Defamation Common Law Flashcards
Old Definition of “Defamatory”
tends to hold P up to any publication which exposes a person to distrust, hatred, contempt, ridicule, obloquy. - HARDER FOR P TO PROVE: NARROW
(Belli)
Modern Definition of “Defamatory”
Broadens the definition: a communication that tends to damage P’s reputation, more or less in the popular sense- that is, to diminish the respect, good will, confidence or esteem in which he is held or to excite adverse or unpleasant feelings about him. (Belli)
Policy for jury question
Since one’s reputation is the view which others take of him- whether an idea injures a person’s reputation depends upon the opinions of those whom it is published- logical function of the jury. (Belli)
Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspaper, Inc.
Nationally known lawyer sued for defamation when article published that implied he had “took” the FL. Bar by charging hundreds of dollars of clothes to his hotel room, which was paid for by the Bar. Trial court dismissed because statement wasn’t defamatory - appellate court held that statement was for a jury to decide if the statement was defamatory.
Common Law Elements of Defamation Claim
- Statement presumed false (Defense can be proof the statement is true)
- Statement is unprivileged
- Is published
- Is capable of a defamatory meaning (jury/judge issue depends)
- “Of and concerning”- Colloquim requirement- statement is of or concerning the plaintiff
- Statement damages plaintiff
If statement is capable of only one meaning:
the judge may decide a matter of law if the statement is defamatory or not. (Belli)
If statement is capable of more than one meaning:
it is for a jury to decide if the statement is defamatory or not. (Belli)
Ordinary Standard
Judge will look to the ordinary common meaning of the word, phrase, term, etc. to determine if it is capable of one or more meanings. A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to who it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. (Belli)
Example of Ordinary Standard
“Slut” - generally understood to be a slur or insult, so even a joking statement is likely actionable. (Belli)
Policy for Ordinary Standard
Allowing a term to be deemed derogatory (ex: “homosexual”) promotes the power of the term as a disparaging remark (validates the “hurt” of the term), especially in the light of non-applicable terms (ex: racial slurs to someone clearly not of the race, etc.) (Belli)
For meaning of a word:
Can look to dictionary definitions, etc. Likely can use common usage. Looks to time, place and culture for context. Courts also look to punctuation. (Belli)
Example of time, place and culture for context:
Published statement that “Mr. Woodard enjoyed a bottle of wine in the countryside”.
- During Prohibition, and Mr. Woodard is a well-known self-help author for recovering alcoholics?
a. Defamatory, accusation of breaking law, harms rep. as author - During today’s time and he’s just Woodard?
a. Unlikely - not harmful
Example of punctuation:
- Today - Ms. X associated with a lot of men.
a. Maybe - may depend on the context - Ms. X “associated” with a lot of men
a. Probably - emphasis on alt. meaning of “associated”
What if intended in a joking or complimentary way?
NOT A DEFENSE:
1. Unless it is clear from the context that the term could not be taken in a defamatory way (ex: “You’re as much of a slut as Mother Theresa”), then it may be a defense
2. Also, not a defense to repeat and disagree with the defamation
(Belli)
Grant v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n
Newspaper article accused legislative rep. of being a member of the Communist Party in 1940s. Court held that “right-thinking” people wouldn’t shun leg. On this basis, but P had a right to be free from defamation to even “wrong-thinking” people.
“Right thinkers” v. “wrong thinkers”
Hand says “wrong thinking” people can still be enough to cause defamation. (Grant)
Example 1 of “Right thinkers” v. “wrong thinkers”
Anarchists think it is horrifying to be accused of holding public office. Anarchists are “wrong thinking” people - unlikely to be defamatory b/c the prejudice is so outside the normal belief.
Example 2 of “Right thinkers” v. “wrong thinkers”
: Criminals horrified by being accused of being an informer. Not defamatory - don’t want to advance the standards of a group so far outside the norms.
Damage to rep. for abrogate “wrong-thinking” people:
May reduce damages award
POLICY
Don’t want to encourage behavior or reputations that are so far outside the social norms. Criminals for “snitch” - don’t want to encourage criminals, as viewers, to be protected. Don’t want to discourage either ideological party in Dem. v. Rep., so don’t allow it to be actionable. Etc.
Grant RULE
The interest at stake in all defamation is the reputation of the person assailed; and any moral obliquity of the opinions of those in whose minds the words might lessen that reputation, would normally be relevant only in mitigation of damages. A man may value his reputation even among those who do not embrace the prevailing moral standards; and it would seem that the jury should be allowed to appraise how far he should be indemnified for the disesteem of such persons. (Grant)
Grant HOLDING
We do not believe therefore that we need say whether “right thinking” people would harbor similar feelings toward a lawyer because he had been an agent for the Communist Party, or was a sympathizer with its aims and means. It is enough if there be some, as there certainly are, who would feel so, even though they would be wrong thinking people if they did. (Grant)
Pleading Defamation: Restatement 563
Defamatory matter may be communicated “by innuendo, by figure of speech, by expressions of belief, by allusion or by irony or satire…or by words spoken in jest if not so understood.
Where the meaning is not clear, P must plead the context that renders the words or conduct defamatory.
P must plead:
1. The defamatory words
2. The publication: communication of the words to a third person
3. Extrinsic facts, because of which the words were reasonably understood to convey a meaning defaming the P. This is called the “inducement.”
4. A formal allegation that the words were spoken of and concerning the P. This is called the “colloquium.”
5. An allegation of the particular defamatory meaning conveyed by the words. This is called the “innuendo.”
6. Special damages, when they are necessary to the COA.
(Grant)
Killian v. Doubleday & Co., Inc.
Personal recollection was re-written for dramatic effect to imply author had personally witnessed several horrors at army base run by General, but author was never at base and only heard stories from third persons. General sued for characterizations of him as a dictator, abusive of power and of soldiers. Court held that since author wasn’t actually there, couldn’t be “true” witness story. (Killian)
Killian RULE
In order to support a defense of truth, it is necessary to prove that it was substantially true. (statement must be substantially true). (Killian)
TRUTH
An affirmative defense under common law.
D must raise it and has the burden of proof.
Not always true as a constitutional matter.
Defense looks at the objective truth of the falsity.
Truth is a defense here if:
It were observed by the author and were an acoount of the events. (Killian)
“Substantial truth”
ex: story about 1 finger stretcher bearer, actually had 3 fingers - ok, substantially true
- Must be specific charges for “substantial” truths.
- Cannot be general “bad character” of plaintiff.
- Cannot prove truth of one offense by offering evidence of another (even related/similar) offense. (Killian)
Ex: Stole A’s watch cannot be proven by showing theft of B’s watch and clock.
P must prove falsity:
Some courts hold that the plaintiff must prove falsity (non-truth) as element of prima facie case.
1. Writer/author is responsible for the substantial truth of the report - even if they repeat a story told to them exactly (ex: can’t say “someone told me this story and I reported it exactly”) - puts a premium on fact-checking. (Killian)
Truth/Falsity
Truth/falsity is objective on the facts - doesn’t require the publisher to have a subjective knowledge of the truth/falsity (avoids “I didn’t know” arguments).
Neiman-Marcus v. Lait
Models and female sale staff accused of being hookers and whores, male sales staff accused of being homosexuals. Groups sued in classes (models, female & male sales staff). Court held that female sales staff was too large to be implicated by association and no one person was identifiable. (Neiman)
Neiman-Marcus RULE (Group Defamation Theory)
If statement is inclusive (references “all” or “the entire” group)
1. General Rule: Where the group or class is large then no individual member can sue.
a. Exception: If an individual is named, or language which refers to some ascertained or ascertainable person/individual.
2. General Rule: Where the group or class is small (generally 25 or less), then any individual member can sue. (Majority)
a. Minority: “Intensity of suspicion” - there can be recovery if a high degree of suspicion can inferred to a plaintiff.
i. Ex: 1 of 25 people stole a car
ii. Alt: 24 of 25 people are thieves
3. Depends on the size of the group defamed, not the size of the group suing.
(Neiman)
When some, or less than all of a small group is implicated (ex: “most of the sales staff):
There is a split:
1. Some courts will hold that action is allowed
2. Some courts will hold no cause of action
i. Neiman Marcus court held that those who were members of a group of 25 or smaller could recover.
(Neiman)
Defamation for the Dead RULE
Defamation cannot succeed for statements made after the defamed person’s death (because their reputation doesn’t “go on”)
1. Exception: If the defamation was suffered while plaintiff was alive, suit will survive but damages will be limited to harm suffered while alive (cut-off at death). (Neiman)
Corporation RULE
What if a private security company is defamed? A corporation can have no reputation in the personal sense and cannot be defamed. But a corporation can maintain an action for defamation that casts an aspersion upon its honesty, credit, efficiency, or other business or moral character. (Neiman)
Charitable/Benevolent Corporation
(No-profit) Good COA since defamation affecting its character/operations may deprive it of gifts or other sources of revenue. (Neiman)
Government Entities
Bodies open to “uninhibited public criticism” and thus holding that in contrast to corporations they should not enjoy a right to sue in libel. (Neiman)
Bindrim v. Mitchell
Psychologist held “nude group therapy marathons”, attended by author who later wrote a fiction novel of the same subject. P sued for defamation, claiming the character in the novel was identifiable as him. (Bindrim)
Bindrum RULE
Need not be identified by name, as long as a reasonable person would identify the plaintiff as the character.
1. Whether a reasonable reader, with knowledge of the surrounding circumstances/extrinsic facts, would understand the words to represent the plaintiff.
2. Reasonable reader would need to know enough extrinsic facts to make the connection (ex: Killian case - if someone only knew he was the general at the fort, it would still impute the defamation to him).
3. Publication to even one person is sufficient to support a defamation action - may limit damages if the number who can identify is small/low.
(Bindrim)
Bindrim Dissent
The support of defamation chills free speech - the point of fiction and to create non-factual characterization is to avoid defamation, not to create “actual malice” for lack of truth. : Less likely to write these books if charged with defamation. (Bindrim)
DAMAGES
The fewer the number of persons who are possessed with knowledge of the surrounding circumstances that identify the P, the less damages that may be awarded. (Bindrim)
Bindrim STANDARD
When the P is not expressly identified, the issue is whether a reader with knowledge of the surrounding circumstances could have reasonably understood that the words referred to P. The standard against which the material is read or understood changes with the medium. (Bindrim)
Disclaimers
(Note 4, p. 885) - A disclaimer that “this is a work of fiction and any similarities are unintentional. (Bindrim)
2 Forms of Action for Defamatory Publication
- Libel- originally concerned written or printed words.
2. Slander- originally oral.
Damages for Slander
Must prove “special damages” (pecuniary loss) unless the words spoken come within one of the four classes of what is called slander per se.
Damages for Libel
Does not require special damages to be actionable- some disagreement on whether this applied to libel which was not defamatory on its face.
Old View of Libel and Slander:
17th century- The distinction was between words that were written or printed and those that were oral.
Modern View of Libel and Slander:
- Libel was extended to include defamatory pictures, signs, statues, motion pictures and the like, and even conduct carrying a defamatory implication, such as hanging the plaintiff in effigy, or erecting a gallows before his door.
- Libel is communicated by the sense of sight, while slander is conveyed by the sense of hearing.
- Slander was soon extended to include transitory gestures, such as signals of a deaf-mute.
- Publication of libel to read a defamatory writing aloud and also to speak orally words expected to be and in fact written down (dictation or statement made to a newspaper reporter).
Restatement (2nd) of Torts 568 (Libel and Slander definitions)
- Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, or by its embodiment in physical form, or by any other form of communication which has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words.
- Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures, or by any form of communication other than those stated in Subsection (1).
- A) The area of dissemination, B) the deliberate and premeditated character of its publication, and C) the persistence of the defamation are factors to be considered in determining whether a publication is a libel rather than a slander.
Shor v. Billingsley
Ad lib’ed statement made during a radio broadcast was defamatory. Scripted radio transmissions were held to be libel. Court held that the type of damage caused was more like libel than the transitory nature of slander, so it was actionable per se and should be considered libel. (Shor)
Arguments for libel:
- Increased likelihood of harm because of the wide-reaching nature of radio and TV transmissions
- Presumption of wide-reaching damages caused by the publication via radio or TV - although there is no “permanence” or “durability”, the concern of long-term harm. (Shor)
Arguments for slander:
It wasn’t read from a script, it was oral statement made over a broadcast, more like an amplifier and it wasn’t memorialized prior to or after the statement was made. (Shor)
Court’s HOLDING
Court held it was a libel transmission. (Shor)
Shor RULE
The utterance of defamatory remarks, read from a script into a radio microphone and broadcast, constitutes publication of libel. (Shor)
Slander v. Libel Damages
- Libel-PRESUME DAMAGES- general presumed damages
a. P wants libel because does not have to prove damages - Slander- do not presume damages- have to show SPECIAL DAMAGES (financial/pecuniary) unless slander per se.
a. D wants to establish slander
(Shor)
Statutes:
Most of the statutes enacted under lobbying from broadcasting companies, provide that any broadcast defamation is to be treated as slander, whether there is a script or not. (Shor)
The English Defamation Act
Provides that any broadcast is libel as does Illinois. (Shor)
Terwilliger v. Wands
D said P was “running to” Mrs. Fullers to have sex with her and wanted to keep Mr. Fuller in jail so P could have “free access” to Mrs. Fuller. P was bedridden from hearing these accusations. Court held that medical/heath damages from mere apprehension of damage to character were not the type of actual special damages to his reputation protected by slander. (Terwilliger)
Terwilliger RULE (Special damages)
The SPECIAL DAMAGES must have been the natural, immediate, and legal consequence of the words that flow from injury to his character. (Terwilliger)
Terwilliger RULE (Monetary Nature)
When special damages have to pleaded and proved the harm must be of a monetary nature.
If no pecuniary loss is shown, it is not enough that P has suffered acute mental distress and serious physical illness as a result of the defamation. (Terwilliger)
Mental Damages
Even though cannot recover for those alone, once established he can recover (add on). (Terwilliger)
What constitutes special damages?
1.Loss of marriage,
2. Loss of hospitable gratuitous, entertainment
3. Preventing a servant or bailiff from getting a place,
4. The loss of customers by a tradesman; 5. And says that in general whenever a person is prevented by slander from receiving that which could otherwise be conferred upon him, though gratuitously is sufficient. (Terwilliger)
Ex: Student in A (“Alice”) says to Section B (“Bob”) says that guy in army reserves assigned in Cleveland, OH isn’t very observant. Farnsworth is very observant, but loses a security job based on statement.
Rule of Law framed:
In reference to common and usual effects and not those which are accidental and occasional. (Terwilliger)
Loss of character:
Must be a substantive loss- one which has actually taken place. (Terwilliger)
Original Repetition RULE
D was liable only for damages due to his own publication and was not responsible for repetition by others. (Terwilliger)
Modern Repetition RULE
The original publisher is liable for damages due to a repetition that might reasonably have been anticipated. (Terwilliger)
Slander Per Se
Four special kinds of slander are exception to the general common law rule and actionable without proof of special damages (damages assumed):
1.Imputations of Major Crime- crime must be one of “moral turpitide- am inherent baseness of vileness of principle in the human heart.”
the character of the act charged
2. Loathsome Disease- diseases that are permanent, lingering and incurable- being communicable is important.
3. Business, Trade, Profession or Office- if the spoken words are likely to affect the P in his business trade, profession, or office, the probability of some temporal damage is sufficiently obvious. Any legitimate calling is included be it ever so base. Even uncompensated offices are included.
The exception is limited to defamation of kind incompatible with the proper conduct of the business, trade, profession, or office itself.
The person must be employed in the profession at the time that the statement is made.
4. Serious Sexual Misconduct- charge imputing unchastity on women.
Libel
Printed or written defamation- damages presumed( generally favorable).
Libel Per Quod
Statement not defamatory on its face and it was necessary to be aware of certain extrinsic or unstated facts in order to appreciate its defamatory implications- P must allege and prove those extrinsic facts in order to have a COA- must prove special damages. (Some courts reject the distinction).
Libel Per Se
“On it’s face”
Economopulos v. A.G. Pollard Co.
Although more than one person heard the accusation of the theft, the other people didn’t understand because it was in Greek. (Econ)
Economopoulos RULE
Communication of the defamatory words to someone other than the person defamed. It must be heard and understood. (Econ)
Presumption
- Sometimes court presumes that some one has read and understood the defamatory words.
- Other courts require proof of the actual reading is required. (Econ)
Exception:
When plaintiff publishes the statement himself?
1. The courts are split on this issue - it normally comes up in the employment.
2. Look to facts about what languages they may have heard him speak.
a. Requires intent or negligence to publish (not intent to defame, cause harm or lie).
(Econ)
Re-publishers/repeaters
Publishers are responsible for all harms for the defamation, including harm from a repeater’s defamation, if the republication/repeating was foreseeable. (Econ)
INTENT
- For communication to a third party to be a publication, it must have been done INTENTIONALLY or by a NEGLIGENT ACT. 2. There is no publication when words spoken by D directly to P, with no reason to suppose that any one can overhear, but they are in fact overheard by a concealed listener.
- Thus, when the words are spoken in so loud a voice that D can expect some one may overhear, the D has published the defamatory imputations. (Econ)
NO PUBLICATION where:
- Defamatory matter is sent by D to P in a sealed letter which is unexpectedly opened and read by third persons.
- But there is publication where D knows or should know someone in the circumstances would likely read it and the words are in fact read by such person. (Econ)
Communications:
- There is a publication when a telegraph company transmits a message or a third party orally repeats a message.
- Postal service does not make a publication when it delivers a letter.
- Nor is there a publication by the phone company when its system is used for communication purposes.
- Same rule applies to an Internet service provider for emails sent through its servers. (Econ)
PUBLICATION BY PLAINTIFF:
- Ordinarily D is not liable for any publication made by P alone, since it is considered it is P’s responsibility and not the D’s.
- But suppose it is reasonable for P to consult someone else about a defamatory communication made only to P and the D might expect this. Obvious case is that of the P who is blind or illiterate.
(Econ)
FAILURE TO REMOVE DEFAMATION
In several cases D is liable for failure to remove defamation posted on his premises. Courts have not agreed on a theory. (Econ)
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.
Someone posted a highly suggestive profile and somewhat lewd for an actress on Matchmaker.com, which provided plaintiff’s personal information and solicited personal (violent) contact. Actress filed suit against Matchmaker for publishing the profile. Matchmaker claimed immunity under CDA, claiming anonymous user provided the info. Court held that Matchmaker was not liable, because they were protected by the CDA. (Carafano)
CDA of 1996 (Immunity):
NO:
- Provider or user of interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
- Any information provider by another content provider.
- Must prove that they are an interactive computer service.
i. Traditional website, ISP, e-news letters, “compilers” - an intermediary who transmits information unaltered. - Defamatory information must have been provided by another content provider.
i. Blogger, end-user (e-profile creator). - E-Bay - E-Bay claimed they were the mere information compiler of the seller ratings information, not the creator of the information - creator was.
- Matchmaker - also considered a “compiler” of the information. The site provides a form for the user to fill out, but the information itself is provided by and published by the user.
i. Drop-down menus were not enough to be considered information itself
ii. Addition of information only is not enough to create liability (ex: height) - the defamatory information itself must be created by the website (think a blog) to violate the CDA immunity - AOL (Note 2) - claim actual damages, don’t need to prove punicary damages (cost of changing phone #, harm suffered, etc.)
- People will likely sue the ISP, instead of the original poster because:
i. It is difficult or impossible to ID the original poster
ii. Deeper pockets of the ISP - Rule of law, not of fact (not for the jury)
- Some changes are allowed (Batzel, p. 898), including selecting portions of the defamatory writing (an e-mail) for publication
(Carafano)
47 USC 230(c)(1):
- No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider
- Congress granted most Internet services immunity from liability for publishing false or defamatory material so long as the information was provided by another party.
- Internet publishers are treated differently from corresponding publishers in print, television and radio.
(Carafano)
Communications Decency Act of 1996 for 2 policy reasons:
- To promote free exchange of information and ideas over the internet.
- To encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene material.
(Carafano)
Section 230 (c):
Interactive computer services have flourished to the benefit of all Americans with a minimum of government regulation and that increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services. (Carafano)
POLCY OF THE US:
To promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services and to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies. (Carafano)
Section 230 (c) Immunity (broad):
- Reviewing courts have treated 230(c) immunity as quiet robust, adopting an expansive definition of interactive computer service and a relatively restrictive definition of information content provider.
- CDA creates broad immunity for ISPs:
The protection extends to ISPs that fall within the definition of secondary publishers and even more to those that come within the terms of primary publishers.
(Carafano)
Carafano RULE 1
Under the statutory scheme, an interactive computer service qualifies for immunity so long as it does not also function as an information content provider for the portion of the statement or publication at issue. (Carafano)
Matchmaker:
- Can’t be considered an information content provider under the statute because no profile has any content until a user actively creates it.
- The fact Matchmaker classifies user characteristics into discrete categories and collects responses to specific essay questions doesn’t transform it into a developer of the underlying misinformation.
- Matchmaker lacks responsibility for the underlying misinformation.
- Matchmaker did not play a significant role in creating, developing, or transforming the relevant information.
(Carafano)
Carafano RULE 2
- Even if D is an information content provider, the statute precludes treatment as a publisher or speaker for “any information provided by another information content provider.”
- The statute would still bar P’s claims unless D created or developed the particular information at issue. (Carafano)
Original v. Secondary Publishers
- Original publishers- generally strict liability under common law.
- Secondary publishers- is knew or should have known. (Carafano)
Carafano RULE 3
- 230(c)(1)- an entity would remain a provider or user and this eligible for immunity under 230(c)(2) as long as the information came from someone else; but it would become a publisher or speaker and lose the benefit of 230(c)(2) if it created the objectionable information.
- The section precludes an ISP as a publisher, while allowing state regulation of ISPs.
- D can invoke this immunity as long as have interactive computer service and information provided by another information content provider.
(Carafano)
Ogden v. Association of the U.S. Army
The book containing the alleged libel was published in November, 1955. This suit was filed on June 25, 1959. The District of Columbia has a 1-year statute of limitations for defamation. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted. (Ogden)
OLD RULE (Minority):
Every sale or delivery of libelous matter was a new publication and that, therefore, a new COA accrued on each occasion. (Ogden)
Policy for the Old Rule
Good because D makes profits from each publication so it would be fair to let P recover for republication and it would discourage D from reprinting defamatory statements. (Ogden)
SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE (Majority):
Publication of a book, periodical, or newspaper containing defamatory matter gives rise to but one COA for libel, which accrues at the time the original publication, and that the statute of limitations runs from that date. (Ogden)
Policy of New Rule
Avoids unnecessary litigation and upholds the statute of limitations. (Ogden)
Damages:
The number of copies of the offending publication supplied to the public is a factor to be considered in determining the amount of damages to be awarded. (Ogden)
Internet:
- Unlike a book or magazine that has specific publication runs, this constant modification, if counted as a publication could create a morass of litigation that defeat the statute of limitations for Internet defamation.
- Also mere addition of information to a website can’t serve as republication of any defamatory material already on the website
- Publication on the Internet know no national boundaries.
(Ogden)
Libel Tourism
- Actions brought in English courts by aggrieved persons against publishers who would have been protected in the U.S.
- Prompted some State legislatures to enact statutes and the U.S. Congress to introduce legislation designed to protect Americans First Amendment rights.
(Ogden)
SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE OVERVIEW:
- Strict application is only newspapers, books and periodicals
a. Note 1 (p. 903) extends Single Publication Rule to radio, TV, movies, including re-publications/re-runs
b. Note 2 (p. 903) extends to Internet/websites - The extent or numerosity of republication will be taken into account for calculation of damages.
a. Policy: Stops a multiplicity of law suits (not 1 for each “new” publication), protects the publisher by giving a distinct statute of limitation by “stopping” the publication at the date of the first publication.
i. Hypo: E-mail defamation message sent around. Suit brought 1 year, 2 days after the original e-mail was sent, but it has been forwarded.
ii. HYPO: D who publishes a book in 2010, but in 2008, D provided copies of defamatory statements to friends. SoL is 1 year. Barred by the single publication rule?
iii. Publication was first made in 2008, so bar would be in 2009.
iv. Argue policy - that there was no widespread dissemination in 2008 (goes against multiplicity of suits policy); could manipulate the system by showing to one other person, waiting a year and then publishing en mass. (Ogden)
