Criminal Law & Procedure Flashcards
Summary
The woman invoked her Miranda right to counsel on February 4 when she said, “I want a lawyer.” At that point, the detective was required to cease interrogation or provide an opportunity for the woman to obtain counsel. This restriction on interrogation, however, does not continue in perpetuity.
Here, following the woman’s invocation, the detective properly ended the custodial interrogation on February 4. There is no indication that the detective and the woman had any further contacts until March 15. This was sufficient time to terminate the detective’s obligation to honor the woman’s February 4 invocation of the right to counsel. Therefore, it was not a violation of the
woman’s Miranda rights for the detective to wait more than a month, repeat the Miranda warnings, obtain a waiver, and engage in custodial interrogation on March 15. The fact that the woman remained in jail from February 4 through March 15 does not mean that she was in “custody” during this time for Miranda purposes.
On March 15, the detective properly read the woman the state’s standard Miranda warnings. The detective’s subsequent statement describing the procedures for obtaining counsel did not
undermine the reasonable conveyance to the woman of her Miranda rights. On March 15, the woman did not invoke her right to counsel when she said, “I might need a lawyer.” This was not a “clear and unequivocal request” for counsel. Faced with an ambiguous
or equivocal statement, the detective was not required to (1) cease questioning the woman or (2) take any further action to determine whether the woman wanted counsel present.
Thus, the court did not err in denying the woman’s motion to suppress on any of the grounds raised by the woman’s lawyer
Did the detective violate the woman’s rights by
(1) interrogating the woman on March 15 after she had invoked her right to counsel under Miranda on February 4?
The woman’s invocation of her Miranda right to counsel on February 4 did not prevent the detective from interrogating her on March 15.
Rule
If a suspect clearly and unequivocally invokes her right to counsel after being informed of her Miranda rights, the police must cease the custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966). After invocation, counsel must be provided before a suspect can be questioned unless the suspect (1) initiates contact with law enforcement, (2) is given a fresh set of Miranda warnings, and (3) executes a knowing and intelligent waiver. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). However, in Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010), the Court held that cessation of custodial interrogation for 14 days terminated the Edwards requirements. Thus, after
14 days, law enforcement may approach a suspect who has previously invoked the right to counsel and (assuming new Miranda warnings and a valid waiver) reinitiate custodial interrogation even without a lawyer present.
Application
Here, assuming that the woman was undergoing custodial interrogation, she invoked her right to counsel and was returned to her cell on February 4, more than five weeks before the detective’s
March 15 interrogation. Assuming that Miranda was fully complied with on March 15 (see Point Two), the woman’s February 4 invocation of the right to counsel had terminated by March 15.
Finally, this analysis is not affected by the fact that the woman remained in jail from February 4 through March 15. In Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, the Court held that there are “vast differences
between Miranda custody and incarceration pursuant to conviction.” The release of a person from interrogation and back into his “normal life” in the general prison population ends the “‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial interrogation. Thus, the lengthy break between the woman’s initial invocation of her Miranda right to counsel and her interrogation on March 15 terminated the Edwards requirement, notwithstanding that she was in jail during that time.”
The court properly rejected the defense argument.
Did the detective violate the woman’s rights by incorrectly conveying to the woman her Miranda right to counsel by the statements
he made on March 15?
On March 15, the detective properly informed the woman of her right to counsel.
Rule
Miranda v. Arizona requires that law enforcement inform a suspect that she has the “right to the presence of an attorney and that if [she] cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for [her]
prior to any questioning if [she] so desires.” 384 U.S. at 479. Miranda does not require perfect adherence to the suggested language in the decision itself. See 384 U.S. at 476. See also California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per curiam); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S.
195, 202–03 (1989). For example, in Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010), the Court rejected the defense argument that informing a suspect of “the right to talk to a lawyer before answering
any of [their] questions” and “the right to use any of [his] rights at any time [he] want[ed] during th[e] interview,” but failing to inform the suspect of the right to counsel during interrogation
violated Miranda. 559 U.S. at 62. Miranda warnings need not be “the clearest possible formulation,” id. at 63; instead they must “reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda.” Id. at 62; Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203.
Application
Here, the state’s standard Miranda warnings read to the woman on both February 4 and March 15 “reasonably conveyed” her Miranda rights. However, the question remains: did the detective undermine or alter the Miranda warnings on March 15 when he told the woman:
We have no way of getting you a lawyer immediately, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. We don’t know when that will happen. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering questions until a lawyer is present.
Under the relevant constitutional standard, it is clear that the detective did nothing more than inform the woman of the procedure for appointment of counsel in the state. Taken in conjunction
with the detective’s March 15 reading of the state’s standard Miranda warnings, this statement did not undermine the reasonable conveyance of Miranda rights. Thus, the court did not err in
rejecting the argument that the woman’s statements should be excluded on this basis.
Did the detective violate the woman’s rights by interrogating the woman on March 15 after she had invoked her right to counsel
under Miranda on March 15
On March 15, the woman did not invoke her right to counsel when she said, “I might need a lawyer” because this was not a “clear and unequivocal request” for counsel.
Rule
The mere mention of the word “lawyer” does not constitute an invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requiring cessation of questioning under Edwards. Invocation of the right to counsel
“requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994),
citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991). To “unambiguously request counsel,” a suspect must “articulate [her] desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable
police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. In contrast, where a suspect’s request is ambiguous or equivocal, questioning need not cease. An ambiguous request is one that “a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel.” Id. (emphasis in original). When a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal
request for counsel, officers are not required to attempt to assess “the likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present.” Id
Application
The woman’s statement, “I might need a lawyer,” on its face, is not an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. In addition, the detective’s response—”That’s your call, ma’am”—and the fact that the woman remained silent before signing the waiver form suggests that, at the time of the woman’s statement, she was not asking for a lawyer to be present but was still weighing her options. Under these circumstances, the woman did not invoke her right to counsel, and the court properly rejected the defense argument that the woman’s statements to the detective should be excluded.
