Criminal Law & Procedure Flashcards
Summary
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, is offense-specific. Although the suspect had an attorney representing him on his pending assault charge, he had no Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel with respect to the five uncharged burglaries because formal adversarial proceedings had not yet commenced on those charges. The suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated by the detective’s failure to inform him that the lawyer was present or of the lawyer’s demands.
However, a person undergoing custodial interrogation also has an independent constitutional right to counsel during custodial interrogation under Miranda. When a suspect invokes his right to counsel under Miranda, custodial interrogation must immediately cease for a period of at least 14 days. However, the invocation of the right to counsel must be unambiguous and clearly convey that the suspect has requested counsel. Here, because the suspect’s statement, “I think I want my lawyer here before I talk to you,” was ambiguous, he did not invoke his Miranda right to counsel.
A waiver of rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Here, the suspect waived his right to remain silent under Miranda when he signed the waiver form. The fact that the detective did not correct the suspect’s assumption that the lawyer would need to drive to the jail—by telling him that the lawyer was in the waiting room and was demanding to see him—did not affect the validity of the suspect’s waiver.
Did the detective violate the suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he questioned the suspect about the burglaries without the lawyer present, given that the lawyer represented the suspect in an unrelated criminal matter?
The suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated because the right does not attach on new charges until formal adversarial judicial proceedings have commenced on those charges.
Rule
The Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” The right to counsel does not attach with respect to particular charges until formal adversarial judicial proceedings have commenced (i.e., “at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment [or in some states, arrest warrant],” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (internal quotations omitted)). Once a suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, any attempts to “deliberately elicit” statements from him in the absence of his attorney violate the Sixth Amendment. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is charge-or offense -specific. Representation by counsel in one prosecution does not, in itself, guarantee counsel for uncharged offenses. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175; Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
Application
Here, the suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached only for the pending aggravated assault charge. The suspect’s right to counsel for the aggravated assault case did not guarantee counsel for the five unrelated and uncharged burglaries that were the subject of the detective’s interrogation. Thus, because formal adversarial judicial proceedings against the suspect for the uncharged burglaries had not begun, he had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Finally, the detective’s failure to inform the suspect of the lawyer’s presence and demands to speak with him does not implicate the suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which had not yet attached. See id.; Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428–31 (1986).
Under Miranda, did the suspect effectively invoke his right to counsel when he said, “I think I want my lawyer here before I talk to you”?
The suspect did not effectively invoke his right to counsel under Miranda because his statement was not unambiguous.
Rule
A suspect subject to custodial interrogation has a right to consult with counsel and to have an attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When a suspect invokes his right to counsel during an interrogation, law enforcement must immediately cease all questioning. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). Custodial interrogation cannot be reinitiated unless and until the suspect has been re-advised of his Miranda rights, has provided a knowing and voluntary waiver, and (1) counsel is present and (2) the suspect himself initiated further communication with the police, see id. at 484, or (3) (if the suspect was released from custody after the initial interrogation) at least 14 days have passed. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010).
To invoke the right to counsel, a suspect’s request must be “unambiguous.” This means that the suspect must articulate the desire for counsel sufficiently clearly that a reasonable officer would understand the statement to be a request for counsel. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). If the request is ambiguous, the police are not required to stop the interrogation.
Application
In this case, the suspect’s statement, “I think I want my lawyer here before I talk to you,” was not an unambiguous request for counsel. The most reasonable interpretation of this statement is that the suspect might be invoking his right to counsel. Id. at 461 (“maybe I should talk to a lawyer” is not an unequivocal request for counsel). See also Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 197–98 (4th Cir. 2000) (“I think I need a lawyer” is not an unambiguous request for an attorney); Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 594–95 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussion of various statements that did not constitute unequivocal requests for counsel).
Under these circumstances, the detective was not required to cease the custodial interrogation of the suspect. Nor was the detective required to clarify or ask follow-up questions to determine whether the suspect in fact wanted an attorney. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459–60.
Was the suspect’s waiver of his right to remain silent under Miranda valid?
The suspect’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite the fact that he was never told of the lawyer’s presence in the jail or of the lawyer’s demands.
Rule
A valid waiver of Miranda rights must be “voluntary”—i.e., the product of a free or deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382–83 (2010). In addition, the waiver must be knowing and intelligent. That is, it “must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 421 (1986).
In this case, the suspect signed a Miranda waiver form after receiving proper warnings. There is no evidence “that the police resorted to physical or psychological pressure to elicit the statements.” Id. The entire interview lasted only 45 minutes. The only issue is whether the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights despite the fact that the detective did not tell the suspect about the lawyer’s presence and her demands.
The Supreme Court has said that “[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.” Id. at 422. If the suspect “knew that he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and . . . was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction,” then the waiver is valid regardless of the information withheld. Id. at 422–23.
Application
Here, the suspect was correctly informed of his rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467–73. His comments demonstrate that he understood that he could have a lawyer present if he desired (i.e., wondering whether he should call his attorney) and that he understood that there might be consequences to speaking with the detective (“I probably should keep my mouth shut, but I’m willing to talk to you for a while.”). His comment, “[L]et’s not waste any time waiting for someone to call my attorney and having her drive here,” along with his signature on the Miranda waiver form, show that his waiver was valid under the constitutional standard.
The fact that the detective did not tell the suspect about the lawyer’s presence and demands has no bearing on the validity of the suspect’s waiver because “such conduct is only relevant to the constitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.” Moran, at 424. The Supreme Court has specifically declined to adopt a rule requiring that law enforcement tell a suspect of an attorney’s efforts to contact him, id. at 425 (“Nor are we prepared to adopt a rule requiring that the police inform a suspect of an attorney’s efforts to reach him.”).
[NOTE: An examinee might also recognize that this general rule is further supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010), approving state Miranda warnings that do not explicitly warn suspects that they have a right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.]
