Democratic deficit Flashcards
Central critique
EU and institutions are not democratic
Conceptions of democracy
a) Structural democracy
b) Democracy in terms of cultural and social community
Manifestation of democratic deficit
a) Unresponsiveness to democratic pressures
b) Executive dominance
c) Technocratic dominance
d) Distance
e) Transparency and complexity
f) Weakening of judicial control
g) Imbalance between capital and labour
a) Unresponsiveness to democratic pressures
Voters can change politicians through general elections but cannot change EU governing institutions besides EU Parliament
Response to a) Unresponsiveness to democratic pressures
Gradual response rather than no response at all over 28 elections producing 28 Ministers
Political majority has moral authority to create winners and losers
EU lacks similar authority
b) Executive dominance
EU governance concentrated in executive institutions at expense of democratically elected ones
Response to b) Executive dominance
Similar complaint internally for other MS e.g. UK
Might actually have less executive dominance and more separation of powers in EU since Commission does not need to have majority in EU Parliament
c) Technocratic dominance
Most EU law embedded in secondary legislation implementing and delegated powers shaped by technocratic bodies
Problem: technocracy is not free of ideological influences, not fully pragmatic 9Keynes)
Response to c) Technocratic dominance
True of most national systems
d) Distance
Important law-making competencies transferred to Brussels and further away from national citizens
Response to d) Distance
MS governments probably exercising powers in no more effective or accountable way than EU institutions
Conferring power to Brussels gives smaller MS new powers, by pooling sovereignty with others
e) Transparency and complexity
Lack of transparency re operations of EU
Response to e) Transparency and complexity
True
Very technical, committee-driven: hard to achieve accountability given opacity of processes
Electorate cannot make informed decisions: meaningless democracy exercise at election
f) Weakening of judicial control
EU law being supreme, judicial authorities have lost the power to exercise their function of judicial control to CJEU
Response to f) Weakening of judicial control
Judicial control by CJEU may empower courts to set aside conflicting national laws and ensure 4 freedoms
Itself problematic: EU treaties involve economic constitution primarily
Economic principles treated as fundamental rights protected by courts
g) Imbalance between capital and labour
EU is structurally committed to promotion of free market interests, reinforcing existing imbalance between capital and labour, business interests, workers/social interests
Follesdal and Hix
Unresponsive to democratic pressures - requires contestation for political leadership and argument over direct of policy agenda
5 problems of executive dominance
a) Weak EP
b) No European elections
c) Institutional distance
d) Psychological distance
e) Arena for neo-liberal policy drift from voters
Response to Follesdal and Hix: Majone
EU need not democratic in traditional sense: performs technical functions, not redistributive, just has to be efficient and accountable
Response to Majone
Inadequate since many policies are redistributive, involve ‘winners and losers’ that require democratic mandate
Response to Follesdal and Hix: Moravcsik
Executive dominance not problem as long as
a) Governments are accountable domestically
b) EP powers increased over time
c) EU policy making transparent
Response to Moravcsik
Idea of compromise will lead to centrist policies, which is misleading as EU generates neo-liberal policies and do not reflect shifts in policy preferences
a) Lack of accountability nationally not EU’s fault e.g. Danish government has EU Affairs committee
b) Countries minded with particular issues only, giving rise to closed doors negotiations to gain support over issues they are vested in
- MS want to retain this
- EU should aspire to actual and competitive democracy
Potential for change and democracy at EU level - Council must be more transparent and Commission must be recognised as political and not technocratic actor
Moravcsik
Europe’s legitimacy rests in MS; more transfer of power and democratic representativity to EU institutions will exacerbate it
Moravcsik: DD critiques are myths
a) EU not superstate - limit to 10-20% of national decision-making
b) EU not technocracy - small civil service, stringent checks and national oversight
c) EU not unaccountable - most powers rest on representation of MS
d) National referendum
e) Low public participation/interest not indication of mistrust
f) Low public participation/interest not due to stifling EU institutional set-up
Bellamy and Castiglione
Solution to DD is not strengthing EP or enhancing MS control over EU
- Role of national parliaments ought to be strengthened in recognition of the fact that Europe is composed of several peoples
Overview of measures to alleviate democratic deficit
a) Institutional reforms
b) Procedural reforms
c) Substantive reforms
d) Creating European political dimension
Institutional reforms
a) Increasing powers of EP
b) Rendering Commission more accountable to EP
c) Recognising some EU level prerogatives to national parliaments
a) Increasing powers of EP
Elections - directly elected by MS citizens
Law-making powers - constantly expanded, including areas requiring veto
b) Rendering Commission more accountable to EP
Strengthened role of EP
- Hustings
- Proposal by Councils first
- Votes in College of Commissioners
- Art 17(8) TEU: Commission responsible to EP
- EP has threatened to block whole Commission before e.g. 1999, forced resignation
c) Recognising some EU level prerogatives to national parliaments
Treaty of Lisbon: yellow card or reasoned opinion when Commission legislative proposals infringe principle of subsidiarity
If majority of Ps issue yellow cards, Council or EP can vote down (orange card)
Procedural reforms
a) Law making procedures
b) Comitology system oversight
c) Strenghtening judicial accountability of EU institutions and law making
a) Law making procedures
Unanimous vote in Council now exceptional (Art 238 TFEU)
Co-decision/ordinary legislative procedure (Art 294 TFEU)
Ending Commission agenda/setting, right of initiative monopoly
P may request Commission to submit any proposal
(Art 225 TFEU)
b) Comitology system oversight
Committees from MS to oversee executive activites of Commission, and oversight attribution to EP
c) Strenghtening judicial accountability of EU institutions and law making
Enhanced fundamental rights
a) Art 263(4) TFEU: reformed standing requirments for private litigants seeking JR for non-implementation of regulation
- Circumvent strict ruling in Plaumann
b) Art 6(2) TEU: ECHR accession
Substantive reform
a) Reinforcing EU treaty references to democratic and social values
b) Charter
c) Regulatory competencies to European Social Partners
a) Reinforcing EU treaty references to democratic and social values
References in Art 2, Art 10 TEU
Art 7 TEU mechanisms that may remove rights
b) Charter
Now binding and regularly referred to by CJEU
c) Regulatory competencies to European Social Partners
Art 155 TFEU: EU Social Partners (EU level trade unions and employers representative organisation) to adopt Framework Agreements in socail sphere that can be incorporated in EU Directives
e.g. parental leave
Creating European Politician Dimension
a) Eurozone crisis in 2012
b) Pan European anti austerity movement
c) European Parliament elections (direct)
European political parties act according to party lines rather than national interest lines
Is there a need to redress deficit
Wrong comparative basis
- National models (Hix)
- Can never match the models, MS as main providers of legitimacy fo EU project (Moravcsik)
Own distinct basis
a) Menon, Weatherill: Eu’s legitimacy based on output legitimacy
b) Marks: EU as complex and multi level governance, with democratic inputs at various levels
But limited normative value, only descriptively useful
