Defenses Flashcards
Sec. 53a-4. Voluntary act.
A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and which he is physically capable of performing.
Every offense requires a voluntary act. Includes duties imposed by law.
Sec. 53a-5. Criminal liability; mental state required.
When the commission of an offense defined in this title, or some element of an offense, requires a particular mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms “intentionally”, “knowingly”, “recklessly” or “criminal negligence”, or by use of terms, such as “with intent to defraud” and “knowing it to be false”, describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.
Mens Rea :
(1) Intentionally
(2) Knowingly
(3) Recklessly
(4) Criminal Negligence
(5) Specific Intent = “with intent to… knowing it to be… etc.”
When one and only one MR term appears, it is presumed to apply to every element unless an intent to limit it clearly appears
Sec. 53a-6. Effect of ignorance or mistake.
Mistake of Fact is valid when
(1) Negates MR; or
(2) MOF listed as a defense in the statute; or
(3) Mistake supports justification as a defense
Mistake of Law is never valid
(a) A person shall not be relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief of fact, unless:
(1) Such factual mistake negates the mental state required for the commission of an offense; or
(2) the statute defining the offense or a statute related thereto expressly provides that such factual mistake constitutes a defense or exemption; or
(3) such factual mistake is of a kind that supports a defense of justification.
(b) A person shall not be relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense.
Sec. 53a-7. Effect of intoxication.
Intoxication is not a defense
Intoxication can be evidence to negate an R or CN Mens Rea if the intoxication is shown to be a but-for cause of failure to perceive the risk.
Intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge, but in any prosecution for an offense evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to negate an element of the crime charged, provided when recklessness or criminal negligence is an element of the crime charged, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of or disregards or fails to perceive a risk which he would have been aware of had he not been intoxicated, such unawareness, disregard or failure to perceive shall be immaterial. As used in this section, “intoxication” means a substantial disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body.
Sec. 53a-8. Criminal Liability
(a) But-for test; unless
(1) Concurrent Cause clearly was sufficient to cause the result, and
(2) actor’s conduct insufficient, and
(b) Result is not too remote or accidental (such that it has a just bearing on the actor’s liability)
A person is criminally responsible if
(a) the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient, and
(b) the result is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a just bearing on the actor’s liability.
Sec. 53a-9. Criminal liability for acts of another.
(a) Acting with required MR - intentionally involved with aiding another actor, guilty or innocent, to commit an offense - is liable as the principal offender.
(b) Giving a firearm to another when you should know they intend to commit a crime with it - liable as principal offender.
(a) A person, acting with the mental state required for commission of an offense, who solicits, requests, commands, importunes, intentionally aids another person or causes an innocent agent to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable for such conduct and may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.
(b) A person who sells, delivers or provides any firearm, as defined in subdivision (19) of section 53a-3, to another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense knowing or under circumstances in which he should know that such other person intends to use such firearm in such conduct shall be criminally liable for such conduct and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.
Sec. 53a-10. Defense. (renunciation)
Renunciation - (a) termination of complicity and (1) wholly depriving it of effectiveness, and (2) manifesting complete and voluntary renunciation.
(b) Renunciation is not voluntary if motivated at all by an increased risk or difficulty; or if it is merely to delay the act to a more advantageous time.
(a) In any prosecution in which the criminal liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person under section 53a-9, it shall be a defense that the defendant terminated his complicity prior to the commission of the offense under circumstances: (1) Wholly depriving it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense, and (2) manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(b) For purposes of this section, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is
motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor’s course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.
Sec. 53a-12. Defenses; burden of proof.
Affirmative Defense - (DEF) establish by POTE
Non-affirmative defense - (State) disprove BRD
(a) When a defense other than an affirmative defense, is raised at a trial, the state shall have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
(b) When a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Sec. 53a-13. Lack of capacity as affirmative defense.
(a) Lack of substantial capacity due to mental illness, whether in appreciating wrongfulness or controlling conduct; is an affirmative defense.
(b)(1) Unless this illness was proximately caused by voluntary intoxication.
(a) In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.
(b) (1) It shall not be a defense under this section if such mental disease or defect was proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion, inhalation or injection of intoxicating liquor or any drug or substance, or any combination thereof.
Sec. 53a-14. Duress as affirmative defense.
Coercion of use or threat of imminent use of force upon DEF or 3rd person; when reasonable person unable to resist. - Affirmative Defense
Unless DEF intentionally or recklessly placed themself in that situation.
In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the
proscribed conduct because he was coerced by the use or threatened imminent use of physical force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. The defense of duress as defined in this section shall not be available to a person who intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.
Sec. 53a-16.Justification as defense.
Justification - Defense (Non-affirmative)
In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 53a-18 to 53a-21,
inclusive, shall be a defense.
Sec. 53a-18. Use of force generally (Teachers)
Teacher or other person entrusted with supervision of a minor for school person may use reasonable force to
(a) protect self and others from immediate injury,
(b) obtain possession of a dangerous instrument or controlled substance,
(c) protect property, or
(d) restrain or remove minor to maintain order.
(a) The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances:
(6) A teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor for school purposes may use reasonable physical force upon such minor when and to the extent such teacher or other person reasonably believes such force to be necessary to (A) protect himself or herself or others from immediate physical injury, (B) obtain possession of a dangerous instrument or controlled substance, upon or within the control of such minor, (C) protect property from physical damage, or (D) restrain such minor or remove such minor to another area, to maintain order.
Sec. 53a-19. Use of physical force in defense of person.
(a) Person may use reasonable force to defend self or 3rd person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of force, degree is what is reasonably believed to be necessary;
Except deadly force allowed only if actor reasonably believes the other is (1) using or about to use deadly force/GBH.
Duty to retreat and Castle Doctrine
(b) No justification for deadly force if he knows that he can avoid use of force with complete safety
(1) by retreating, unless in your own dwelling, and was not initial aggressor, or
(2) by surrendering possession of property to a person “asserting a claim of right thereto”
(3) by complying with their demand of performance or non-performance
(c) A person is not justified if they
(1) Intending to cause injury/death, provoke the aggressor
(2) He is the initial aggressor, unless withdrawal and effectively communicates intent to do so
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force, and he may use such degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose; except that deadly physical force may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that such other person is (1) using or about to use deadly physical force, or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if he or she knows that he or she can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety (1) by retreating, except that the actor shall not be required to retreat if he or she is in his or her dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100, and was not the initial aggressor, or (2) by surrendering possession of property to a person asserting a claim of right thereto, or (3) by complying with a demand that he or she abstain from performing an act which he or she is not obliged to perform.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force when (1) with intent to cause physical injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of physical force by such other person, or (2) he is the initial aggressor, except that his use of physical force is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so, but such other person notwithstanding continues or threatens the use of physical force.
Sec. 53a-21. Use of physical force in defense of property.
Reasonable force with a reasonable belief that it is necessary to prevent an attempt to commit larceny, criminal mischief involving property, or to regain property reasonably believed to have been acquired by larceny in a reasonable timeframe.
A person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by such other person to commit larceny or criminal mischief involving property, or when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to regain property which he reasonably believes to have been acquired by larceny within a reasonable time prior to the use of such force; but he may use deadly physical force under such circumstances only in defense of person as prescribed in section 53a-19.
