Criminal Damage Flashcards
Samuels v Stubbs
Ratio: Whether property is damaged is a question of fact and degree. Damage includes injury, mischief, or harm done to property. Damage does not necessarily need to render the property useless or prevent it from serving its normal function.
A (a juvenile) v R
Ratio: For damage to be constituted, there must be some expense on behalf of the owner to restore the property to its previous condition.
Facts: Spitting on a policeman’s coat was held not to be criminal damage.
Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon
Ratio: Damage doesn’t have to be permanent.
Facts: Defendant had painted on pavements as part of a CND demonstration. Local authority employed a graffiti squad to deal with it, even though it would have been washed away by the rain. Held to be damage since money, time and effort had been spent to restore the pavement to its original state.
Roe v Kingerlee
Ratio: Damage will be constituted if there is expense in rectifying it.
Facts: Mud was smeared on the walls of a police cell and it cost £7 to remove. This was held to be damage.
Morphitis v Salmon
Ratio: Criminal damage includes not only permanent or temporary physical harm but also permanent or temporary impairment of value or usefulness.
Fiak
Ratio: Criminal damage includes not only permanent or temporary physical harm but also permanent or temporary impairment of value or usefulness.
Facts: Defendant stuffed his blanket down the toilet in his prison cell and repeatedly flushed it, causing the cell to flood. Although the floor was waterproof and the damage washable, this constituted damage because both were rendered temporarily useless.
R v Whitely
Information is not property.
R v Maloney
Intention is to be given its ordinary meaning.
R v G
To prove recklessness the prosecution must prove that:
• At the time of committing the AR, the accused was subjectively aware of the risk; and
• In the circumstances known to him, it was objectively unreasonable for the accused to take that risk.
R v Smith
Ratio: It is insufficient that D does an act that damages property intentionally, it must also be proved that he knew, or was reckless as to whether, the property belonged to another.
Ignorance of civil law can prevent liability.
Facts: Smith had installed electrical wiring to connect a stereo system and with his landlord’s permission, he put down floorboards, wall panels and roofing material. When Smith decided to vacate the flat, he asked the landlord if his brother, who had been living with him, could remain and he declined. Smith then smashed up everything he had installed, allegedly to remove the wiring he had fitted. Court of Appeal quashed his conviction since he believed he was damaging his own property.
Jaggard v Dickinson
Ratio: An individual will be entitled to the defence under the CDA 1971, s 5(2)(a) irrespective of whether the belief was reasonable, even if it arises from intoxication.
Facts: Dickinson broke a window in the drunken belief that the house was that of a friend with whom she was staying and that he would want her to sleep inside the house even though she could not get access through the front door.
R v Denton
Ratio: For the purposes of CDA 1971, s 5(2)(a) the defendant’s motive for causing the damage is irrelevant, even where the motive is to perpetrate a fraud.
Facts: Owner of a factory in financial difficulties had apparently said to the defendant: ‘There is nothing like a good fire for improving the financial circumstances of a business’. D took this as an instruction to set fire to the factory, which he did. On appeal his conviction was quashed as the Court held he was entitled to CDA 1971, s 5(2)(a) as a defence.
Blake v DPP
Ratio: God cannot consent to criminal damage.
For CDA 1971, s 5(2)(b) to be used, the damage cause by the accused must be (objectively) capable of damaging the property.
Facts: During a demonstration protecting about the use of military force by the allies in Iraq and Kuwait, the defendant used a marker pen to write a biblical quotation on a concrete pillar at the Houses of Parliament. He appealed against his conviction for criminal damage, claiming that he was carrying out the instructions of God and God had consented. This was dismissed.
R v Baker & Wilkins
Ratio: CDA 1971, s 5(2)(b) only relates to the protection of property.
Facts: A mother who kicked open a door to rescue her child from a perceived threat by her estranged husband was not allowed to raise the CDA 1971 s 5(2)(b) defence because a child is not property.
Johnson v DPP
Ratio: For CDA 1971, s 5(2)(b) to be used the accused must believe that the property was in immediate need of protection (subjective test).
Facts: Johnson, a squatter in a council house, damaged a door while attempting to fit lock in the house. He was charged with criminal damage and raised this defence on the basis that there had recently been a lot of thefts in the area and so he needed to protect his property. Court held that this did not demonstrate a belief that his property was in immediate need of protection.
