E. Dynamics Among the Branches of Govt Flashcards
Is the adoption of the plea-bargaining framework in Drug Cases under Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 unconstitutional?
Yes. The adoption of the plea-bargaining framework in Drug Cases under Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 is unconstitutional for the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court. (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, 15 Aug. 2017)
What are the exceptions of plea-bargaining in drug cases?
Exceptions of plea bargaining in drug cases:
- Imposable penalty is life imprisonment or life imprisonment to death.
- Sale, Trading, etc. of Dangerous Drugs involving other kinds of dangerous drugs, except shabu and marijuana.
(Sec. 5, R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
Q: A group of losing litigants, in a case decided by the SC, filed a complaint before the Ombudsman charging the Justices with knowingly and deliberately rendering an unjust decision in utter violation of the penal laws of the land. Can the Ombudsman validly take cognizance of the case?
A: NO. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers, the correctness of the decisions of the SC as final arbiter of all justifiable disputes is conclusive upon all other departments of the government; the Ombudsman has no power to review the decisions of the SC by entertaining a complaint against the Justices of the SC for knowingly rendering an unjust decision. (In re: Laureta, G.R. No. L-68635, 14 May 1987
Q: May the RTC or any court prohibit a committee of the Senate like the Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring a person to appear before it when it is conducting investigation in aid of legislation?
A: NO. The RTC or any court may not do so because that would be violative of the principle of separation of powers. The principle essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. (Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon, G.R. No. 136760, 29 July 2003
Q: Pres. Benigno Aquino III signed E.O. No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission, a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the Arroyo administration. Is E.O. No. 1 constitutional?
A: NO. The President has no power to create a public office. It is not shared by Congress with the President, until and unless Congress enacts legislation that delegates a part of the power to the President, or any other officer or agency.
It is a settled rule that the President’s power of control can only mean the power of an officer to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties, and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
As such, the creation by the President of a public office like the Truth Commission, without either a provision of the Constitution or a proper law enacted by Congress authorizing such creation, is not an act that the power of control includes. (Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, 07 Dec. 2010, Bersamin, J. separate opinion)
Q: Amog was elected Congressman. Before the end of her first year in office, she inflicted physical injuries on a colleague, Camille Gonzales, in the course of a heated debate. Charges were filed in court against her as well as in the House Ethics Committee. Later, the HoR, dividing along party lines, voted to expel her. Claiming that her expulsion was railroaded and tainted by bribery, she filed a petition seeking a declaration by the SC that the House gravely abused its discretion and violated the Constitution. She prayed that her expulsion be annulled and that she should be restored by the Speaker to her position as Congressman. Is Amog’s petition before the Supreme Court justiciable?
Summ: No as viol8 SOP. But SC cud check if GAD.
A: NO. The petition is not justiciable because as stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Alejandrino v. Quezon, et al. (G.R. No. 22041, 11 Sept. 1924), it could not compel the Senate to reinstate a Senator who assaulted another Senator and was suspended for disorderly behaviour, because it could not compel a separate and co-equal department to take any particular action.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144, 28 Oct. 1960), it was held that the Supreme Court could not interfere with the suspension of a Congressman for disorderly behaviour, because the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour. The assault of a fellow Senator constitutes disorderly behaviour.
However, under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court may inquire whether or not the decision to expel Amog is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Q: Joey Tribbiani was convicted of Estafa. When his case reached the Supreme Court, some Justices proposed to alter the penalties provided for under RPC on the basis of the ratio of P1.00 to P100.00, believing that it is not fair to apply the range of penalties, which was based on the value of money in 1932, to crimes committed at present. However, other justices opposed the said proposal for it amounts to judicial legislation. Is the opposition correct?
A: YES. The opposition is correct because the Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature’s perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court’s decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.
Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a coequal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation. (Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, 29 Apr. 2014)
Give Examples of the Blending of Powers.
- Power of appointment which can be exercised by each department and be rightfully exercised by each department over its own administrative personnel;
- General Appropriations Law – President prepares the budget which serves as the basis of the bill adopted by Congress;
- Amnesty granted by the President requires the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Congress; and
- Power of the COMELEC to deputize law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the government for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections in accordance with the power granted to it by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative the conduct of elections.
(Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution; Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, Macalintal v. COMELEC
What is the principle of checks and balances?
Allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments. (Cruz, 2014)
C&B: Test to determine whether a given power has been validly exercised by a particular department:
GR: Whether the power has been constitutionally conferred upon the department claiming its exercise.
XPN: Doctrine of Necessary Implication (2010 BAR) Exercise of the power may be justified in the absence of an express conferment because the grant of express power carried with it all other powers that may be reasonably inferred from it. (Cruz, 2014)
C&B Q: An appropriations law granting the legislators lump-sum funds in which they have full discretion on what project it would fund and how much the project would cost, was passed. Is such law unconstitutional?
- It violated the principle of separation of powers - Insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution.
- It violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power - insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine.
- Denied the President’s power to veto items - insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment.
- Impaired public accountability - insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize.
- Subverted genuine local autonomy - insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions.
- Transgressed the principle of nondelegability - insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects.” (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19 Nov. 2013)
DOP: What are the exceptions to the principle of non-delegability
XPNS:
- Delegations to the People at large;
a. R.A. 6735 – The Initiative and Referendum Act as authorized by the constitutional mandate for the creation of a system of legislation by initiative and referendum
b. A plebiscite is required in the creation, division, merger, abolition of province, city, municipality, or barangay or the substantial alteration of its boundary.
NOTE: These are more of reservations of power by the people than delegations considering the fact that the people are repositories of all governmental powers.
2. Emergency powers of the President;
3. Tariff powers of the President;
4. Delegation to local governments; and
5. Delegation to administrative bodies of the power of subordinate legislation.
(Cruz, 2014)
For the delegation of emergency powers to the President to be valid, what requisites must concur: (N-A-Li-Res)
(N-A-Li-Res)
- It is done during war or National emergency
- It must Allow the President to exercise such powers which are necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
- Such exercise must be for a Limited period only.
NOTE: If the Congress does not expressly take back the power by means of a Resolution, the same shall cease upon its next Adjournment. 4. Such exercise must be subject to Restrictions prescribed by the Congress. (Sec. 23 (2), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Give the provision on Tariff Powers?
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. (Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
DOP: What are the tests for Valid Delegation?
- Completeness Test – The law must be complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate.
- Sufficiency Standard Test – The law must fix a standard, the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable, to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions
