Criminal Law Flashcards
Murder and voluntary manslaughter
First-degree murder is murder committed “willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation” or murder committed in the course of a forcible felony.
Second-degree murder is “all other murder,” which would include unlawful killings
committed “with malice aforethought.”
At the common law, an unlawful killing was committed with malice aforethought when it was committed with the intent to kill, with the intent to cause serious bodily harm, with reckless disregard for human life, or in the course of committing a felony.
The statute defining voluntary manslaughter as a killing committed “without malice aforethought”
follows the common law treatment of heat-of-passion killings as being “without malice” if they occur in response to a sufficient provocation.
Premeditation for murder
In most jurisdictions, a person acts deliberately only if the person acts with a “cool mind that is
capable of reflection.” Most jurisdictions also interpret “premeditation” to require proof of some
period of reflection before the intent to kill is formed.
In contrast, other jurisdictions hold that premeditation may be formed in an instant or that
premeditation may be inferred from circumstantial evidence of an intent to kill, including the type
of weapon, the way it was used, and the nature of the injuries inflicted. In these jurisdictions, jurors are typically instructed that “deliberate and premeditated” means just that the defendant had a “specific intent to kill” at the time of the act that caused the death, and proof of intent to kill allows for a first-degree murder conviction requiring premeditation.
Common law difference between murder and manslaughter (intentional killing)
At common law, the difference between an intentional killing that was murder and an intentional
killing that was manslaughter was “the presence or absence of malice.” Malice was said to be absent in intentional homicides that were committed “in a sudden heat of passion, caused by adequate provocation, before there has been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool.”
Defense of others
A defendant who attacks someone who is attacking someone else may raise the complete
justification defense of defense of others. Killing in defense of others was, at common law,
derivative of self-defense. States typically use one of two rules to evaluate defense of others.
Under the first rule, the defendant steps into the shoes of the person being attacked and can claim defense of others only if the person being attacked could have acted in self-defense. This typically requires that the person being attacked was not the initial aggressor.
Under the second rule, a defendant can argue defense of others if he reasonably (but mistakenly) believed that the person being attacked had a right to act in self defense.
Miranda rights - interrogation
If a suspect clearly and unequivocally invokes her right to counsel after being informed of her
Miranda rights, the police must cease the custodial interrogation.
After invocation, counsel must be provided before a suspect can be questioned unless the suspect (1) initiates contact with law enforcement, (2) is given a fresh set of Miranda warnings, and (3) executes a knowing and intelligent waiver. However, in Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court held that cessation of custodial interrogation for 14 days terminated the Edwards requirements. Thus, after 14 days, law enforcement may approach a suspect who has previously invoked the right to counsel and (assuming new Miranda warnings and a valid waiver) reinitiate custodial interrogation even without a lawyer present.
In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court held that there are “vast differences between Miranda custody
and incarceration pursuant to conviction.” The release of a person from interrogation and back
into his “normal life” in the general prison population ends the “‘inherently compelling
pressures’ of custodial interrogation. Thus, the lengthy break between the woman’s initial
invocation of her Miranda right to counsel and her interrogation on March 15 terminated the
Edwards requirement, notwithstanding that she was in jail during that time.”
Miranda rights - right to counsel
Miranda v. Arizona requires that law enforcement inform a suspect that she has the “right to the
presence of an attorney and that if [she] cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for [her]
prior to any questioning if [she] so desires.” Miranda does not require perfect adherence to the
suggested language in the decision itself. For example, in Florida v. Powell, the Court rejected
the defense argument that informing a suspect of “the right to talk to a lawyer before answering
any of [their] questions” and “the right to use any of [his] rights at any time [he] want[ed] during
th[e] interview,” but failing to inform the suspect of the right to counsel during interrogation
Common law definition of burglary
At common law, burglary was defined as the “breaking and entering of the dwelling house of
another in the night with the intent to commit a felony” therein.
Theft offences
The crime of “theft” was traditionally three separate crimes: larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses.
Larceny
At common law, larceny was defined as the misappropriation of another’s personal property by means of taking it from his possession without his consent. Larceny requires an intent to steal. Moreover, under the common law, the intent to retain property temporarily and then return it to its rightful owner has long provided a defense to larceny.
Embezzlement
Although precise statutory definitions vary, embezzlement generally
occurs when a person unlawfully converts property owned by another to his own use with the
intent to permanently deprive the lawful owner of the property.
Receiving stolen property
Receiving stolen property typically has two elements: (1) the actus reus of the receipt of stolen
property and (2) the simultaneous mens rea of knowledge that the property was stolen. Most
jurisdictions include the further requirement that the defendant intend to deprive the owner of her property. “Stolen property” typically includes property unlawfully obtained using larceny,
embezzlement, or false pretenses, because “it is inappropriate to make the liability of the receiver turn on the method by which the original thief acquired the property.”
Incompetence to stand trial
Competence to stand trial is a legal requirement that refers to a defendant’s ability to participate
in criminal proceedings.
In some jurisdictions, competence is called “fitness to stand trial.” To be competent, it is not
enough that the defendant be “oriented to time and place and [have] some recollection of
events.” The Dusky test has two prongs: the defendant must have (1) “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and (2) “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” In Drope v. Missouri, the
Supreme Court elaborated on the Dusky standard, clarifying that the defendant must be able “to
assist in preparing his defense.”
Assisting counsel also requires that a defendant be able to make decisions, including whether to go to trial or plead guilty. Whenever the defense can establish a “bona fide doubt” regarding the defendant’s decision-making abilities, the court must hold a hearing to determine competence to stand trial. Once the defendant has made this preliminary showing, the burden of evaluating competency is placed on the courts and court-appointed experts.
Not guilty by reasons of insanity
State A, like most states that provide a not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) defense, limits
the defense to a defendant who can show that, at the time of the charged crime, she suffered from a “severe mental disease or defect,” and that, as a result of that mental disease or defect, “she did not know that her conduct was wrong.” Although there is no universal definition of mental illness that satisfies the legal requirement of a “severe mental disease or defect,” a serious mental disease like schizophrenia should qualify, especially when accompanied by delusions or other significant impairments of a defendant’s capacity to recognize reality. Thus, if the jury finds that the woman was suffering from schizophrenia accompanied by delusional beliefs at the time of the charged crime, this finding should establish that she suffered from the type of severe mental disease or defect contemplated by the State A NGRI statute.
M’Naghten Test (Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity)
Under the M’Naghten test for NGRI used by State A (and a majority of states), the defense must
prove that, at the time of the offense, (1) the defendant suffered from a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind; and (2) as a result of this mental disease or defect, the defendant at the time of the act did not know the nature and quality of the act, or that the act was wrong. In State A, as in most states, the defense must prove the affirmative defense of NGRI by a preponderance of the evidence.
Under the first prong of the M’Naghten test, the defense probably cannot prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant suffered from a defect of reason caused by a
disease of the mind. There has never been a comprehensive statutory or jurisprudential definition of “defect of reason” or “disease of the mind.” However, for a court to find a defendant NGRI, the defendant’s mental defect or disease must be sufficiently severe to cause the consequences described in the second prong of the M’Naghten test.
Under the M’Naghten test, a finding that the defendant was suffering from a “defect of reason”
caused by a “disease of the mind” is necessary—but insufficient—to support a verdict of NGRI.
The bifurcated second prong of the test requires that the defense also prove that, as a result of
this mental disease or defect, the defendant either did not know the nature and quality of the act
or did not know that the act was wrong.
Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that a person shall not be twice
put in jeopardy for the “same offense.” Thus, the question is whether the elements of the theft
charge are wholly contained in the burglary charge or vice versa.
If the elements of the lesser charge (theft) are not wholly contained in the greater charge
(burglary)—i.e., if each charge requires proof of a fact that the other does not—then convicting
the defendant of both crimes would not violate double jeopardy even when the two offenses
occurred at the same time and are thus arguably part of the “same transaction.”
Due process clause and the burden of proof
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution to require
that the prosecution prove all elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of
proof cannot be shifted to the defendant by presuming an essential element upon proof of other elements of the offense, because shifting the burden of persuasion with respect to any element of a criminal offense is contrary to the Due Process Clause.
Sixth amendment right to jury trial in applying sentences
The Supreme Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey, that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt” because “[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed [because] such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The Court reaffirmed Apprendi in Blakely v. Washington, holding that the “‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”
In United States v. Booker, the Court relied on Blakely and Apprendi to conclude that protecting a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial required that “[a]ny fact . . . which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Depraved heard manslaughter
In most jurisdictions, a person who recklessly causes the death of another can be charged with
so-called “depraved-heart” murder if the person acted with “extreme indifference to the value of
human life.” Generally, however, reckless driving alone would not lead to a charge of
depraved-heart murder. Such a charge would be appropriate only if the reckless driving was
combined with intoxication or other aggravating factors.
Manslaughter
In most jurisdictions, a defendant whose conduct causes the death of another human being can be charged with manslaughter if the defendant acted with criminal negligence, which can include the criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
Defence of duress
The typical affirmative defense of duress excuses defendants from criminal liability if their
conduct was committed “under the pressure of an unlawful threat from another human being to
harm” the defendant. The unlawful threat must cause the defendant to reasonably believe that
“the only way to avoid imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or to another is to
engage in conduct which violates the literal terms of the criminal law.” The defendant must also
prove that he engaged in the criminal behavior because of the threat and not for some other
reason. The rationale for the duress defense is that “even though he has done the act the crime
requires and has the mental state which the crime requires, his conduct violating the literal
language of the criminal law is excused because he ‘lacked a fair opportunity to avoid acting unlawfully.’”
The Model Penal Code defines the affirmative defense of duress as a threat such that a person of reasonable firmness would be unable to resist it. This standard, which is followed in several
jurisdictions, is also satisfied here. A person of reasonable firmness of character would very
likely be unable to resist the threat posed by the woman under these circumstances. At the
common law, and in most jurisdictions today, duress is not available as a defense to any kind of
intentional homicide.
