E2

Question 1

E2D1

Answer 1

By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is considered as an extended thing.

(See E1P25C)
Referenced in: E2P13L2, E2P13L3, E3P2

Question 2

E2D2

Answer 2

I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

Referenced in: E2P10, E2P10CN, E2P37, E2P49

Question 3

E2D3

Answer 3

By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing.

Explanation.–I say conception rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind.

Referenced in: E2P48N

Question 4

E2D3

Answer 4

By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing.
Explanation.–I say conception rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind.

Referenced in: E2P48N

Question 5

E2D4

Answer 5

By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.

Explanation.–I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its object (ideatum).

Referenced in: E4P62, E5P17

Question 6

E2D5

Answer 6

Duration is the indefinite continuance of existing.

Explanation.–I say indefinite, because it cannot be determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of the thing, but does not take it away.

Question 7

E2D6

Answer 7

Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.

Referenced in: E4PREF, E5P35, E5P40

Question 8

E2D7

Answer 8

By particular things, I mean things which are finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several individual things concur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular thing.

Question 9

E2A1

Answer 9

The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or that man does or does not exist.

Referenced in: E2P10, E2P11, E2P30

Question 10

E2A2

Answer 10

Man thinks.

Referenced in: E2P11

Question 11

E2A3

Answer 11

Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, etc. But the idea can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.

Referenced in: E2P11, E2P49

Question 12

E2A4

Answer 12

We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.

Referenced in: E2P13

Question 13

E2P1

Answer 13

Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

Proof.–Particular thoughts, or this or that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God (E1P25C). God therefore possesses the attribute (E1D5) of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God’s eternal and infinite essence (E1D6). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: E2P2, E2P3, E2P20

Question 14

E2P1N

Answer 14

This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from the consideration of thought alone we conceive an infinite being, thought is necessarily (E1D4 and E1D6) one of the infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.

Question 15

E2P1N

Answer 15

Note. –This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from the consideration of thought alone we conceive an infinite being, thought is necessarily (E1D4 and E1D6) one of the infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.

Question 16

E2P3

Answer 16

In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence.

Proof.–God (by E2P1) can think an infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same thing, by E1P16) can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all that is in the power of God necessarily is. (E1P35) Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and in God alone. Q.E.D. (E1P15)

Referenced in: E2P5,- E2P9C,- E2P20,- E2P24,- E5P22,- E5P35

Question 17

E2P4

Answer 17

The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
Proof.–Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes of God and his modifications (E1P30). Now God is one (E1P14C1). Therefore the idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.

Question 18

E2P5

Answer 18

The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.

Proof.–This proposition is evident from E2P3 of this Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.

It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (E1P25C) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore (E1P10) involves the conception of no other attribute of God, and consequently (by E1A4) is not the effect of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, etc. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: Let68b-P01

Question 19

E2P5

Answer 19

The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.

Proof.–This proposition is evident from E2P3 of this Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.

It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (E1P25C) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore (E1P10) involves the conception of no other attribute of God, and consequently (by E1A4) is not the effect of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, etc. Q.E.D.

Referenced in: Let68b-P01

Question 20

E2P6C

Answer 20

Hence the actual being of things, which are not modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from the attribute of thought.

Referenced in: E2P36, E5P1

Question 21

E2P6C

Answer 21

Hence the actual being of things, which are not modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from the attribute of thought.
Referenced in: E2P36,- E5P1