Counter terrorism Flashcards
CONTEST
The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK from terrorism,
Between January 2009 and December 2010 over 600 people were arrested for terrorist-related activity in the UK.
Organised around four workstreams, each comprising
a number of key objectives
Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks;
Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack;
Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.
PREVENT
Not possible to resolve the threats we face simply by arresting and prosecuting more people.
Aim - Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support // Work with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet and health) where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address
Success in Prevent will mean that:
• There is a reduction in support for terrorism
• There is more challenge to and isolation of extremists
and terrorists operating on the internet
CHANNEL
Channel is a key element of the Prevent strategy.
It is a multi-agency approach to protect people at risk from radicalisation.
Collaboration between local authorities, the police and the local community to:
• identify individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism;
• develop the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned.
Channel is about safeguarding children and adults from being drawn into committing terrorist-related activity.
Identification
Screen referrals Exit or referral to alternative support
o Ensure there is a specific vulnerability around radicalisation and the referral is not malicious or misinformed
Appropriate Preliminary assessment Exit or referral to alternative support
o Determine suitability (alternative support mechanisms)
o Collective assessment of vulnerability and risk
Multi-agency panel
o Review of vulnerability assessment and risk
o Develop support plan
o Review Progress
Delivery of support package
Prevent and prevention
PREVENT is a government policy whereas prevention is a well-established science.
Prevention can act at different levels -
Societal level
o Control of supply, advertising, pricing, environment of use, taxation, mass media, employment
Community level
o Local by-laws, licensing, advocacy, networking, alternative leisure provision community groups
Close to individual
o School, education, role modelling, parental rules, peer effects, socialisation
ACPO’s ‘Prevent pyramid’ tiered model of intervention
At the apex of the pyramid are active terrorists (those actively breaking the law) who remain relatively few in number when considered in relation to all those who may sympathise with their beliefs and feelings.
This larger group occupy the next level down (Moving towards extremism). While not committing any violent acts themselves, they may provide support to those sitting at the top of the pyramid and act to inspire others.
At this lower level, there sits a far larger grouping which constitutes all those that are considered ‘vulnerable’ to being influenced by these messages.
At the very bottom of the pyramid is the ‘wider community’
The key aim of any prevention intervention is to prevent the recipients from engaging in a target behaviour
Therefore, prevention interventions are delivered to individuals who are not already engaging in the target behaviour.
Bartlett and Birdwell, 2010 argue that radicalisation is more ‘unpredictable and complicated’ than the linear process assumed by Prevent. McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2008) identifies 12 different social/psychological processes that can lead to radicalisation.
By their very nature prevention interventions will generate a large number of ‘false positives’, i.e. individuals who do not go on to display the target behaviour will be treated as if they will. This raises legitimate ethical concerns that prevention carries the potential for unfairly labelling those targeted for intervention who may not pose a genuine risk.
Universal/targeted prevention
Indicated prevention
Universal prevention interventions are designed for the general population or specific populations, such as schools or communities. A universal prevention is delivered regardless of the perceived risk so all the intended recipients are exposed.
Targetted prevention interventions are designed to protect specific groups who may be considered „at risk‟ Young people who are vulnerable to peer pressure and potential negative influences of friends and family. Personal, social and cultural circumstances may make them particularly vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists
Indicated prevention interventions are designed for individuals who may be considered „high risk‟ because they are likely to engage in the target behaviour. Intervention to increase their critical thinking skills and offer alternatives to violence for addressing problems and issues.
Prevention interventions
Tackling problems at their „root causes‟ means investing in people who are vulnerable and/or „at risk‟, not those who are already „high risk‟.
As an intervention people like information giving – easy to see an impact
Beware the ‘prevetion paradox’ - contradictory situation where the majority of cases/greatest harm come from those at least risk and only a minority of cases come from the high risk population - because there are far more of them
Nation et al (2003)
Using a review-of-reviews approach across 4 areas (substance abuse, risky sexual behavior, school failure, and juvenile delinquency and violence), the authors identified 9 characteristics that were consistently associated with effective prevention programs: Programs were comprehensive, included varied teaching methods, provided sufficient dosage, were theory driven, provided opportunities for positive relationships, were appropriately timed, were socioculturally relevant, included outcome evaluation, and involved well-trained staff
The IVP guidance
Cole, alison, cole and Alison Guidance to support practitioner's level of awareness in identifying vulnerable individuals. Presence of even one should prompt the practitioner to seek advice from line manager A variety of risk factors o Cultural and religious isolation o Isolation from family o Risk taking behaviour
Individuals engaging in the following are
displaying strong behavioural indicators that they may already be on the way to becoming involved in violent extremism
o Death rhetoric
o Being a member of an extremist group
o Contact with known recruiters/extremists
USE TO NEGATIVELY LABEL IS UNETHICAL
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
Conflict ecosystem
An insurgency is an organized, prolonged politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, while increasing insurgent control.
Counterinsurgency is military, political, economic and psychological actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency
Kilcullen (2006)
Proposes a mental model that helps individuals and agencies cooperate. It creates platforms for collaboration and forms a basis for improvisation.
There are two parts to this model - “conflict ecosystem”
and a tentative framework for whole-of-government counterinsurgency in that environment.
It includes many independent but interlinked actors, each seeking to maximize their advantage in a combative environment.
Some actors existed in the environment before the conflict - government, social classes, political institutions.
The internal power struggle has resulted in conflict and threatens to destroy the society.
This new state of the environment also produces new actors - armed organizations
Important to realize that the intervening counterinsurgent, are not outside this ecosystem, rather, we are inside the system.
Where the counterinsurgent differs from other actors is largely a matter of intent. Like other players they seek to maximize survivability and influence, and extend the space which they control. But unlike some other players (the insurgents, for example) intent is to reduce the system’s destructive, combative elements and return it to its “normal” state of competitive interaction
Three pillars model
Kilcullen (2006)
Framework for inter-agency counterinsurgency operations
Framework, not a template. It helps people see where their efforts fit into a campaign, rather than telling them what to do in a given situation
The model is structured as a base (Information), three pillars (Security, Political and Economic) and a roof (Control).
Information is the base component for all other activities, providing the linkages that allow discrete functional elements to cooperate as an integrated whole
The security component
Providing physical security against insurgent violence.
Economic and Development component
This includes immediate humanitarian relief and the provision of essential services as well as longer-term programmes to develop the infrastructure and capacity fro legitimate agricultural, industrial, educational, medical and governmental activities
Political strategy
The political pillar focuses on mobilizing support
Key function in a COIN effort, providing a framework of political reconciliation, genuine reform.
All 4 combine to enable the government to control its environment, such that the population will in the long run, support it rather then the insurgents
These thoughts are tentative; they need a large amount of work. Systematic oversimplifications of reality. But might be a basis for further development.
Iterative counterinsurgency campaign design
logical lines of operations for a counterinsurgency
While strategy drives design, which in turn drives tactical actions, the reverse is also true.
Observations of actions result in learning that may generate modifications to the design, which in turn may have strategic implications.
The COIN imperative to “Learn and Adapt” is essential in making the design process work correctly.
Commanders use LLOs to visualize, describe, and direct operations. LLOs are appropriate for synchronizing operations against enemies that hide among the populace. A plan based on LLOs unifies the efforts of joint, interagency, multinational, and HN forces toward a common purpose. Each LLO represents a conceptual category along which the Host nation government and COIN intend to attack the insurgent strategy and establish HN government legitimacy. Successful achievement of the end state require careful coordination of actions undertaken along all LLOs.
High value targetting
Civilian and military leaders of governments fighting insurgencies have often turned to highvalue targeting (HVT) operations to achieve objectives such as damaging an insurgent group by depriving it of effective direction and experience
We define high-value targeting as focused operations against specific individuals or networks whose removal should disproportionately degrade an insurgent group’s effectiveness.
HVT operations can cause greater disruption than a group can. Leadership losses can erode morale at all levels and reinforce the costs and risks of involvement, especially when the group has no clear succession plan in place.
You can just replace a leader with another leader.
growing discomfort with civilian deaths involved,
Targeted killing may have some direct implications for the overall morality of armed conflict and combat. Drone technology removes the soldier from the actual battlefield and may have removed any remnants of ‘humanity of combat’ and produced the factual dehumanization of the enemy (Moore, 2009)
