descartes - main scholarly articles Flashcards
Gilson on relationship between soul and body
- L’âme est une substance incomplete
o Mais, ‘il y a entre l’âme et le corps un rapport naturel et comme une proportion qui les destine à constituer une unité substantielle’ (10)
Gilson on the soul as the form of the body
- ‘l’âme est la forme du corps, et, parce qu’elle est la forme du corps, toute opération intellectuelle qui est vraiment une operation de l’homme suppose l’intervention du corps’ (12)
Gilson on the originality of descartes
- ‘la distinction posée par saint Augustine se faisait tout entière au profit de l’âme et se bornait à exclure de l’âme tout ce qui appartient au corps. L’originalité de Descartes fut de repenser cette distinction en fonction de la physique mécaniste, de revendiquer les droits du corps comme saint Augustin avait revendiqué ceux de l’âme, et de donner comme corollaire à la démonstration de la spiritualité de l’âme celle de la matérialité du corps’ (267)
Gilson on the ontological argument
- ‘le prédicat existence est nécessairement inclus dans le sujet Dieu’ (42)
Gilson on the difference between Augustine and descartes
- l’argument de Descartes a une tout autre portée que celui de saint Augustin, car saint Augustine s’en sert pour retrouver l’image de la Trinité en l’homme, au lieu que Descartes s’en sert pour prouver la distinction réelle de l’âme et du corps’ (193)
- D’s work is reminiscent of A’s. but, his mathematical emphasis is where he diverges. Diverges from purely metaphysical mindset
o ‘puisqu’il décide en mathématicien de partir de la pensée, il ne peut plus, en métaphysicien, partir d’une autre pensée que la sienne’ (200)
gilson on similarities between Descartes and augustine
o to refute doubt – concern for D and A
o senses deceive
o like D, argues that certainty must be found outside the senses
o like D, A looks at the certainty of the thoughts in order to deduce the spiritual soul
o for both A and D, concern = knowing God and the soul
- although the end of D’s thought is anti-Augustine, the means and features of his thought are the same
o both look at idea of God as innate
o il a ‘opposé à l’animisme de Saint Thomas le mentalisme de saint Augustin’ (291)
Gilson, aquinas and descartes
- faith comes from God, reason from nature
- ‘il devient évident que la conception cartésienne des rapports de la foi et de la raison peut se développer parallèlement à celle de saint Thomas d’Aquin; dans les deux doctrines, l’acte de foi est essentiellement volontaire, la raison apportant néanmoins les motifs de crédibilité qui le légitiment et développant la théologie qui en dérive si l’on veut prendre la peine de l’en faire sortir’ (289)
- does not agree with everything A but ‘il refuse de d’abord de critiquer son illustre prédécesseur’ (207)
- ‘la réponse de Descartes consiste donc à substituer à la preuve thomiste une preuve qui n’est pas de saint Thomas et que d’ailleurs Saint Thomas n’eût pas acceptée’ (208)
Gillespie, problem of purity
- ‘Such intellectual things are pure because they are not corrupted by the images that derive from sensation and appear in the imagination. This purity, however, leads to a certain problem: purely intellectual things are severed from the actuality they are supposed to inform and explain. This problem arises for Descartes because his notion of intuition is modelled on the neo-Platonic, Augustinian notion of divine illumination’ (37)
gillespie on doubting and the cogito
o doubting is a ‘form of thinking in general and of will in particular’ (42)
o with cogito, ‘Descartes’ fundamental principle is not the conclusion of a syllogism or an intuition but a judgment and thus an act of the will’ (45)
o in meditations the cogito is ‘the affirmation of a necessary connection’ (46)
gillespie on certainty of god
o ‘it also became clear to him that the mere possibility that such a God exists – and not his actual existence – was sufficient to undermine the certainty of intuition and science’ (39)
menn, descartes and amustien on metaphysical knowledge
‘Descartes, like Augustine, believes that metaphysical knowledge, being purely intellectual, is independent of the testimony of the senses, and even somehow opposed to what the senses habitually conceive’ (5
menn, D contact with augustinian theologians
o ‘We know that Descartes, in the years around 1630, had been in contact with Augustinian theologians belonging to the French congregation of the Oratory, and with the founder of that congregation, Cardinal Pierre de Berulle.’ (7)
menn, effect of reformation on turn away from Aristotle
o Catholic reformers wanted to broaden and deepen Xian commitment
o ‘It is natural that many of the Catholic reformers should wish to dispense with Aristotle. The alliance with Aristotle had detracted from the central concerns of Christian thought, and damaged the credibility of the church; thus a large part of the Catholic Reformation (like Erasmus before) sought to bypass the scholastics, and to draw their theology directly from the Fathers of the church. Above all, they turned to Augustine.’ (22)
menn, conflict with sceptics
- ‘These passages make very clear the nature of Descartes’ conflict with the sceptical humanism of his time. He is not especially concerned to establish our knowledge of the basic truths of philosophy against the few sceptics or atheists who might deny them; he is concerned rather to show, against humanist suspicions, the fecundity of his knowledge for the derivation of practical consequences’ (39-40)
menn, conflict between scepticism and wanting to retain philosophy
o ‘Reforming theologians wish to free the faith from its embarrassing alliance with Aristotelian philosophy, but wish to retain some philosophy to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul; Descartes offers them a new approach to philosophy, which begins with the doctrines of God and the soul, and detaches them from the Aristotelian context in which they had become embedded.’ (52)