspartei (–> DDP)

Question 33

Hvornår fandt Tivoli-Kongressen sted? Og hvad er det væsentlige?

Answer 33

The Tivoli Congress took place in 1892 and was named after the Tivoli Brewery on the Kreuzberg in Berlin in whose festival venue the German Conservative Party first adopted anti-semitism as part of its political programme

At the Tivoli Congress only Werner von Blumenthal opposed the adoption of anti-semitism. From the congress the Tivoli Programme was developed. This was a party manifesto whose first clause included the words “We fight against the often obtrusive and corrosive Jewish influence on our national life. We demand Christian authorities for the Christian people and Christian teachers for Christian students.”

Question 34

Hvad lavede Hugenberg før han blev leder af DNVP? Og hvornår tog han over (i DNVP)?

Answer 34

In 1891, Hugenberg co-founded the ultra-nationalist General German League and in 1894 its successor movement the Pan-German League (Alldeutscher Verband)
…
He remained at Krupp until 1918 when he set out to build his own business and during the Great Depression he was able to buy up dozens of local newspapers. These became the basis of his publishing firm Scherl House and, after he added controlling interests in Universum Film AG, Ala-Anzeiger AG, Vera Verlag and the Telegraphen Union, he had a near monopoly on the media which he used to agitate against the Weimar Republic amongst Germany’s middle classes.
…
He was elected to the Reichstag in the 1920 elections to the new body.[10] The DNVP suffered heavy losses in the 1928 election, leading to the appointment of Hugenberg as sole chairman on 21 October that same year.[10]
…
Hugenberg moved the party in a far more radical direction than it had taken under its previous leader, Kuno Graf von Westarp. He hoped to use radical nationalism to restore the party’s fortunes, and eventually, to overthrow the Weimar constitution and install an authoritarian form of government.[2] Up to this point right-wing politics outside of the far right was going through a process of reconciliation to the Weimar Republic but this ended under Hugenberg, who renewed earlier DNVP calls for its immediate destruction.[11] Under his direction a new DNVP manifesto appeared in 1931, demonstrating the shift to the right. Amongst its demands were immediate restoration of the Hohenzollern monarchy, a reversal of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, compulsory military conscription, repossession of the German colonial empire, a concerted effort to build up closer links with German people outside Germany (especially in Austria), a dilution of the role of the Reichstag to that of supervisory body to a newly established professional house of appointees reminiscent of Benito Mussolini’s corporative state and reduction in the perceived over-representation of Jews in German public life

Question 35

Hvad var Hugenbergs forhold til Hitler og NSDAP?

Answer 35

Hugenberg was vehemently opposed to the Young Plan ….However he recognised that the DNVP and their elite band of allies did not have enough popular support to carry any rejection of the scheme through. As such Hugenberg felt that he needed a nationalist with support amongst the working classes whom he could use to whip up popular sentiment against the Plan. Adolf Hitler was the only realistic candidate and Hugenberg decided that he would use the Nazi Party leader to get his way. As a result the Nazi Party soon became the recipients of Hugenberg’s largesse, both in terms of monetary donations and of favourable coverage from the Hugenberg-owned press, which had previously largely ignored Hitler or denounced him as a socialist … Hitler was able to use Hugenberg to push himself into the political mainstream and once the Young Plan was passed by referendum Hitler promptly ended his links with Hugenberg. Hitler publicly blamed Hugenberg for the failure of the campaign but he retained the links with big business that the Committee had allowed him to cultivate and this began a process of the magnates deserting the DNVP for the Nazis. Hitler’s handling of the affair was marred only by one thing and that was premature announcement in the Nazi press of his repudiation of the alliance by the Strasser brothers, whose left-wing economics were incompatible with Hugenberg’s arch-capitalism.

Question 36

Hvad var Hugenbergs indflydelse på NSDAP’s vej til magten?

Answer 36

In early January 1933 Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher had developed plans for an expanded coalition government to include not only Hugenberg but also dissident Nazi Gregor Strasser and Centre Party politician Adam Stegerwald. Although Hugenberg had designs on a return to government his hatred of trade union activity meant that he had no intention of working with Stegerwald, the head of the Catholic Trade Union movement. When von Schleicher refused to exclude Stegerwald from his plans, Hugenberg broke off negotiations.

Hugenberg’s main confidante Reinhold Quaatz had, despite being half-Jewish, pushed for Hugenberg to follow a more völkisch path and work with the Nazi Party and after the collapse of the von Schleicher talks this was the path he followed. Hugenberg and Hitler met on 17 January 1933 and Hugenberg suggested that they both enter the cabinet of Kurt von Schleicher, a proposal rejected by Hitler who would not move from his demands for the Chancellorship. Hitler did agree in principle to allow von Schleicher to serve under him as Defence Minister, although Hugenberg warned the Nazi leader that as long as Paul von Hindenburg was president Hitler would never be Chancellor. A further meeting between the two threatened to derail any alliance after Hugenberg rejected Hitler’s demands for Nazi control over the interior ministries of Germany and Prussia but by this time Franz von Papen had come round to the idea of Hitler as Chancellor and he worked hard to persuade the two leaders to come together.

During the negotiations between Franz von Papen and president Paul von Hindenburg, Hindenburg had insisted that Hugenberg be given the ministries of Economics and Agriculture both at national level and in Prussia as a condition of Hitler becoming Chancellor, something of a surprise given the President’s well publicised dislike of Hugenberg.[28] Hugenberg, eager for a share of power, agreed to the plan and continued to believe that he could use Hitler for his own ends, telling the Stahlhelm leader Theodor Duesterberg that “we’ll box Hitler in”. He initially rejected HItler’s plans to immediately call a fresh election, fearing that damage such a vote might inflict on his own party but, after being informed by Otto Meißner that the plan had Hindenburg’s endorsement and by von Papen that von Schleicher was preparing to launch a military coup, he conceded to Hitler’s wishes. Hugenberg vigorously campaigned for the NSDAP–DNVP alliance, although other leading members within his party expressed fears over socialist elements to Nazi rhetoric and instead appealed for a nonparty dictatorship, pleas ignored by Hitler.

Hugenberg made no effort to stop Hitler’s ambition of becoming a dictator; as previously mentioned he himself was authoritarian by inclination. For instance, he and the other DNVP members of the cabinet voted for the Reichstag Fire Decree, which effectively wiped out civil liberties.

Question 37

Hvad var Harzburg-fronten? Og hvornår blev den dannet?

Answer 37

The Harzburg Front (German: Harzburger Front) was a short-lived right-wing political alliance in Weimar Germany, formed in 1931 as an attempt to present a unified opposition to the government of Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. It was a coalition of the national conservative German National People’s Party (DNVP) under millionaire press-baron Alfred Hugenberg with Adolf Hitler’s NSDAP Nazi Party, the leadership of the Stahlhelm paramilitary veterans’ association, the Agricultural League and the Pan-German League organizations.

The Harzburg Front was an attempt by wealthy right wing nationalists in Weimar Germany to join together to use their influence and power persuade the President, Paul von Hindenburg, to remove Chancellor Heinrich Brűning from office.

Question 38

Hvornår og hvorfor faldt Brüning?

Answer 38

I 1932. Faldt i unåde hos Hindenburg

Hindenburg’s re-election and Brüning’s fall[edit]
Hindenburg was not willing at first to stand for re-election as president but subsequently changed his mind. In 1932, Brüning vigorously campaigned for Hindenburg along with virtually the entire German left and centre, calling him a “venerated historical personality” and “the keeper of the constitution”. After two rounds of voting Hindenburg was re-elected with a substantial majority over his main opponent Adolf Hitler. However, Hindenburg considered it shameful to have been elected with the votes of “Reds” and “Catholes”, as he called Social Democrats and the mostly Catholic Centre Party, and compensated for this “shame” by moving further to the right. His failing health increased the camarilla’s influence.

At the same time Brüning was viciously attacked by the Prussian Junkers, led by Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau, who opposed his policies of distributing land to unemployed workers and denounced him as an “Agro-bolshevik” to Hindenburg.

The president, having a personal conflict as owner of a Junker estate, refused to sign any further emergency decrees. As a consequence Brüning announced his cabinet’s resignation on 30 May 1932, “hundred metres before the finish”,[citation needed] and was relieved of his office in an undignifiedly brief ceremony by Hindenburg. He firmly rejected all suggestions making the president’s disloyal behaviour public because he considered such a move indecent, and still considered Hindenburg the “last bulwark” of the German people

Question 39

Ifølge AB: Var de konservative grupper “taberne” ved overgangen til demokratiet?

Answer 39

JA! * “Taberne” ved udvikling og overgangen til demokratiet (eller de hidtidigt privilegerede).

  * AB: interessant at se på “taberne”; nemlig de aktører (konservative grupper), der havde svært at begribe en mere kompliceret og moderne verden, hvor flere aktører skulle deltage (egalitarisme).

Question 40

Ifølge AB: Hvad var nogle af konservatismens dilemmaer?

Answer 40

• Konservatismens dilemmaer:

  * Forsvare det bestående i en verden i forandring. 
  * “Folkets” rolle som magtfaktor og ifølge ideologien. 
  
     * Meget væsentligt; nemlig hvordan man forholder sig til folket som en magtfaktor. 
        * Hvad gør man, hvis man gerne vil have magt? Og magten skal komme fra den brede befolkning, som man ikke mener har den legitime ret.
  * Øvrigstænkning? Undersåtsmentalitet? Konservativ politiker sagde i RT i 1910: den tyske konge/kejser må til enhver tid være villig til at sige til en løjtnant: “Ta’ 10 mand og luk RT”.

Question 41

Hvordan stemte kvinderne til Nationalforsamlingen?

Answer 41

Lille flertal der stemte borgerligt. The elections to the National Assembly appeared to reward the DNVP
women’s efforts. Particularly encouraging were the estimates on women’s voting
behavior, generalized from a number of districts with separate voting. They indicated
that the DNVP had received a majority of its votes from female voters,
whereas the socialist parties had fared poorly among women.14 To the relief of
all bourgeois parties, the SPD and Independent Socialists together received only
45.5 percent of the vote

Question 42

Hvordan opfatter Allan Sonderweg?

Answer 42

• AB: I vores nødvendige opgør med SOnderweg-tesen har vi nok brudt lidt for meget med nogle af de kontinuitetstræk, der er i den tyske “særvej”.
  * Ang. determinisme: vi vil gerne kunne forklare, hvad der havde foregået - men også have øjne for, at der også var andre muligheder.

Question 43

Hvordan forholdt Erdmann sig til det forhold at beskæftige sig med WR?

Answer 43

Erdmann: Alt beskæftigelse med BRD må nødvendigvis beskæftige sig med spørgsmålet om WR undergang.

Question 44

Ifølge Wehler og hans Sonderweg-tese: hvornår begyndte Tyskland at “afvige”?

Answer 44

Ca. 1860’s/1870’s

Volumes 1-2 cover the period from feudalism through the Revolution of 1848. Volume 3 Von der “Deutschen Doppelrevolution” bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges 1849-1914 (1995) employs Wehler’s longtime emphasis on a German Sonderweg or “special path” as the root of Nazism and the German catastrophe in the 20th century. Wehler places the origins of Germany’s path to disaster in the 1860s-1870s, when economic modernization took place, but political modernization failed to take place and the old Prussian rural elite remained in firm control of the army, diplomacy and the civil service. Traditional, aristocratic, premodern society battled an emerging capitalist, bourgeois, modernizing society. Recognizing the importance of modernizing forces in industry and the economy and in the cultural realm, Wehler argues that reactionary traditionalism dominated the political hierarchy of power in Germany, as well as social mentalities and in class relations (Klassenhabitus). Wehler’s Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges bis zur Gründung der Beiden Deutschen Staaten 1914-1949 (2003) is the fourth volume of his monumental history of German society. Germany’s catastrophic politics between 1914 and 1945 are interpreted in terms of a delayed modernization of its political structures. At the core of Wehler’s fourth volume is his treatment of “the middle class” and “revolution,” each of which was instrumental in shaping the 20th century. Wehler’s examination of Nazi rule is shaped by his concept of “charismatic domination,” which focuses heavily on Adolf Hitler. The fifth volume will extend to 1990; none of the series has yet been translated into English.[8]

From the 1980s, however, the Bielefeld school was increasingly challenged by proponents of the “cultural turn” for not incorporating culture in the history of society, for reducing politics to society, and for reducing individuals to structures. Historians of society inverted the traditional positions they criticized (on the model of Marx’s inversion of Hegel). As a result, the problems pertaining to the positions criticized were not resolved but only turned on their heads. The traditional focus on individuals was inverted into a modern focus on structures, and traditional emphatic understanding was inverted into modern causal explanation.

Question 45

Hvad var navnet på den pan-tyske liga? Grundlagt hvornår? Og hvilken politik stod den for?

Answer 45

The Pan-German League (German: Alldeutscher Verband) was an extremist, ultra-nationalist[1] political interest organization which was officially founded in 1891, a year after the Zanzibar Treaty was signed. It was concerned with a host of issues, concentrating on imperialism, anti-semitism, the Polish Question, and support for German minorities in other countries.[2] The purpose of the league was to nurture and protect the ideology of German nationality as a unifying force.

Vigtigt: –> The organization was created in 1891 as a response to the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty. Ernst Hasse was its first president, and was succeeded by Heinrich Class in 1908. The industrialist Emil Kirdorf was also a founding member.

The position of Pan-German league gradually evolved into biological racism, with belief that Germans are “superior race”, and Germans need protection from mixing with other races, particularly Jews.[2] By 1912 in the publication “If I were the Kaiser”, a leading member of the Pan-German league, Heinrich Class called on Germans to conquer Eastern territories inhabited by “inferior” Slavs, depopulate their territories and settle German colonists there.[2] There were also calls for expulsion of Polish population living in Prussian territories.[7]

The Alldeutscher Verband had an enormous influence on the German government during World War I, when they opposed democratization and were in favour of unlimited submarine war. Opponents of the Verband were called cowards. Influential figures in the Alldeutscher Verband founded the Vaterlandspartei in 1917 following the request of the majority of the German parliament to begin peace negotiations with the allies.

After World War I, the Alldeutscher Verband supported general Erich Ludendorff in his accusation against democrats and socialists that they had betrayed Germany and made the Germans lose the war. According to Ludendorff and the Verband, the army should not have been held responsible for the German defeat. Ludendorff, however, had declared that the war was lost in October 1918, before the German November Revolution. That accusation is called the Dolchstoßlegende (“stab in the back legend”).

Membership in the league was overwhelmingly middle and upper class males. Most members’ occupations reflected the League’s emphasis on education, property ownership, and service to the state. They were, in this sense, solid representatives of the German classifications of Bildung and Besitz (education and position in life).

Question 46

Hvornår trådte den første anti-socialistlov i kraft? Og forbød den SPD direkte?

Answer 46

1878. Og nej.

Mere info:

The Anti-Socialist Laws or Socialist Laws (German: Sozialistengesetze; officially Gesetz gegen die gemeingefährlichen Bestrebungen der Sozialdemokratie, approximately “Law against the public danger of Social Democratic endeavours”) were a series of acts, the first of which was passed on October 19, 1878 by the German Reichstag lasting till March 31, 1881, and extended 4 times (May 1880, May 1884, April 1886 and February 1888).[1] The legislation was passed after two failed attempts to assassinate Kaiser Wilhelm I by the radicals Max Hödel and Dr. Karl Nobiling; it was meant to curb the growing strength of the Social Democratic Party (SPD, named SAP at the time), which was blamed for influencing the assassins.

Although the law did not ban the SPD directly, it aimed to cripple the organization through various means. The banning of any group or meeting of whose aims were to spread social democratic principles, the outlawing of trade unions and the closing of 45 newspapers are examples of suppression. The party circumvented these measures by having its candidates run as ostensible independents, by relocating publications outside of Germany and by spreading Social Democratic views as verbatim publications of Reichstag speeches, which were privileged speech with regard to censorship.

The laws’ main proponent was Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who feared the outbreak of a socialist revolution similar to the one that created the Paris Commune in 1871. Despite the government’s attempts to weaken the SPD, the party continued to grow in popularity. A bill introduced by Bismarck in 1888 which would have allowed for the denaturalization of Social Democrats was rejected. After Bismarck’s resignation in 1890, the Reichstag did not renew the legislation, allowing it to lapse.

Question 47

Fra hvornår løb Kulturkampf? Og var det primært kun i Preussen?

Answer 47

1871 - 1880. Ja.

The German term About this sound Kulturkampf (help·info) (pronounced [kʊlˈtuːɐ̯kampf], literally “culture struggle”) refers to German policies in relation to secularity and reducing the role and power of the Roman Catholic Church in Prussia, enacted from 1871 to 1878 by the Prime Minister of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck.

Bismarck accelerated the Kulturkampf, which did not extend to the other German states such as Bavaria. As one scholar put it, “the attack on the church included a series of Prussian, discriminatory laws that made Catholics feel understandably persecuted within a predominantly Protestant nation.” Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans and other orders were expelled in the culmination of twenty years of anti-Jesuit and antimonastic hysteria.[1]

In 1871, the Catholic Church comprised 36.5% of the population of the German Empire, including millions of Poles, who were subject to official discrimination. In this newly founded Empire, Bismarck sought to appeal to liberals and Protestants (62% of the population) by reducing the political and social influence of the Catholic Church and attempting to eradicate the Polish nationality.

Priests and bishops who resisted the Kulturkampf were arrested or removed from their positions. By the height of anti-Catholic legislation, half of the Prussian bishops were in prison or in exile, a quarter of the parishes had no priest, half the monks and nuns had left Prussia, a third of the monasteries and convents were closed, 1800 parish priests were imprisoned or exiled, and thousands of laypeople were imprisoned for helping the priests.[2]

Bismarck’s program backfired, as it energized the Catholics to become a political force in the Centre party and revitalized Polish resistance. The Kulturkampf ended about 1880 with a new pope willing to negotiate with Bismarck, and with the departure of the anti-Catholic Liberals from his coalition. By retreating, Bismarck won over the Centre party support on most of his conservative policy positions, especially his attacks against Socialism.

Question 48

Hvad er Dick Gearys pointe i “The Industiral Bourgeoisie and Labour Relatins in Germany 1871 - 1933”?

Answer 48

• Hvad er tekstens formål?
o At diskutere, som påstået både i samtiden og senere, at de tyske industiralister (også) havde taget en Sonderweg og derfor – modsat fx britiske og franske industrialister – fremstod langt mere “feudale” i både tanke og handling.
• Hvad er den overordnede påstand?
o 1: Var arbejdsgiverne i det kejserlige Tyskland så patriarkalske, at man kan tale om “feudale” arbejdsgivere, som havde en pre-industriel opfattelse af arbejdsmarkedets indretning. Umidelbart: NEJ!
o 2: Vise at modstanden i WR ikke skyldes forstokkede konservative værdier, men derimod mere at man var fjendtlig stillet over for en socialstat, der forsøgte at omfordele samfundets goder og var en hæmsko for virksomhederne.
• Hvilke belæg føres der for den påstand? Og hvilket fokus?
o De tyske arbejdsgivere handlede ud fra simpel markedsrationalitet; f.eks. var 90 pct. af alle typogrofer organiseret, fordi de var en efterspurgt og specialiseret arbejdskraft (lille udbud, højt efterspørgsel). Derfor måtte arbejdsgiverne være imødekommende. Modsat så kunne store kartel-mastodonter som fx Krupp fortsat køre den såkaldte “feudale og patriarkalske” stil med at være “herre i eget hus” og fyre og intimidere de arbejdere, der forsøgte at organisere sig.
o Når de tyske arbejdsgivere ofte var mere uforsonlige, så det også ses i lyset af SPD’s stormende fremmarch (1912-valget især); og SPD var langt mere dogmatisk marxistisk end i andre lande.

FP: gennem en blandning af velfærdsgoder og aurotiær undertrykkelse søgte industiralisterne at holde hånd i hanke med arbejderne. MEN! Hvad har det at gøre med “pre-industirel” kontinuitet eller tysk exceptionelisme? Ingenting. Der var snarere tale om en moderne respons til moderne problemer (som et industrisamfund nu engang medførte).
o >market rationality< → det forhold at arbejdsgiver patriarkalisme afvigede totalt fra sektor til sektor er også en understregning af, at det var markedsrationalitet – og faktorer, der afgjorde, om virksomheden ville tegne overenskomst eller køre sine egne patriarkalske programmer.
o De store mastodonter som AEG og Siemens tegnede ikke overenskomst; hvorimod små og mellemstore virksomehder ofte gjorde. Især inden for typograf-branchen. Udbudet efter de faglærte typografer var stort – og virksomhederne var derfor villig til at indgå overenskomst.
- p. 146: ingen organisering i kul-industrien
o Konklusion: paratheden til at indgå overenskomst afhang af udbud og efterspørgslen inden for pågældende sektor.

Question 49

Hvorfor var det ifølge Wildt just NSDAP der havde den største succes med at definere “Volksgemeinschaft?”

Answer 49

“While the social and moral mileues of ealirer political currents (liberal, conservative, Cathlolic, socialist) began to crumble, the NSDAP could exploit its intial marginal situation, for it was not bound to any clientdele and presented itself rather as a young and class-trancendent “Volkspartei”, one that did not seek to represent any particular interest but rather the Volksgemeinschaft as a whole. Yet in contrast to the Social Ddemocrats, for exemple, who advocated an inclusionary understanding of the Volksgemeinschaft that was supposed to unify all producers in opposition to a few monoploly capatalist, the Volksgemeinschaft on the political right - especially NSDAP - was determined by bounderies: by exclusion. The right was not so much conerned with those who belonged to the Volksgemeinschaft, but rather with those who were not suppoed to belong - above all: the jews.

….

The exclusion of the German Jews from the VOlksgemeinschaft, not merely rhetorically, but through ats of violence, formed the consitutive element in the National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft.

Question 50

Hvad er pointen i P. Fritzches Stahlhelm-artikel?

Answer 50

hvor det at mobilisere masser normalt var noget man eksklusivt forbandt med SPD’s stormende fremmarch og store tag i arbejderklassen, så er Stahlhelm et bevis på hvordan man fra konservativ side også formåede at mobilisere masser. Bl.a. til valget af Hindenburg i 1925

• p. 166: Hindenburgs 1925 valg havde vist, at Stahlhelm var en vigtig aktør i at mobilisere vælgertilslutning.
• p. 166: Stahlhelm som katalysator for at mobilisere og opnå ”borgerlig enighed”
• p. 166: SH opgav dets – i starten – apolitiske karakter og gik sidenhen i kødet på republikken. Ville støtte op om at ”erobre den fra højre”
  o Derefter: opgiver dets tilknytning og tro på traditionel partipolitik. Omfavner i stedet idealer et nationalt quasi-socialisitsk samfund (eg. Frontgemeinschaft).
  o Alligevel blev SH fedtet ind i DNVP og Hindenburgs lejr; hvilket gav det et antisocialt billede. Bl.a. derfor nåede SH aldrig at opbygge en stort og populær bevægelse (som der ellers var målsætningen). → NSDAP
• p. 167: forsøgte før NSDAP at omfavne nationalistiske bevægelser der båede omfattede de gamle højrefløjspartier og nedbryde specielle interesser.
• p. 167: før 1914: der var nationalisme tæt knyttet til konservative partier. Dog uden mobilisering af masserne.
• p. 167: Stahlhelm var klart den største af alle de nationalistiske bevægelser. Peakede i slut 1920’erne med 500-600 k medlemmer.
• p. 168: skønt stadig en primær Mittelstand-bevægelse, som ikke havde den store appel til industriarbejderne, så skal man ikke forklejne, at SH opnåede og rummede social og politisk diversitet som var utænkeligt før 1914.
• p. 169: paradoksalt nok en modvilje mod militær hierarki qua ”egalitets-princippet”
• p. 169: Kommunikationsteoretisk: “Allthough the Stahlhelm espoused the Führeridee (authoritarian idea) and frequently parroted the elist vocabulary of National Socialists (SH leaders began in 1927 to publish front-page ’orders’ in Der Stahlhelm as Nazis did in the Völkischer Beobachter”
• p. 169: Kap. “The Stahlhelm and Bourgeouis Socialbillity”
• p. 170: brugte mange penge på at købe de originale kejserlige faner (Sort-hvid-rød)
• p. 170: Weimar og kampene om fanerne (
• p. 171: Tæt tilknytning til riffelforeninger
• p. 176: koordinering så tusinder af SH-medlemmer steg af toget på samme tid og marcherede videre.
  o En af de største tilløb (ralleys) var ”Tag der Frontsoldaten” i 1927 i Berlin. SH med over 130k uniformerde medlemmer. Gjorde stort indtryk i arbejderbyen.
• p. 177: politisk vold: sjældent mere end en flækket læbe eller plakater, der bliver revet ned.
• p. 178: kap. The Stahlhelm’s Bid for Political Leadership

Question 51

Hvad er en overordnet pointe i P. Fritsches “Rehearsals for Fascism?”

Answer 51

Politisk mobiliering FØR krisen.

In this compelling and ambitious study, Peter Fritzsche analyzes the dramatic transformation of bourgeois politics before the Nazi breakthrough in 1930. Examining the local texture of civic life–market square protests, small town patriotism, and social clubs–as well as political parties and interest groups, Fritzsche provides a crucial perspective for understanding the fate of the Weimar republic, one which has been largely neglected by German historians. Even before the Great Depression the traditional bourgeois parties were eclipsed by a new breed of populist politicians who not only resisted the left but also embraced public activism and attacked big business, German conservatism, and the Weimar state itself. It was this populist sentiment to which the Nazis appealed with such consummate skill, not so much seizing power as assuming the ambitions and prejudices of middle class voters while transcending the limitations of the political organizations.

Question 52

Hvad er Volkovs hovedpåstand?

Answer 52

Volkov argues that a new look at both the nature of antisemitism and at the complexity of modern Jewish life in Germany is required in order to provide an explanation. While antisemitism had a number of functions in pre-Nazi German society, it most particularly served as a cultural code, a sign of belonging to a particular political and cultural milieu. Surprisingly, it only had a limited effect on the lives of the Jews themselves. By the end of the nineteenth century, their integration was well advanced. Many of them enjoyed prosperity, prestige, and the pleasures of metropolitan life

til volkov -teksten

• AB: hvorfor har de AS-erklærede politiske partier så stor fiasko i perioden? (1890’erne) - hvad kan vi slutte af med, når de store AS-partier lider skibsbrud?
• AS forbundet med andre forestillinger
• AS bliver en kulturel kode, når man bekender sig til, at det er denne her gruppe jeg befinder mig i - og denne her gruppe (jøderne) kan jeg ikke li’.
• NS-tiden: kommulatiativ radikaliseringsproces

Question 53

Hvordan ser Anna von der Goltz myter?

Answer 53

Forfatter def. af myte: The term ‘myth’ is defined as an ‘order of images with a metaphysical claim’.Myths are symbolically charged narratives that purport to give a true account of a set of past, present, or predicted political events and are accepted by a social group
- p. 6: om myters normative funktion: myten fungerer som en rollemodel for hvordan samfundet bør være; og hvilke værdier, det bør bygge på.
o Myter kan både stabilisere og destabilisere et samfund – alt efter om “myten” er pro-statslig eller anti-statslig
o Weimar-perioden var som skabt til mytedannelser; fordi: The period under investigation, which was defined by the experience of the First World War, Germany’s military collapse and revolution in 1918/19, and the politically, economically, and socially unstable years of the Weimar Republic was the perfect ‘incubator for political myths’, the ‘natural soil’ in which they ‘found ample nourishment’

Question 54

Fulda. Hvis mediestøtter er så vigtig, hvorfor forklarer det så ikke…?

Answer 54

o Det er ikke nyt i forsknignen at linke NSDAP gennembrud med presseklimaet; bl.a. er det en gammel historie, at Hugenberg hjalp Hitler med at opnå gennembrud på den nationale scene qua deres front sammen mod Young-planen i 1929. Mange tillægger især den støtte Hitler og NSDAP fik qua mediestøtte fra Hugenbergs store medieimperium. MEEN! Hvis mediestøtten kan lægges til grund for NSDAP’s gennembrud, hvad så med det faktum, at NDVP og Hugenberg ikke formåede at høstestemmer – trods det forhold at det blev massivt understøttet af hans eget medieimperium.

• • Endvidere: 50 pct. af alle aviser i Berlin i start 1930’ere kom fra det jødiske pressehus Mosse und Ullstein; som om nogen bakkede om den politiske liberalisme – men netop den liberale midte forsvandt på det her tidspunkt.

bevis på at der ikke er konsistens mellem antallet af solgte aviser og så stemmeandel. Hugenbergs oplagstal gik op; hvilket ingenlunde materialiserede sig i flere stemmer. NSDAP’s presse (f.eks. Der Angriff), grundlagt 1927, var kun henvendt til (næsten) partimedlemmer. Stagnerede med 10k læsere i 1929, men ved valget til byrådet samme år fik NSDAP over 130k stemmer

Question 55

Fulda. Mange forskere elsker at se på film og radioen. Men var avismarkedet ikke vigtigere?

Answer 55

Jo. o Fulda: mange forskere har forelsket sig i de nye moderne og elektroniske medier som film og radio og har har derfor ikke givet pressen den store bevågenhed som den fortjener. Markedet for det skrevne ord var over dobbelt så stor som radoen (når man tager i betragtning, at flere i husstanden lytter med. Ellers kun ca. 3,5 mio. radio licenser). Dertil: husk også at også aviser bliever læst af mere end én person. Kvanitativt er aviserne uden tvivl det største mediemarked i Tyskland i 1920’erne.

Question 56

Hvad var Barmat-skandalen? Og hvornår fandt den sted?

Answer 56

The Barmat Scandal in 1924 and 1925 in Weimar Republic implicated the Social Democratic Party of Germany in Germany in charges of corruption, war profiteering, fraud, bribery, and financial misdeeds. The scandal provided right-wing political forces within Germany (including the young Nazi Party) with a basis with which to attack the Social Democrats and the republic itself. Antisemitism in connection with the scandal also featured prominently in Nazi propaganda, since the Barmat brothers were Jewish.[1] The scandal was used by the German right to foster the belief that wealthy Jewish families, in quasi-criminal operations found fertile ground in the Republic and easily exploited the Social Democrats to do their bidding..[2] The right-wing press was eager to use Barmat Scandal as a vehicle for antisemitism

Question 57

Hvordan kan det være, at skønt NSDAP’s egen presse ikke var i stand til at tiltrække et massepublikom, at vælgerne så alligevel strømmende til partiet fra 1930 og frem?

Answer 57

Fulda: det sidste kapitel den intensive nyhedsdækning af politisk vold i de sidste to år af Weimarrepublikken og undersøger fiaskoen som regeringer havde i deres pressehåndtering. Skønt NSDAP’s egen presse var ude af stand til at tiltrække et stort publikom, hvorfor støttede vælgerne så om partiet ? Kapitlet argumenterer for, at det ikke var den økonomiske krise, der mobiliserede vælgerne til at støtte op om NSDAP, men derimod pressens afdækning af den såkaldte kommunisiske vold, og faren for kommunuistisk oprør, og dermed truselen om borgerkrig.

Question 58

Fulda. Hvad ville læserne helst have?

Answer 58

Omnibusaviser: problem for partiavsierne at de var for fokusseret på at skole deres læsere i partipolitik frem for at give det, som læserne ville have; “Light entertainment and local news iwth less political news- this mixture served by the Generalanzeiger suited the taste of a mass audiance and according to SOllamnn the duty fo SPD editors was to accomodate this Massengeschamach while at the same time not compreomising in their party poltiical struggle and education.” Intern kritik: “Americaniation of the party press”

Boulevardzeitungen → mere upolitiske end Generalanzeiger
o Hugenberg i klemme i baglandet qua at hans medieimperium også indbefattede en boulevardzeitung – men han ville ikke lade Ullstein sidde på hele markedet.

Alternativet i midt tyverne til den gamle traditionelle sprøjte var Boulvevardzeitungen. “The sensationalist presentation and the packing of news with the entertainment were execedingly popoular. The emphasis moved away from politics, but tabloids were not unpolitical. On the contrary, they sold politics in a distinctly modern style: on smaller, more concise, portions illustrated and polulist.”
o De politiske beslutningstagere var langsomme om at indse denne forskydning. Hvorfor de fortsat fokuserede på de aviser, de selv læste; nemlig de elitære politiske aviser. Partierne anså det stadig for vigtigt at de havde hånd i hanke med en partipresse; men ironisk nok var de eneste de havde råd til at købe var de gammeldags, tabsgivende og i stigende grad upopulære poltiske blade og aviser.

Question 59

Hvordan gik det for de tabloid-aviser, der kørte en anti-system linje? F.eks. i 1925

Answer 59

This phenonmenon is significant because tabloids depended much more on street sales rather than on subscriptions like all other German papers”
o Interessant: de tabloids fra 1925 der kørte flest kampagner på anti-system, de klarede sig bedst.

Question 60

Fulda. forskel på pressedækning. Kejserriget / Weimar?

Answer 60

skønt de mange kontinuiteter, der er at spore fra wilhelmske kejserrige til WR, så var der et afgørende brud: there existed no longer a consensus on what constituted legitimate power

Question 61

Fulda: var højrepressens kampagner med til at myrde Erzberger?

Answer 61

Ja indirekte.. f Erzberger, så var det just fordi, at Erzberger troede, at det betød noget, når der blev fremsat de her injuriende udsagn. Fulda: “Allthough one can only speculate, it is very likely that Erzberger’s electoral support would not have been grevely affected if he had chosen to ignore the attacks. It was only the much greater publicity generated by the trial and the ’facts’ created by it and amplified by the press that seriously undermined Erzbergers’s trustwothiness – though, as mentioned above, not neccessarily in the eyes of his core supporters”
- p. 73: skønt højrepressen ikke kunne bestemme hvad dens læsere skulle tænke, så havde de magten til at bestemme, hvad de skulle tænke på. Og derfor blev Erzberger et muligt mål for nationalisterne.

Question 62

Fulda. Hjalp det at gå i retten for at få oprejsning?

Answer 62

Nej. Ofte var det en farlig cocktail. trods at Ebert ønskede at slå igen; så havde det den stik modsatte effekt. Faktisk ville mange af sager havde været henlagte i pressen ret hurtigt, hvis det ikke havde været fordi, at der var blevet en sag ud af det. Fulda: “… the combination of a predominately anti-republican judiciary enabling and protecting anti-republican press polemics proved lethal to the legitimacy of Weimar democracy.
–> Fuldas case: at Hindenburg blev valgt i 2. ombæring var et close run; derfor gør han gældende at netop Magdeburg-retsagen samt Barmat-skandalen meget vel har været udsalgsgivende for, at en person, der blev regnet for at være ”over partierne” blev valgt.

Question 63

Ifølge Ross, var medierne så mere politiseret i Tyskand end andre steder?

Answer 63

Ja. “In short, nowhere in Europe was the rise of the mass media nad their impact on sociotey more potent on politicized than in Germany”. (Bemærk: Fulda mener ikke der var nogen tysk Sonderweg - dermed ikke sagt at Ross agiterer for én sådan position)

Question 64

Var der censur?

Answer 64

Article 118 of the Weimar constitution forbade censorship with the text “No censorship will take place”. The only exception to this article was film. The film industry was regulated by the Film Assessment Headquarters. The purpose of this organization was to censor films released in Germany for pornography and other indecent content.

The Gesetz zur Bewahrung der Jugend vor Schund- und Schmutzschriften (“Law for the Protection of Youth from Trash and Filth Writings”) of 18 December 1926 provided for the partial censorship (restrictions on distribution) of printed materials in the interest of youth welfare, though it was only applied post-publication on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, it incorporated limits to what could be censored and on what grounds; printed materials could not be added to the index for political, social, religious, ethical, or world-view-related reasons.

• derudover taleforbud?

officielt: MINUS censur “The continuation of such restrictions under the peacetime republican goverment was bases on the fact thta they did not leggally constitute “censorship”. Allthough the Natioanl Assembly formally abolished ”censorship” in Art. 118 of the WC, theis partained specifically to political intervention in a narror sence, and did not cover other forms of social control such as licensing confiscation, and bans, which police forces were still authorized to carry out for the sake of upholding public order and, from 1922, protecting the Republic itself”
o Art. 118: er egentlig en kompromis-løsning; “The SPD, liberals and Z made a difficult compromise on Article 118, which in the end upheld the basic right to freedom of expression without maintaing a complete ban on censorship for paritcualr forms of amusement”
o Se Art. 118

Question 65

Hvornår blev Lex Heinze og Schmutz- und Schundgesetz indført?

Answer 65

1900 og 1926

: Schmutz- und Schundgesetz
o Interssant at der var flere modstandere mod Lex Heinze loven i 1900 end mod Schmutz und Schund (tarveligt stads) i 1926

The Lex Heinze (Latin: Heinze Law) was a controversial law of 1900 amending Germany’s Reich Criminal Code, named after the Berlin pimp Heinze, who was accused and convicted of committing “bodily injury resulting in death”. It censored the public display of the “immoral” in artworks, literature and theatre and made pimping a criminal offence. After numerous public protests and resistance by several circles within the liberal middle class and the Social Democrats, the Reichstag passed a looser version of the draft law and added a “morality clause” into the Reich Criminal Code as a compromise proposal

Question 66

Blev filmmediet, ifølge Ross, anset som værende et vigtigt medie i samtiden?

Answer 66

Afgjort ja. - p. 78: After the war film was generally recognized as the most powerful meidum of the age and therefore in need of careful supervision.
- p. 79: “The supression of the ”smut film” was indeed one of the few issues on which Left and Right could agree in the immediate post-war years”
o p. 79: “The fact that the Reichtag passed the Reich Film Law (Lichtspielgesetz) less than a year fter the consitution came into effect demonstrated the sence of urgency and cross-party aggreement on the need to control the popoular cinemar. ”

. 79: Socialistisk beskyldning om at kommisionen var dobbeltmoralakse; forbød russiske film, men tillod militaristiske og monarkistiske film.
- p. 80: vigtigt at have in mente: “Yet prior to the more restrivtive athmosphere of the early 1930’s German consors were arguably the most liberal in Europe, especially in terms of political intervention. Germany was one of the few countries in which Eisensteins Battleship Potemkin was publicly screened” (trods konservative protester)
o Derimod var ungdomscensuren utrolig streng i Tyskland
- p. 81: også regionalt censur; f.eks. Bayern og Wurtenberg – strengere

Question 67

Var radioen under statslig regulering?

Answer 67

Ja, det var den fra starten - indtil den til sidst kom 100 pct. under staten.

o Radioen!! Det blev taget for givet, da der skulle lovgives herom, at den skulle operere under tæt statskontrol.
• Skræmmebilledet: radiomarkedet i USA
• Man søgte ikke at udelukke private, der kunne skyde midler i – men det skulle være på offentlig licens
o p. 84: 9 regionale udbydere – hver især havde et monopol på deres område (man mente at konkurrence vil være skadeligt )
o p. 84: 1926: fra da af var radioen de facto et statskørende system. Misvisende at tale om en blandingsøkonomi
• Betragtning: ”it had become a state institution, a part of the Reich administration)
• Dog stadig plads til private investorrer, men de kunne hver især max havde 10. pct.
• 1932: under the goverment of Franz von Papen the Postal Ministrey and Lander goverments bought out the privae shareholders and acquired sole posscession of the boradcasters assests in an attempt to ensure their content supported the reactionary cabinet’s policies.
• Derfor nemt for NSDAP at overtage radioerne og gøre det til et 100 pct. centraliseret system

Question 68

Hvad var det karakteristiske ved Heimat?

Answer 68

• som noget af det eneste, der forenede tyskerne - udover sproget

o “… To fit every Heimat in Germany, the German Heimat had to fit no specific one”
A clearly defined national Heimat would have been unable to convey the meaning of unity and diversity and to harmonize the indivisible nation with the multitude of local and regional identities.

WW1 → “Heimatization” → “Beskyt din lokale Heimat”
o “The image of the national Heimat was the ultimate stereotypization of Germany, its nature, its people and its communities…”

Heimat is a German concept. People are bound to their heimat by their birth and their childhood, their language, their earliest experiences or acquired affinity. Heimat as a trinity of descendance, community and tradition—or even the examination of it— highly affects a person’s identity.

Heimat found strength as an instrument of self-assurance and orientation in an increasingly alienating world as Germany’s, Austria’s and Switzerland’s population from the days of the Industrial Revolution made a massive exodus from rural areas into more urbanised communities around the countries’ major cities (Landflucht). Heimat was a reaction to the onset of modernity, loss of individuality and intimate community.[2] Heimat began as an integral aspect of German, Austrian and Swiss identity that was patriotic without being nationalistic. Regional identity (along with regional dialect) is an important foundation for a person’s Heimat

o	FP: “This mode of proceeding has led me to the idea of Heimat, which represented after the the 1880’s the ultimate German community – real and imagined, tangible and symbolic, local and national – of people who had a particualar relationship to one another, sharing a past and a future. Germans constructed Heimat as an interchangeable representation of the local, the regional and the national community. Moreover, in the minds of Germans the Heimat idea allowed Catholics and Protestants, liberals and socialists, Prussians and Bavarians to remain themselves, yet to inform together a transcendent [ophøjet | som ligger uden for erfaringens grænser] national community”
-	p. 50: skønt betydningen af Heimat var difus, så var den kollektive erindring organiseret og struktureret: Bestod af tre dele: 
o	1) Historie 
o	2) Naturen 
o	3) Folkeminder 
o	Udbredelsen af disse? 
•	Heimatbucher
•	Heimatkunde (studier) 

• p. 51: især fra 1885 begyndte Heimat-opfattelsen at brede sig
• p. 52: Heimat-opfattelsen blev hverken instrumentaliseret fra oven eller fra neden, men belv produceret af diverse socialgrupper, både fra neden og fra oven!
• p. 52: Heimat-museer med til at popularisere opfattelsen
• p. 53: Hverken bønder eller arbejdere spillede nogen rolle; og aristrokratiets rolle var moderat. Heimat-bevægelsens oprindelse findes især i provins-Tyskland – og de vigtigste bannerfører var tyske småborger […] who being often leaders of the community, stood at the crossroads of the great developments of German society after 1871: modernity and nation building. In Heimat memory they found a way to reconcile local with national identity and local national pasts with modernity.

o “In times of technologcal change, findong one’s roots meant making sence of modernity. Through the Heimat idea Heimaters transformed the localness of history, nature and folklære into a concept of nationhood. In particular, it was the task of the Heimat museums – which, existing acroos Germany, represented the single community, yet in their totality were a represenation of the entire nation – to mold the image of the nation transform localness into nationhood.”

Question 69

Hvad var the Landvolkbewegung? Hvor hørte den geografisk til? Og hvornår opstod den?

Answer 69

(Landvolkbewegung) was a farmers’ protest movement in northern Germany from 1928 to 1933. Due to an agricultural crisis, demonstrations took place in numerous towns and cities in early 1928, and deputations were sent to Berlin to voice grievances against trade and tax policies. Farmers’ continuing financial difficulties and dissatisfaction with their own lobby organizations led to more radical protests, especially in the province of Schleswig-Holstein, from late 1928. Passive resistance included tax strikes and the obstruction of foreclosures, but some farmers, with the assistance of nationalist radicals, resorted to terrorist methods. Throughout 1929 bombs were placed in public buildings, including the Reichstag. The Rural People’s Movement ran its own newspaper “Das Landvolk” which was edited by Bruno von Salomon, the brother of Ernst von Salomon. With the arrest of the bombers and many of its leaders, as well as the rise of the Nazi Party, the Landvolk declined from 1930.

Question 70

Var DNVP helt immune over for arbejderstemmer?

Answer 70

Nej. DNVP fik i 1924 omkring 2,2 mio. stemmer fra arbejdere.

Question 71

Er det korrekt, at hele Mittelstand blev udryddet qua hyperinflation?

Answer 71

Nej. Det er en tilsnigelse. økonomiske historikere er enige om at den udbredte opfattelse af “destruktionen af middelklasse” qua hyperinflationen er usand. “Middelklassen” bestod af meget forskellige grupper, som blev påvirket på mange forskellige måder som følge af den næsten fuldstændige devaluering af valutaen og den efterfølgende udviskning af alt gæld. Mens opsparer, kreditorer, indehaver af obligationer og rentier mistede alt, så gjorde de små forretninger god business og blev knap nok ramt af inflationen. Og også bønderne var upåvirket.

Question 72

Var der mange sociale rettigheder i WR?

Answer 72

Ja! Der var en masse sociale rettigheder i WF (i modsætning til den danske der er rent liberalistisk); men mange af paragraferne i WF var såkaldte løfteparagrafer, hvilket vil sige, at de var meget svagt beskrevet - altså sent til hjørnespark til senere lejlighed. Husk på at de sociale udgifter gik fra ca. 19 pct. af statsbudget omrking weimars fødsel - og endte på ca. 40 pct. i slutningen af 1920’erne.

Question 73

Hvad er forskellen på NSDAP’s pladser i RT i henholdsvis 1928 - og 30?

Answer 73

May 1928: 2.6 &

September 1930: 18.3 %

Question 74

Hvornår måtte Hitler tale igen?

Answer 74

Hitler had been forbidden to speak in public until 1927

Question 75

Fulda: hvad siger en af de få meningsmålinger på området?

Answer 75

Fulda: viser en af de få opinionsmålinger på avisfronten: “folk syntes at der var for meget parti-snak i aviserne”