Criminal Law And Procedure Learning Questions - Set 7 Flashcards
Which of the following statements is true regarding a detainee’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda?
A
All doubts about a request for counsel are construed in favor of the detainee.
B
The right applies only at custodial interrogations by the police or one known to be an agent of the police.
C
The police may question the detainee about an unrelated crime if they scrupulously honor the request by waiting a few hours and rewarning the defendant before the new questioning begins.
D
A detainee cannot waive the right to counsel in the absence of counsel.
B
The Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda applies only to custodial interrogations by the police or one known to be an agent of the police. The purpose of the rule is to protect the right against self-incrimination by preventing the police from badgering a suspect until he talks. The warnings are intended to offset the coercive atmosphere of custodial police interrogation, and so the right does not apply when the suspect is not in custody or is not being questioned by a police officer or one known by the suspect to be an agent of the police.
If a detainee invokes his Miranda right to counsel, the police may NOT question him about an unrelated crime. This is different from the rule for when the detainee merely invokes his right to remain silent, in which instance the police may question about a different crime if they scrupulously honor the request.
It is not true that all doubts about a request for counsel are construed in favor of the detainee. A request for counsel must be unambiguous and specific.
Neither is it true that a detainee cannot waive the right to counsel in the absence of counsel. A waiver will be valid if it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
The warnings required under Miranda ________ include that the detainee has the right to __________.
A
Do not; remain silent
B
Do not; be informed of the charges against him
C
Do; confront witnesses against him
D
Do; an impartial decisionmaker
B
The warnings required under Miranda do not include that the detainee has a right to be informed of the charges against him.
Also, it is not true that the warnings must include that the detainee has the right to an impartial decisionmaker. While such a right exists under the Due Process Clause, Miranda does not require that detainees be informed of that right.
Nor is it true that the warnings must include that the detainee has the right to confront witnesses against him. While there is such a right under the Sixth Amendment, Miranda does not require that detainees be informed of that right.
The warnings required under Miranda do require that the warnings inform the detainee of the right to remain silent.
The full warnings must inform the detainee that:
(i) He has the right to remain silent;
(ii) Anything he says can be used against him in court;
(iii) He has the right to the presence of an attorney; and
(iv) If he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him if he so desires.
Note that Miranda warnings do not need to be given verbatim, as long as the substance of the warning is there.
Miranda warnings __________ need to be given before a suspect is interrogated by a civilian working for the police.
A
Always
B
May
C
Never
B
Miranda warnings may need to be given, depending on whether the suspect knows this person is employed by the police. Miranda generally applies only to interrogation by the publicly paid police. It does not apply where interrogation is by an informant who the defendant does not know is working for the police. The rationale is that the warnings are intended to offset the coercive nature of police-dominated interrogation, and if the defendant does not know that he is being interrogated by the police, there is no coercive atmosphere to offset.
Miranda warnings are required as a prerequisite to the admissibility of confessions resulting from custodial police interrogation.
Which of the following statements is true about the interrogation requirement under Miranda?
A
Spontaneous statements violate Miranda if made before Miranda warnings are given.
B
The term “interrogation” includes any police tactic that officers should know is likely to elicit an incriminating response.
C
Allowing a suspect to talk to his wife in the presence of the police can constitute interrogation.
D
Routine booking questions usually will be considered interrogation.
B
The term “interrogation” includes any police tactic that officers should know is likely to elicit an incriminating response. It is not limited to direct questioning.
The Supreme Court has held that for purposes of Miranda, allowing a suspect to talk to his wife in the presence of the police DOES NOT constitute interrogation.
The Supreme Court has also held that routine booking questions do not constitute interrogation (because information about a suspect’s name or address usually is not incriminating).
Finally, if a spontaneous statement is made before Miranda warnings are given, there is no Miranda violation. Spontaneous statements are statements not made in response to any police conduct. Where the suspect blurts out information upon seeing the police, there is no interrogation.
Acting on an anonymous telephone call, police went to the defendant’s apartment, knocked on the door, and demanded to search it for narcotics. When the defendant refused, the police forced the door open and placed him under arrest. As they were removing him from the apartment, the defendant offered to give the officers “valuable information” in exchange for his release. Before he could say anything else, the defendant was given Miranda warnings by the police. Thereafter, he told the police that he had stored some heroin in his friend’s apartment and that he and his friend had been going to sell it. The heroin was recovered, and the defendant was prosecuted for conspiracy to sell narcotics and for possession of narcotics. At his trial, the defendant moved to suppress his statements.
Which of the following is the defendant’s best argument in support of the motion to suppress?
A The defendant is entitled to know the identity of his accuser, and the state cannot supply this information.
B The police should have given the defendant Miranda warnings prior to entry into the apartment, and the warnings were ineffectual once the defendant offered to give the police information.
C The defendant was intimidated by the forced entry into the apartment, and because the statements were involuntary and coerced, their use against him would violate due process of law.
D The statements were fruits of an unlawful arrest, and though the Miranda warnings may have been sufficient to protect his right against self-incrimination, they were not sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest.
D
The entry into the defendant’s apartment and his arrest, without a warrant, probable cause, or circumstances permitting an exception from these requirements, were unconstitutional. The statements he made thereafter were fruits of the original unconstitutional arrest and must be suppressed unless the taint was purged. The giving of Miranda warnings was not sufficient. Hence, (D) is the best answer. If probable cause for a warrant is based on information from an informer, usually that informer’s identity need not be revealed. Thus, (A) is incorrect. (B) is a misstatement of law. There was no interrogation by the police to trigger the Miranda requirements. (C) is attractive but not as accurate an answer as (D). If the police had been acting with probable cause to arrest, their forced entry into the apartment would not have made the defendant’s statements involuntary.
A man and a woman were arrested and charged with conspiring to blow up a federal government building. After being given Miranda warnings, they were questioned separately and each of them gave a written confession. The confessions interlocked with each other, implicating both of the defendants as being involved in every stage of the conspiracy. Subsequently, the woman attempted to retract her confession, claiming that it was false. At a preliminary hearing, the judge rejected her claim. Both defendants were tried together, and the prosecutor introduced both confessions into evidence. At trial, the woman testified that she was not involved in any conspiracy and that her confession was fabricated. Both defendants were found guilty by the jury.
The woman challenges her conviction on appeal because of the admission of the man’s confession. If the woman succeeds, what is the likely reason?
A The man’s confession was more incriminatory to her than her own confession.
B The jury was not instructed to consider the man’s confession as evidence only of his guilt and not of the woman’s.
C The man refused to testify at trial and therefore was not subject to cross-examination regarding his confession.
D The man testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination but denied making the confession attributed to him.
C
If the woman prevails in her challenge to the admission of the man’s confession, it will be because the man could not be cross-examined regarding his confession. Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant in a criminal prosecution has the right to confront adverse witnesses at trial. If two persons are tried together and one has given a confession that implicates the other, the right of confrontation generally prohibits the use of that statement because the other defendant cannot compel the confessing co-defendant to take the stand for cross-examination. A co-defendant’s confession is inadmissible even when it interlocks with the defendant’s own confession, which is admitted. If the man refused to take the stand and subject himself to cross-examination, his confession was not properly admitted because it violated the woman’s Confrontation Clause rights. (A) is incorrect because the fact that the man’s confession incriminates the woman more than her own confession is not relevant. Just the interlocking nature of the man’s confession with the woman’s confession makes it more damaging by making it harder for the woman to claim that her confession was false. (B) is incorrect because the Supreme Court has held that instructing the jury to consider the confession only as going to the guilt of the confessing defendant is inadequate to avoid Confrontation Clause problems, because the risk that the jury will not follow the limiting instructions is too great in this context. (D) is incorrect. Confessions of a co-defendant may be admitted if (i) all portions referring to the other defendant can be eliminated (so that there is no indication of that defendant’s involvement), (ii) the confessing defendant takes the stand and subjects himself to cross-examination regarding the truth or falsity of the statement, or (iii) the confession of the nontestifying co-defendant is being used to rebut the defendant’s claim that his confession was obtained coercively, and the jury is instructed as to that purpose. Even if the co-defendant denies ever having made the confession, as stated in choice (D), the opportunity at trial to cross-examine the co-defendant satisfies the Confrontation Clause.
A defendant was arrested on suspicion of running an illegal “moonshine” operation. After taking the defendant back to the police station, an officer began questioning the suspect, thinking that his partner had already given the defendant a Miranda warning. The defendant voluntarily confessed to each and every element of the crime.
At trial, the defendant took the witness stand and testified on his own behalf, declaring that he was innocent and that a distillery that the officers found at his home belonged to someone else. The prosecution, on cross-examination, produced the confession that the defendant gave concerning his illegal activities. The defense counsel objected to the admission of the confession.
How should the court rule on the defendant’s objection?
A Sustained, because all evidence obtained in violation of Miranda rights is inadmissible.
B Sustained, because the prosecution did not get permission from the court in advance to use the confession for any purpose.
C Overruled, because the prosecution may question the defendant on cross-examination concerning any issue that was brought out in his defense.
D Overruled, but the confession should be admitted only for the limited purpose of impeachment.
D
The defendant’s objection should be overruled. A confession obtained in violation of Miranda, but otherwise voluntary, can be used for the limited purpose of impeaching a defendant who testifies at trial. In contrast, an involuntary confession cannot be used to impeach. Here, there are no facts to indicate that the defendant’s statement was involuntary. Thus, it can be used to impeach the defendant. (A) is too broad a statement. Although a confession obtained in violation of Miranda is inadmissible in the state’s case-in-chief as evidence of guilt, as discussed above, such evidence is admissible for limited purposes. (B) is wrong. Advance permission from the court is not a requirement if the confession is used to impeach. (C) is a correct statement but it does not speak directly to the issue of whether the confession is admissible and to what extent.
A 12-year-old girl entered a grocery store. When she believed that no one was looking, she grabbed two candy bars and concealed them under her coat. As she attempted to leave the store, a security guard employed by the store grabbed the girl by the arm. He told her, “You’re too young to be a thief!” The girl began crying and blurted out, “I lost my lunch money on the way to school and I was really hungry!”
If the girl is charged with shoplifting, what is the prosecution’s best argument that her Miranda rights have not been violated by the security guard?
A The guard’s statement was not interrogatory.
B It is discretionary whether to give juveniles Miranda warnings.
C The girl has not yet been arrested and formally charged with any crime.
D The security guard was not a government agent.
D
The prosecution’s best argument is that, because the security guard was not a government agent, he need not have given the girl Miranda warnings. As a means of protecting the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, a person must be informed prior to custodial interrogation that: (i) she has the right to remain silent; (ii) anything she says can be used against her in court; (iii) she has the right to the presence of an attorney; and (iv) if she cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for her if she so desires. These Miranda warnings must be given only if the detainee is being questioned by someone known to be working for the police. Here, the security guard is employed by a private business (the grocery store). Thus, since the guard was not required to inform the girl of the Miranda warnings, he could not possibly have violated the girl’s Miranda rights. (A), (B), and (C) all reflect matters that would come into play only if the guard were a government agent. However, they would also be incorrect even if the guard were a government agent. (A) is incorrect because the guard’s statement might be deemed to be interrogatory. “Interrogation” refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Although it is not an express question to say “You’re too young to be a thief,” such words are reasonably likely to bring forth some sort of incriminating response. Therefore, it is incorrect to state that the guard’s statement was not interrogatory. (B) is incorrect because, in a delinquency proceeding, a juvenile must be afforded the right not to testify, including all aspects of the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda warnings are a very important aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, a juvenile court may determine that a child should be transferred to adult court for trial as an adult on criminal charges. Certainly, in such an instance, the requirement of Miranda warnings would be applicable. Consequently, regardless of whether a child is treated by the courts as a juvenile or an adult, it is incorrect to state that giving the Miranda warnings to juveniles is discretionary. (C) is incorrect because an actual arrest and formal charges are not a prerequisite to triggering the need for Miranda warnings. All that is required is that an interrogation be custodial in nature. An interrogation may be considered custodial if a reasonable person under the circumstances would feel that she is not free to terminate the interrogation and leave. The security guard grabbed the girl by the arm before making his statement. Thus, it could be argued that what followed was custodial interrogation, because the girl did not believe she was free to leave.
