Criminal Law & Procedure Flashcards
Summary
There are three reasons why the woman did not commit armed robbery when she took the cash from the homeowner. First, the woman did not commit theft when she received the money from the homeowner because she believed the homeowner was voluntarily paying her for the landscaping services previously provided. Because the woman lacked the mens rea required for theft, and theft is a necessary element of armed robbery, her conduct did not constitute armed robbery. Second, the woman was not carrying a dangerous weapon, as that term is defined in the statute. Third, the woman did not engage in either of the two alternative coercion-related elements of armed robbery: she did not engage in any actual “force, violence, or assault” and she did not intentionally put the homeowner in fear.
The woman did, however, commit theft when she took the figurine. All the elements of theft under State A’s law are satisfied. First, the figurine had been in the homeowner’s custody, sitting on her front lawn. Second, the homeowner never expressly or impliedly consented to the woman’s taking of the figurine. And third, the woman intended to permanently deprive the homeowner of the figurine.
The woman also committed criminal possession of stolen property. After she took the figurine under the circumstances that constituted theft, she was necessarily in knowing possession of stolen property. And by selling the figurine, she demonstrated her intent both to benefit herself and to impede the homeowner’s recovery of it.
The assistant committed criminal possession of stolen property. The assistant knew or reasonably should have known that the figurine was stolen because she purchased it under circumstances that would have informed an objectively reasonable person that the woman lacked the right to sell it: she offered to sell it at a cost much lower than the tagged price; the figurine was in new condition; and the woman had quipped, “Just don’t ask where I got it.”
Did the woman commit armed robbery of the $100 cash?
The woman did not commit armed robbery of the $100 cash.
The woman’s conduct in removing the cash from the homeowner’s hand violated State A’s armed-robbery statute only if she engaged in a theft and did so meeting the additional elements of armed robbery as defined by the statute. The woman neither committed theft of the cash nor removed the cash in a manner that meets the additional statutory elements.
First element of armed robbery offense
State A’s armed-robbery statute incorporates its theft statute as the first element of an armed-robbery offense. Theft either expressly or implicitly carries the mens rea element of intent. Here the woman did not intend any unlawful taking, since the facts strongly indicate her belief that the homeowner was voluntarily paying her for the $100 debt owed for landscaping services. The circumstances suggest that the woman accepted cash payment that, from her perspective, the homeowner was voluntarily providing to satisfy an obligation. Thus, the theft element of armed robbery is lacking. Although the homeowner may have thought the woman was stealing from her, the woman lacked the requisite mens rea of intent to steal. See generally, Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 19.5(d) (6th ed. 2017); and see People v. Butler, 421 P.2d 703, 706 (Cal. 1967) (“It has long been the rule . . . generally throughout the country that a bona fide belief, even though mistakenly held, that one has a right or claim to the property negates felonious intent” to steal). Therefore, under the statute, the woman did not commit armed robbery.
Second element
The second element of armed robbery also is lacking here. The facts do not indicate that the woman was “carrying a dangerous weapon” when the alleged taking occurred. Whether the woman’s pruning shears are a “dangerous weapon” depends on the statutory definition. State A qualifies an object as a “dangerous weapon” in any of three categories, none of which covers the pruning shears here. The pruning shears do not fall within the first category, as they are not a type of “firearm.” As to the second category, although it is true that pruning shears are “capable of producing death or great bodily harm,” they are commonly known to be designed for cutting branches as a landscaping or gardening tool, not “for use as a weapon.” The pruning shears therefore do not fall in the second category of dangerous weapons. And they do not fit the third and final catch-all statutory category because, although the pruning shears might be “used in a manner likely to produce death or great bodily harm,” in this case the woman did not “use” them in that way, as she merely held the shears downward, at her side.
Third element
The third element, which can be established by either of two alternative coercive means, also is not met here. Specifically, the woman did not engage in an armed robbery unless, during her alleged theft while using a dangerous weapon, she also either used “force, violence, or assault” or she “put[] the victim in fear of serious injury.” Neither of these occurred here. The facts suggest no physical conduct or violent threat that would constitute “force, violence, or assault.” The first alternative coercion element is therefore lacking. Regarding the second alternative, although the facts do suggest that the homeowner was in fear, the woman’s actions will satisfy the “putting in fear” element only if she actually meant to use force or intended to put the homeowner in fear. See, e.g., LaFave, supra § 20.3(d)(2) (indicating that committing robbery by threat or intimidation requires “purposeful” use of threats or putting in fear). And the facts suggest only that the woman willingly expressed annoyance, not that she engaged in intimidating conduct designed to put the homeowner in fear of any kind, let alone fear of force or violence designed to coerce handing over money. The second coercion element is therefore lacking.
[NOTE: A complete answer to this question should discuss all three elements of armed robbery to receive full credit.]
Did the woman commit theft of the figurine?
The woman committed theft when she took the figurine from the homeowner’s custody without permission and with intent to permanently deprive her of it.
Whether the woman committed theft when she took the figurine depends on the application of State A’s theft statute. “Theft is the unlawful taking and carrying away of property from the person or custody of another, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property.” The facts here establish that the woman committed theft of the figurine.
Application
The woman took the homeowner’s figurine after the homeowner provided cash sufficient to cover the unrelated debt. Understanding that the $100 entirely covered the amount owed for landscaping services and acting without the homeowner’s consent, the woman evidenced her intent to steal by the taking. Her culpability is not excused by the suggestion that she felt “entitled” to more than the $100. Context indicates that her supposed entitlement was not in the nature of a legal obligation, as the facts suggest that it arose only from the woman’s indignation and her unilateral moral belief that “a tip” or “something extra” was warranted. That the woman did not actually believe she had any legal right to the figurine is also evidenced by the fact that she looked back at the home to ensure that “the homeowner wasn’t looking” before she took it. And it is clear that she intended to permanently deprive the homeowner of the figurine because, shortly after taking it, she sold it to her assistant for cash. The woman committed theft when she took the figurine.
Did the woman commit criminal possession of stolen property based on possession of the figurine?
The woman committed criminal possession of stolen property of the lawn figurine because she knowingly possessed and then sold the property taken from the custody of another with intent to benefit herself or to impede the recovery of the property by its owner.
Criminal possession of stolen property
Under the State A statute, a person commits criminal possession of stolen property by knowingly possessing stolen property with intent to either benefit herself or a person other than the owner or to impede the owner’s recovery of the property. The actus reus of the crime of possession of stolen property is the wrongful possession of that property, regardless of the situation under which such possession was obtained. The mens rea element is the defendant’s knowledge that the property was stolen. See, e.g., People v. Hunt, 112 A.D. 781 (App. Div., 4th Dep’t, N.Y. 1985) (knowledge that property is stolen is “a necessary element of criminal possession of stolen property”). The actus reus and mens rea elements of criminal possession of stolen property are certainly met here. The woman knew the figurine was stolen property because she had stolen it. And her conduct also meets the additional element of the statute because her selling of the figurine to her assistant establishes either (and in this case both) that she possessed it “to benefit [herself] or a person other than an owner” and that she intended “to impede the recovery by an owner.”
[NOTE: In many jurisdictions, a defendant might not be convicted of both the crime of theft and the crime of possession of stolen property under these circumstances, since many states prohibit the conviction (or the punishment) of multiple offenses if they arise from the defendant’s singular course of conduct. But those statutes, which raise statutory or constitutional concerns about double jeopardy, are not relevant to the question here, which asks simply whether the woman committed the crimes, not whether she might have some right to avoid being convicted of or punished for them.]
Did the woman’s assistant commit criminal possession of stolen property?
The woman’s assistant committed criminal possession of stolen property when she purchased the lawn figurine from the woman under circumstances that would have led a reasonable person to believe that the figurine was stolen.
Again, a person commits criminal possession of stolen property in State A by possessing property knowing the property is stolen or having reason to believe the property is stolen with intent to benefit herself or a person other than the owner or to impede the owner’s recovery of the property. The circumstances satisfy the actus reus element of the assistant’s crime because she acquired possession of the stolen lawn figurine after she purchased it from the woman. The assistant also acted to benefit herself, as she purchased the figurine in “a great deal” that left her with property greater in value than the amount she paid for it, and she also indicated her intent to sell the figurine “for a hefty profit” to herself.
The circumstances also satisfy the mens rea element of the assistant’s crime. This element is met by alternative means under the statute provided, that the defendant possesses property that she either “knows” is stolen property or that she “reasonably should know is stolen property.” Although the facts at hand do not establish that the assistant knew the figurine was stolen property, they do establish that the assistant reasonably should have known it was stolen property.
Application
The facts as presented here are silent as to whether the assistant actually knew the figurine was stolen. In most jurisdictions, actual knowledge can be established through circumstantial evidence, and the circumstances here might convince a fact-finder to infer that the assistant actually knew that the figurine was stolen. Under the modern and majority view, this mens rea requirement would be proved from inferences from the surrounding circumstances rather than by direct evidence. See LaFave, supra § 20.2(d) n. 73 (citing United States v. Prazak, 623 F.2d 152 (10th Cir. 1980) (noting that a low price can support the inference that the purchaser knew the property was stolen)); United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1947) (same); State v. Butler, 450 P.2d 128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (same); State v. Chester, 707 So. 2d 973 (La. 1997) (same). See also People v. Waterford, 124 A.D.3d 1246 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (circumstantial evidence sufficient to support conviction of criminal possession of stolen property).
Here, however, it is unnecessary to rely on such inferences, because the facts readily meet the alternative mens rea element. An objectively reasonable person would believe that the lawn figurine was stolen based on the facts that the figurine looked new, it had a $200 price tag (substantially in excess of the $10 asking price), and the assistant heard the woman quip, “Just don’t ask where I got it.”
