Crypto Protocols Flashcards
Reflection Attack
- message is encrypted
- attacker can send the original message back to the sender
- if m = “pay peter 200 €”; peter would get 400
Defence Reflection Attack
- put the original sender in the encryption
- attacker can no longer reflect to original person
Replay Attack
- attacker copies message and send several time to a person
- if m = hans, “pay peter 200 €”; peter would get from receiver 400
Defence Replay Attack
- with timestamps
- needs global clock - Nonces
- > b sends a nonces; a puts nonces in message
- A nonce (“Number used ONCE”)
PC (plain-cipher)
CP (cipher-plain)
CC (cipher-cipher)
PC: b to a: nonce a to b: {A, m, nonces}_k_AB CP: b to a: {A, m, nonces}_k_AB a to b: nonces -> as acknowledgment CC: b to a: {B, m1, nonces}_k_AB a to b: {A, m2, nonces}_k_AB
all encrypted m can just be decrypted by a and b
TLS: Transport Layer Security - Record Protocol
- en-/decrypts and validates data
TLS Handshake Protocol
C -> S: highest TLS + nonces + session ID
S -> C: chooses TLS + nonces + copied session ID from C
S -> C: server certificate + DH parameters + ask C for certificate
C -> S: certificate + DH parameter + {pre-master secret}_enc pub key of S + CV -> signs handshake with certificate
C -> S: sends changed_cipher_specs
S -> C: finished
Why ID’s in TSL?
- multiple TLS connection share a session
- resume a session or add one to it; very easy
Why DH in TLS and not RSA?
- if RSA key leaked whole conversation can be leaked
- with DH -> perfect forward security
SSL 2.0 weaknesses
- no support for non-RSA alg. and certificates
- attacker could delete padding of MAC
- DOWNGRADE ATTACK (give server options with venerability in it)
TLS traffic analysis
- if content on server is know and m has certain size we can assume that this was dowloaded
Common Name (CN)
determines domain validity
e.g. for www.google.com
or *.brainscape.com
-> wildcard, also a.b.brainscape.com
PKI / Certificate Hierarchy
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
- Root CA: trusted by everyone
- Intermidiary CA: root CA trust tehem to issu certificates
- End entities: Users, system, devices
-> chain of trust