CRIMPRO Searches and Seizures (Part II) Flashcards
Section 13, Rule 126 Rules of Court (Search incident to lawful arrest.)
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. (12a)
Section 5, Rule 113 Rules of Court Section 5. —Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:
(1) consented searches;
(2) as an incident to a lawful arrest;
(3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws;
(4) searches of moving vehicles;
(5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders;
(6) where the prohibited articles are in “plain view;”
(7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and
(8) “stop and frisk” operations.20 (emphasis underscoring supplied)
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (meaning)
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.
Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); - Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches;
(2) as an incident to a lawful arrest;
(3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws;
(4) searches of moving vehicles;
(5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders;
(6) where the prohibited articles are in “plain view;”
(7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and
(8) “stop and frisk” operations.20 (emphasis underscoring supplied)
“stop-and-frisk” operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v. Chua22 held:
The act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
This principle of “stop-and-frisk” search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In said case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a “stop-and-frisk.” In People v. Solayao, we also found justifiable reason to “stop-and-frisk” the accused after considering the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons w[h]ere roaming the vicinity. (emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)1âwphi1
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him.
Such a “stop-and-frisk” practice serves a dual purpose:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
The search of a moving vehicle
However, the rule that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the fact that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle — petitioner’s vehicle was “flagged down” by the apprehending officers upon identification. Therefore, the police authorities were justified in searching the petitioner’s automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded immediate action.
. . . the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought
moving vehicle
“As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court cannot again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, it has been held that ‘considering that before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of practicability.’
The search of a moving vehicle (Probable cause)
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One such form of search of moving vehicles is the “stop-and-search” without warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances:
(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds;
(2) simply looks into a vehicle;
(3) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors;
(4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
(5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and
(6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
The “plain view” doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The “plain view” doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant to be valid, (
1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;
3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. These requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure (G. O. No. 58), particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver the same to the corresponding court (secs. 102-104).
It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear,
first, that the right exists;
secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (67 C. J., 299.) It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. She could not have objected because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon Alfredo Salas. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. (56 C. J., p. 1183.) Of course, the petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some of her papers and documents. But this was precisely the reason why she sent her attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usuary Board to demand the return of the documents seized. In any event, the failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority of the law. (Const. Lim., 8th ed., Vol., I, p. 630.) As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181.)
