Criminal Law

Question 1

Statutory Interpretation

Answer 1

1. Plain meaning
2. Contextual meaning
3. Legislative intent (as determined by the structure of the statutes around it)
4. Grading/merger problem/surplussage
5. Absurdity
6. Ejusdem generis
7. Rule of lenity

Question 2

Statute: Criminal Trespass

Answer 2

5 Elements
(i) knowingly
(ii) enters or remains unlawfully
(iii) in a building or upon real property
(iii)(a) which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii)(b) where the building is used as a public housing project in violation of conspicuously posted rules or regulations governing entry or use thereof

Mens Rea = knowingly for all elements

Criminal Trespass in the 3rd degree

Question 3

Statute: Theft

Answer 3

Elements
(i) takes possession or control
(ii) of the property of another or property in possession of another
(iii) with the intent to permanently deprive the other thereof

Mens Rea = silent
MPC = Recklessly for (i) and (ii)
Staples = Knowingly for (i) and (ii)

Question 4

Statute: Operating a motor vehicle without consent

Answer 4

Elements
(i) takes possession or control of
(ii) any self-propelled vehicle
(iii) the property of another
(iv) without the consent of the owner of such
(v) without the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof

Mens rea = silent
MPC = Recklessly for (i)-(iv)
Staples = Knowingly for (i)-(iv)

Aggravated misdemeanor

Question 5

Statute: Robbery

Answer 5

Elements:
(i) steals
(ii) the property of another
(iii) by force or threat of force

Mens rea = silent
MPC = Recklessly for all
Staples = Knowingly for all

Question 6

Statute: Traditional Burglary

Answer 6

Elements:
(i) breaks and enters
(ii) dwelling
(iii) at night
(Iv) with the intent to commit a felony therein

Mens rea = silent
MPC = Recklessly for all
Staples = Knowingly for all

Question 7

Statute: Sparks Burglary

Answer 7

Elements:
(i) enters
(ii) any house, room, store, or other building
(iii) with intent to commit larceny or any felony

Mens rea = silent
MPC = recklessly for (i) and (ii)
Staples = knowingly for (i)

(California statute)

Question 8

Statute: Aiding & Abetting a Suicide

Answer 8

Elements:
(i) deliberately
(ii) aids or advises or encourages another
(iii) to commit suicide

Mens rea = deliberately
MPC = Purposely for all

Felony
In re. Joseph G.

Question 9

Statute: Diversion of Construction Funds

Answer 9

Elements:
(i) receives money for the purpose of obtaining or paying for services, labor, materials or equipment
(ii) willfully fails to apply such money for such purpose by either
(iii)(a) failing to complete the improvement or
(iii)(b) failing to pay for service, labor, materials or equipment
(iv) wrongfully diverts the funds to a use other than that for which the funds were received

Mens rea = silent for (i)
MPC = recklessly for (i)
Staples = knowingly for (i)

Public offense
People v. Stark

Question 10

Statute: Keeping intoxicating liquors in a motor vehicle

Answer 10

(i) driver of a motor vehicle
(ii) owner not present
(iii) keep or allow to be kept in a motor vehicle
(iv) when such vehicle is upon the public highway
(v) any bottle or receptacle containing booze
(vi) which has been opened

Mens rea = silent
MPC = recklessly for all
Staples = knowingly for (iii)(v)(vi)
Court says = strict liability because traffic offense (regulatory)

Misdemeanor
State v. Loge

Question 11

Statute: Theft (Moon)

Answer 11

Elements:
(i) obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
(ii) the property of another
(iii) with the intent to permanently deprive him thereof

As used in this section, “exercises unauthorized control” includes but is not limited to trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee and embezzlement.

Mens rea = silent
MPC = recklessly for (i) and (ii)
Staples = knowingly for (i) and (ii)

State v. Moon

Question 12

Statute: Possession with Intent to Distribute

Answer 12

(i) knowingly or intentionally
(ii) possess
(iii) a controlled substance
(iv) with intent to distribute

Mens rea = knowingly or intentionally for all
United States v. Hunte

Question 13

Queen v. Dudley & Stephens

Answer 13

☠️🍽️

In order to save your own life you may not lawfully take away the life of another, when that other is neither attempting nor threatening yours, nor is guilty of any illegal act whatever towards you or anyone else

Question 14

Martin v. State

Answer 14

🥴🛣️

Conduct must be voluntary to be criminal

Question 15

In re. Joseph G.

Answer 15

🚗⛰️

If (i) a mutual suicide pact is genuine, (ii) the instrumentality of death is the same for both parties to the pact, and (iii) the attempted death is simultaneous, the survivor of the act is guilty of aiding and abetting a suicide rather than murder

Question 16

People v. Kellogg

Answer 16

🥴🏘️

It is not permissible under the 8th Amendment for a state to impose criminal punishment because of a person’s condition of being a homeless alcoholic, but it IS permissible to impose criminal punishment when the addict engages in conduct which spills into public areas

Question 17

People v. Cowden

Answer 17

💡

The value of property stolen determined what level of offense Cowden could be charged with

“Cow lamp”

Question 18

State v. Shedrick

Answer 18

💵🤷

In a prosecution for first-degree theft, the state must prove the defendant’s culpable mental state with respect to the value of property stolen

“Shedrick shoulda known”

Question 19

Commonwealth v. Alvarez

Answer 19

❄🧑‍🏫

No mens rea was needed for the attendant circumstance element (strict liability applied) because the legislature expressly stated that lack of knowledge of the element was not an excuse.

“Al-var-is he from the school?”

Question 20

People v. Ryan

Answer 20

🍄⚖️

(1) Defendant has to know the pure weight of the drug he possessed.
(2) Knowledge of the pure weight of the drug possessed can be inferred from evidence like negotiations concerning weight, potency, price, or number of doses.
(3) Post-Ryan statute: knowledge of aggregate weight not required, but knowledge requirement for pure weight stands

Question 21

Whitaker v. People

Answer 21

🚌💊🤷

Although Colorado has adopted the M.P.C., there is a clear contrary purpose indicated by the structure of the statute. Knowledge does not apply to the quantity of the controlled substance, rather strict liability applies

Question 22

State v. Ducker

Answer 22

🚗👶👶

Application of the Staples rule: the offense of aggravated child abuse contains the elements of (1) awareness of conduct, (2) awareness of circumstances; and (3) strict liability for result of conduct. The conduct and circumstances separate guilty from innocent conduct.

Question 23

Staples v. United States

Answer 23

🔫🪪

A defendant must know the facts that make his conduct illegal. If an element divides innocent conduct from guilty conduct, then there must be a mens rea to that element, and it can be no lower than knowingly

Test: if you remove an element from the definition of the crime, is the conduct still illegal? (example: Any person who sells drugs within 500 feet of a school - if the proximity to the school is removed, the conduct of selling drugs is still illegal, so knowingly doesn’t apply to that element)

Question 24

United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.

Answer 24

👶🎥

Application of the Staples rule: knowingly applies to “minor” and to “sexually explicit activity”

Question 25

Elonis v. United States

Answer 25

👨‍💻🎤

Application of the Staples rule: knowingly applies to the threatening nature of Elonis’ Facebook posts. Suggests that recklessly may suffice for elements which separate innocent from guilty conduct

“Tone Dougie”

Question 26

Ostrosky v. State

Answer 26

🎣🪪

Mistake of Law is almost never a valid defense, but if the mistake was made as a result of reasonable reliance on a court order, then it is a defense

Question 27

Rehaif v. United States

Answer 27

🔫👽

Application of the Staples rule: student must know his citizenship status because it is an element of the crime.

Mistake of Law defense: because citizenship status is governed by a different set of statutes, mistake of law governing citizenship status is a defense for another offense, of which it is an element

Question 28

State v. Varszegi

Answer 28

🖥️🖨️💰

Mistake of Law defense: because the defendant did not know that his lease provision allowing him to seize and sell his tenant’s property was not valid under the statutes governing leases, he believed he was entitled to her property and therefore did not act with the felonious intent needed to prove the crime.

“How Varsze-gonna go to punish his tenant?”

Question 29

United States v. Balint

Answer 29

💊🧾

Strict Liability applies to regulatory offenses. Multi-factor test for identifying regulatory offenses:
(a) purpose = prevent a possible future harm (malum prohibitum) rather than punish conduct which is dangerous in itself (malum in se)
(b) conduct/item in question puts a person on notice that it is likely highly regulated
(c) legal classification of something (immigration status, type of drug, etc.)
(d) carries less harsh penalties
(e) statute is silent regarding mens rea
(f) strict liability does not “sweep in a broad range” of apparently innocent conduct

“IRS form for opium sales”

Question 30

United States v. Rizo-Rizo

Answer 30

👽🤷

Immigration law is regulatory, so strict liability applies. The defendant did not need to know his immigration status to be guilty of entering the U.S. without inspection

Question 31

State v. Loge

Answer 31

🚗🍺

Traffic law is regulatory, so strict liability applies. In this case, the structure of the open container statute further suggests strict liability applies.

Question 32

United States v. Hale

Answer 32

🧑‍🦯

Two part rule for willful blindness: a defendant must
(1) subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists
(2) take deliberate actions to avoid learning that fact

“Ah hale naw the goods weren’t stolen”

Question 33

United States v. Moran

Answer 33

📼👮‍♂️

Moran earnestly believed that he was acting lawfully under copyright law, and his conduct reflects this belief. He could not have willfully violated this complex body of law if he believed that he was acting lawfully

“Moran the Moron”

Question 33

Cheek v. United States

Answer 33

🙏

(1) Cheek’s belief that his wages did not count as taxable income was earnest. He did not believe he was breaking the law when he stopped paying taxes and filing returns (i.e. willfully/general intent not met)
(2) An earnest belief that a law is unconstitutional (like Cheek’s belief that the tax code was unconstitutional) is not reasonable. As a mistake of law, it is not a valid defense

Question 34

State v. Schminkey

Answer 34

🥴🛻

Theft is a specific intent crime (intent to permanently deprive). The mere fact that Schminkey took the pickup without the owner’s consent does not allow the inference that he intended to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle. Additional facts are needed to make that inference.

“Schminkey drinkey drivey”

Question 35

People v. Stark

Answer 35

👷‍♂️💸

If the definition of a crime consists only of the description of conduct, without reference to do a further act, it is a general intent crime.

Here, the only act the statute describes is the diversion of funds, and there is no reference to a specific intent to permanently deprive the rightful owner of the funds. It is immaterial whether Stark intended to pay back the funds or not, just that he diverted them from their designated purpose.

“Construction Ponzi scheme”

Question 36

United States v. Oglivie

Answer 36

👰👰‍♀️

(1) False official statement = specific intent crime. If Oglivie honestly believed something was true (i.e. that he was divorced) then he had no intent to deceive another because he didn’t think he was lying. Found not guilty because his belief was earnest.
(2) Bigamy = general intent crime. A mistake of fact (i.e. whether he was divorced) is only an excuse if the belief is both honest and reasonable. Found guilty because his belief was not reasonable.

Question 37

People v. V.V.

Answer 37

🎇🔥🧑‍🚒

Malice may be presumed or implied from the intentional doing of the act without justification or excuse or mitigating circumstances

“V.V. bad fireworks”

Question 38

McBoyle v. United States

Answer 38

✈️≠🚗

An airplane is not a “vehicle” within this statute, because the specific examples of the term “motor vehicle” evoke only images of vehicles moving on land

“McBoeing”

Question 39

People v. Jacques

Answer 39

🤺

A fenced-in area is not a “structure” within the entering without breaking statute. Steps:
(1) Plain meaning
(2) ejusdem generis (unless a contrary purpose appears)

“Jaques says en garde when he fences”

Question 40

Yates v. United States

Answer 40

🎣➡️🌊

A fish is not a “tangible object” within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act destruction of evidence statute. Ejusdem generis can be supported by plain meaning and contextual usage of the term in other related statutes.

“Enron fish”

Question 41

United States v. Santos

Answer 41

💰🧼🧺

“Proceeds” in money laundering statute means “profits,” not “receipts,” because that interpretation is more favorable to defendants

“Santos was a saint so he gets the rule of lenity”

Question 42

State v. Evans

Answer 42

🪪✍️💰

Corporations are persons protected by the identity theft statute in Washington.

Plain meaning and legislative intent (discerned from legislative history) clearly establish this. Thus it is not necessary to apply the rule of lenity by interpreting the statute in Evans’ favor

Question 43

People v. Luke

Answer 43

🏢🤷🏢

A person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building when he is aware that he is not licensed or privileged to do so. Luke accidentally entered the public housing building, believing that he was licensed to enter to visit his aunt. Thus he was not guilty of criminal trespass.

“Luke was Lost”

Question 44

State v. Keeton

Answer 44

💵🥊

Intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and actions of the defendant. Testimony at trial and Keeton’s actions were sufficient to support the inference that Keeton had intent to make contact with or threaten the clerk in a manner meeting the definition of assault

“Heisman”

Question 45

Carter v. United States

Answer 45

🥊≠💰

Under Rule 81(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense.” Here, a bank robber is unsuccessful in arguing for larceny as a lesser included charge of robbery because larceny includes three elements which are not included in robbery.

“Cart full of money from the bank”

Question 46

People v. Sparks

Answer 46

➡️🚪💭

A bedroom within a single-family home is a “room” within the meaning of the CA burglary statute. Intent can be formed after the defendant’s entry into the house. If it is formed prior to the defendant’s entry into the room, they are guilty of burglary.

Question 47

State v. Moon

Answer 47

🏛️💸

Embezzlement = theft of funds entrusted to you by your employer. Intent to permanently deprive can be inferred if the defendant disposes of the stolen funds in a way that makes it unlikely that the owner would ever recover them.

Question 48

People v. Perry

Answer 48

🏨🛌🏃‍➡️

The use of a hotel room is property within the meaning of the statute and the taking of such property by deception can result in the owner being permanently deprived of its benefit.

Question 49

United States v. Jackson

Answer 49

📺👶🙊

A threat to disclose information which will damage someone’s reputation is extortionate if
(1) The person making the demand has no rightful legal claim to the money (especially not that much money); and
(2) The demand for payment has no nexus with the threat to disclose (the threat would not resolve the claim if it came to fruition, rather, making good on the threat makes payment less likely)

Cosby love child

Question 50

United States v. Avenatti

Answer 50

✓💸

The Jackson rule applied:
(1) Lawyer had no rightful legal claim to money from Nike (especially not that much money)
(2) Lawyer’s threat had no nexus to the demanded payment (if he disclosed the information, he would lose his leverage)

“Just don’t do it, Harvey Spector”

Question 51

Kier v. State

Answer 51

🚬🚗

To prove constructive possession, the state must show some connection between the person and the drug other than spatial proximity. The state must show that the defendant knowingly had
(1) power
(2) intention
at a given time to exercise control over the drug

When the state’s constructive possession case is based wholly on circumstantial evidence, the law requires that the proved facts shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.

The circumstantial evidence presented at trial was entirely consistent with Kier’s theory of innocence. The state failed to prove Kier’s possession beyond reasonable doubt.

Question 52

United States v. Hunte

Answer 52

👫🚬

To prove constructive possession, the state must show that the defendant knowingly had
(1) power
(2) intention
at a given time to exercise control over the drug (either directly or through others)

There was a clear nexus between Hunte and the drugs, and regardless of the fact that she was not the leader of the group, she acted in concert with the leader. All members of the group had joint possession of the drugs.

“on the Hunte for marijuana”

Question 53

State v. Pigford

Answer 53

🥬🚛

Possession of marijuana can be inferred from the fact that the defendant had
(1) dominion AND
(2) control
over his trailer and its contents (which included the marijuana).

Possession alone does not prove knowledge, but knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances (Pigford was off course, he was nervous, the marijuana was easily found once inside the trailer, value of marijuana mad alternative theory that someone else left it there implausible)

“This little piggy drove a truck full of marijuana”

Question 54

Garcia v. State

Answer 54

⚾️🤷

Guilty knowledge includes knowledge of both
(1) the presence of and
(2) the illicit nature of
the substance possessed.

The jury found that Garcia knew of the presence of the item, but did not find on whether he knew of the illicit nature of the substance possessed. Garcia should not have been convicted without the jury finding him guilty of the latter.

“Meth softball”

Question 55

MPC Rules for Mens Rea in Statutory Interpretation

Answer 55

(1) If the statute is silent, apply Recklessly to all material elements
(2) If the statute prescribes a mens rea term, it applies to all material elements
(3) A higher level of mens rea satisfies a lower level

Question 56

Defenses

Answer 56

(1) Self-defense (Queen v. Dudley) = killing another innocent person to preserve your own life is not a valid defense for murder

(2) Mistake of law (Ostrosky v. State) = valid defense if mistake was made in reasonable reliance on valid authority

(3) Mistake of Law (Rehaif v. United States; State v. Varszegi) = valid defense if the violation of ANOTHER law is an element of the crime you are charged with, and you are mistaken about violating that other law.

(4) Negating “willfulness” WRT a complex statutory scheme (Cheek v. United States; United States v. Moran) = an earnest belief that you are not violating a complex legal code (tax code and copyright law) is a valid defense, because the violation is not voluntary and intentional.

(5) Mistake of Fact (Oglivie) =
(a) Specific Intent offense (false official statement) = an earnest belief in the mistaken fact (being divorced) is a valid defense
(b) General Intent offense (bigamy) = an earnest AND reasonable belief in the mistaken fact (being divorced) is a valid defense

Question 57

Conduct

Answer 57

(1) Must be voluntary to be criminal (Martin)

(2) 8th Amendment prohibits punishment of a condition, but it is permissible to punish conduct that spills into public areas (Kellogg)

(3) Conduct can be used for grading (murder v. aiding and abetting suicide in Joseph G)

Question 58

Grading

Answer 58

(1) Conduct can be used for grading (murder v. aiding and abetting suicide in Joseph G, robbery v. theft in Keeton or Carter)

(2) Attendant Circumstances can be used for grading (distance from school in Alvarez, weight of drug in Ryan and Whitaker, intent when entering in Sparks, minors in sexually explicit acts in X-Citement)

(3) Lesser Included Offense (theft and robbery in Keeton, bank larceny and bank robbery in Carter)

(4) Severity of result (aggravated child abuse in Ducker, value of property stolen in Cowden, Shedrick, and Perry )

Question 59

mens rea terms

Answer 59

(1) “Willfully”/general intent = a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty (MPC equates this to “Knowingly”)

(2) Specific intent = the intent to perform some act along with the desire to produce some result/harm (MPC treats specific intent as an attendant circumstance element)

(3) “Deliberately” (Joseph G) = a purposeful act done in order to produce some additional harmful result, perhaps also with deliberation in advance (MPC = use “Purposely”)

(3) “Maliciously” (V.V.) = no fixed meaning, but can usually be satisfied by MPC knowingly or purposely

(4) Purposely = conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature, to cause such a result, or knows or hopes that an attendant circumstance exists.

(5) Knowingly = aware that his conduct is of that nature, that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result, or is aware that an attendant circumstance exists. Can also be satisfied by willful blindness.

(6) Recklessly = consciously disregards a substantial risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct

(7) Negligently = should be aware of a substantial risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct

(8) Strict liability = guilty regardless of state of mind. Applies to regulatory crimes (see Balint test) or when a crime/element expressly made strict liability by legislature. MPC does not accept strict liability in any circumstance.

Question 60

mens rea applied

Answer 60

(1) MPC rules = Shedrick, Ryan, Hale (“willful blindness” to prove knowledge)

(2) Staples rule = Staples, Ducker, X-Citement Video, Elonis, Rehaif,

(3) Strict liability = Alvarez, Whitaker, Balint, Rizo-Rizo, Loge

(4) Specific intent = Schminkey, Oglivie, Moon, Hunte

(5) General intent = Stark, Oglivie

(6) Other terms = Joseph G. “deliberately,” V.V. “maliciously”

Question 61

ejusdem generis applied

Answer 61

(1) McBoyle: airplane ≠ “vehicle”

(2) Jacques: fenced-in area ≠ “structure”

(3) Yates: fish ≠ “tangible object”

Question 62

Rule of Lenity applied

Answer 62

(1) Santos: proceeds = profits, not receipts

(2) Evans: corporation = person (Rule of Lenity requested by Evans but not applied)

Question 63

Case Law: Criminal Trespass

Answer 63

(1) People v. Luke:

A person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building when he is aware that he is not licensed or privileged to do so.

Luke accidentally entered the public housing building, believing that he was licensed to enter to visit his aunt. Thus he was not guilty of criminal trespass.

(2) Jacques: a fenced-in area is not a structure under the “entering without breaking” statute

Question 64

Case law: Robbery

Answer 64

(1) State v. Keeton: intent (to threaten force) may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and actions of the defendant.

(2) Carter v. United States: bank larceny is not a lesser included offense of bank robbery because it contains three elements that bank robbery does not contain.
Both robbery and larceny:
- takes
- any thing of value
- belonging to/in possession of any bank

Larceny but not robbery:
- carries away
- intent to steal or purloin
- value exceeding $1,000

Question 65

Case law: burglary

Answer 65

People v. Sparks

A bedroom within a single-family home is a “room” within the meaning of the CA burglary statute. Intent can be formed after the defendant’s entry into the house. If it is formed prior to the defendant’s entry into the room, they are guilty of burglary.

Question 66

Case law: theft

Answer 66

(1) State v. Moon: Embezzlement = theft of funds entrusted to you by your employer. Theft = taking the property of another with the intent to permanently deprive

(2) People v. Perry: “use of a hotel room” is property, and Perry used deception to deprive the hotel of its value permanently

Question 67

Case Law: Extortion

Answer 67

(1) United States v. Jackson: A threat to disclose information which will damage someone’s reputation is extortionate if
(1) The person making the demand has no rightful legal claim to the money (especially not that much money); and
(2) The demand for payment has no nexus with the threat to disclose (the threat would not resolve the claim if it came to fruition, rather, making good on the threat makes payment less likely)

(2) United States v. Avenatti: The Jackson rule applied:
(1) Lawyer had no rightful legal claim to money from Nike (especially not that much money)
(2) Lawyer’s threat had no nexus to the demanded payment (if he disclosed the information, he would lose his leverage)

Question 68

Case Law: Constructive Possession

Answer 68

To prove constructive possession, the state must show some connection between the person and the drug other than spatial proximity. The state must show that the defendant knowingly had
(1) power
(2) intention
at a given time to exercise control over the drug

Cases:
(1) Kier: elements not met for joint on the floorboard

(2) Hunte: All members of the group had joint possession of the drugs

(3) Pigford: Possession can be inferred from the fact that the defendant had
(1) dominion AND
(2) control
over his trailer and its contents (which included the marijuana).

Possession alone does not prove knowledge, but knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances

(4) Garcia: Guilty knowledge includes knowledge of both
(1) the presence of and
(2) the illicit nature of
the substance possessed.

(5) Ryan: (1) Defendant has to know the pure weight of the drug he possessed.
(2) Knowledge of the pure weight of the drug possessed can be inferred from evidence like negotiations concerning weight, potency, price, or number of doses.

Question 69

Statute: First-Degree Murder

Answer 69

Causing the death of another person, with malice aforethought, and through conduct that is deliberate and premeditated during a period of cool reflection.

First-degree murder under the felony-murder rule = causing the death of another person during the commission of an enumerated felony.

Question 70

Statute: Second degree murder

Answer 70

Causing the death of another person with malice aforethought.

Three theories of malice aforethought:
(1) Intentional killing (purpose or knowledge with regards to the killing)
(2) Intent to cause serious bodily injury which is likely to lead to death
(3) Depraved heart (extreme indifference to the value of human life)

Second-degree murder under the felony murder rule = causing the death of another person during the commission of an unenumerated felony which is inherently dangerous.

Mitchell rule: Two theories of inherently dangerous felonies:
(1) Abstract approach (inherently dangerous as a matter of law)
(2) Factual approach (inherently dangerous in light of the facts - did the defendant commit the crime in an inherently dangerous way)

Question 71

Statute: Voluntary manslaughter

Answer 71

Causing the death of another person with malice aforethought, BUT with the justification of a provocation defense

(i.e. would be guilty of second-degree murder, except that the defendant was provoked)

Question 72

Statute: Involuntary manslaughter

Answer 72

Causing the death of another person recklessly (while aware of and having disregarded a risk of death resulting)

Usually equivalent to Reckless Homicide.

Question 73

Statute: Negligent Homicide

Answer 73

Causing the death of another person negligently (while unaware of a risk of death resulting, when you should have been aware)

Cabrera rule: Criminal negligence is a step up from tort negligence. Criminal negligence involves a GROSS deviation from the standard of care. It is characterized by “serious blameworthiness” and conduct which creates a risk. Examples: driving while intoxicated, texting while driving, speeding really excessively, drag racing.

Question 74

American Bystander Rule

Answer 74

No legal duty for a person to rescue or summon aid for another person. If you see someone in peril and fail to act to help them, and your failure to act causes them to die, you are NOT guilty of criminal homicide.

Exceptions: A failure to act can give rise to criminal liability when a particular relationship exists between the victim and the bystander:
(1) Duty based on personal relationship (parent-child, husband-wife, etc.)
(2) Duty based on statute
(3) Duty based on contract
(4) Duty based on voluntary assumption of care
(5) Duty based on creation of the peril
(6) Duty to control the conduct of others
(7) Duty based on being a landowner

Exception to the exception: if you have a special duty to summon aid BUT you yourself are in an unsafe condition, then you do NOT have a duty to summon aid UNTIL you yourself are safe.

Kuntz case: Kuntz had a husband-wife relationship with Becker event though they were not legally married. Additionally, she created the peril by stabbing him, thus she had a duty to summon aid. However, because she was herself in an unsafe position, she did not have a duty to summon aid until she reasonably thought she was safe.

Question 75

Statute: Modern Rape

Answer 75

Rape = sex without consent (without actual consent, or with a person who lacked the legal capacity to consent)

Consent must be freely and affirmatively given. (State in the Interest of MTS). A reasonable person in the circumstances would understand that consent was freely and affirmatively given. Consent can be withdrawn, nullifying any prior consent given (John Z)

Force not a necessary element of the offense

Shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that consent was freely and affirmatively given

Question 76

Legal consent

Answer 76

Legal consent has to do with whether an individual has the capacity to understand the act and its consequences and make a decision about whether to participate.

Individuals do not have the legal capacity to consent when:
- Severely intoxicated (People v. Giardino)
- Unconscious
- Mental disorder
- Developmental disability
- Physical disability

mens rea regarding legal capacity to consent = negligence (a person should be aware of whether or not another person has the capacity to consent)

Question 76

Statute: Prostitution

Answer 76

i. solicit or engage in
ii. any lewd act (for the purpose of sexual gratification of one or both actors)
iii. between two persons (customer and sex worker)
iv. in exchange for money or other consideration

mens rea = recklessly

(Wooten v. Superior Court)

Question 77

Statute: Extortion

Answer 77

18 U.S.C. § 875

i. Intent to extort money or any thing of value
ii. transmits in interstate or foreign commerce
iii. a threat to injure the property or reputation of another person

Fine or imprisonment for up to 2 years, or both

Question 78

Ordinary self-defense

Answer 78

Non-deadly force

i. reasonably believes
ii. immediately necessary
iii. to protect against imminent use of unlawful force
iv. force defendant used is proportionate to force used against the defendant

• Not justified in using force in response to words alone
• Not justified in using force if defendant provoked the fight and then did not abandon it
• Not justified in using force to resist arrest (even unlawful arrest)

Question 79

Deadly force self-defense

Answer 79

Force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, OR force that results in death even though not intended/expected to do so

i. reasonably believes
ii. immediately necessary
iii. to protect against imminent use of deadly force OR to protect against commission of an enumerated felony (robbery, rape, kidnapping)
iv. (in some jurisdictions only) duty to retreat if you can do so in complete safety unless you are in your home (castle doctrine)

• Use of force in retaliation is NOT justified self-defense. Force can only be used to defend against further use of force
• To defend your home, deadly force is justified when the intruder is threatening a violent crime, whether or not they are threatening to use deadly force against the occupant

Question 80

Attempt

Answer 80

MPC definition:
i. Acted purposely to cause the result element of the target crime (e.g. for murder = acted to accomplish the purpose of the death of another)
ii. Acted with the mens rea required for the attendant circumstance and result elements of the target crime (e.g. for possession of a controlled substance, knowledge of the presence and illicit nature of the substance)
iii. Substantial steps taken toward the accomplishment of the target crime which are highly corroborative of the person’s purpose
(United States v. Jackson)

Dangerous Proximity Test = but-for timely interference, the target crime would have occurred
(People v. Rizzo)

Question 81

Attempt (impossibility)

Answer 81

Same as the MPC definition for attempt, but due to a mistake of fact, the crime was not actually committed.

“Under the facts as the defendant believed them to be” the defendant was guilty of committing the crime. This person is not actually guilty of committing the crime, because the fact was not true (it was impossible for them to actually have committed the crime), but they are guilty of attempting to commit the crime.

(United States v. Gladish)

Question 82

Aiding & Abetting (Complicity)

Answer 82

Aiding and abetting (a.k.a. Complicity) is a mechanism for convicting an accomplice of a substantive crime.

Elements:
(1) Intentional conduct which aids or encourages the perpetrator of the crime
(2) Specific intent that the conduct will encourage or help bring about the crime

Question 83

Conspiracy

Answer 83

Conspiracy = agreement to commit a crime. Conspiracy is a crime in itself. The target crime need not have occurred.

Elements:
(1) Intent to commit the target crime (inherent in the agreement to commit the crime)
(2) Entered into an agreement to commit the crime (sometimes bilateral agreement, meaning agreement with undercover law enforcement doesn’t count)
(3) Any of the co-conspirators performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement (not required in all jurisdictions)

Question 84

Conspiracy (supplier)

Answer 84

Conspiracy: when is the supplier of goods or services a co-conspirator in a crime?

In some cases, the vendor is clearly an co-conspirator, because the whole purpose of the business is to further some illegal activity. Outside of such cases, the intent of a supplier who knows of the criminal use to which his supplies are put to participate in the criminal activity connected with the use of his supplies may be established by
(1) direct evidence that he intends to participate, or
(2) through an inference that he intends to participate based on,
(a) his special interest in the activity, or
(b) the aggravated nature of the crime itself

Question 85

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville

Answer 85

🍞

A statute is void-for-vagueness (unconstitutionally vague) when:
(1) the statute fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden
(2) the statute encourages arbitrary and/or discriminatory enforcement because it allows for discretionary rather than standardized enforcement

Here, the Jacksonville ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because the proscribed conduct is so broad that the statute makes criminal a broad range of activities which are normally innocent (like “loafing”). It also permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because it provides no standards to guide law enforcement.

Question 86

Gray v. Kohl

Answer 86

🚌🔲

A statute is void-for-vagueness (unconstitutionally vague) when:
(1) the statute fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden
(2) the statute encourages arbitrary and/or discriminatory enforcement because it allows for discretionary rather than standardized enforcement

Here, the School Safety Zone statute is unconstitutionally vague because it leaves ordinary citizens to guess at whether their reason for being in the zone is “legitimate.” The statute also gives law enforcement unbridled discretion in enforcement because it contains no standard to ascertain whether a person is within the zone on “legitimate business.”

Question 87

Kolender v. Lawson

Answer 87

🪪

A statute is void-for-vagueness (unconstitutionally vague) when:
(1) the statute fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden
(2) the statute encourages arbitrary and/or discriminatory enforcement because it allows for discretionary rather than standardized enforcement

Here, the disorderly conduct - loitering - statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to describe what kind of identification would be sufficiently credible to satisfy the statute so that the person is not guilty of loitering. Without these guidelines, the statute permits “a standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections”

Question 88

City of Greenville v. Peterson

Answer 88

🥪⛔️

A statute that says nothing about race can be enforced discriminatively.

Here, a group of ten black people were convicted of trespassing because they refused to leave a store after the manager told them to leave, and thus they are guilty of criminal trespass. The manager asked them to leave because they didn’t want to serve black people at the lunch counter.

Question 89

Alexis v. McDonald’s

Answer 89

🍔⛔️

A statute that says nothing about race can be enforced discriminatively.

Here, Alexis and her family refused to leave a McDonald’s after being told to do so, and thus they are guilty of criminal trespass. They were asked to leave, and Alexis later beaten, because they were black.

Question 90

State v. Ramirez

Answer 90

🙅‍♀️

Balancing a defendant’s right to due process of law (specifically, their constitutionally protected ability to develop an effective defense) with a victim’s rights to be treated with dignity, to be free from intimidation, and to have inconveniences minimized (Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights).

Here, the court decided that the defense can contact the victim by phone or email, but can’t show up at their house. The defense can request the victim’s address, but if the victim says no, their request will not be granted.

Question 91

Doe 1 v. United States

Answer 91

🙊

The Victims’ Bill of Rights includes the right to confer with the attorney for the Government on the case.

Here, Epstein’s victims’ right to conferral was violated, because the Government concealed the possibility of a plea agreement with Epstein from the victims. Epstein then killed himself in prison, making prosecution and potential plea deals moot.

Question 92

Smallwood v. State

Answer 92

🍆💉

A necessary element of attempted murder is the intent to kill. Intent to kill may be inferred from circumstantial evidence:
(a) Defendant’s conduct has natural and highly probable consequence of the result occurring
(b) Defendant’s words indicate the result was desired
(c) Defendant used a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the body (under the proper circumstances)

Here, death by AIDS was not a sufficiently probable result of Smallwood’s actions (unprotected sexual intercourse despite knowing he was HIV+) to infer the requisite intent to kill that would support an attempted murder conviction.

Question 93

People v. Rizzo

Answer 93

💰👨‍💼🤷‍♂️

Attempt = “dangerous proximity” to the crime occurring. Test: In all probability, the intended crime would have been accomplished but for timely interference (in a parallel universe without the interference, would the crime have occurred?)

Here, Rizzo and his co-defendants are not guilty of attempted robbery because they were unable to find their intended victim in order to rob him.

Question 94

United States v. Jackson

Answer 94

🏦🕵️🕵️‍♂️

MPC Approach for attempt: To be guilty of an attempt, you must (1) intend the completed crime and (2) take a “substantial step” toward its completion

Mens rea:
(1) Purpose to do the conduct of the intended crime; AND
(2) mens rea required for the attendant circumstance and/or harm element of the intended crime

Conduct:
(1) “Substantial steps” taken towards accomplishment of the crime; AND
(2) Conduct is highly corroborative of the person’s criminal purpose (conduct furthers the purpose of committing the crime)

Here, Jackson and co. are guilty of attempted robbery because their conduct strongly corroborated their criminal purpose and were substantial steps toward its accomplishment.

Question 95

United States v. Gladish

Answer 95

👧🤷‍♂️

“Impossibility” = “under the facts as the defendant believed them to be,” the defendant was guilty of committing the crime, even thought it was impossible for him to be guilty of the crime itself. The defendant is thus guilty of an attempt of that crime.

Distinction between attempt impossibility and mitigation of guilt for the actual crime due to mistake of fact: whether the fact at issue is true or false.
(a) If the fact is true, then the defendant could indeed have committed the crime. Charge the actual crime and excuse with the mistake of fact defense.
(b) If the fact is false, then the defendant could not have committed the crime. Charge attempt via impossibility.

Here, the “girl” Gladish thought he was talking to was an adult government agent. He cannot be found guilty of solicitation of a minor, but he can be found guilty of attempted solicitation of a minor via impossibility.

Question 96

Hicks v. United States

Answer 96

🤠🔫

Aiding and abetting (a.k.a. Complicity) is a mechanism for convicting an accomplice of a substantive crime.

Elements:
(1) Intentional conduct which aids or encourages the perpetrator of the crime
(2) Specific intent that the conduct will encourage or help bring about the crime

Here, Hicks was not convicted of aiding and abetting murder because there is no evidence which shows a conspiracy between Rowe and Hicks to kill Colvard, and no evidence to show that Hicks acted in encouragement of the killing at the scene.

Question 97

Wilcox v. Jeffrey

Answer 97

🎷

Aiding and abetting (a.k.a. Complicity) is a mechanism for convicting an accomplice of a substantive crime.

Elements:
(1) Intentional conduct which aids or encourages the perpetrator of the crime
(2) Specific intent that the conduct will encourage or help bring about the crime

Here, Wilcox paid for a ticket to the show and did not protest it. Thus, he (and everyone in the audience) is guilty of aiding and abetting Hawkins in working without legal permission.

Question 98

Conn v. State

Answer 98

🥛🔫

Conspiracy = agreement to commit a crime. Conspiracy is a crime in itself. The target crime need not have occurred.

Elements:
(1) Intent to commit the target crime (inherent in the agreement to commit the crime)
(2) Entered into an agreement to commit the crime (sometimes bilateral agreement, meaning agreement with undercover law enforcement doesn’t count)
(3) Any of the co-conspirators performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement

Here, Conn was convicted of conspiracy to murder Stacy Howell. The intent and agreement to commit the crime are not at issue, and there were several overt acts in furtherance of the commission of the crime (surveillance x 2, experimental milk jug silencer).

Question 99

United States v. Shabani

Answer 99

💊🤝

21 U.S.C. § 846 the drug conspiracy statute does not require the Government to prove that a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Here, Shabani could be convicted of drug conspiracy even in the absence of an overt act toward the furtherance of the conspiracy.

Question 100

State v. Pacheco

Answer 100

👮‍♂️🤫

MPC normally allows unilateral conspiracies, but this particular conspiracy statute requires a bilateral agreement. Sacharoff thinks unilateral conspiracy misses the point of punishing conspiracy because “two criminals working together are more dangerous than one.”

Conspiracy to commit murder requires a mutual agreement between two or more persons. If one of those persons is an undercover agent who does not actually want the crime to occur, then no conspiracy existed. (Not the rule in all jurisdictions).

Here, Pacheco conspired (unknowingly) with an undercover police officer. Thus, he cannot be convicted of conspiring with the officer.

Question 101

Interstate v. United States

Answer 101

🎥🤑

To prove conspiracy, you must prove that an agreement exists, but you can prove it circumstantially.

Here, conspiracy to fix movie showing prices between distributors and theaters was easily proved through the letters and conduct of the people involved

Question 102

People v. Lauria

Answer 102

📞💁‍♀️

Conspiracy: when is the supplier of goods or services a co-conspirator in a crime?

In some cases, the vendor is clearly an co-conspirator, because the whole purpose of the business is to further some illegal activity. Outside of such cases, the intent of a supplier who knows of the criminal use to which his supplies are put to participate in the criminal activity connected with the use of his supplies may be established by
(1) direct evidence that he intends to participate, or
(2) through an inference that he intends to participate based on,
(a) his special interest in the activity, or
(b) the aggravated nature of the crime itself

Here, Lauria is not guilty of conspiracy to commit prostitution, because there was insufficient evidence that he intended to further the prostitutes’ activities by providing answering services to them, and no circumstantial evidence from which a special interest in their activities could be inferred.

Question 103

Pinkerton v. United States

Answer 103

🧾🤥

Pinkerton Doctrine = a mechanism for convicting all conspirators of the substantive crime, even if they, themselves did not commit the crime.

Test: Provided that a conspiracy exists, did any co-conspirator do something in furtherance of the conspiracy, and was it foreseeable that the crime would occur.

There is no merger problem with charging both conspiracy to commit the substantive offense and committing the substantive offense itself.

Here, though Daniel was in prison when his brother Walter committed tax fraud, the fact that Daniel had agreed to the tax fraud means that he is guilty of committing the tax fraud himself.

Question 104

Wooten v. Superior Court

Answer 104

👯‍♀️

Pimping is soliciting another person for sex work in order to support your own livelihood. Pandering is procuring another person for the purpose of prostitution and causing them to remain in the business by promises/threats/etc.

Prostitution is the predicate offense for both of these crimes. It involves (1) a lewd act (2) between the prostitute and the customer, (3) in exchange for money or other consideration

Question 105

Commonwealth v. Lopez

Answer 105

💪🍆

Rape = sex by physical force
It is not necessary that the defendant intend the intercourse to be without consent. Therefore, a mistake of fact as to the giving of consent is irrelevant.

MPC would apply recklessly to the lack of consent, and Staples would apply knowingly. But under this statute, lack of consent is strict liability.

Here, Lopez is guilty of rape because his mistake of fact defense (he thought the victim was a willing participant) is irrelevant. Sex + force = rape, without having to consider whether a reasonable person would understand that consent was given.

Question 106

State in the interest of M.T.S.

Answer 106

🍆✅

Rape = sex without consent, and no force is required beyond that which is necessary to achieve penetration. Consent = (1) freely given (not coerced); AND (2) affirmative (the word “yes,” or other conduct from which affirmative consent can be inferred)

This is the “modern” approach, but it shifts the burden of proof to the defendant and puts the victim on trial.

Here, the victim had not affirmatively and freely expressed consent to intercourse with the defendant, and thus he is guilty of rape

Question 107

People v. John Z.

Answer 107

✅…⛔️

Rape = sex without consent at the time of penetration. If consent is first given and then later withdrawn, then the withdrawal of consent nullifies any earlier consent. Forcible persistence in what has then become nonconsensual intercourse is rape.

Holding:
(1) Consent can be withdrawn
(2) If consent is withdrawn, the perpetrator may or may not have a reasonable time to stop the activity (reasonable time may or may not be a defense)

What must be proved for rape:
(1) Consent is withdrawn
(2) A reasonable person would know that consent had been withdrawn
(3) The defendant continued the act after consent was withdrawn
(4) The defendant used force after consent was withdrawn

Here, if in fact Laura did initially give consent, substantial evidence shows that she withdrew it and John Z. persisted anyway. Thus, he is guilty of rape.

Question 108

People v. Giardino

Answer 108

🥴🍆

Actual consent is not sufficient by itself to establish a defense to a charge of rape. The victim had to have the legal capacity to understand the act and give legally cognizable consent voluntarily and freely. If the person lacks the capacity to give legal consent, then the giving of actual consent is irrelevant. A person can be sufficiently intoxicated to deprive them of their ability to exercise reasonable judgment and thus render them incapable of giving legal consent. The line for when a person is too drunk to legally consent is a fuzzy one. The mens rea associated with legal capacity to give consent is that the defendant knew or should have known that the victim was incapable of giving legal consent.

Here, there is substantial evidence that the victim actually consented and that she possessed the legal capacity to do so.

Question 109

State v. Smith

Answer 109

🥴🍆

Circumstantial factors can create inferences about the victim’s state and the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s state. Factors:
* Behavior
○ Slurring, stumbling, etc.
○ Number of drinks, time period
* Qualities
○ Height & weight
○ Experience with alcohol

Mens rea = knew (knowingly) or should have known (negligence). Reasonable mistake of fact about the victim’s capacity to give consent is a valid defense.

Test: Would a reasonable person of the same level of intoxication understand that the other person was too drunk to give consent? (If a defendant was also drunk, that can be a factor in determining whether the defendant was aware of the victim’s state.

Question 110

State v. Holmes

Answer 110

👧⛔️

“Statutory rape” = rape of a victim who is define by statute as lacking the legal capacity to consent to sex.

Strict liability as to the age of the victim in most states. This means that mistake of age is not a defense, no matter how reasonable.

Most states allow a defense if the defendant is close in age to the victim (3-5 years).

Here, statutory rape is a strict liability crime, mistake of age is not a defense, and Holmes’ conviction is affirmed.

Question 111

Paschal v. State

Answer 111

👨‍🏫

Ar. Code § 5-14-125(a)(6) prohibiting sex between teachers and students under 21 years of age criminalizes consensual sexual intercourse between adults, and thus infringes on the Constitutional right to privacy.

Relationship of trust and authority is not a part of the statute.

Here, a teacher had a months-long affair with a student the school where he taught, but because she was a legal adult and consented, he was not guilty of statutory rape.

Question 112

State ex rel. Kuntz

Answer 112

🔪📞

American Bystander Rule = a bystander has no legal duty to rescue or summon aid for another person. In other words, if you fail to act, and your failure to act causes the death of another person, then you are not guilty of criminal homicide.

Exceptions: (definitely know the two starred items)
* If you created the peril*
* If you have a special relationship with the victim*
* Statute creates a duty
* Contractual relationship
* Voluntary assumption of care
* Landowner
* Control the conduct of others

Exception to the exception: if you have a duty to save/call for help, but you yourself are unsafe, then your duty to save/call for help does not kick in until you have reached safety for yourself.

Here, Kuntz had a special duty because she had a husband-wife relationship with Becker. However, she did not have a duty until she herself was safe.

Question 113

Commonwealth v. Coleman

Answer 113

🔫🚗

Murder = causing the death of another person after premeditation (“cool reflection”)

There is no set period of time that constitutes premeditation. Seconds are enough, as long as the resolution to kill must be formed prior to the blow being struck. Resolution to kill can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct.

Premeditation separates first-degree from second-degree murder, but it does not necessarily mean that the defendant is more culpable.

Here, Coleman’s walking to his car to get a gun constituted the requisite premeditation for a murder charge, even though the killing occurred in the heat of the moment during a brawl outside of a nightclub.

Question 114

State v. Texieira

Answer 114

🦵🤕

Murder = causing the death of another person after premeditation

Premeditation requires forming the intent to kill a “period of time” prior to the killing, but it doesn’t have to be that long of a time period.

Here, Texieira is guilty of murder for causing Ortega’s death by kicking him in the head in a fight outside of a nightclub.

Question 115

State v. Porter

Answer 115

🖤

Second degree murder = causing the death of another person with malice aforethought

Three ways to establish malice aforethought:
* Intent to kill (purpose or knowledge with regards to the killing)
* Intent to cause serious bodily injury
* Depraved heart (reckless with an extreme indifference to the value of human life)
○ Recklessness plus = recklessness that can be fairly assimilated to purpose or knowledge
○ Ok with someone dying as a result of your actions

Deliberate intent to kill is not a necessary element of second degree murder.

Here, the court denies Porter’s attempt to argue for the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter and remands for a trial on the charge of second degree murder.

Question 116

State v. Robinson

Answer 116

🏌️🤕

Second degree murder = causing the death of another person with malice aforethought.

Three ways to establish malice aforethought:
* Intent to kill (purpose or knowledge with regards to the killing)
* Intent to cause serious bodily injury
* Depraved heart (reckless with an extreme indifference to the value of human life)
○ Recklessness plus = recklessness that can be fairly assimilated to purpose or knowledge
○ Ok with someone dying as a result of your actions

Here, Robinson was guilty of depraved heart second-degree murder because he manifested extreme indifference to the value of human life when he struck Crowley so hard with a golf club that the club became embedded in Crowley’s skull and killed him.

Question 117

People v. Billa

Answer 117

🚗🔥☠️

A defendant is liable for the death of a co-conspirator via the felony murder rule when
(1) The death results from co-conspirators’ actions in furtherance of the conspiracy; and
(2) The defendant was present at the scene and actively participated in the events immediately causing death

Here, Billa was present and actively participating in events that furthered the conspiracy and led to his co-conspirator’s death. Thus, he is guilty of murder via arson under the felony murder rule.

Question 118

State v. Mitchell

Answer 118

❄️☠️

Two approaches for determining whether an unenumerated felony is inherently dangerous and can support a second-degree murder charge via the felony murder rule:
(1) Abstract approach (umbrella judgment; crime always dangerous/not dangerous as a matter of law)
(2) Factual approach (case-by-case judgment; crime dangerous or not dangerous based on the manner it is carried out by the defendant)

The factual approach should be used, because even a crime which on its face does not appear to be dangers to human life can be carried out in a manner that makes it dangerous to human life.

Test: was the felony committed in a manner that created a substantial risk of death? If it was, and the defendant should have known that it created a substantial risk (negligence) then it was done in an inherently dangerous way and can support a felony murder charge.

Here, Mitchell’s motion to dismiss the second-degree murder charge against him is denied. A jury will determine whether unlawful distribution of a controlled substance can support a second-degree murder charged because it was inherently dangerous in the way that Mitchell carried it out.

Question 119

Commonwealth v. Acevedo

Answer 119

🏡🥊☠️

Voluntary manslaughter = intentionally causing the death of another with malice aforethought BUT with an excuse (provocation, sudden combat, extreme emotional distress) that lowers the charge from second-degree murder.

Provocation excuse elements:
(1) Provocation must come from the victim;
(2) Defendant was subjectively provoked to act because their extreme emotional distress “eclipsed their ability to reason;”
(3) A reasonable person in the circumstances would be provoked such that their extreme emotional distress “eclipsed their ability to reason;” and
(4) There was no cooling off period (or no change of location) between the provocation and the act which caused the death

Here, because Acevedo was surrounded in the fight outside of the house party, he was repeatedly punched in the head, he was knocked to the ground, and he had not chance for his emotions to cool, there was evidence in support of provocation.

Question 120

State v. Shumway

Answer 120

🎮🔪☠️

Voluntary manslaughter = intentionally causing the death of another with malice aforethought BUT with an excuse (provocation, sudden combat, extreme emotional distress) that lowers the charge from second-degree murder.

Extreme emotional distress elements:
(1) Distress caused by the victim;
(2) Defendant’s extreme emotional distress “eclipsed their ability to reason;”
(3) A reasonable person in the circumstances would be provoked such that their extreme emotional distress “eclipsed their ability to reason;”

Here, because Ray initiated the conflict when he retrieved the knife and began poking at Shumway, because Shumway had been bullied his whole life, and because Shumway had a stab wound to his hand, there was evidence that he acted out of extreme emotional distress and therefore his charge should be reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter.

Question 121

State ex rel. Thomas

Answer 121

🚗🚗☠️

Involuntary manslaughter = recklessly causing the death of another (did not intend to cause death, but aware of the facts which create the risk that death will occur and consciously disregarded that risk)

Here, the court chooses to admit evidence showing that Reagan did not have the requisite mens rea of recklessness because he was being chased, and thus unable to recognize and disregard the risk of death occurring. This evidence would support a justification defense (self-defense or duress) which is not available to Reagan because his actions resulted in the death of a third party, not the aggressor, but the evidence will not be considered for that purpose.

Question 122

People v. Cabrera

Answer 122

🚗🏞️☠️

Negligent homicide = causing the death of another unintentionally, where the defendant should have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death.

Criminal negligence = a gross deviation from the standard of care of a reasonable person
* Non-perception of unreasonable risk
* Additional affirmative act which creates unreasonable risk
* Seriously blameworthy carelessness

Here, the evidence was not sufficient to show that Cabrera’s conduct in driving too quickly around the corner with four other teens in the car was not only a failure to perceive a risk of death but also seriously blameworthy conduct that created the risk. The three counts of negligent homicide were dismissed.

Question 123

People v. Goetz

Answer 123

🚇🔫

A person is justified in using deadly force self-defense when he reasonably believes that another person is using/about to use deadly physical force against them OR another person is attempting to commit an enumerated felony, including robbery

Here, Goetz may have been justified in using deadly force against the first three teens who approached him to ask for money/rob him. It is unlikely that he was justified in using deadly force against the fourth teen, who never approached him and who he shot twice.

Question 124

State v. Norman

Answer 124

🧤💎🫰

A person is justified in using deadly force in self-defense only when force that would result in death or serious bodily injury is imminently threatened against them.

“Inevitable” that he would kill me ≠ imminent threat of force

Here, it may be true that the abusive husband would have inevitably killed his wife, but she was not justified in causing his death because the threat to her life was not imminent.