DERIVATIVE ASST PRICING Flashcards

1
Q

“Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial
Markets” - (Lamont, O. A., Thaler, R. H. (2003))

What is the Law of One Price?

A

If there are no transaction costs or other constraints, identical goods must have identical prices.

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2
Q

“Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial
Markets” - (Lamont, O. A., Thaler, R. H. (2003))

What usually happens in financial markets if Law of One Price does not hold?

A

If the Law of One Price does not hold and two identical securities are traded at different prices, an arbitrageur will exploit an arbitrage opportunity - making riskless profit by trading the mispriced assets.

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3
Q

“Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial
Markets” - (Lamont, O. A., Thaler, R. H. (2003))

What are the types of financial assets that violate the law of one price?

A
  1. Closed-End Country Funds
  2. American Depositary Receipts
  3. Twin Shares
  4. Dual Class Shares
  5. Corporate Spinoffs
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4
Q

“Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial
Markets” - (Lamont, O. A., Thaler, R. H. (2003))

How do Closed-End Country Funds violate the law of one price?

A

Introduction for dummies:

Similarly to an ETF, a Closed-End Fund trades like simple company stock. However, a closed-end fund is different from an open-end fund in a way that after its shares are publicly offered to potential investors, the fund’s manager issues NO additional shares. If you want to get a Closed Fund share, you can only buy it from other people who want to sell their share of the particular Closed-Fund.

How does a closed-end fund violate the law of one price?

While an open-end fund’s share price is based on its net asset value (NAV), a closed-end fund’s share price works just like a usual stock price which fluctuates according to its supply and demand. So, although a closed-fund share price should also be based on its NAV, the changes in investor demand can lead to a closed-end fund trading at a premium or a discount to its NAV. Even though moderate discounts/premia can be justified by management fees, expenses, superior stock-picking skills, the share price of average should equal its NAV (Law of One Price).

What happened in real life?

Taiwan country fund (shortly after its launch in the U.S. in 1987, it traded at a 205% premium - nothing can sufficiently explain the mispricing - why pay $1 for $0.33 of assets?)
German country fund - had traded at 100% premium after the Berlin Wall fell

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5
Q

“Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial
Markets” - (Lamont, O. A., Thaler, R. H. (2003))

How do American Depository Receipts violate the law of one price?

A

Introduction for dummies:

American Depositary Receipts are a convenient and popular way for investors to buy stocks of companies based outside the U.S. ADRs exist because many foreign companies do not want to bother with the expense and hassle of directly listing their shares on U.S. stock exchanges.

How it works:

  1. A broker will buy shares of foreign companies trading on their home exchanges.
  2. The broker will deliver these shares to a holding bank where the shares will stay.
  3. Another type of bank - a depositary bank - will issue shares called “Receipts” (aka ADRs) on basis of those shares held by the holding bank. Those receipts can then be traded on a U.S. exchange just like any other share. The share price, as well as dividends are collected in US dollars.

What happened:
An ADR of an Indian company “Infosys” was trading at a 136% premium relative to Infosys’ Bombay-listed shares, violating the law of one price. However, the LOOP was not violated THAT much as article says that investors who saw this could not use the arbitrage opportunity to the fullest because US investors could not trade Indian shares. Moreover, the ADR premium was extremely volatile and most likely could not hold on for long.

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6
Q

“Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial
Markets” - (Lamont, O. A., Thaler, R. H. (2003))

How do Twin Shares violate the law of one price?

A

Introduction for dummies:
An example provided in the article is about Royal Dutch/Shell twin shares. Royal Dutch & Shell are a dual-listed company - it is a corporate structure in which two corporations function as a single operating business, but retain separate legal identities and stock exchange listings. The shares of dual-listed companies represent exactly the same underlying cash flows - therefore, at efficient financial markets, stock prices of the companies should move similarly. But, in real life, they don’t - and investors are trying to exploit the mispricing by setting up arbitrage positions in such circumstances. These arbitrage strategies involve a long position in the relatively underpriced part of the dual-listed company and a short position in the relatively overpriced part.

What happened:
Royal Dutch shares (traded in Amsterdam, S&P500 member) receive 60% of the company’s profits, while Shell shares (traded in London) get the remaining 40%; BUT the ratio of the share prices was significantly deviating from 1.5 (40*1.5=60 or that’s how much “higher” the Royal Dutch shares were allowed to be according to Law of One Price).

An explanation on why these Twin Shares supposedly did not fit LOOP:
Different index membership can result in twin shares being mispriced. When Royal Dutch was excluded from the S&P 500 index, the premium quickly fell to 0, restoring the hypothetical 1.5. ratio of share prices

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7
Q

“Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial
Markets” - (Lamont, O. A., Thaler, R. H. (2003))

How do Dual Class Shares violate the law of one price?

A
What are dual-class shares?
Two classes of shares for the same company, but with different voting rights (e.g. Class A gets 1 voting right per share, Class B gets 10). The two are supposed to trade at about the same price unless when there is some battle for corporate control.

What happened?
For a company “Molex”, before 1999, the premium on shares with bigger voting rights fluctuated between 0% and 10%; but, after the shares were added to the S&P 500, the premium rose to 49%. The Law of One Price does not hold and it is hard to see why voting rights would become more valuable because the firm was included in the S&P 500.

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8
Q

“Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial
Markets” - (Lamont, O. A., Thaler, R. H. (2003))

How do Corporate Spinoffs violate the law of one price?

A

Introduction for dummies:

A corporate spinoff is a type of corporate action where a company “splits off” a specific division as a separate business

What happened?

  1. 3Com (parent company) was planning a spin-off of its Palm division.
  2. It was announced that issuance of 1.5 Palm’s shares for each share of 3Com would happen in half a year.
  3. In March, 2000, 5% of Palm’s shares were made public.
  4. By the end of the day, Palm’s market value went to 54 billion, according to shares.
  5. However, 3Coms market value was at 28 million.
  6. As only 5% of Palm were made public, theoretically, 95% of Palm still stood under 3Com, and 95%*54=around 50 million
  7. Therefore, 3Coms implied market value without the Palm subsidiary was 28-50=negative 22 billion, even though the company had about $10 per share in cash.
  8. So, an implied arbitrage opportunity appears (LOOP is violated)
  9. Buy cheap - a share of the extremely undervalued 3Com stock and short 1.5 of overvalued Palm’s shares.
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9
Q

“Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial
Markets” - (Lamont, O. A., Thaler, R. H. (2003))

What prevents the arbitrageurs from enforcing the Law of One Price?

A

Violations of the Law generally create good but risky bets, not arbitrage opportunities (certain risk-less profits).

Risks for arbitrageurs:

  1. Short selling constraints
    - such as limited lendable supply of shares (only 5% of Palm’s shares were public and of those, only the 1% was held by institutional investors who engage in block trades, which is an order to buy or sell 10,000 or more shares at a time);
  2. Legal barriers that prevent access to trading in foreign markets (Infosys in Bombai)
  3. Transaction costs.
  4. Noise trader risk
    - after taking the position in such cases, the volatility of the stock usually is high, causing the net wealth of the arbitrageur to decline and can even lead possible bankruptcy before the prices/spreads converge in the desired direction
    - the case of Long Term Capital Management - a multi-billion hedge fund which had bets on the convergence of bond spreads in the long term - and the spreads diverged instead of converting, and LTCM entered financial distress before proving that the bonds willl “converge in the long term”.
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10
Q

“Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial
Markets” - (Lamont, O. A., Thaler, R. H. (2003))

What is a noise trader risk?

A

Example:
An informed trader has a model that suggests the value of XYZ shares is $10, but due to a piece of bad news in the media, the stock is now oversold by noise traders, with shares trading down to $8. The smart analyst believes that the negative news story should only move the expected value down to $9.90, but despite this, the noise traders dominate the market activity, at least in the short run.

Noise trader risk in terms of the article:
Even though an informed arbitrageur can calculate that the “price will go back to 10$” according to Law of One Price; in the short run, the noise traders dominate the market activity and, thus, there is a risk for the arbitrageur to go bankrupt before the long-term hopes get fulfilled.

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11
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

What is a closed-end fund?

A

A closed-end fund is created when an investment company raises money through an IPO and then trades its shares on the public market like a stock. Closed-end funds limit the amount of shares issued.

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12
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

What is an open-end fund?

A

Open-end fund does not limit the amount of shares a company issues, but rather issues as many as investors want.
(unlimited amount of shares issued, option to buy back shares). Valued at NAV (net asset value= (total asset value - liabilities)/total shares outstanding)).

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13
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

What is an ETF?

A

Exchange traded fund - A collection of securities(e.g. stocks) that tracks an underlying index, although they can invest in any number of industry sectors or use various strategies. (e.g. SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY), which tracks the S&P 500 Index)

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14
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

What is a hedge fund?

A

A private investment fund that markets itself almost exclusively to wealthy investors. Actively managed (complex strategies), specific requirements for potential investors. Small in size, but require BIG initial INVESTMENT.

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15
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

What is a mutual fund?

A

A type of financial vehicle made up of a pool of money collected from many investors to invest in securities. Mutual funds are operated by professional money managers. Almost anyone can invest in mutual funds. BIG in size, but small initial investment required. NO leverage/short-selling.

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16
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

Describe regulation and disclosure policies of hedge funds vs. mutual funds

A

Hedge funds- unregulated leading to aggressive and risky strategies. No disclosure needed (meaning their wishy washy strategies are protected but risk evaluation is impossible). Sometimes they disclose voluntarily to attract funds.

Mutual funds - heavily regulated (risk level, manager’s compensation, governance). Disclosure, reporting and auditing required.

17
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

Describe funds withdrawal of hedge funds vs. mutual funds

A

Hedge funds: Lock - up (window of time when investors are not allowed to buy or sell shares of a particular investment) period is set by hedge fund (month - years) Notice about withdrawal should be given month in advance.

Mutual funds: very LIQUID, shares can be bought and sold daily.

18
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

Describe managers compensation of hedge funds vs. mutual funds

A

Hedge funds: 1 -2% of assets under management. 15-25% above the hurdle rate (the minimum rate of return on a project or investment required by a manager or investor). Managers get compensated only when loss is recovered.

Mutual funds: depends on assets under management.

19
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

What do hedge funds do?

A

Attempt to find trades that are almost arbitrage opportunities. They use derivatives and short-selling, which allows them to make use of arbitrage opportunities better that mutual funds.

Some have been accused of making money in wishy-washy ways: insider trading, late trading.

20
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

Will hedge funds be affected by the changes in the market?

A

Not really - if the stock market drops, the mutual fund would lose but a hedge fund no. They become market-neutral over time. Hedge funds are expected to have average performance (while equity markets have good or bad performance).

21
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

Describe hedge fund strategies (4).

A
  1. A long-short equity. Takes both - long and short positions in stocks. E.g., they identify undervalued stocks, then take long positions, and hedge with short options and futures.
  2. Event-driven. Takes advantage of opportunities created by significant events (spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcies). They try to predict the outcome.
  3. Macro hedge fund. Identify mispriced valuations in stock markets, interest rates, foreign exchange rates, create leveraged betas in these markets.
  4. Fixed income arbitrage. Find arbitrage opportunities in fixed-income markets. (e.g. where government and corporate bonds are traded)
22
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

How have hedge funds been performing vs. the mutual funds?

A

Hedge funds perform slightly better with less risk.

Returns: 10.8% (hedge); 10.3% (mutual)
Risk: 7.8% (hedge); 14.5% (mutual)
Alphas: positive (hedge); negative/0 (mutual)

23
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

Why is it difficult to assess individual hedge fund performance? (4)

A
  1. Biased Sample:
    only hedge funds who voluntarily send their returns can be observed (because they are not regulated).
  2. Need to adjust for market exposure:
    complex strategies with complex derivatives make it hard to measure risk-adjusted returns. (hard to measure what big brain do)
  3. Past performance of hedge fund gives selective view of risk:
    hedge funds may have similar payoffs to those of earthquake insurance companies (most of the time earthquakes don’t happen and a company gets profit, but when it does, they have to pay out a lot)
  4. Problems of valuation:
    OTC traded securities.
24
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

What are the risks of hedge funds to the economy? (4)

A
  1. Investor protection:
    10% of hedge funds stop working every year because of poor performance
  2. Risks to financial institutions:
    Create credit exposures (they borrow, transact, use derivatives). They are very levered, and a collapse of large hedge fund may create problems in the economy.
  3. Liquidity risks:
    hedge funds rely on the ability to get out of trades when things are going wrong, but if they do this when things are going wrong, it can make matters worse.
  4. Excess to volatility risks:
    hedge funds can lead prices to overreact by making trades that push prices away from fundamental values (NOT enough EVIDENCE for this)
25
Q

Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future. Stulz, R.M. (2007).

What is the future of hedge funds? (3)

A

As the hedge fund industry grows, concerns about their regulation also (žuļiki jāreguleito).

  1. this would make them similar to mutual funds
  2. discretion will have to decline when they get more institutional investors
  3. growing industry will result in everyone running after same price discrepancies (profits), which makes everyone get less.
26
Q

“Alpha or beta in the eye of the beholder: What drives hedge fund flows?”
(​​Agarwal, Vikas, Clifton T. Green, and Honglin Ren (2018))

What are the main questions asked and answered?

A
  1. Which risk model do investors use to evaluate hedge fund performance?
  2. Do investors respond differently to the returns due to traditional risks and the returns attributable to exotic risks?
  3. Are investors’ capital allocation decisions justified by funds’ future alphas and returns due to traditional and exotic risks?
27
Q

“Alpha or beta in the eye of the beholder: What drives hedge fund flows?”
(​​Agarwal, Vikas, Clifton T. Green, and Honglin Ren (2018))

What is the problem raised in this paper?

A

Hedge funds engage in more exotic investment strategies, and their investors are viewed as more sophisticated than mutual fund (or ETF) clienteles; they also pay substantial fees

Despite large literature on hedge fund performance, it remains unclear how investors evaluate performance

28
Q

“Alpha or beta in the eye of the beholder: What drives hedge fund flows?”
(​​Agarwal, Vikas, Clifton T. Green, and Honglin Ren (2018))

What is the answer to RQ1? (Which risk model do investors use to evaluate hedge fund performance?)

A

CAPM the best

Method: flow-performance horse rate – from which model alpha predicts money flows to hedge funds the best?

Models considered: CAPM, 3-Factor Model, 4-Factor Model, Option- Factor Model, 7-Factor Model, 12-Factor Model

Sample: 16k hedge funds from 18 years

The probability that the sign of the fund flow is positive (negative) conditional on the sign of the alpha being positive (negative) is the highest for CAPM, the simplest model. It is even higher than for the raw return!

29
Q

“Alpha or beta in the eye of the beholder: What drives hedge fund flows?”
(​​Agarwal, Vikas, Clifton T. Green, and Honglin Ren (2018))

What is the answer to RQ2? (2. Do investors respond differently to the returns due to traditional risks and the returns attributable to exotic risks?)

A

YES, source of return matters

Method: decompose hedge fund returns to alpha, traditional risk factors and exotic risk factors and see if flows are more sensitive to some factors than others

Investor flows respond to all 3 return components, but emphasis on exotic factors is larger than on traditional factors

Investors credit hedge fund managers not only for the alpha, but also for the ability to generate returns from exotic factors, i.e., investors know why they want to invest in hedge funds.

30
Q

“Alpha or beta in the eye of the beholder: What drives hedge fund flows?”
(​​Agarwal, Vikas, Clifton T. Green, and Honglin Ren (2018))

What is the answer to RQ3? (3. Are investors’ capital allocation decisions justified by funds’ future alphas and returns due to traditional and exotic risks?)

A

Hedge funds follow certain strategies for risk exposures, but future returns to those exposures are not predictable from the recent returns to those exposures

This does not rule out that these factors, on average, deliver a risk premium

Method: evaluate the persistence over time for hedge fund alpha, returns attributable to traditional risks, and returns attributable to exotic risks (regress risk component in the next period on risk component in the current period)

They find no persistence, but that could also be because returns to those factors are not persistent

They check if exposures to risks (not returns from exposures to risks) are persistent, and find evidence of risk exposure (beta) persistence. This means hedge funds follow certain strategies for risk exposures, but future returns to those exposures are not predictable from the recent returns to those exposures

This does not rule out that these factors, on average, deliver a risk premium

31
Q

“Alpha or beta in the eye of the beholder: What drives hedge fund flows?”
(​​Agarwal, Vikas, Clifton T. Green, and Honglin Ren (2018))

What are the conclusions of this paper?

A

Emphasis on CAPM does not reflect a lack of awareness of untraditional risks

But it reflects a specific tendency of investors to chase recent returns associated with both traditional and exotic risk exposures

As the returns to factors do not persist, this is not an optimal practice

Instead of looking at how much exotic risks contributed to recent returns, investors should employ more sophisticated models and separate traditional and exotic risks

This would help them allocate capital between cheap mutual funds or ETFs (where they can get exposed to traditional factors) and hedge funds with exotic exposures

32
Q

“A 30-Year Perspective on Property Derivatives: What Can Be Done to Tame Property Price Risk?” (Fabozzi, Frank J., Robert J. Shiller, and Radu S. Tunaru (2020))

What is the reasoning behind this paper?

A

Movements in property prices possess severe risks to their holders, an obvious example being the Great Financial Crisis (2008)

We have a well-established derivatives market for many assets, including stocks, gold, coffee beans, and other commodities, that allow, among other things, to hedge against risk

But the market for property derivatives is “in a state of infancy”. Why so is what the authors cover in the paper.

33
Q

“A 30-Year Perspective on Property Derivatives: What Can Be Done to Tame Property Price Risk?” (Fabozzi, Frank J., Robert J. Shiller, and Radu S. Tunaru (2020))

What would be the advantages of property derivatives?

A
  1. One can infer information about the future of evolution of property prices from them
  2. One can hedge housing price risk:
    - More insurance products can be offered, like insurance that you will not lose the value of the down payment and even price guarantees
    - Banks can hedge against the default risk that jumps when housing prices fall
    - Young households can buy futures if housing prices in an area they want to move to grow faster than their income
  3. One can get exposure to real estate without owning it (diversification)
  4. One can design a reverse mortgage:
    - A put option on house prices would benefit this market against declines in prices (negative equity)
34
Q

“A 30-Year Perspective on Property Derivatives: What Can Be Done to Tame Property Price Risk?” (Fabozzi, Frank J., Robert J. Shiller, and Radu S. Tunaru (2020))

Why did the need for derivatives rise?

A

Acceleration of property price growth in the 1970s; before that, the prices were mostly rising slowly

Unpreparedness of covered mortgages and mortgage-backed securities for elevated inflation of 1970s

Shift to adjustable rate mortgages; previously, mortgages have been balloon payments (sometimes the principal was not amortized at all, so one just faced the whole amount to repay at maturity)

Overall, some property derivatives have been developed since then, but none of them has become truly widespread. Crisis in subprime lending (and so GFC) also did not help the initiatives.