Criminal Law Flashcards
Burden of Proof: Woolmington (1935)
Where D raises a defence it is for the prosecution to negate that defence. This applies to nearly all defences.
Burden of Proof: Lambert (2001)
It is normally a breach of human rights for D to have to prove innocence.
Burden of Proof: Sheldrake (2004)
BUT imposing a legal burden of proof on D is not objetionable where the offence carries risk of death and the relevant information is within D’s knowledge.
Purpose of Law: Brown (1993)
The law should protect society from a cult of violence
Purpose of Law: Wilson (1996)
Consensual marital behavior was not criminal BUT the law should develop on a case by case basis
Judicial Law-Making: Shaw v DPP (1961)
Created the offence of corrupting public morals
Judicial Law-Making: Knuller v DPP (1973)
Recognized that Shaw had created the offence of corrupting public morals; majority also thought an offence of outraging public decency existed.
Judicial Law-Making: R (1991)
Law should change with society
Elements of a Crime: Fagan v MPC (1968)
Actus reus can be a continuing act, so that if mens rea is superimposed on it at any point it completes the offence.
Elements of a Crime: Thabo Meli v R (1954)
Where mens rea and actus reaus are present in a series of acts then there is a sufficient concidence for D to be guilty.
Actus Reus: Omissions: Gibbins and Proctor (1918)
Parents and anyone who has undertaken care of a child owe a duty to that child.
Actus Reus: Omissions: Stone and Dobinson (1977)
D may owe a duty to vulnerable family members. Anyone undertakening care of an elderly person may owe a duty.
Actus Reus: Omissions: Miller(1983)
Where D sets in motion a chain of events which might cause harm, he has a duty to act.
Actus Reus: Omissions: Evans (2009)
A person who has created or contributed to a life threatening state of affairs is under a duty to act.
Actus Reus: Omissions: Dytham (1979)
There may be a duty because of a public office
Actus Reus: Intervening Acts: Roberts (1972)
Where V’s intervening act is reasonably forseeable then it does not break the chain of causation.
Actus Reus: Intervening Acts: Wiliams and Davis (1992)
If V’s conduct is not reasonably foreseeable then it will break the chain of causation
Actus Reus: Causation: White (1970)
The act myust be the factual cause
Actus Reus: Causation: Pagett (1983)
A reasonable response to self defence does not break the chain of causation.
Actus Reus: Causation: Malcherek (1981)
Switching off a life-support machine does not break the chain of causation.
Actus Reus: Causation: Cheshire (1991)
Negligent treatment by medial staff does not normally break the cain of causation.
Mens Rea: Intention: Mohan (1975)
Intention is a decision to bring about a certain consequence.
Mens Rea: Intention: Moloney (1985)
Foresight of consequence is evidence of intention.
Mens Rea: Intention: Hancock and Shankland (1986)
Probablity is important in foresight of consequences
Mens Rea: Intention: Nedrick (1986)
The consequence has to be a virtual certanity and D must realise this
Mens Rea: Intention: Woolin (1998)
Where the consequence is a virtual certanity and D realizes this, the jury can find intention.
Mens Rea: Recklessness: Cunningham (1957)
Maliciously means either interntion or subjective recklessness
Mens Rea: Recklessness: G and another (2003)
Recklessness means that D must realise there is risk and take that risk.
Mens Rea: Gross Negligence: Bateman (1925)
The negligence must be higher than for a civil case. D’s conduct must show such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount in a crime
Mens Rea: Gross Negligence: Adomako (1994)
The three elements of negligence must be present and the breach must be sufficiently serious to make it criminal.
Mens Rea: Transferred Malice: Latimer (1886)
An intention can be transferred to an unintended victim
Mens Rea: Transferred Malice: Pembiliton (1874)
Malice cannot be transferred if D intended a completely different offence
Mens Rea: Transferrred Malice: A-G’s ref (No 3 of 1994) (1997)
Confirmed that the doctrine of transferred malic is good law
Strict Liability: Absolute Liability: Larsonneur (1935)
An absolute offence can be committed through a state of affairs. Not only need D have no mens rea, but D’s ac need not be voluntary.
Strict Liability: Strict Liablity and Human Rights: G (2008)
The concept of strict liablity offences does not breach human rights
Strict Liability: Statutory Offences: Sweet v Parsley (1969)
There is a presumption that mens rea is required
Strict Liablility:Statutory Offences: Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd (1984)
The presumption that mens rea is required can only be displaced if it is clearly the effect of the statute.
Strict Liablility: Statutory Offences: B (a minor) (2000)
The starting point is that mens rea is required
Strict Liablity: Statutory Offences: Sherras v de Rutzen (1895)
A genuine mistake can be a defence only if the offence is not one of strict liablity
Secondary Participation: Actus Reus: Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1975)(1975)
Aid, abet, counsel and procure have different meanings
Secondary Participation: Actus Reus: Giannetto (1997)
Abetting can be mere encouragement upwards
Secondary Participation: Actus Reus: Wilcox v Jeffery (1951)
Prescence at a public performance can be sufficient
Secondary Participation: Actus Reus: Clarkson and others (1971)
Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not enough
Secondary Participation: Actus Reus: Calhaen (1985)
There is no need for a causal link between counseling and the offence
Secondary Participation: Mens Rea: National Coal Board v Gamble (1958)
Intention to do the act which aids and abets but there can be indifference to the offence
Secondary Participation: Mens Rea: Brainbridge (1959)
There is no need to know the details of the offence the principal will commit
Secondary Participation: Mens Rea: DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell (1978)
It is enough for D to know that it is one of a number of possible crime.
Secondary Participation: Mens Rea: Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) (1975)
For procurring there is no need to prove a shared intention
Secondary Participation: Joint Enterprise: Powell; English (1997)
There need only be foresight or contemplation that the principal might commit the offence.
Secondary Participation: Joint Enterprise: Stewart and Schofield (1995)
If a secondary party does not foresee or contemplate serious injury or death they cannot be liable for murder
Secondary Participation: Joint Enterprise: Uddin (1998)
If all intent serious injury or death, they are all liable for murder. If a very different weapon is used, D is not liable for the death
Secondary Participation: Joint Enterprise: Rahman (2008)
Confirmed decision in Powell; English
Secondary Participation: Withdrawal from a Joint Enterprise: Becerra and Cooper (1975)
D must effectively communicate his withdrawal
Secondary Participation: Withdrawal from a Joint Enterprise: Mitchell and King (1999)
Where there is a spontaneous violence then walking away is sufficient for withdrawal
Inchoate Offences: Encouraging and Assisting:
ss 44, 45, and 46 Serious Crime Act 2007
Inchoate Offences: Attempts: A-G’s reference (No 1 of 1992)(1993)
Need not have performed the ast act before the crime proper, nor reached the point of no-return
Inchoate Offences: Attempts: Gullefer (1987)
Must have gone beyond purely preparatory acts and be embarked on the crime proper
Inchoate Offences: Attempts: Millard and Vernon (1987)
Recklessness as to a consequence is not sufficient mens rea for an attempt
Inchoate Offences: Attempts: Shivpuri (1987)
Even when the complete offence is impossible to commit, there can be an attempt
Inchoate Offences: Statutory Conspiracy: Reed (1982)
There is a statutory conspiracy when an offence will necessarily be committed if the plan is carried out as intended
Inchoate Offences: Statutory Conspiracy: Jackson (1985)
A plan for a contingency which necessarily involved the commission of an offence is sufficient
Inchoate Offences: Statutory Conspiracy: Yip Chiu-Cheung v R (1994)
D and at least one other must intend that the offence be committed
Inchoate Offences: Statutory Conspiracy: Kenning (2008)
Cannot conspire to aid and abet
Inchoate Offences: Conspiracy to Defraud: Scott v MPC (1975)
(1) Not necessary to prove that economic loss was suffered, but V’s economic interests must be put at risk. (2) Deception is not a required element of the offence.
Inchoate Offences: Conspiracy to Defraud: Wai Yu-tsang (1991)
It is enough if anyone may be prejudiced in any way by the fraud.
Capacity: Children: JTB (2009)
S.34 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has abolished the common law presumption of doli incapax
Capacity: Corporations: Bolton (Engineering) v TJ Graham (1956)
There are people who represent the mind and will of the company
Capacity: Corporations: Tesco Supermarket v Natrass (1972)
Only those at a asufficiently high managerial level can make the company liable
Capacity: Mentally Ill: Unfitness to plead: Antoine (2000)
Following a finding of unfitness to plead a jury should e empanelled to decie if D did the act alleged
Capacity: Mentally Ill: Insanity: M’Naghten’s casew (1843)
Presumed sane until the contrary is proved. Must have a defect of reason caused by disease of the mind so as not to know the nature and quality of act or that what he was doing was wrong
Capacity: Mentally Ill: Insanity: Sullivan (1984)
Impairment can be organic or functional and need not be permanent
Capacity: Mentally Ill: Insanity: Burgess (1991)
A mental disorder which manifests itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind
Capacity: Mentally Ill: Insanity: Hennesy (1989)
An internal cause is a disease of the mind, even where the disease is a physical one such as diabetes
Capacity: Mentally Ill: Insanity: Winde (1952)/Johnson (2007)
If D knows he is doing wrong the defence of insanity is not available to him
Capacity: Mentally Ill: Diminished Responsibility: Byrne (1960)
Old definition: ‘abnormality of mind’ is wide enough to cover perception, ability to form rational judgment and to exercise willpower
Capacity: Mentally Ill: Diminished Responsibility: Dietschmann (2003)
The abnormality does not havve to be te sole cause of D’s acts in doing the killing
Capacity: Mentally Ill: Diminished Responsibility: Wood (2008)
Alcohol dependency syndrome can amount to an abnormality (of mind)
Capacity: Vicarious Liabliity: Coppen v Moore (1898)
An act done within the scope of employment can make the employer liable
Capacity: Vicarious Liabliity: Adams vCamfoni (1929)
An act outside of the scope of employment does not make the employer liable
Capacity: Vicarious Liabliity: Allen v Whitehead (1930)
Where there is full delegation the knowledge of the delegate will be imputed to the delegator
Capacity: Vicarious Liabliity: Vane v Viannopoullos (1964)
Where there is only partial delegation the knowledge of the delegate will not be imputed to the delegator
Duress: DPP for NI v Lynch (1975)
Duress is where D’s will is overborne by hreats of death or serious injury