descartes cosmo argument- continuing existence Flashcards
what is this argument about?
second argument
he asks whether the fact of this own existence is enough to show that there must be a god. to answer this he investigates where his own existence might have come from.
Argument based on his continuing existence – causation
parents god myself always existed lesser than god
P1 the cause of my existence as a thinking thing could be (A) myself, (B) I have always existed (C) my parents (D) a being less than god (E) god
P2 I cant have caused myself to exist for then I would have created my self perfect nor can I sustain myself in existence for then I would be god.
P3 neither have I always existed for then I would be aware of this.
P4 my parents may be the cause of my physical existence but not of me as a thinking mind nor do they sustain me each moment
P5 I cant be created by a being less than god as I have the idea of god inside me and there must be as much reality in the cause as in the effect.
Conc therefore by elimination only god could have created me
issues- Descartes’s casual principle
criticism: the possibilities are not exhausted
the only options that Descartes discusses are not exhausted and he cherry-picks his examples so it isn’t a true representation of the possibility that we were created by a being or process other than god. Descartes finds fault in all but one and concluded his discussion that God is the only correct answer without any fault yet he does not spend time discussing this.
criticisms- Descartes causal principle
descartes thought it self evident that the total cause of something must contain at least as much reality as does the effect.
so from having the idea of god inside him the effect Descartes claims that the cause of this idea can only be god.
this principle proves true in the physical world but is called into question when regarding the world of ideas. our minds can easily create better versions of real objects. our ideas do not have to because of something with as must or more reality.
