Damages

Question 1

Hawkins v. McGee NH 1929, 2

Answer 1

Reliance/Expectation Damages

Key Facts:
∆ opreated on π’s hand and it made it worse, hairy hand. Does he get difference b/e what he was promised (perfect hand) and what he has, or just compensated for his harm.
Holding/Takeaway:
∆ promise was a contract and π should get expectation damages -> difference b/w current hand and perfect hand.
Dissent/Critique:
Isn’t this a windfall?

Question 2

Groves v. John Wunder MN 1939, 6

Answer 2

Expectation Damages

Key Facts:
∆ intentionally breached contract/lease which required him to level land while he used it. Cost to level was $60,000, and value of leveled land was $12,160
Holding/Takeaway:
Cost of remedying the defect is the proper measure of damages. Tort concerned with fradulent breach. Holds ∆ to the contract
Dissent/Critique:
Recovery cannot be greater than actual loss. Windfall!

Question 3

Peevyhouse v. Garland OK 1963, 13

Answer 3

Expectation Damages

Key Facts:
Same facts as Groves, except Peevyhouses actually live on the land.
Holding/Takeaway:
remedial work was “incidental” to the purpose of the contract which was to benefit from the coal. Econ. waste theory.

Question 4

Landis v. Fannin OH 2011, 16

Answer 4

Expectation Damages

Key Facts:
Landis contract ∆ to build custom home. ∆ messes up “stain” for siding so it doesn’t match. Cost of repainting siding with solid color is $8,500, cost or putting on new “stained” siding is $66,906.
Holding/Takeaway:
Economic waste theory is tempered by the reasonableness test. Are the damages sought “reasonable.” [test taken from trespass tort cases]. Court find that they are because Landises wanted “Custom” home with “rustic” siding so the contractors must provide that in order to make them whole. Ugly fountain.

Question 5

Acme Mills v. Johnson KT 1911, 22

Answer 5

Expectation Damages

Key Facts:
on April 26, π contracted to purchase wheat from ∆ on July 25 for $1.03 a bushel. On July 14-15 ∆ sold his wheat to Liberty Mills at $1.16 a bushel. He threshed on July 29th and did not deliver any wheat to π. Price July 25th = $1.00. Price July 29th < $1.00. Trial court $0 for breach of contract.
Holding/Takeaway:
Ct. appeals affirmed. Harm is calculated by comparing the general market price of the product on the date it would have been sold to the contract price.

Question 6

Laurin v. DeCarolis MA 1977, 24

Answer 6

Expectation Damages

Key Facts:
∆ sold wooded area to π and removed gravel during sale w/o permission during closing of sale. Fair market value of gravel was $6480. PP: Trial court awarded π fair market value $6480 on torts theory of conversion. Ct. Appeals reversed, only had contract claim based on diminution in value of property, which was basically $0.
Holding/Takeaway:
π was entitled to the value of the gravel “as it lay in the land” without the added labor costs. Diminution of value was not appropriate b/c it did not measure the loss correctly, but neither is the π entitleled to the cost of the ∆’s labor.

Question 7

Watt v. Nevada RR NV 1896

Answer 7

Reliance damages

Key Facts:
∆ negligently operated his train and set fire to π’s “backup” hay. Nearest hay market $10-12 a ton + 8.50 for bailing and transportation Trial judge gave π judgment and valued it at $10 a ton. ∆ appealed. Ct. appeals reversed and valued it at $3.50 (top market price - bailing and transportation costs.
Holding/Takeaway:
TORTS. No recovery for hay. It did not have value because the need for it is conjectural and π did not in actuality replace it. Can recover for the hay press with transportation costs.

Question 8

Strouth v. Pools by Murphy and Sons, Inc., CT, 2003, p,797

Answer 8

Breaking Promises

Homeowners contracted for the installation of a peanut-shaped pool but the pool company excavated for a kidney-shaped pool, and the homeowners sued for breach of contract. A material breach of a contract by one party justifies the other party’s termination of the agreement.

Question 9

Plante v. Jacobs, WI, 1960, p.799

Answer 9

Breaking Promises

K to build house; minor defects: wall between kitchen and living room 1 ft in wrong way. Ct: substantial performance (performance meets essential purpose of K) even if it ≠ completely in compliance. P should recover K price – deduction for small issues of repair. Reconstructing wall would be economic waste b/c wall does ≠ effect value of house. D did ≠ ask for cure during construction of stock house (≠ customized). Measure damage under cost-of-replacement or diminution of value rule depending on nature/magnitude of defect.

Question 10

Printing Center of Texas, Inc. v. Supermind Pub. Co., TX, 1984, p.814

Answer 10

Breaking Promises

Sued for refund of deposit made under K to print books b/c they failed to conform to K. UCC 2-601 = perfect tender rule – buyer’s can reject goods that do ≠ conform to K in every respect (complete performance). Sample provided that induced K creates an express warranty that the whole of goods will conform. Implied warranty of merchantability as well.

Question 11

Prescott & Co. v. J.B. Powles & Co., WA, 1920, p.816

Answer 11

Breaking Promises

Order for 300 crates of onion, only one ship sailing between Australia and San Fran, only allowed to order 240 b/c remainder suddenly taken up by US gov. Buyer refused acceptance, seller resold at lesser market value. Ct: delivery of goods must be exact quantity; no excuse b/c of govt b/c sued on K (full performance must be shown). Buyer could have rendered performance impossible or a waiver.

Question 12

Ramirez v. Autosport, NJ, 1982, p.817

Answer 12

Breaking Promises

Allow rescession only for material breaches now + opportunity to cure. UCC 2-601: mitigation w/ good faith; 2-601, excluding installment Ks; 2-612: broad definition of installment K, test of materiality

Question 13

Beck & Pauli Lithographing Co. v. Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 8th Cir. 1892, p.818

Answer 13

Breaking Promises

Extensive order of engraved letterhead, bills, etc. Proof submitted and approved; finished products shipment, arriving 2 months later, rejected. Ct: time of performance ≠ necessarily essence unless express provision indicates condition. In K for artistic skill and labor, time clauses are ≠ strictly construed. Articles ≠ sellable to other buyers. No indication of injury.

Question 14

Plateq Corp. of North Haven v. Machlett Labs., Inc., CT, 1983, p821

Answer 14

Breaking Promises

Two lead covered steel tanks constructed to P’s specifications. K provided tanks would be tested for radiation leaks before acceptance and P would need to cure. When performance substantially completed, D noted some deficiencies. P promised to correct and D communicated general acquiesce to proposed tender (truck by for pickup). Then, D cancelled. Ct: D accepted by signaling willingness to take tanks despite nonconformities. Could have demanded cure UCC 2-508, or revoked under UCC 2-608 (substantial impairment of value), but accepted after inspection (failed to make effective rejection) – liable for full price under UCC 2-607(1). Rejection ≠ particularized UCC 2-605 (prevent a cure). Tank ≠ sellable on open market, so seller gets K price minus salvage.

Question 15

Worldwide RV Sales & Service v. Brooks, IN, 1989, p.825

Answer 15

Breaking Promises

K to purchase motor home; agreed it would have two roof AC units; when Brooks arrived, vehicle only had one roof AC. Refused acceptance; Worldwide offered to cure by installing two ACs (leaving hole in roof); declined. Ct: refusal proper under UCC 2-601 (can≠ claim 2-508: nonconforming delivery or substitution).

Question 16

Fortin v. Ox-Bow Marina, Inc., 1990, p.825

Answer 16

Breaking Promises

Months after taking delivery of Bayliner, P revoked acceptance and sued for refund. Ct: support for findings of minor defects, but series of defects, even if some cured, can shake buyer’s faith in goods -> sub impairment of value. Delay of revocation ok if buyer/seller in constant communication/seller makes repeated assurances of cure.

Question 17

Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, NY, 1921, p.802

Answer 17

Breaking Promises

Owner did ≠ complain of defect for 9 months. K required that pipes be from Reading, but thy did ≠ use that type. P sued to recover balance from D. Ct: omission of pipe ≠ willful and there was no diff in quality, etc. (ev excluded from trial), should be atoned for by allowance of damage (≠ a breach of condition followed by forefeiture). If change was so dominant/pervasive, it would frustrate purpose of K, but degree of deviation ≠ great here and parties were silent as to importance (says Cardozo.) Two options: market value difference or cost of replacement.

Question 18

Reynolds v. Armstead, CO, 1968, p.805

Answer 18

Breaking Promises

π contracted to apply brick veneer to ∆’s house. Failed to do so properly. Material breach, but still entitled to quantum meruit

Question 19

Hadden v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, NY, 1974, p.806

Answer 19

Breaking Promises

After an employee’s retirement, employer discovered facts that would have allowed for “for cause” termination and revoked his pension. Ct. found that employee’s performance was substantial given that the breach was in some of the employment years, not all of them, and the breach doesn’t impair the overall work.

Question 20

K&G Const. Co. v. Harris, MD, 1960, p.737

Answer 20

Breaking Promises

GC in K w/ sub for excavating. Progress payments for each month of K. D accidentally bulldozed wall; GC w/held progress payment; D refused to work. Ct: Performances were conditioned on promise of others; where total price fixed for K, work ≠ divisible by progress payments. Sub materially breached promise of workmanship when bulldozing the wall, but GC treated it as partial breach by allowing sub to continue work after he messed up the wall meant Kor treated nonperformance as partial breach. Sub defaulted against by refusing to continue K

Question 21

Stanley Gudyka Sales Co. v. Lacy Forest Products Co., 7th Cir., 1990, p.740

Answer 21

Breaking Promises

Dealer in wood products K for services of similar dealer; would split profits, could terminate K for “just cause.” Lacy terminated b/c he failed to promptly remit commissions ($3000), but Lacy owed Gudyka ($46,000) Ct: found for Gudyka. Self-help available only where termination is in proportion to the need for accountability and breach is material/≠ insignificant. W/out notice and opportunity to cure, there is no just cause. Doctrine of conditions ≠ a tool, which will permit a party to use an insignificant breach as a pretext for avoiding Kual obligations.

Question 22

Wholesale Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Decker, ME, 1993, p.735

Answer 22

Breaking Promises

Agreed to install driveway on Decker’s property w/ no completion date specified; payment w/in 90 days of completion. Began work immediately, but difficulties b/c ground wet, so waited. D contacted P re: lack of progress; P reassured, but still failed to perform. Ct: anticipatory repudiation = “definite and unequivocal manifestation of intention on part of repudiator to ≠ render promised performance when time fixed for it arrives. May be through words or conduct. May also excuse non-occurrence of condition. [Could have demanded assurance 2-609, R2K §251]

Question 23

Hathaway v. Sabin, VT, 1891, p.810

Answer 23

Breaking Promises

D to furnish an opera house for a concert and pay $75 after the entertainment. Weather horrid and D decided to ≠ open/heat hall even though P eventually arrived; P = failed to furnish the hall. Ct: party who becomes involved in difficulties that he ≠ responsible for should ≠ be deprived of benefits of K b/c other party assumes difficulties are insurmountable if he can perform ultimately. D decided against performing too early ≠ for D to decide that damages were less than amount he agreed to pay when P incurred everything on his part and was prevented from earning compensation solely b/c of D’s failure. AoR should be on concert promotor?

Question 24

Tipton v. Feitner, NY, 1859, p.750

Answer 24

Breaking Promises

P orally agreed to sell 88 dressed hogs AND live hogs. Sets of hogs had different prices and would be delivered at different times. P refused to deliver live hogs b/c D had ≠ paid for dressed hogs. Ct: like the purchase of property – if there no stipulation for credit/delay on either side, payment of price are conditions of the other, neither party can sue for breach w/out having offered performance on his part. ≠ paying immediately would be like extending credit for indefinite period (‘till live hogs arrive; ≠ P’s intention). P waived payment concurrent w/ delivery, so P should have sued asap before delivery of live hogs. But D can≠ refuse to pay for the dressed hogs b/c P broke K re: live hogs; should have remedy by separate action.

Question 25

Kelly Const. Co. v. Hackensack Brick Co., NJ, 1918, p.749

Answer 25

Breaking Promises

Entered in K w/ D for all brick required for construction of school. K said nothing re: payment; after making several deliveries, D refused to continue b/c P hadn’t yet paid. P covered in market and sued for damages. Ct: Sale for specified quantity of goods = entire K; payment when performance is completed in whole. Failure to pay for part delivery doesn’t excuse seller from completing. Delivery of goods and payment usually concurrent conditions, but not when deliveries must be in installments b/c of quantity.

Question 26

Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co. 4th Cir., 1929, p.56

Answer 26

Breaking Promises

P can’t receive full K damages if notice of repudiation is given mid-performance. P has a duty to mitigate damages, so stop work upon notice of final repudiation. Correct damages are for part performance plus profit of K.

Question 27

Leingang v. City of Mandan Weed Board, ND, 1991, p.59

Answer 27

Breaking Promises

Should fixed overhead expenses be included in damage calculation? D wants to prove that P has high expenses (that would be sunk regardless of performance of K) and low profits to minimize damages. Could this mean that you pay overhead twice (regardless and then subtracted out of the remedy)

Question 28

Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., CA, 1970, p.61

Answer 28

Breaking Promises

P contracted to star in musical for D. D cancelled production and offered role in western instead with same salary. P refused. D alleged failure to mitigate. Court held that western was ≠ equivalent to musical for P and that she had no duty to mitigate with something worth less than original offer.

Question 29

Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., NY, 1972, p.30

Answer 29

Breaking Promises

Purchase unique speedboat; put down deposit. Wanted to take back b/c of heart attack; seller refused. Later sold boat at earlier K price. Ct: deposit goes back to breacher but retailer can counterclaim on K breach. “Lost volume doctrine.”

Question 30

In re WorldCom, Inc., NY, 2007, p.68

Answer 30

Breaking Promises

After WorldCom (D) filed bankruptcy, Michael Jordan (P) made a claim against the bankruptcy estate for the amount unpaid on an endorsement deal, but WorldCom (D) argued that Jordan (P) was not entitled to the full amount claimed because Jordan (P) could have reduced his damages by making a deal with another company. BLACK LETTER RULE The doctrine of avoidable consequences, which has also been referred to as the duty to mitigate damages, bars recovery for losses suffered by a non-breaching party that could have been avoided by reasonable effort and without the risk of substantial loss or injury.

Question 31

Hadley v. Baxendale, UK, 1854, p,75

Answer 31

Breaking Promises

P contracted with D to send a broken mill shaft to manufacturer. Mill stopped until delivery of new shaft. Due to D’s negligence, shaft delivery was delayed. D is responsible only for lost profits/damages that are a foreseeable consequence/naturally arising circumstances of its breach. Lost profits ≠ foreseeable because due to special circumstances and they were ≠ communicated to D.

Question 32

Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., US, 1903, p.78

Answer 32

Breaking Promises

The federal court dismissed the plaintiff’s breach of contract case because it found that the actual damages did not meet the jurisdictional minimum requirement, and the plaintiff appealed. Under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, a person can be held responsible only for such consequences from a breach of contract as may be reasonably supposed to be in the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract is made.

Question 33

Lamkins v. International Harvester Co., AR, 1944, p.82

Answer 33

Breaking Promises

Farmer wanted to use tractor at nighttime/seller promised a light but did not deliver. Ct: should have mitigated by buying light. Not proportional to hold seller responsible for a whole year of crops for not delivering light – tractor was still functional.

Question 34

Victoria Laundry (Windsor) v. Newman Indus., UK, 1949, p.83

Answer 34

Breaking Promises

Laundry boiler dropped in accidental fall, delay in delivery, cleaner won b/c bad business was a foreseeable result of not having boiler quickly.

Question 35

Hector Martinez & Co. v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 5th Cir., 1980, p.85

Answer 35

Breaking Promises

Foreseeable damages from not having dragline; shipped for use, not for sale (if it were for sale, it might be excusable loss)

Question 36

MindGames, Inc. v. Western Publishing Co., 7th Cir., 2000, p.91

Answer 36

Breaking Promises

P contracted with D to promote and sell its adult board game with the payment of royalties. D did ≠ vigorously promote game and failed to pay renewal fee. P ≠ entitled to renewal fees b/c it failed to seek nominal damages. P also ≠ entitled to seek lost profits. New business rule should be applied as a standard and ≠ a rule b/c of vagueness and inability to apply as strict rule. However, lost profits demanded were pure speculation and P offered no evidence of what they would actually earn.

Question 37

Freund v. Washington Square Press, Inc., NY, 1974, p.96

Answer 37

Breaking Promises

K to publish hardcover book, made impossible because publisher bought out by publisher that did not do hardcover books. Specific performance impossible = nominal damages.

Question 38

Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., MI, 1976, p.97

Answer 38

Breaking Promises

book and bottle shop. Ct: can recover for a reasonable estimate of the extent of harm.

Question 39

Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, IL, 1932, p.38

Answer 39

Breaking Promises

P entered in K with D to participate in boxing match. P also entered into Ks with another boxer and a promoter. D breached and repudiated K. What expenses should be included in a damages award? No reasonable estimate of the future profits of the match. No damages for prep expenses prior to actual signing of K. No damages for trying to make D comply with K. (undertaken at P’s risk). Payment to promoter conditional on success of event, no event, no payment. Is there a frustration of purpose here? Damages for reliance expenses incurred between signing of K and breach if they furthered the entire performance. NO DAMAGES because nothing has happened yet (also proceeds are speculative, etc.)

Question 40

Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., MO, 1932, p.45

Answer 40

Breaking Promises

P contracted with D to ship exhibit to convention. P told D what purpose of shipping was and necessary arrival date. D failed to deliver the most important package, so P unable to participate in convention. Ct: some reliance damages, including ones incurred before K, because they were in reliance of performance and had some certainty of loss

Question 41

Anglia Television, handout

Answer 41

Breaking Promises

Ct: only reliance damages, not expectation damages. D only responsible for reliance expenditures after hired under K. [Pottow: this is in tension with Dempsey]

Question 42

Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. U.S., US, 200, p.101

Answer 42

Breaking Promises

Two oil companies sought restitution of $156 million they paid to the United States government in return for oil exploration and development rights, which were conditioned on the companies getting further permission from the government; the oil companies argued that the government’s failure to obtain required Department of Interior approval constituted repudiation of the contracts, such that the government owed them their up-front money back. BLACK LETTER RULE If one party to a contract advances the other party money, principles of restitution require the latter, upon repudiation, to refund that money.

Breaking Promises

Two oil companies sought restitution of $156 million they paid to the United States government in return for oil exploration and development rights, which were conditioned on the companies getting further permission from the government; the oil companies argued that the government’s failure to obtain required Department of Interior approval constituted repudiation of the contracts, such that the government owed them their up-front money back. BLACK LETTER RULE If one party to a contract advances the other party money, principles of restitution require the latter, upon repudiation, to refund that money.

Question 43

U.S. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 4th Cir., 1973, p,103

Answer 43

Breaking Promises

P was subcontracted by D to do steel work. P part performed until D breached and P refused to continue work. P allowed to refuse continuation. Ct: P could sue for quantum meruit, value of services performed. Prevents unjust enrichment by D from P’s services. Damages = quantum meruit – already made payments.

Question 44

Kearns v. Andree, CT, 1928, p.105

Answer 44

Breaking Promises

K to sell land and house to D. D refused to perform K unless P made certain changes to house. Once changes made D again refused performance. P had to make additional changes and sold house at lower price. K unenforceable because mortgage clause was indefinite. P can recover quantum meruit despite unenforceable K (illusory K), but only for changes made at request of D b/c they were done with the understanding of compensation and for benefit of D. Can’t we just say you are estopped into a K (purpose of down payment = bind buyer to seller)

Question 45

Alsson v. Moore, IN, 1992, p.107

Answer 45

Breaking Promises

Moores answered Olsson’s ad for house + lot for sale. Moores wanted to buy. B/c house was unsuitable for winter, asked for permission to begin renovations asap. Olsson agreed and Moore repaired kitchen floor, renovated 4 rooms, and reroofed house. Ps and D were negotiating price of property. One day after Moore’ old home’s sale was closed, house burned down accidentally. Olsson collected insurance, but policy did ≠ cover improvements. He refused to pay for lab and material supplied. Ct: No K at all existed at the time of fire; parties’ minds did ≠ “meet” BUT D received a benefit from improvements (increased value of home) and bears the cost of the benefits he received/ratified. Olsson could have declined renovations/stopped them whenever (conduct/oral K)

Question 46

Britton v. Turner, NH, 1834, p,125

Answer 46

Breaking Promises

P contracted by D to labor for one year at set price of $120. P stopped work after 9 ½ months. Question: can P recover for part performance? Yes, P can recover quantum meruit – any damages caused to D from breach. Can only get paid for the amount of work that actually benefited D, ≠ just preparation.

Question 47

Pinches v. Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Church, CT, 1887 p.130

Answer 47

Breaking Promises

P contracted by D to buy church. P deviated from K in some material ways that could ≠ be fixed without starting anew. P entitled to restitution minus the damages caused by ≠ following K, ≠ the amount needed to make building conform to K.

Question 48

Kelley v. Hance, CT, 1928, p.133

Answer 48

Breaking Promises

P contracted by D to excavate and build a sidewalk on D’s property. P did excavation but then left the job. P sued for quantum meruit. Lower Ct held that P could recover. Appeals Ct said ≠ benefit received by D despite having been done on his property. No recovery when willful breach.

Question 49

Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., CT, 1980, p.134

Answer 49

Breaking Promises

P contracted to buy condo from D and made down payment of $7880 (10% of total K price). P repudiated K and sued to recover deposit under restitution. Burden of proof of unjust enrichment is on the breacher. They must prove that deposit exceeds the actual loss. Liquidated damages clause (that deposit is nonrefundable) is a reasonable allocation of risk. So P can’t recover unless they can show that D could recover damages in another way, so be unjustly enriched by keeping deposit.

Question 50

Muldoon v. Lynch, CA, 1885, p,143

Answer 50

Breaking Promises

P contracted by D to buy monument to deceased husband by certain date with clause of $10 forfeiture for each day delay. Delayed two years and P sued to recover full K price. Ct: clause = penalty (based on K language) and unenforceable. Liquidated damage clauses can only be for compensation and must match estimate of actual loss when loss is difficult to calculate. No psychic/emotional damages covered. (would it work better if we framed it as a discount device?)

Question 51

Yockey v. Horn, 7th Cir., 1989, p. 144

Answer 51

Breaking Promises

P and D entered into a settlement agreement, which included a $50,000 liquidated damages clause for voluntarily participating in a lawsuit against the other. D breached that agreement. P allowed to be awarded the $50,000 because even though D’s voluntary participation in lawsuit was ≠ the significant for success of suit, it could have damaged P’s reputation, etc., which is difficult to determine actual loss and $50,000 is a reasonably estimate.

Question 52

Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., OH, 1984, p.153

Answer 52

Breaking Promises

security system – doesn’t allow liquidated damages). P contracted with D to install and provide a security system. D was negligent in providing security service, which resulted in huge loss from shop, but K limited damages to $50. Exculpatory clause valid if ≠ penalty. K can≠ just state that clause is ≠ penalty, it must also meet the elements of a liquidated damages clause: uncertain amount, K as a whole is ≠ unconscionable, and parties’ intended amount to result in case of negligent breach. Clause doesn’t meet any => invalid

Question 53

Fretwell v. Protection Alarm Co.

Answer 53

Breaking Promises

(security system – allows liquidated damages). P contracted with D to install and provide a security system. D was negligent, burglars to reenter the home without alerting. Liquidated damages clause valid? Yes b/c it is a limitation of liability, ≠ actually liquidated damages clause. Clearly does ≠ try to estimate actual loss.

Question 54

Edge Group WAICCS LLC v. Sapir Group LLC

Answer 54

Breaking Promises

The buyer of a property interest backed out of the deal the day before closing and the seller sued for specific performance of the contract of sale. To be entitled to specific performance, the plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a contract, (2) the defendant’s breach of that contract by non-performance, (3) the plaintiff’s substantial performance of its obligations under the contract and its ability and willingness to undertake any additional steps required of it under the contract, and (4) that the invocation of the court’s equitable powers is justified by the absence of an adequate remedy at law.

Question 55

Curtice Bros. Co. v. Catts, UK, 1907, p. 165

Answer 55

Breaking Promises

P contracted to buy tomato crop from D. D failed to deliver tomatoes. Specific performance allowed because the nature of the factory makes having a certain amount of tomatoes at a certain time necessary to the functioning of the whole factory, which can≠ be recovered by money damages

Question 56

Fitzpatrick v. Michael, MD, 1939, p.177

Answer 56

Breaking Promises

P provided nursing and housekeeping until his death for $8/week plus room/board plus house after D’s death. D repudiated the contract before death. K unenforceable in K because of statute of frauds for sale of land. No equity recovery b/c can≠ award specific performance for personal service Ks (can≠ force intimacy of parties). Monetary damages can≠ be determined.

Question 57

Lumley v. Wagner, UK, 1852, p.181

Answer 57

Breaking Promises

D contracted perform exclusively at P’s opera house. D breached K by agreeing to perform at a competitor’s house. Court allowed to grant injunction to prevent D from performing at competitor’s house even though he can≠ force D to perform at P’s house. Hope that D will choose to complete performance because of injunction without actually forcing her.

Question 58

Pingley v. Brunson, SC, 1979, p.182)

Answer 58

Breaking Promises

P contracted to play the organ at restaurant. D repudiated K after part performance. P ≠ allowed to demand specific performance because D did ≠ meet exception and money damages would be sufficient. Exception: if D possesses unique and exceptional skill or ability in his area of expertise. Also ≠ allowed no-compete injunction because no clause in K and can≠ imply such a clause.

Question 59

Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, WI, 1955, p.184

Answer 59

Breaking Promises

P contracted D as a manager of lumber store. In D’s K was a non-compete clause for 10 years. After quitting, D opened his own store in breach of clause. Trial and Appeals Ct found clause unreasonable.. Ct found that three years, from point of injunction, was reasonable time for noncompete clause.