Criminal Law Review Flashcards
Distinguish motive from intent.
Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a definite result, while
intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.
Intent is an element of the crime (except in unintentional felonies),
whereas motive is not.
What do you understand by aberratio ictus, error in personae and praeter intentionem? Do they alter the criminal liability of the accused?
Aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow occurs when the offender delivered the blow at his intended victim but missed, landing on an unintended victim. The situation generally brings about complex crimes where from a single act, two or more grave or less grave felonies resulted.
Error in personae or mistake in identity occurs when the offender hit the person intended but turned out to be different from the intended victim. The criminal liability is not affected unless the mistake resulted in a different crime.
Praeter intentionem occurs when the consequence went beyond that intended or expected, and is a mitigating circumstance when there is a notorious disparity between the act and the resulting felony.
Distinguish mala in se from mala prohibita.
Mala in se is wrong from its very nature, as most of those punished in the RPC. In its commission, intent is an element and good faith is a defense.
An act mala prohibita is wrong because it is prohibited by law. The mere commission of that act constitutes the offense punished, and criminal intent is immaterial.
What are heinous crimes? Name ten specific heinous crimes.
Heinous crimes are grievous, odious, and hateful offenses that are repugnant to common standards of decency and morality. They are punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The ten specific heinous crimes are:
Treason,
Qualified Piracy,
Qualified Bribery,
Parricide,
Murder,
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention,
Robbery with Homicide, Destructive Arson,
Rape committed by two or more persons, or with a deadly weapon or with homicide,
Plunder.
What are the instances when the death penalty could not be imposed, although it should otherwise be meted out?
Under Art. 47 of the RPC, the death penalty shall not be imposed when:
- The guilty person is below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, or
- Is more than 70 years of age, or
- When upon appeal of the case by the SC, the required majority vote is not obtained.
When is the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law not applicable?
The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to:
- Persons convicted of offenses punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment;
- Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
- Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage;
- Those convicted of piracy;
- Those who are habitual delinquents;
- Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
- Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon;
- Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year;
- Those sentenced by final judgment prior to the law’s approval;
- Those sentenced to destierro or suspension.
What is an impossible crime?
It is an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment, or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. If the acts performed constitute an offense under the RPC, the penalty should be that for the latter and not for an impossible crime.
Distinguish instigation from entrapment.
Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not be committed.
Entrapment signifies the means devised by a peace officer to apprehend a person who has committed a crime. With or without the entrapment, the crime has already been committed.
What is the purpose of the Probation Law?
The purposes of the Probation Law are:
To promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing individualized treatment;
To provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender; and
To prevent the commission of offenses.
What is the doctrine of implied conspiracy?
The doctrine of implied conspiracy holds two or more persons participating in the commission of a crime collectively responsible as co-conspirators, even without an agreement, when they act in concert, demonstrating unity of criminal intent and a common purpose.
1. TREACHERY
As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat.
The rule does not apply, however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim.
This is more so, where the assault upon the victim was preceded by a heated exchange of words between him and the accused.
In the case at bench, the assault came in the course of an altercation and after appellant had sharpened his bolo in full view of the victim.
Appellant’s act of sharpening his bolo can be interpreted as an attempt to frighten the victim so the latter would leave him alone. It was simply foolhardy for the victim to continue walking to and fro near appellant in a taunting manner while the latter was sharpening his bolo.
The suddenness of the attack does not, by itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia where the decision to attack was made peremptorily and the victim’s helpless position was incidental. (PEOPLE vs. REAL, G.R. No. 93436. March 24, 1995)
2. COMPLEX CRIME
Where the appellant inflicted a stab wound on each of the two (2) victims who were separated from each other by a distance of three (3) meters, the acts of the appellant may not be characterized as a delito compuesto.
There were, in other words two (2) distinct acts, directed at two (2) different victims successively, separated from each other by a brief but discernible interval of time and space.
A delito compuesto, in contrast, arises from a single physical act resulting in simultaneous injury to two (2) or more victims. (PEOPLE vs. MISION. G.R. No. 63480. February 26,1991)
3. AMNESTY
A person released by amnesty stands before the law as though he had committed no offense.
Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged. Amnesty is a public act of which the court should take judicial notice.
Thus, the right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented either by the complainant or prosecution or by the offense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation, which has force of the law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, and not to be punished as a criminal. (PEOPLE vs. VERA, G.R. No. 26539. February 28, 1990)
4. PARDON
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
The pardon granted to petitioner resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment, but to regain her former post, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
The Court cannot oblige her Civil liability arising from crime. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner’s civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. (MONSANTO vs. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 78239. February 9, 1989)
5. MALVERSATION
It is settled that good faith is a valid defense in the prosecution of malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent.
The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea—a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. (TABUENA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN. G.R. Nos. 103501-03. February 17,1997)
6. ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION
Acts of endorsing of checks by way of identification of the signatures of the payees entitled to said checks and their proceeds constitute the crime of estafa through falsification of mercantile document by reckless imprudence because such endorsement constituted a written representation that the payees participated in the indorsement and cashing of the checks, when in truth and in fact the true payees had no direct intervention in the proceedings.
In the crime of falsification by imprudence of public or mercantile documents the element of intent to cause damage is not required because what the law seeks to repress is the prejudice to the public confidence in these documents. (SAMSON vs. CA, et al. Nos. L-10364 and L-10376. March 31.1958)
7. RAPE
There is no such crime as frustrated rape.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.
Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated.
The uniform rule is that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or the lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. (PEOPLE vs. QUIÑANOLA, G.R. No. 126148, May 5, 1999)
Absence of injuries does not negate the commission of rape. It is true that, although complainant testified that appellant boxed her on the stomach, the medical report did not indicate any abrasion, hematoma or bruise on that part of her anatomy.
This is of no consequence. Medical authorities agree that when force is applied on the stomach, no marks may be detected. Injuries may have been caused in the internal organs, but external signs are not always visible.
The absence of injuries, however, does not negate the commission of rape. (PEOPLE vs. JOYA, G.R. No. 79090. October 1, 1993)
It should be underscored that the presence or absence of spermatozoa in the vagina is not determinative of the commission of rape because a sperm test is not a sine qua non condition for the successful prosecution of a rape case.
Thus, the lack of spermatozoa in the victim’s body does not negate the crime of rape. The important element in rape is penetration of the pudenda and not emission of seminal fluid. (PEOPLE vs. BONDOY, G.R. No. 79089. May 18, 1993)
8. ROBBERY
When robbery is committed by three (3) persons in conspiracy and not by a band, that is more than three (3) armed malefactors taking part in the commission of the crime, only the offender committing rape shall be liable for the special complex crime of robbery with rape. (PEOPLE vs. MORENO, G.R. No. 92049, March 22, 1993)
It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstances.
The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Art. 13 of the same code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is a specific paragraph (par 10) providing for analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of robbery) would result in an analogous situation where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. However, the remedy lies with the legislature.
A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute. In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be considered as aggravating.
The proper penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper. (PEOPLE vs. REGALA, G.R. No. 130508. April 5, 2000)
In robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution need only to prove these elements:
(a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons; (b) that the property taken belongs to another;
(c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi; and
(d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) was committed.
These elements were present when accused-appellants, acting in unison, demanded money from her mother, forcibly took the same against her will and then hacked her to death. (PEOPLE vs. CABILES, G.R. No.113785. September 14, 1995)
It has been repeatedly held that when direct and intimate connection exists between the robbery and the killing, regardless of which the two precedes the other, or whether they are committed at the same time, the crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
It is a settled doctrine that when death supervenes by reason or on occasion of the robbery, it is immaterial that the occurrence of death was by mere accident.
What is important and decisive is that death results by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
The death of a robbery victim by accident can, however, be considered as a mitigating circumstance.
If the circumstances would indicate no intention to kill, as in the instant case where evidently, the intention is to prevent the deceased from making an outcry, and so a “pandesal” was stuffed into her mouth, the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave may be appreciated.
The stuffing of the “pandesal” in the mouth would not have produced asphyxiation had it not slid into the neckline, “caused by the victim’s own movements.” (PEOPLE vs. OPERO, No. L- 48796. June 11, 1981)
9. KIDNAPPING WITH SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION
The essence of kidnapping or serious illegal detention is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim or the deprivation of his liberty. There is no kidnapping with murder, but only murder where a 3-year old child was gagged, hidden in a box where it he and ransom asked.
The demand for ransom did not convert the offense in to kidnapping with murder. The defendant was well aware that the child would be suffocated to death in a few moments after she left.
The demand for ransom is only a part of the diabolic scheme of the defendant to murder the child, to conceal his body and then demand money before the discovery of the cadaver. (PEOPLE vs. LORA, G.R. No.49430. March 30, 1982)
10. DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of a passionate outburst.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements:
(1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and
(2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.
These elements are present in the case.
Though about one hour had passed between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused- appellant.
The RPC, in requiring that the accused “shall kill any of them or both of them… immediately” after surprising his spouse in the act of sexual intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter.
It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity.
But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors.
The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused’s rage. (PEOPLE vs. ABARCA. L-74433. September 14,1987).
1. CONSPIRACY
When accused-appellant Pugay poured gasoline on the victim’s body and thereafter his co- accused Samson set the victim on fire, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime.
There was no animosity between the deceased and Pugay or Samson.
Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased.
Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, each of them is liable only for the act committed by him.
Pugay is liable for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence, while Samson is liable for Homicide.
Pugay failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from his act.
Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise.
Giving him the benefit of the doubt, it can be conceded that as of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased’s clothes on fire.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. (PEOPLE vs. PUGAY, No. L-74324. November 17, 1988)
2. FRUSTRATED FELONY
When the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
Where the offender treacherously inflicted a wound upon the victim which was sufficient to have caused death, but the victim survives by reason of prompt medical attention, the offender is liable for frustrated murder. (PEOPLE vs. MISION. G.R. No. 63480. February 26,1991)
3. SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense is man’s inborn right. In a physical assault, retaliation becomes unlawful after the attack has ceased, because there would be no further harm to repel.
But that is not the case when it is aimed at a person’s good name.
Once the aspersion is cast its sting clings and the one thus defamed may avail himself of all the necessary means to shake it off.
He may hit back with another libel which, if adequate, will be justified. (PEOPLE vs. HIONG. No. 10413-R. October 20, 1954)
If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel and the second requisite of self-defense would have no basis.
Even if we allow appellant’s contention that Tuquero was the initial unlawful aggressor, we still cannot sustain his plea of self-defense.
After appellant successfully wrested the knife from Tuquero, the unlawful aggression had ceased.
After the unlawful aggression has ceased, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.
The presence of large number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim. (PEOPLE vs. SO, G.R. No.104664. August 28, 1995)
Plainly, the accused-appellant could no longer retreat from the continuing assault by the victim who, as inexorably shown by his relentless advance towards the accused-appellant, was poised to kill the latter.
The danger to the accused-appellant’s life was clearly imminent.
It would not then be proper nor reasonable to claim that he should have fled or selected a less deadly weapon, because in the emergency in which, without any reason whatever, he was placed, there was nothing more natural than to use the weapon he had to defend himself.
In the natural order of the things, following the instinct of self-preservation, he was compelled to resort to a proper defense.
It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense.
What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. (PEOPLE vs. GUTUAL. G.R. No. 115233. February 22,1996).
The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing would have resulted in the further chiseling of the walls of appellant’s house as well as the closure of the access to and from his house and his rice mill—which were not only imminent but were actually in progress.
There is no question, therefore, that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia was actually participating in the fencing.
This was indeed an aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights.
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of one’s rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
Appellant who was sleeping when the victims chiselled his house and fenced off his estate and who asked them to stop doing so is not guilty of sufficient provocation when he shot the victims who ignored his plea. (PEOPLE vs. NARVAEZ. Nos. L-33466-67. April 20,1983.)
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of aggression.
Even if we give credence to accused-appellant’s version of the events, specifically that the deceased hurled invectives at him and moved as if to draw something from his waist, the Court are unable to establish a finding of unlawful aggression on the victim’s part.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. (PEOPLE vs. ARIZALA, G.R. No. 130708. October 22, 1999)
4. OBEDIENCE TO ORDER OF A SUPERIOR OFFICER
The subordinate who, in following an order of the superior, failed to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement, cannot escape responsibility for such omission; but where he acted in good faith, his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature, not criminal. (TABUENA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN. G.R. Nos. 103501-03. February 17,1997)
5. INSANITY AS EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
Accuse-appellant must thus prove that he was completely deprived of reason when he killed his father in order to be exempt for parricide.
There is nothing either in the report of Dr. Gerona or his testimony which indubitably show that accused-appellant was completely without reason when he killed his father because the latter wanted him to leave the house.
The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance and, like the justifying circumstance of self- defense, the burden is on the defense to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was insane immediately before the commission of the crime or at the very moment of its execution.
Although schizophrenia is not exempting if it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, it may nevertheless be considered mitigating under Art 13 (9) if it diminishes the exercise of his will power. (PEOPLE vs. BANEZ, G.R. No. 125849, January 20, 1999)
6. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY
With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the records show that he was only thirteen (13) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.
Under Art.12, par. (3), of the RPC, a person over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) years is exempt from criminal liability unless it is shown that he acted with discernment.
The minor referred to here is presumed to have acted without discernment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that such minor acted otherwise.
Even if he was indeed a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age. (PEOPLE vs. ESTEPANO. G.R. No. 126283. May 23,1999)
7. ACCIDENT AS AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
At all events, accidents to be exempting, presupposes that the act done is lawful.
Here, however, the act of the accused-appellant of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same not being in self-defense, is unlawful—it at least constitutes light threats (Art. 285,par. 1 of RPC). There is thus no room for the invocation of accident as ground for exemption.
The fact that the victim is not shot in the head, or in any vital part of her body does not negate intent to kill.
The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the victim, as above proved, manifests intention to extinguish life. Moreover, it was likewise declared that the bullet injured a vital organ of the victim. (PEOPLE vs. NEPOMUCENO, JR.. G.R. No.127818. November 11, 1998)
8. VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
The presence of the 5th mitigating circumstance, that is, immediate vindication of a grave offense to said accused, may be taken into consideration in favor of the two accused.
There was no interruption from the time the offense was committed to the vindication thereof.
The herein accused belong to a family of old customs to whom the elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the home and at the same time spreads uneasiness and anxiety in the minds of the members thereof. ( PEOPLE vs. DIOKNO, No. 45100 . October 26, 1936)
9. REITERACION
Reiteracion requires that if there is only one prior offense, that offense must be punishable by an equal or greater penalty than the one for which the accused has been convicted.
There is no reiteracion because that circumstance requires that the previous offenses should not be embraced in the same title of the Code.
While grave threats fall in a title, different from homicide, still reiteracion cannot be appreciated because such aggravating circumstance requires that if there is only one prior offense, that offense must be punishable by an equal or greater penalty that the one for which the accused has been convicted.
Likewise, the prosecution has to prove that the offender has been punished for the previous offense. There is no evidence presented by the prosecution to that effect. (PEOPLE vs. REAL, G.R. No. 93436. March 24, 1995)
10. EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
In the absence of other notorious acts evincing his determination to murder the victim, known premeditation in the instant case cannot be deduced from the mere fact that six (6) hours before he stabbed the victim to death, the accused-appellant took the hunting knife of the victim.
There is nothing in the records to show that there was an enmity between the two and it is not for the Court to conjecture that there was. Indeed, it is foolhardy for the Court to draw from this single act a cold-blooded intention to take the life of another.
The killing was simply committed as a-spur-of-the-moment, induced by that degree of intoxication which then triggered the bellicosity in the accused-appellant who, incidentally, is known in the community as an ex-convict and a killer. (PEOPLE vs. CALIJAN, G.R. No. 94592. September 28, 1993)
Insanity as Exempting Circumstances
Accuse-appellant must thus prove that he was completely deprived of reason when he killed his father in order to be exempt for parricide.
There is nothing either in the report of Dr. Gerona or his testimony which indubitably show that accused-appellant was completely without reason when he killed his father because the latter wanted him to leave the house.
The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance and, like the justifying circumstance of self- defense, the burden is on the defense to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was insane immediately before the commission of the crime or at the very moment of its execution.
Although schizophrenia is not exempting if it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, it may nevertheless be considered mitigating under Art 13 (9) if it diminishes the exercise of his will power. (PEOPLE vs. BANEZ, G.R. No. 125849, January 20, 1999)
Self-Defense
Self-defense is man’s inborn right. In a physical assault, retaliation becomes unlawful after the attack has ceased, because there would be no further harm to repel.
But that is not the case when it is aimed at a person’s good name.
Once the aspersion is cast its sting clings and the one thus defamed may avail himself of all the necessary means to shake it off.
He may hit back with another libel which, if adequate, will be justified. (PEOPLE vs. HIONG. No. 10413-R. October 20, 1954)
If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel and the second requisite of self-defense would have no basis.
Even if we allow appellant’s contention that Tuquero was the initial unlawful aggressor, we still cannot sustain his plea of self-defense.
After appellant successfully wrested the knife from Tuquero, the unlawful aggression had ceased.
After the unlawful aggression has ceased, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.
The presence of large number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim. (PEOPLE vs. SO, G.R. No.104664. August 28, 1995)
Plainly, the accused-appellant could no longer retreat from the continuing assault by the victim who, as inexorably shown by his relentless advance towards the accused-appellant, was poised to kill the latter.
The danger to the accused-appellant’s life was clearly imminent.
It would not then be proper nor reasonable to claim that he should have fled or selected a less deadly weapon, because in the emergency in which, without any reason whatever, he was placed, there was nothing more natural than to use the weapon he had to defend himself.
In the natural order of the things, following the instinct of self-preservation, he was compelled to resort to a proper defense.
It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense.
What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. (PEOPLE vs. GUTUAL. G.R. No. 115233. February 22,1996).
The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing would have resulted in the further chiseling of the walls of appellant’s house as well as the closure of the access to and from his house and his rice mill—which were not only imminent but were actually in progress.
There is no question, therefore, that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia was actually participating in the fencing.
This was indeed an aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights.
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of one’s rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
Appellant who was sleeping when the victims chiselled his house and fenced off his estate and who asked them to stop doing so is not guilty of sufficient provocation when he shot the victims who ignored his plea. (PEOPLE vs. NARVAEZ. Nos. L-33466-67. April 20,1983.)
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of aggression.
Even if we give credence to accused-appellant’s version of the events, specifically that the deceased hurled invectives at him and moved as if to draw something from his waist, the Court are unable to establish a finding of unlawful aggression on the victim’s part.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. (PEOPLE vs. ARIZALA, G.R. No. 130708. October 22, 1999)
Frustrated Felony
When the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
Where the offender treacherously inflicted a wound upon the victim which was sufficient to have caused death, but the victim survives by reason of prompt medical attention, the offender is liable for frustrated murder.
(PEOPLE vs. MISION. G.R. No. 63480. February 26,1991)
Article 46 – Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general.
The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony. Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony in general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated felony.
Article 47 – In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed.
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases:
- When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age.
- When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty.
For the imposition of said penalty or for the confirmation of a judgment of the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the Supreme Court shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all justices of said court, unless some member or members thereof shall have been disqualified from taking part in the consideration of the case, in which even the unanimous vote and signature of only the remaining justices shall be required.
Article 48 – Penalty for complex crimes.
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Article 49 – Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended.
In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed:
- If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
- If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
- The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Article 50 – Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime.
The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.
Article 51 – Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes.
A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
Article 52 – Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in consummated crime.
The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a consummated felony.
Article 53 – Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a consummated felony.
The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony.
Article 54 – Penalty to imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated crime.
The penalty next lower in degree than prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated felony.
Article 55 – Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crime.
The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a frustrated felony.
Article 56 – Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted crime.
The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony.
Article 57 – Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted crime.
The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempted felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony.
Article 58 – Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain accessories.
Those accessories falling within the terms of paragraphs 3 of Article 19 of this Code who should act with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer the additional penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave felony.
Article 59 – Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible.
When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.
Article 60 – Exception to the rules established in Articles 50 to 57.
The provisions contained in Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories.
Article 61 – Rules for graduating penalties.
For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
- When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degrees shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.
- When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be impose to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.
- When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective graduated scale.
- When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned respective graduated scale.
- When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories.
QUESTION: What is the doctrine of implied conspiracy? (1998; 2003)
ANSWER: The doctrine of implied conspiracy holds two or more persons participating in the commission of a crime collectively responsible and liable as co-conspirators although absent any agreement to that effect, when they act in concert, demonstrating unity of criminal intent and a common purpose or objective. The existence of a conspiracy shall be inferred or deduced from their criminal participation in pursuing the crime and thus the act of one shall be the act of all.
QUESTION: Are reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment the same? Can they be imposed interchangeably? (1991; 1994; 2001)
ANSWER: NO. Reclusion perpetua is a penalty prescribed by the RPC, with a fixed duration of imprisonment from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, and carries with it accessory penalties.
Life imprisonment, on the other hand, is a penalty prescribed by special laws, with no fixed duration of imprisonment and without any accessory penalty.
QUESTION: What is a memorandum check? Is a person who issues a memorandum check without sufficient funds guilty of violating B.P Blg. 22? (1994;1995)
ANSWER: A memorandum check is an ordinary check with the word “Memorandum,” “Memo,” or “Mem” written across the check, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay its holder absolutely, thus partaking the nature of a promissory note. It is drawn on a bank and is a bill of exchange within the purview of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
A person who issued a memorandum check without sufficient funds is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22 as said law covers all checks whether it is an evidence of indebtedness, or in payment of a pre-existing obligation, or as deposit or guarantee.
QUESTION: Distinguish clearly but briefly between rebellion and coup d’etat based on their constitutive elements as criminal offenses.
ANSWER: Rebellion is committed by a public uprising and taking arms against the government while coup d’ etat is committed by means of swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth.
The purpose of rebellion is either to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof or any body of land, naval or other armed forces; or to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress wholly or partially of any of their powers or prerogatives.
On the other hand, the purpose of a coup d’ etat is to seize or diminish state power from the duly constituted authorities of the government or any military camp or the installation communication networks, public utilities and other facilities needed for the exercise of continued possession of powers.
Rebellion may be committed by any group of persons while coup d ‘etat is committed by a person or persons belonging to the military or police, or holding any public office or employment. Rebellion is committed by more than 1 person as it involves a public uprising, while coup d ‘etat may be committed by only one person.
QUESTION: Distinguish clearly but briefly between compound and complex crimes as concepts in the Penal Code.
ANSWER: Compound crime is when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while a complex crime is when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
QUESTION: Distinguish clearly but briefly between justifying and exempting circumstances in criminal law.
ANSWER: Justifying circumstances are those when the act of a person is said to be in accordance with law, so that such person is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liability.
On the other hand, exempting circumstances are those grounds for exemption from punishment because there is wanting in the agent of the crime any of the conditions which makes the act voluntary or negligent.
QUESTION: Distinguish clearly but briefly between intent and motive in the commission of an offense.
ANSWER: Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect a definite result while motive is the moving power which impels one to action for such result.
QUESTION: Distinguish clearly but briefly between oral defamation and criminal conversation.
ANSWER: Oral defamation, known as slander, is a malicious imputation of any act, omission or circumstance against a person, done orally in public, tending to cause dishonor, discredit, contempt, embarrassment or ridicule to the latter. This is a crime against honor penalized in Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
Criminal conversation is a term used in making a polite reference to sexual intercourse as in certain crimes, like rape, seduction and adultery. It has no definite concept as a crime.
Praeter Intentionem
When the Resulting Harm is Greater than Means Employed by the Offender
“Praeter intentionem” is defined as having an injurious result that is greater than that intended. The Revised Penal Code describes it as no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
In People vs. Ural, praeter intentionem is a mitigating circumstance “that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed” (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is manifested from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola.
His design being only to maltreat him, may be because in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. Such that when he realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed the victim to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary
People vs. Ural, G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974
Aberratio Ictus
Can A Wrongful Act Done Differently From That Which is Intended Incur Criminal Liability?
In “aberratio ictus” or mistake in the blow, a person directed the blow at an intended victim, but because of poor aim, that blow landed on somebody else. The intended victim as well as the actual victim are both at the scene of the crime.
In the People vs. Flora case, when Hermogenes Flora first fired his gun at Ireneo, but missed, and hit Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead, he became liable for Emerita’s death and Flor’s injuries. Hermogenes cannot escape culpability on the basis of aberratio ictus principle. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended.
Note, however, that when a person intended the commission of several felonies with a single act, it is not called aberratio ictus or mistake of blow, simply because there was no mistake in the commission of crime.
People vs. Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000
Error in Personae
When does a Mistake in Identity Become a Criminal Liability?
“Error in personae” or mistake in identity is injuring one person who is mistaken for another. The intended victim is not at the scene of the crime. It is the actual victim upon whom the blow was directed, but he is not really the intended victim. If the crime committed is the same as the crime intended, but on a different victim, error in persona does not affect the criminal liability of the offender.
The maxim “ignorantia facti excusat” applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.
In this case, Oanis and Galanta, unlike Ah Chong, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, the two had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was accordingly unarmed. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
The crime committed by Oanis and Galanta is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental.
People vs. Oanis, G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943
Mistake of Fact
Is There Criminal Liability for Ignorance or Mistake of Fact?
The legal maxim, “Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea,” aptly justifies that the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so.
In the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged “cancels the presumption of intent,” and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of Article 1 of the (old) Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. There is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
US vs. AH CHONG, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19,1910
What are the Characteristics of Criminal Law?
Generality means that the criminal law of the country governs all persons who lives or sojourns in the Philippines (Article 14, NCC), subject to certain exceptions brought about by international agreement. Ambassadors, chiefs of states and other diplomatic officials are immune from the application of penal laws when they are in the country where they are assigned (People vs. Galacgac, CA., 54 O.G. 1027). Acts performed should be in official capacity and performance of his duty (G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000).
Territoriality means that the penal laws of the country have force and effect only within the National Territory of the Philippines, subject to certain exceptions brought about by international agreements and practice. The territory of the country is not limited to the land where its sovereignty resides but includes also its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, including those outside of its jurisdiction as provided in Article 2, paragraphs 1-5 of RPC.
Prospectivity means the law acts or omissions will only be subject to a penal law if they are committed after a penal law had already taken effect. Vice-versa, this act or omission which has been committed before the effectivity of a penal law could not be penalized by such penal law.
Exception: (1) when new statute it is favorable to the accused and (2) the accused is not a habitual delinquent (Article 22 of RPC).
Mala In Se vs. Mala Prohibita
Mala in se (“evil in itself”) – A crime or an act that is inherently immoral, such as murder, arson or rape. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed.]
Mala prohibita (“prohibited evil”) – An act that is a crime merely because it is prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed.]
Violations of the Revised Penal Code are referred to as malum in se, which literally means, that the act is inherently evil or bad or per se wrongful. On the other hand, violations of Special Laws are ‘generally’ referred to as malum prohibitum.
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended. Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation.
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se, -on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission b)”. reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita.
In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
Dungo vs. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015
Chain of Custody Rule – RA 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation:
FIRST, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
SECOND, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer (within 24 hours);
THIRD, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
FOURTH, the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
People vs. Constantino, Jr. GR No. 199689, March 12, 2014
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
The fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine provides that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
Comerciante vs. People, G.R. No. 205926
When Warrantless Arrest is Lawful
A Warrantless Arrest, also known as “citizen’s arrest,” is lawful under three circumstances:
1) In Flagrante Delicto – When, in the presence of the policeman, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
2) Hot Pursuit – When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it.
3) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a Penal Establishment.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
Rebellion as Complex Crime
Rebellion Can Now Be Complexed with Common Crimes
Rebellion can now be complexed with common crimes – killings, and/or destructions of property, even though committed by rebels in furtherance of rebellion, shall bring about complex crimes of rebellion with murder/homicide, or rebellion with robbery, or rebellion with arson.
Not long ago, Enrile v. Salazar, 86 SCRA 217, and People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil 515 affirmed the rule that rebellion may not be complexed with common crimes. However, in amending Article 135, the acts which used to be component crimes of rebellion, like serious acts of violence, have been deleted. These are now distinct crimes. The legal obstacle for the application of Article 48, therefore, has been removed.
What are acts punished as terrorism?
When the purpose of act is:
a) to intimidate the general public
b) to create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear
c) to provoke or influence the government through intimidation
d) seriously destabilize or destroy fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country
e) create a public emergency or seriously undermine public safety
Who are tagged as terrorists?
a) anyone who engages in acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to another person, or endangers a person’s life
b) anyone who engages in acts intended to cause extensive damage or destruction to a government or public facility, public place or private property
c) anyone who engages in acts intended to cause extensive interference with, damage or destruction to critical infrastructure
d) anyone who develops, manufactures, possesses, acquires, transports, supplies or uses weapons, explosives or of biological, nuclear, radiologicalor chemical weapons
e) anyone who releases dangerous substances, or causing fire, floods, or explosions
What are not acts of terrorism?
Terrorism shall not include:
Advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights, which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public safety
Who are deemed to be person in authority and agents of person in authority?
Persons in authority are persons directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission. Barrio captains and barangay chairmen are also deemed persons in authority. (Art 132, RPC)
Agents of persons in authority are persons who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, are charged with maintenance of public order, the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman, barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority. (Art 152, RPC)
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of the RPC, teachers, professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (PD No. 299 and BP Blg 873)
