Corporations Flashcards

1
Q

Major advantage of corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Limited liability

in partnership, each partner is liable for business debt

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2
Q

Limited liability

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Concept that allows corporations to avoid personal liability for the debts incurred by the corporation (may lose share/investment, but will not be personally liable)

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3
Q

Major disadvantage of corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Double-taxation
(partnership isn’t taxed on its profit, simply credit each partner for share and tax individually = flow-through taxation)

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4
Q

Taxation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • Disadvantage of corporation = double-taxation

- Have to pay income taxes on its profits, then taxed again when dividends distributed to shareholders

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5
Q

S corporations

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • Smaller corporation in which all shareholders are human being and US citizens
    (Exception to double-taxation)
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6
Q

C corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Antithesis to S corporation

Taxed at entity level = double-taxation

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7
Q

3 sets of players in corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  1. shareholders/stockholders
  2. Board of directors
  3. officers
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8
Q

Shareholder

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • Owners of corporation
  • Buy stock from corp to become shareholder
  • Do NOT manage corporation, instead ELECT people who do run it (board of directors)
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9
Q

Shareholder’s power

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Measured by the number of shares owned

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10
Q

Board of directors

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • Managers of corporation
  • Run the organization
  • Must act as a group
  • Not agents of the corporation
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11
Q

Passive investment

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • separation of management and ownership rights
    = allows shareholders to own corp without burden of running it
  • Big advantage of corporation form (distinct from partnership)
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12
Q

Officers

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • Appointed and monitored by the board of directors to carry out board’s policy
  • Act as individuals, not as a group
  • Agents of the corporation = can bind the corporation to contract
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13
Q

Can one person be shareholder, director, officer (or some combination) at the same time?
CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Yes

Key exam tip: keep track of which hat person is wearing when acting to know which rules/duties apply

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14
Q

Can a corporation consist of only one person?

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Yes

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15
Q

Exceptions to basic corporate model

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Often come up in closely held corporation

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16
Q

2 categories of corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Public corporation

Close(ly held) corporation

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17
Q

Public corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • Enormous business (thousands of shareholders)
  • Stock is included on the stock exchange
  • Example = Coca Cola, Microsoft
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18
Q

Close corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • Vast majority of corporations in this county
  • Smaller business (fewer shareholders, sometimes family)
  • No public market for stock
    Example = uber
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19
Q

Close corporation exceptions

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • Can eliminate board of directors

- Shareholders can sometimes be liable for business debt

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20
Q

Law for corporations

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • State law, each has its own corporation code (vary from state to state)
  • No federal law for corporation
    (federal corporations, like Red Cross, are created by legislative acts)
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21
Q

Why Delaware is cool

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Provided the most business-friendly, flexible code

but today the model act is better, but inertia blah blah

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22
Q

Law for formation of corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Can only be formed by complying with state regulation

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23
Q

Requirements to form corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Usually means

  • Article of corporation
  • Capital
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24
Q

Articles of corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Must be accepted

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25
Q

Limited liability filing

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • Any time we have limited liability company, state must accept document for filing (gotta get dat stamp)
  • (distinct from partnership = doesn’t need that, because not limited liability)
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26
Q

Capital

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

= Money
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$M$$$$$0$$$$$$$$N$$$$$$$$$$E$$$$$$$$$$$$Y$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

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27
Q

2 ways of raising capital

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  1. Debt financing (loans)

2. Equity financing (selling ownership interest)

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28
Q

Debt financing

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Loans

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29
Q

Equity financing

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Selling ownership interest

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30
Q

Inherent conflict in corporations

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • Bifurcation of ownership/management interest
  • Board of directors are calling shots that affect the money of shareholders
  • KEY issue = philanthropic decisions
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31
Q

Can corporations participate in philanthropy?

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

Law recognizes corporations are members of the community, and as members of the community, can support charitable causes

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32
Q

B corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A

AKA benefit corporation
= For-profit corporation that is expressly committed to benefit society by certain causes
EXAMPLE = corporation that manufactures widgets in foreign country, pays foreign workers same wage as U.S. workers (cause is expressly stated, board cannot be sued for wasting shareholders money)

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33
Q

Significance of corporation

CORPORATE MODEL /corporations

A
  • Development of corporation unlocked economic engines

- Created jobs, spurred innovation, created tax revenue

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34
Q

3 requirements to form a corporation

FORMATION, ETC /corporations

A
  1. Person (incorporator)
  2. Paper (typically articles of incorporation)
  3. Acts (delivery, filing by usually Secretary of State)
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35
Q

Incorporator

FORMATION, ETC /corporations

A
  • Can have more than one incorporator
  • Usually human being, but doesn’t have to be
  • Job = execute articles and delivery to state
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36
Q

4 types of info required by model act

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION /formation of corporation

A

4 things that must be in the articles

  1. Name of corporation
  2. Name and address of each incorporator
  3. Name of registered agent, address of registered office
  4. Information about the stock
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37
Q

Name of corporation

FORMATION, ETC /corporations

A

Must have one of magic words, spelled out or abbreviated

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38
Q

4 magic words of corporation name

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION /formation of corporation

A

(required by model act, vary slightly from state to state)

  1. Corporation
  2. Company
  3. Incorporation
  4. Limited
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39
Q

Address of registered office

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION /formation of corporation

A

Must be in the state of incorporation

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40
Q

Registered agent

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION /formation of corporation

A

Official legal representative of the corporation

EXAMPLE = someone who can receive service of process or tax docs

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41
Q

Information about the stock

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION /formation of corporation

A

Number of shares available

If having classes of stock, must note this and describe

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42
Q

additional info required by some states

A

Some states require article of incorporation to include

Statement of purpose for corporation (can be very general)

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43
Q

2 types of info that can be included

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION /formation of corporation

A
  1. Exculpation provision

2. Names/addresses of initial directors

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44
Q

5 steps of required action

FORMATION, ETC /corporations

A
  1. Incorporator signs articles
  2. Have them notarized
  3. Deliver them to secretary of state
  4. Have to pay filing fee
  5. Secretary stamps and files = corporation forms at this moment
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45
Q

Organizational meetings - 2 situations

ORGANIZATION /corporations

A
  1. Initial directors were named in articles

2. Initial directors were not named in articles

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46
Q

Organizational meeting if initial directors named in articles
ORGANIZATION /corporations

A

Named directors hold meeting to

  1. Select directors
  2. Adopt initial bylaws
  3. Conduct other appropriate business, like authorizing issuance of stock
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47
Q

Organizational meeting if no directors named in articles

ORGANIZATION /corporations

A
  • incorporator(s) holds meeting (doesn’t have to be in person, can be by written consent) to SELECT initial directors
  • Most states = can also adopt initial bylaws/conduct other biz OR can let initial directors do it
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48
Q

Differences between bylaws and articles of incorporation

ORGANIZATION /corporations

A

Articles = far more important, actually form corporation when filed with state, public documents, usually very short document, extremely difficult to amend (constitutes “fundamental corporate change”)

Bylaws = not filed with state, completely internal, lay out internal rules, easy to amend (most states = shareholders can do it, some state = directors or shareholders can)

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49
Q

When articles and bylaws conflict, which prevails?

ORGANIZATION /corporations

A

Articles

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50
Q

Form corporation in state A and want to do business in state B
INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE & FOREIGN CORPORATION /corporations

A
  • Incorporate in state A (= domestic corporation in state A)

- Qualify to do business in state B (= foreign corporation in state B)

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51
Q

Doing business

INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE & FOREIGN CORPORATION /corporations

A

Engaged in the regular course of intrastate business activity
= must qualify as foreign corporation
(if activity is more sporadic, don’t need to qualify AKA corp doesn’t need to qualify in every single state in which it has ever done a single business)

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52
Q

Qualifying as foreign corporation

INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE & FOREIGN CORPORATION /corporations

A

Must get certificate of authority from state B
by showing
1. Content of articles
2. Proof that corporation is in good standing in state A

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53
Q

Requirements as foreign corporation (once you get certificate of authority)
INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE & FOREIGN CORPORATION /corporations

A
  • Must get registered agent in state B (so somebody there to receive service of process if sued in state B)
  • Must pay taxes and stuff to state B
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54
Q

Failure to qualify

INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE & FOREIGN CORPORATION /corporations

A
  • Subject to civil fine

- Cannot assert a claim in state B (until pay fine and get qualified)

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55
Q

Internal affairs rule

INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE & FOREIGN CORPORATION /corporations

A

Q = what law governs internal affairs?
A = internal affairs of a state A incorporation are governed by state A law
AKA governing law for internal affairs is state of incorporation EVEN IF corp doesn’t do any business at all in incorporating state

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56
Q

Definition

PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS /corporations

A

Somebody acts on behalf of corporation that’s not yet formed and enters contract on behalf of that corp WHEN EVERYONE KNOWS THERE’S NO CORPORATION

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57
Q

Promoter

PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS /corporations

A

Person acting on behalf of corporation that’s not yet formed and enters pre-incorporation contracts

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58
Q

Liability of corporation

PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS /corporations

A
  • Corporation is never automatically liable on pre-incorporation contract
  • Not liable UNTIL it adopts the contract
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59
Q

2 types of adoption

PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS /corporations

A

Can be express or implied

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60
Q

Express adoption

PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS /corporations

A

Board of directors has meeting and agrees to adopt or something like that

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61
Q

Implied adoption

PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS /corporations

A

Corporation accepts a benefit under that contract

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62
Q

Liability of promoter

PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS /corporations

A

Promoter is PERSONALLY liable because she is a party to that contract
EVEN IF corporation is never formed

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63
Q

Effect of adoption on liability of promoter

PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS /corporations

A

Promoter is liable on pre-incorporation contracts until there’s a novation

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64
Q

Novation

PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS /corporations

A

Agreement between promotor and corporation and lessee that corporation will replace promoter on contract
(adoption is not novation = if corp adopts contract, BOTH promoter and corp are liable until novation occurs)

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65
Q

Definition

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A

Everyone THINKS there is a corporation but legally there isn’t due to defect in formation (= no de jure corporation)

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66
Q

Distinction from pre-incorporation contracts

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A
PIC = everyone knows the corp doesn’t exist
DI = everyone believes the corp does exist
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67
Q

Liability of defective incorporators

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A

No formation of de jure corporation BUT if defective incorporators are acting together, probably formed partnership
= personally liable (by rules of partnership)

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68
Q

2 doctrines that may help defective incorporators avoid liability
DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A

= under these common law doctrines, treated as corporation = not personally liable

  1. De facto corporation (DFC)
  2. Corporation by estoppel (CBE)
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69
Q

Requirements to assert DFC or CBE

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A

Must be unaware of failure (defect) to form a corporation

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70
Q

3 requirements for DFC

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A

Must show that
1. There is relevant incorporation statute (met in every state)
2. Parties made good faith, colorable (you were soooo close) attempt to comply with statute
3. Some exercise of corporate privilege (AKA acting as though corporation existed)
= de facto corporation doctrine applies, court treats as if corporation was actually formed

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71
Q

Application of DFC

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A
  • Parties not personally liable
  • Applies in BOTH for contracts and in tort
    BUT state can still enforce penalties/action for failure to incorporate (= still liable to state)
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72
Q

Liability to state (of defective incorporation) under DFC

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A

Still liable to state for failure to incorporate correctly

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73
Q

2 takeaways of CBE

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A
  1. If parties treats business as incorporation and act under that belief, 3P can be estopped from denying the corporation’s existence (AKA estopped from claiming the entity is not a corporation)
  2. Used as defense by defective incorporation to prevent 3P from suing them individually
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74
Q

Application of CBE

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A
  • Very narrow doctrine (narrower than DFC)

- Applies only in contract (not tort)

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75
Q

State law on CBE/DFC

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A
  • Common law doctrines
  • All over the map
  • Some states abolished both, some follow one, some follow both
  • NOTE WHAT PROFESSOR THINKS RE: WHETHER GOOD LAW
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76
Q

Section 2.04 of model act

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A

people who act behalf of corporation KNOWING that it doesn’t exist/wasn’t formed = personally liable

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77
Q

Interpretation of section 2.04

DEFECTIVE INCORPORATION /corporations

A
  • Some think it implies CBE and DFC are abolished
  • Some think that lack of knowledge means that you can use CBE and DFC
  • NOTE WHICH PROFESSOR THINKS
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78
Q

Capital

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Fancy word for money

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79
Q

2 ways corporation can raise money

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  1. Debt financing
  2. Equity financing
    (usually raise capital using both)
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80
Q

Debt financing

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Borrow money

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81
Q

Equity financing

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Allow investors to buy ownership interest in the business

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82
Q

Creditor

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • Gives money to corporation to loan for interest (debt financing)
  • Payment from corporation does not vary with profits/losses of corporation
  • Riskier for the business
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83
Q

Owner

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • Gives money to corporation to buy for ownership (equity financing)
  • Payment from corporation varies with profits/losses of corporation
  • Riskier for the investor
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84
Q

How does corporation use debt or equity financing?

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

By issuing securities

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85
Q

Issue

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Fancy word for sell

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86
Q

Securities

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Fancy word for investment

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87
Q

Bond

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • Security issued by corporation to lender (creditor)

- With debt financing

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88
Q

Debenture

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • Loan to corporation, repayment of which is not secured by corporate assets
  • Form of debt financing
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89
Q

Stock

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • Security of ownership interest issued by corporation to investor
  • With equity financing
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90
Q

Issuance of stock

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Corporation is selling its own stock

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91
Q

Authorized stock

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • Maximum number of shares corporation may sell

- Always set out in the article (cannot sell more unless amend articles)

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92
Q

Issued stock

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Number of shares corporation actually does sell

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93
Q

Outstanding stock

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Number of shares corporation has sold and has not reacquired

if issued and bought back, no longer outstanding

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94
Q

Issuance rules

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

When corporation is selling its own stock, must abide by 2 rules

  1. Must be for a proper form of consideration
  2. Must be for a proper amount of consideration
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95
Q

Issuance rules - proper form of consideration

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • Historically = couldn’t do promissory notes and promise for future services
  • Modern view = buyer may pay for an issuance with any tangible or intangible property or benefit to corporation (AKA pretty much any consideration)
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96
Q

Issuance rules - proper amount of consideration

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Corporation has to get at least par value

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97
Q

Par

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

= minimum issuance price
Completely arbitrary, has no relationship with actual value of stock
(key word = minimum, can be more)

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98
Q

Requirement of par stock

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • Not required

- Set up by the articles

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99
Q

No-par stock

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • No minimum issuance price

- Board can set whatever price it wants

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100
Q

Application of issuance rules

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • ONLY applies when corporation sells its own stock

- Don’t apply to regular people selling the corporation’s stock

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101
Q

Watered stock

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

When stock is listed for less than par value

Difference btwn par value and selling price = water

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102
Q

Liability for watered stock

DEBT & EQUITY FINANCING /finance, accounting, distributions

A

AKA what happens when stock is listed for less than par value
= corporations sue for payment of water
- Directors who approve the issuance of watered stock = liable for the water
- Buyer of watered stock = liable for the water charged with notice of par value (can’t use ignorance of par value as defense)
- 3P to whom buyer transfers watered stock = not liable for the water if didn’t know about the water

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103
Q

Distributions

DISTRIBUTIONS TO SHAREHOLDER /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Term of art

= Payment by corporation to its shareholders

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104
Q

3 basic types of distributions

DISTRIBUTIONS TO SHAREHOLDER /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  1. Dividends
  2. Repurchase
  3. Redemption
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105
Q

Dividends

DISTRIBUTIONS TO SHAREHOLDER /finance, accounting, distributions

A

= where corporation is paying the shareholders

  • Corporation is doing well, making money = can choose to put that back into corporation OR to pay dividends
  • Some corporations never pay dividends
106
Q

Repurchase

DISTRIBUTIONS TO SHAREHOLDER /finance, accounting, distributions

A

= corporation buys stock back from shareholder

107
Q

Redemption

DISTRIBUTIONS TO SHAREHOLDER /finance, accounting, distributions

A

= corporation forces shareholder to sell back her stock, pays her for it (redeemed stock)

  • Fairly rare
  • MUST be set up in the articles of incorporation
108
Q

Shareholder’s right to distribution

DISTRIBUTIONS TO SHAREHOLDER /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • No, shareholder’s don’t have rights to distribution
  • Payment of distribution is left entirely to discretion of the board
    (if shareholder sues, very hard to win, must show bad faith and stuff)
109
Q

Distribution payment

DISTRIBUTIONS TO SHAREHOLDER /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Paid pro rata per each share (unless articles say otherwise)

110
Q
Preferred class of stock
DISTRIBUTIONS TO SHAREHOLDER /finance, accounting, distributions
A
  • Preferred = pay first (NOT pay more = might get more, might get less)
  • Articles will set up classes
  • Articles will set up preferred amount
111
Q

Principle

PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • Law imposes restrictions on when corporation can make distribution
  • 2 schools of thought
112
Q

3 approaches

PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  1. historical/fund approach

2. Modern approach (majority approach)

113
Q

Historical (fund) approach

PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Must know about 3 types of funds in life of corporation

114
Q

Historical/fund approach - 3 types of funds

PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  1. Earned surplus
  2. Stated capital
  3. Capital surplus
115
Q

Historical/fund approach - earned surplus

PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A

= profits corporation earned by doing well on market (making more than it spends)
- Proper source (fund) for distribution AKA may pay distribution from earned surplus

116
Q

Historical/fund approach - stated capital

PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A

= par value of a par issuance (at board’s discretion with no-par balance)

  • Related to corporation’s raising money by issuing stock (rather than profiting from business)
  • Can NEVER be used to pay distribution
117
Q

Historical/fund approach - capital surplus

PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A

= excess over par value (at board’s discretion with no-par balance)

  • Related to corporation’s raising money by issuing stock (rather than profiting from business)
  • CAN be used to pay distribution
118
Q

Modern approach

PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Corporation can make a distribution UNLESS
1. Corporation is insolvent OR
2. The distribution would render it insolvent
Looks at insolvency, not the type of funds

119
Q

Modern approach - 2 definitions of insolvency

PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Company is insolvent if
1. Unable to pay its debts as they come due
2. Corporation’s assets are less than its liability
These are ALTERNATIVE tests = if corporation meets either, it is insolvent
Model act section 6.40(c)(1) and (2)

120
Q

Modern approach - tricky part of liability test for insolvency
PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A

Liabilities INCLUDE preferential liquidation rights

= must be taken into account when testing for insolvency

121
Q

Modern approach - preferential liquidation rights

PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • Class of stock with liquidation preference (analogous to dividend preference)
  • Comes up when company dissolves (rather than during distribution)
    = distributed first to those with liquidation preferences
122
Q

Liability for improper distribution

PROPRIETARY OF DISTRIBUTION /finance, accounting, distributions

A
  • Directors who approved the distribution = usually liable to the extent that distribution was improper (some states = strict liability, some states require breach of duty of care)
  • Shareholders who received distribution = liable ONLY if knew distribution was improper AT TIME IT WAS RECEIVED
123
Q

Initial directors

BACKGROUND /board of directors + officers

A

Either named in articles or elected by incorporators

124
Q

Subsequent directors

BACKGROUND /board of directors + officers

A

Elected by shareholders every year at annual meeting

125
Q
# of directors
BACKGROUND /board of directors + officers
A
  • Need only one
  • Model act = can be enumerated in articles OR bylaws
    (varies by state)
126
Q

Entity as directors

BACKGROUND /board of directors + officers

A
  • Nope

- Has to been an adult human being

127
Q

Individual directors as agents

BACKGROUND /board of directors + officers

A
  • Nope

- No authority to bind the corporation

128
Q

Responsibilities of directors

BACKGROUND /board of directors + officers

A
  • Smaller companies = day-to-day operations

- Large companies = oversee management, but officers undertake actual management

129
Q

Locus of authority of directors

BACKGROUND /board of directors + officers

A
  • Held by the board of directors
  • Directors can
    1. Set management policy
    2. Make big decisions
  • NOT the shareholders
130
Q

Inside director

BACKGROUND /board of directors + officers

A
  • Not only a director but also employed full-time by the corporation (as officer)
  • Sometimes called management director
131
Q

Outside director

BACKGROUND /board of directors + officers

A

Someone whose day job is not within the corporation

132
Q

Annual meeting

DIRECTOR ELECTION & REMOVAL /board of directors + officers

A
  • Required, shareholders must hold it to elect directors

- If late, directors will be holdover directors until successor is appointed

133
Q

Term of directors

DIRECTOR ELECTION & REMOVAL /board of directors + officers

A
  • Up for election every year

- Sometimes can be longer in staggered boards

134
Q

Staggered board

DIRECTOR ELECTION & REMOVAL /board of directors + officers

A
  • divided into halves or thirds

- half/third of board is elected each year

135
Q

Firing directors

DIRECTOR ELECTION & REMOVAL /board of directors + officers

A
  • Can remove a director before term is up
  • With or without cause
    (some states = if staggered board, must have cause)
136
Q

Vacancy on the board

DIRECTOR ELECTION & REMOVAL /board of directors + officers

A
  • Majority = shareholder or remaining directors can fill that position
  • Majority = if shareholders created the vacancy, shareholders should select replacement
137
Q

Carrying out responsibilities

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A

Must act as a group

138
Q

2 ways board can take an action

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A
  1. Unanimous written agreement (generally includes email)

2. Meetings

139
Q

2 kinds of board meetings

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A
  1. Regular

2. Special

140
Q

Regular meeting

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A

Corporation does not have to give notice to shareholders

time/date/frequency is usually set up in the bylaws

141
Q

Special meeting

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A

Corporation MUST give notice to directors

142
Q

Notice of special meeting

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A
  • Must state time and place of meeting
  • Does not have to state the purpose of the meeting
  • Model act 8.22(b) requires notice be given at least two days before meeting
  • Details of how to give notice = statutes usually vague, often put in bylaws
143
Q

Failure to give notice of special meeting

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A

Any action taken by board at that meeting may be voided

UNLESS those not given notice waive the defect

144
Q

Waiver of defective/failed notice

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A
  1. May do this in writing at any time

2. May do this by attending the meeting without objecting at the outset of the meeting

145
Q

Meeting process

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A

Every decision board makes comes to board as resolution to be passed or not
Key Q = does it have a quorum

146
Q

Quorum

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A

Majority of the directors (unless bylaws say otherwise)

147
Q

Passing a resolution

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A

Once have a quorum, just need positive/affirmative vote from majority of those in attendance

148
Q

Broken quorum

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A

If director leaves meeting (even for short bit) and majority is not longer present = quorum is broken, board cannot act

149
Q

Participating in a meeting

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A
  • Directors don’t have to be in the same place or see each other
  • TEST = directors merely have to hear each other live
  • Everyone participating is considered present
150
Q

Shareholder voting

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A
  • Can vote by proxy

- Can enter voting agreements

151
Q

Director voting

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A

voting proxies/agreements = void by public policy

directors owe nondelegable fiduciary duties to corporation

152
Q

Effect of director’s presence

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A

Every director present is PRESUMED to have concurred with whatever action board took
UNLESS dissent or abstention is noted in writing

153
Q

3 ways to satisfy noted in writing requirement (dissent/absention)
BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A
  • In the minutes OR
  • Deliver in writing to presiding officer in the meeting OR
  • Filed written dissent with the corporation immediately after the meeting
154
Q

Improper distribution impact on dissenting/absent director

BOARD ACTION /board of directors + officers

A

Liable UNLESS the dissent or abstention is noted in writing in 1 of 3 permitted ways
(usually in the minutes)

155
Q

To make a Corporation an LLC

NATURE OF CORP /key principles

A

You can create a shell LLC with no assets and merge with the corporation with the LLC being the survivor

156
Q

Formation

CORP v. PARTNERSHIP /key principles

A

Corporation = Formalities required.

Partnership = Can be informal.

157
Q

Limited Liability

CORP v. PARTNERSHIP /key principles

A

Corporation = Yes.

Partnership = Depends on type.

158
Q

Free Transferability

CORP v. PARTNERSHIP /key principles

A

Corporation = Easier.

Partnership = More difficult.

159
Q

Continuity

CORP v. PARTNERSHIP /key principles

A

Corporation = Default infinite.

Partnership = Default at will.

160
Q

Centralized Management

CORP v. PARTNERSHIP /key principles

A

Corporation = Yes.

Partnership = No.

161
Q

Costs

CORP v. PARTNERSHIP /key principles

A

Corporation = Lawyer, filing fees, etc.

Partnership = Zero for GP.

162
Q

Default Rules

CORP v. PARTNERSHIP /key principles

A

Corporation = More extensive.

Partnership = Extensive.

163
Q

Client Perception

CORP v. PARTNERSHIP /key principles

A

Corporation = Easier to understand and high prestige.

Partnership = Hard to understand and low prestige.

164
Q

Flexibility

CORP v. PARTNERSHIP /key principles

A

Corporation = More limited.

Partnership = High.

165
Q

Tax

NATURE OF CORP /key principles

A

Corporation = Double.

Partnership = Single. Pass though.

166
Q

Indicia of Corporations

NATURE OF CORP /key principles

A

(Courts says you must have 3 out of 4)

  1. Limited L
  2. Unlimited Duration
  3. Centralized management, and
  4. Freely transferable interest
167
Q

General Attributes of a Corporation

NATURE OF CORP /key principles

A
  • Legal personality: a corporation is a legal entity distinct from its owners;
  • More freely transferable ownership interest (Liquidity)
  • Flexible capital structure
  • Infinite duration
  • Limited liability
168
Q

Separation of ownership and control

NATURE OF CORP /key principles

A

Centralized corporate management =

  • the right to manage the corporation is not spread out among the shareholders
  • but rather is centralized in a board of directors, who usually delegates day-to-day management duties to officers
169
Q

Liquidity

NATURE OF CORP /key principles

A

a shareholder can sell his shares to whomever he wants, whenever he wants in most circumstances

170
Q

Tax

NATURE OF CORP /key principles

A

Corporations are taxed twice:

  1. Corporation is taxed as an entity, and
  2. Taxed when corporation pays out dividends to shareholders
171
Q

Equity

NATURE OF CORP /key principles

A

Stock: an equity security is an instrument representing an investment in the corporation whereby its holder become a part owner of the business

172
Q

Debt

NATURE OF CORP /key principles

A
  • Bonds: set return, interest. Debt gets paid first if company goes bankrupt.
  • A debt security represents a creditor/debtor relationship with the corporation, whereby the corporation has borrowed funds from an outside creditor and promised to repay the creditor
  • A bond holder has no ownership interest in the business
173
Q

Articles of Incorporation - amending

FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A

May be amended at any time by a three step process:

  1. The Board recommends amendment to the shareholders
  2. Shareholders must approve the amendment, AND
  3. Amendment must be field with the secretary of state’s office
174
Q

Articles of Incorporation - name

FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A
  • May not be same or confusingly similar to that of another corporation incorporated or qualified to do business in the state of incorporation
  • The name must also include some word or abbreviation indicating that the business is incorporated such as corporation, company, Inc, or the like
175
Q

Articles of Incorporation - authorized shares

FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A

The articles must state the maximum number of shares the corporation is authorized to issue

176
Q

Articles of Incorporation - registered agent

FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A
  • The articles must state the name of the corporation’s registered agent and the address of its registered office
  • The registered office must be located within the state of incorporation
  • The registered agent receives service of process when the corporation is sued
177
Q

Incorporators

FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A
  • The articles must state the name and address of each incorporator
  • Traditionally needed 3, but today you only need 1
178
Q

Optional Provisions of the Articles

FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A
  1. Statement of Purpose
  2. Classes and Series of Shares
  3. Director and Officer Indemnification and Liability Limitation
179
Q

Optional Provisions of the Articles - Statement of Purpose

FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A

The articles may state the nature of the corporation’s business or the purpose for which it was formed

180
Q

Optional Provisions of the Articles - Classes and Series of Shares
FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A
  • Corporate stocks may be separated into multiple classes and series
  • If the corporation wishes to do so, the articles must identify the different classes and the number of shares of each class the corporation is authorized to issue
  • Where one or more classes of shares have certain preferential rights over other classes, those rights must be spelled out in this part
181
Q

Optional Provisions of the Articles - Director and Officer Indemnification and Liability Limitation
FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A

Most corporate statutes now permit the articles to include provisions limiting the scope of a director’s liability and/or permitting indemnification of directors

182
Q

Bylaws

FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A

= the rules the Corporations Adopts to Govern Internal Affairs

  • Binding contracts between directors, officers and shareholders
  • May contain any provision, not inconsistent with the law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers, or employees
  • Stockholders are put on notice of bylaws upon the purchase of stock
183
Q

Articles v. Bylaws

FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A
  • Bylaws tend to be far more detailed than the articles of incorporation for these reasons
    1. Bylaws need not be filed with the state government, so they are not part of any public record
    2. Bylaws are more easily amended than articles of incorporation
    3. Officers and directors tend to be more familiar with bylaws than with the articles, which makes them a ready repository for organizational rules.
  • Articles control over bylaws
184
Q

Forum Selection Clause

FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A
  • A contractual provision in which the parties establish the place (such as the country, state, or type of court) for a specified litigation between them
  • Cuts down on a corporation’s litigation because cases from different states can be consolidated
  • The only requirement is that it must be internal business for it to be subject to the forum selection clause
185
Q

Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corporation
FORMAL INCORP /key principles

A

Re: Forum Selection Clause
1. Under Delaware law, forum selection bylaws adopted pursuant to articles of incorporation w/o a vote by stockholders are not facially invalid.
2. Shareholders can bring direct and derivative actions.
3. Stockholders have the power to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws, but a corporation may confer this power upon the directors (but this never divests this power from the stockholders).
4. When challenging the contractual validity of the bylaws:
Burden is a difficult one – must show that bylaws cannot operate lawfully or equitable under any circumstances.

186
Q

Types of Corporations

CORP ENTITY /key principles

A
  1. C-Corporations
  2. Close Corporations
  3. De Facto Corporation
  4. Corporation by Estoppel
187
Q

C-Corporations

CORP ENTITY /key principles

A

Public v. Private

  • Most common formation
  • Taxation: it pays income taxes on any profits that it makes, and generally shareholders do not have to pay income tax on the corporation’s profits until the profits are distributed. Double taxation
188
Q

Close Corporations

CORP ENTITY /key principles

A

50% of the company’s stocks are in the hands of 5 or fewer people

189
Q

De Facto Corporation

CORP ENTITY /key principles

A
  • This is a corporation in fact
  • This doctrine provides that a defectively formed corporation (that is one that fails to meet the technical requirements for forming a de jure corporation) may attain the legal status of a de facto corporation if certain elements are met
  • Elements = instantly comes into being when
    1. Proceeding in good faith (a good faith attempt to comply)
    2. Using a valid LLC/Corporation statute
    3. For an authorized/permitted purposes, AND
    4. Have executing and acknowledged articles of association pursuant to that purpose
    5. Cannot have a true corporation until that state says you are (must complete all requirements, paperwork, etc.)
    (However, if a state has not done what it is supposed to do, it can still be recognized as a corporation because courts look to substance over form)
190
Q

Corporation by Estoppel

CORP ENTITY /key principles

A
  • A person who treats an entity as a corporation will be estopped from later claiming that the entity was not a corporation
  • This is an equitable remedy, the purpose of which is to prevent one who contracts with a corporation from later denying its existence in order to hold the individual officers or partners liable
  • Court applies this doctrine to LLCs because the corporate structure has little impact on the equitable principles at stake, there is no reason to draw a distinction, and it can coexist with an LLC like it coexists with the BCA
191
Q

Introduction

LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A

The courts will disregard the corporate form, or pierce the corporate veil whenever necessary to prevent fraud or to achieve equity (would promote injustice or fraud)

(This is the opposite of de facto and estoppel argument because here, a valid corporate existence is ignored in equity to make individuals personally liable)

192
Q

Piercing the Veil

LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A

Veil will be pierced when corporate formalities are ignored (when the corporation is the alter ego or mere instrumentality of another corporation)

193
Q

Piercing the Veil - Individual Shareholders

LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A

= corporation is dummy for its individual stockholders who are actually carrying on business in their person capacities; the stockholder would be personally liable

  • Alter ego results in basic injustice
  • When a company’s owner does not take care to observe the formal separation between himself and his business, the business creditors can collect their debts directly from him
194
Q

Walkovszky v. Carlton

LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A

= the plaintiff must allege that a shareholder used the corporate form to conduct business in his individual capacity and further his own business interests’ rather than the corporations:

  • He will be liable for the corporation’s acts upon the principle of Respondeat superior applicable even where the agent is a natural person
  • This liability extends even to the corporation’s negligent acts as well
195
Q

Parent-Subsidiary - General

LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A

= Corporation is a fragment of a larger corporation which actually conducts business; only larger corporate entity financially responsible

  • If one corporation owns all the shares of common stock of another corporation
  • A showing of substantial domination is required
    1. First company (owner of shares) is generally the parent corporation
    2. The second company is generally the subsidiary
  • Like an individual shareholder; however a corporate shareholder must be aware of the danger that if it is not careful, the creditors of the subsidiary may be able to pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiary
  • The parent must also be careful to not become directly liable by virtue of its participation in the activities of the subsidiary
196
Q

Parent-Subsidiary - 4 Indicators

LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A
  1. The failure to maintain adequate corporate records or to comply with corporate formalities
  2. The comingling of funds or assets
  3. Undercapitalization
  4. One corporation treating the assets of another corporation as its own
197
Q

Parent-Subsidiary - The failure to maintain adequate corporate records or to comply with corporate formalities
LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A
  • Daily operation of the two corporations is not kept separate
  • Subsidiary does not observe basic corporate formalities, such as keeping separate books and records and holding shareholders and board meetings
    (This was the most important factor In Re Silicone)
198
Q

Parent-Subsidiary - The comingling of funds or assets

LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A
  • Parent and subsidiary file consolidated financial statements and tax returns
  • Parent finances subsidiary
199
Q

Parent-Subsidiary - Undercapitalization

LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A
  • Subsidiary operate with grossly inadequate capital
200
Q

Parent-Subsidiary - One corporation treating the assets of another corporation as its own
LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A
  • Parent and subsidiary have common directors or officers;
  • Parent and subsidiary have common business departments
  • Parent causes the incorporation of the subsidiary
  • Parent pays the salaries and other expenses of the subsidiary
  • Parent uses subsidiary’s property as its own
201
Q

Affiliated Corporations - 3 takeaways

LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A
  1. When the corporation is inadequately capitalized at the outset
  2. To prevent fraud
    - Circumstances must be such that adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice (must allege more than simply a promotion of injustice because that would be an issue in every case and too general; some element of unfairness, something akin to fraud, deception, or the existence of a compelling pubic interest must present in order to disregard the corporate fiction
  3. The corporate veil of limited liability does not protect from criminal liability
    - A corporation is an agent of human action so if a corporation injures someone an individual authorizing such action may/can be liable
    - This does not happen often
202
Q

Affiliated Corporations - Reverse piercing of the corporate veil
LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A

pulling corporate assets on a personal suit by claiming an individual was acting as an agent for the corporation

203
Q

Affiliated Corporations - Shareholders

LIMITED LIABILITY /key principles

A
  • If shareholders respect the requirements of a corporation then they are relieved of personal liability
  • See Netjets for an example of what NOT respecting the existence of shareholders and a corporation looks like
204
Q

Direct or Derivative?

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A
  • Who suffered the alleged harm (corporation or suing shareholders individually)?
  • Who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (corporation or shareholders individually)
205
Q

Shareholder Direct Action

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A
  1. Class action:
    - E.g. directors reconfigured Shareholder rights to harm preferred shareholders
  2. Direct individual action:
    - E.g. director reconfigured bylaws to squeeze out a particular shareholder
  3. Generally:
    - A breach of fiduciary duty owed to the shareholder by an officer or a director of a corporation
    - Brought by shareholder in his own name
    - Cause of action belongs to shareholder in his individual capacity
    - Arises from an injury directly to the shareholder
    - Often brought as a class action
  4. Recovery goes to the shareholder
206
Q

Derivative Actions by Shareholders

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A
  1. Suit brought by the shareholders, not in their name, but in the name of the corporation enforcing the rights of the corporation
  2. Arises out of an injury to the corporation as an entity
  3. Asking the court to declare that under the circumstances they should be allowed to step into the shoes of the directors and take action
  4. Ex. CEO is messing with the corporation’s money
    a. If you go to the CEO he will likely do nothing
    b. If you go to the board they will likely not do anything either
  5. A shareholder fails to state a cause of action unless it alleges that a corporation’s directors’ conduct was causing financial loss to the shareholder AND was based upon fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest
    a. A shareholder’s derivative suit can only be based on conduct by the directors, which borders on fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest
207
Q

Derivative Actions by Creditors

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A
  • In Delaware, creditors may only bring derivative actions if the corporation is insolvent
  • In a minority of jurisdictions, creditors can only bring derivative actions if the corporation is insolvent or in the zone of insolvency
208
Q

Demand Requirement - Demand

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A

(either universal demand juris or can’t skip b/c can’t meet qualifications)
- Prohibited from filing a suit within 90 days of the issuance of a demand to the corporation unless rejected earlier except
- Shareholder may file prior to the expiration of the 90-day period, but only if they can show that the corporation would suffer irreparable injury as a result
- Board of corporation rejected the pre-suit demand made by SHs that board assert the corporate claim
- SH can drop the claims or abandon suit OR File suit that rejection was wrongful
(in universal demand jurisdiction this is the SH’s only option)

209
Q

Demand Requirement - No Demand

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A

(Demand futility)
(NY, DE, TN)
You can go straight to court w/o making a demand if:
- Action occurs and you plead with particularity that reasonable doubt exists that:
1. Board lacks independence
2. Decision was not protected by BJR
- Director Oversight cases where inaction/failure to act
(In Re China Agrotech)
- You do this by showing:
1. Majority of board has material familial or financial interest
2. Majority of board is incapable of acting independently
3. Underlying transaction is not the product of valid business judgement

210
Q

Demand Futility - 2 Tests

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A
  1. Grimes/Aronson Test

2. Rales Test

211
Q

Demand Futility - Grimes/Aronson Test

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A

use if challenging an action made by a majority of current directors

TEST: must plead particularized facts that lead to reasonable doubt that
1. Disinterested or independent directors
- Majority of the board has material financial or familial interest
- Majority of the board lacks independence
2. Whether the director exercised valid business judgment in the actions being challenged in the proposed law suit
OR underlying transaction is not a product of Business Judgement Rule
- This is a disjunctive test: if the first rule applies, you don’t have to move the second step
3. Once director interest is established, the Business Judgment Rule is inapplicable and demand is excused

212
Q

Demand Futility - Rales Test

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A

= applies where the subject of the derivative suit is not a business decision of the board (when the plaintiff alleges a Caremark violation by the board for failing its oversight duties, there is no business decision) AKA there is no action, simply inaction

This rule is in place for the common sense reason that a board facing liability likely would not admit any wrongdoing or change its course of action upon receiving such a demand
1. Comes into play when the Business Judgement Rule is inapplicable because there has not been an action
OR
2. Involves board members that were not directors at the time of the underlying transactions, because we are worried that they are not disinterested because of the control of the board majority

TEST: must plead particularized facts that, if true, raise reasonable doubt as to,
- Director disinterest or independence/impartiality
(E.g. when directors “consciously disregarded their duties” and acted in bad faith, and thus face a substantial likelihood of liability)

Generally: a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to director liability

213
Q

The Role of Special Committees

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A
  • A special litigation committee’s determination forecloses further inquiry into a matter, provided the investigation is bona fide.
  • A director’s lack of independence turns on whether the director is, for any substantial reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best interests of the corporation in mind
  • Special Litigation Committees are subject to heightened scrutiny – has to be bulletproof
214
Q

The Role of Special Committees - Analysis

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A

If demand is sought
The Court looks to see if the Board’s decision falls within the Business Judgment Rule
- If it does, there is no judicial review
- If not, use the 2 step test from Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado
1. Inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions
- If not satisfied, deny motion to dismiss
- If satisfied, go to step 2
2. The court should determine, apply its own independent business judgement, whether the motion to dismiss should be granted

215
Q

The Role of Special Committees - Test for Independence

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS /key principles

A

(from In Re Oracle Corp.)
= Whether the director is, for any substantial reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best interest of the corporation in mind

216
Q

Directors

MAJOR PLAYERS IN CORP /key principles

A
  1. Most powerful group. Meet once a month generally (on an as-needed basis)
  2. Responsible for the management of the business and affairs of the corporation
  3. May be removed by shareholders with or without cause
  4. May delegate authority to committees, made up of two or more members of the board
217
Q

Officers

MAJOR PLAYERS IN CORP /key principles

A
  1. The C-Suite: CEO, COO, CFO
  2. Officers have whatever duties the board prescribed
  3. The board remains responsible for supervision of the officers despite the delegation of a duty
  4. Some officers may also be directors:
    - Officers who sit on the Board are called inside directors
    - The majority of directors must be “independent” rather than inside directors
218
Q

Shareholders

MAJOR PLAYERS IN CORP /key principles

A
  1. Individuals who have residual interest in the company
  2. Shareholders have indirect control over the corporation through the power to elect directors, amend the bylaws, and approve fundamental changes to the corporation
  3. Annual meetings to vote on directors
  4. Notice of meetings to shareholders entitled to vote: 10-60 days before the meeting
219
Q

Business Judgement Rule

CORP ROLE & PURPOSES /key principles

A
  • Doctrine relieving corporate directors and/or officers from liability for decisions honestly and rationally made in the corporation’s best interest
  • This broad protection/immunity from their decisions that directors/officers receive that protects them even when they lose lots of company money
220
Q

Common Stock

STOCK /key principles

A
  • A class of stock representing the corporation’s ownership, the holders of which are entitled to dividends only after the holders of preferred stock are paid
  • Shares entitling their holder to dividends that vary in amount and may even be missed, depending upon the fortunes of the company (risky); these shareholders typically want more control
221
Q

Dividend

STOCK /key principles

A

The payment of earning to a corporation’s shareholders in proportion to the number of shares held

222
Q

Preferred Stock

STOCK /key principles

A
  • Stock that entitled the holder to a fixed dividend, whose payment takes priority over that of common stock dividends (it accumulates)
  • Hybrid between debt and equity
  • When company goes belly-up, these get paid first
223
Q

Convertible Preferred Stock

STOCK /key principles

A

Stock that includes an option for the holder to convert the preferred shares into a fixed number of common shares, usually any time after a pre-determined date

224
Q

Social Enterprise

CORP ROLE & PURPOSES /key principles

A
  • Businesses that trade to tackle social problems, improve communities, people’s life chances or the environment
  • They make their money from selling goods and services in the open market, but they invest their profits back into the business or the local community
  • Benefit corporations: pushback on cases like Dodge and eBay that push corporations too far towards shareholders
  • Low-profit LLC
225
Q

A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE /key principles

A
  1. Donation to Princeton University
  2. A corporation may make reasonable charitable contributions, even in the absence of express statutory provisions.
    - Must be SOME benefit to the corporation
    - Some jurisdictions place cap on % of earnings
226
Q

Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE /key principles

A
  1. A corporation’s primary purpose is to provide profits for its stockholders.
  2. Although a corporation’s directors have discretion in the means they choose to make products and earn a profit, the directors may not reduce profits or withhold dividends from the corporation’s shareholders in order to benefit the public.
227
Q

Duty of Care

DUTIES /key principles

A
  • Directors have gathered information and thought about the problem
  • Corporate decision-making is, by nature, largely discretionary
  • We do not want courts substituting their judgment for that of the directors, we only want courts stepping in when the directors act in an illegal manner
  • This is about balancing between allowing corporations to be run by Boards and the interests of the public and shareholders in being protected from stupid imprudent decisions by the board
  • A director/officer must act:
    1. In good faith
    2. In a manner the director reasonably believes in the best interest of the corporation;
    3. With the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances
228
Q

Obligations of Directors

DUTY OF CARE /key principles

A
  • Directors must make a wise choice if delegating duties and must closely monitor persons making decisions on the corporation’s behalf
  • Directors are only liable if their actions were illegal or unconscionable
  • Policy:
    1. If a director were open to liability for his uncompromised decisions, few people would seek out or accept a position on the Board
    2. Directors must often make quick decisions with huge impacts
    3. Directors must trust that if their decision looks poor in hindsight, they cannot be sued if they made their best efforts to understand the factors relating to the issue
  • The issue of director liability can be difficult when a director shrinks his duties and allows a third party to act on behalf of the corporation, particularly if the third party’s actions are not closely monitored
229
Q

Obligations of Officers

DUTY OF CARE /key principles

A
  • Officer duties are similar to directors, although the law is less well settled for officers
  • Standard of Conduct for Officers:
    = an officer shall act:
    1. In good faith
    2. Care of a reasonable person (in similar circumstances); AND
    3. Reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation
  • Inform superior officer or board directors of information that is:
    1. Within officer’s scope and material to the superior,
    2. Actual or probable violation of the law, and
    3. Breach of duty
230
Q

Business Judgment Rule

DUTY OF CARE /key principles

A

(from Smith v. Van Gorkom)
- Presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the best interest of the company.
- Requires more than imprudence or mistaken judgment to overcome this presumption.
- Whether directors have informed themselves “prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them
- Gross negligence standard (can’t just close eyes to the problem)
- Courts will generally not second guess the BJR unless P shows:
Fraud, illegality, bad faith, self-dealing/conflict of interest, or gross negligence.

231
Q

Business Judgment Rule - application/policy

DUTY OF CARE /key principles

A
  • Does NOT apply if:
    (a) waste, or
    (b) no decision
  • Policy:
    1. Encourages Board service and risk taking (and potential reward)
    2. Courts recognize that directors are generally better suited to make business decisions than judges
    3. Courts also recognize the statutory regime provides responsibility for managing the corporation to directors, not shareholders
    4. Courts recognize that unhappy shareholders can always vote the directors out of office
232
Q

Duty of Loyalty

DUTIES /key principles

A
  • Directors have avoided conflicts of interest or negligence (includes obligation of good faith)
  • A director, officer, and sometimes a dominant shareholder’s “duty to not engage in self-dealing, or otherwise use his or her position to further personal interests rather than those of the beneficiary”
  • Duty as director is to the shareholders
233
Q

Directors and Managers:

DUTY OF LOYALTY /key principles

A

Directors may engage in interested transactions with the corporation, with certain protections:
- If a majority of disinterested directors approve the transaction
• Were all material facts disclosed?
• Were independent directors really independent or were they dominated or controlled by the interested party
- Disinterested shareholders may ratify the transaction
- Entire fairness: if approval cannot be had, director can show that the deal is fair to the company, or similar to an arm’s length deal
- Courts look to the terms of the transaction and ask if it is similar to a deal with a third party?

234
Q

Bayer v. Beran

DUTY OF LOYALTY /key principles

A

Re: duty of loyalty

  • A director does NOT breach his fiduciary duty by approving a radio advertising program in which the wife of the corporate president, who was also a member of the Board of Directors, was one of the featured performers.
  • B/c the program’s purpose was not to enhance the wife’s career or to give her any financial benefit as she was only one of many performers on the campaign and her wages were comparable to that of other performers.
235
Q

Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc.

DUTY OF LOYALTY /key principles

A
  • Delaware General Corporation Law § 144 provides a safe harbor for interested transactions if the material facts as to the director’s relationship or interests as to the K or transaction are disclosed or are known to the Board, and the Board in good faith still authorizes the K or transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of disinterested directors.
  • If committee members are disinterested in independent, the business judgment rule will shield the committee’s decision
236
Q

Burden of Proof

DUTY OF LOYALTY /key principles

A

Duty of care or duty of loyalty

  1. If duty of care is properly alleged, the burden is on the plaintiff
  2. If duty of loyalty is properly alleged, the burden is on the defendant to show intrinsic fairness, unless the defendant ratifies the transaction according to DGCL § 144(a)(1) or § 144(a)(2)
    - If properly ratified, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
237
Q

Corporate Opportunities

DUTY OF LOYALTY /key principles

A
  • There is a duty to deter appropriateness of business prospects “belonging to” the corporation
  • Factors for Corporate Opportunity (Broz): this test is used for guidance only, the court does not necessarily require all four factors:
    1. The corporation is financially able to take the opportunity;
    3. The opportunity is in the corporation’s line of business;
    4. The corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; AND
    5. By embracing the opportunity, the officer or director would create a conflict between his or her self-interest and that of the corporation
238
Q

Corporate Opportunity Doctrine

DUTY OF LOYALTY /key principles

A
  • The rule that a corporation’s directors, officer’s, and employees are precluded from using information gained in corporate capacity to take personal advantage of any business opportunity that the corporation has an expectancy right or property interest in, or that in fairness should otherwise belong to the corporation
  • Opportunity must be integral to the business
239
Q

Dominant Shareholders

DUTY OF LOYALTY /key principles

A
  1. Generally, shareholders do not owe a fiduciary duty to other shareholders, however, dominant shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders not to take advantage
  2. One must show self-dealing in order to shift the burden to the dominant shareholders, and then the burden is on the dominant shareholders to show intrinsic fairness
  3. Shareholders have no reciprocal duties to the corporation, unless they are dominant shareholders (partners always owe a duty)
    - Being a dominant or “controlling” shareholder puts you in a position of determining who will be on the board
    - Here, the liability shifts from the directors to the people who are really calling the shots
    - HOWEVER, the court makes it clear that when a majority shareholder votes PURELY in his capacity as shareholder (and not as a director), he may vote with only his self-interest in mind, at the expense of minority shareholders, without violating any fiduciary duties (otherwise there would be little value in being a controlling shareholder)
240
Q

Intrinsic fairness test

DOMINANT SHAREHOLDERS /key principles

A

A defense to a claim that a director engaged in an interested director transaction by showing the transaction’s fairness to the corporation

241
Q

Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation

DOMINANT SHAREHOLDERS /key principles

A

Duty of Candor = Idea that when you ask shareholders to take an action, then the Board has the duty to provide them w/ all material information related to that decision or action.

242
Q

Ratification

DUTY OF LOYALTY /key principles

A
  • If material information was withheld from the stockholders before their ratification of the action and the withheld information may have had an effect on the stockholder’s decision, then the decision was not informed and will not validate the interested transaction
  • If there is a ratification by a majority of shareholders, the burden is on the shareholders to prove unfairness
243
Q

3 Ways to Remove the Taint of Interested Transaction

RATIFICATION /key principles

A
  1. The Court reads into the statute to require a majority vote of the disinterested shareholders in a voidable transaction
  2. A “void” transaction cannot be ratified: examples of waste (like a gift of company assets or a transaction no reasonable shareholder would have approved of), ultra vires, fraudulent transactions, and illegal transactions
  3. A shareholder could argue that this was a “void” not just a voidable and fair transaction. This is likely a losing argument, because here the Board demonstrated fairness
244
Q

Interested Business Transactions

RATIFICATION /key principles

A
  • These are always going to be subjected to scrutiny
  • The general rule in shareholder derivative suits involving interested director or officer transactions is that the burden of proof is on the defendant director/officer to prove the transaction was intrinsically unfair
245
Q

Fliegler v. Lawrence

RATIFICATION /key principles

A
  • Ratification of an “interested transaction” by a majority of independent, fully informed shareholders shifts the burden of proof to the objecting shareholder to demonstrate that the terms of the transaction are so unequal as to amount to a gift or corporate waste of corporate assets.
  • A majority of disinterested shareholders must ratify corporate transactions w/ an interested director.
    • This rule is meant to protect against invalidation of an action solely b/c a director is involved, not to provide a means for interested shareholders to approve actions in their own personal interests.
246
Q

In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation
RATIFICATION /key principles

A

Interested transaction between corp. and directors
- Will not be voidable if approved in good faith by a majority of disinterested shareholders. Approval by fully informed, disinterested shareholders pursuant to § 144 invokes the Business Judgment Rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden on the plaintiff

Transaction between corp. and its controlling shareholder

  • In a parent/sub merger, the standard of review is ordinarily intrinsic fairness, with the directors having the burden of proving that the merger was entirely fair
  • But where the merger is conditioned upon approval by a majority of the minority shareholders, the standard of review remains entire fairness, but with the burden of demonstrating that the merger was unfair shifting to the plaintiff
  • Here, a speedy decision is not sufficient evidence to support a contention that the board’s decision was not informed.
247
Q

Duties Owed by Director

OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH /key principles

A
  1. Good Faith
  2. Loyalty; and
  3. Due care
248
Q

Good Faith

OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH /key principles

A
  • This is a subsidiary element, a condition of the duty of loyalty
  • A state of mind consisting of:
    1. Honesty in belief or purpose
    2. Faithfulness to one’s duty;
    3. Observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
    dealings or
    4. Absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage
  • The law presumes good faith
  • The business judgement rule applies if the directors were acting in good faith
249
Q

Bad Faith

OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH /key principles

A

Can run the gamut from

  1. Subjective bad faith (fiduciary conduct motivated by an actual intent to do harm)
  2. Intentional dereliction of duty (conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities); AND
  3. Lack of due care (fiduciary action taken solely by reason of gross negligence; but without any malevolent intent

Failure to act in the face of a known duty to act; must be more than merely gross negligence

250
Q

Compensation

OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH /key principles

A

The law presumes that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company

251
Q

Oversight - Caremark Claims

OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH /key principles

A

= necessary conditions predicate for Director Oversight Liability
- This is when the directors are accused of failure to provide adequate oversight
 The board never met,
 Discrepancies in financial reporting
 Complaint supports allegations with references to books and records
1. The directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls, OR
2. Having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention
- Note: in either case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations
- Remedy: damages, an injunction, or handing over the ill-gotten gains; here the business judgment rule does not apply

252
Q

Oversight - Derivative Aspects

OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH /key principles

A
  • Cases involving oversight failures almost never reach merits of claims
  • Typically dismissed for failure to comply with the Delaware Rules of Civil Procedure
  • Typically issued in a case: whether demand was excused as futile
  • No board action
253
Q

In re China Agritech, Inc. v. Shareholder Derivative Litigation
OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH /key principles

A

re: oversight > derivative aspects > no board action
- Under Delaware law, a sustained or systematic failure of the Board of Directors to exercise oversight establishes the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to Board L.
- In a derivative suit that involves something other than a business decision of the Board (i.e. failure to exercise oversight) a litigation demand is futile when directors would face a substantial likelihood of L if the suit were filed.
- This rule is in place for the common-sense reason that a Board facing L likely would not admit any wrongdoing or change its course of action upon receiving such a demand.

254
Q

Oversight - Derivative Aspects Test

OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH /key principles

A
  1. Does complaint create reasonable doubt that directors could have exercised independent judgment in responding to a demand
    - Substantial risk of monetary liability (Under Delaware law, 102(b)(7)
    - Risk of liability analysis depends on whether your state has a 102(b)(7) law
  2. If it does, there is an absolute affirmative defense as long as you can prove that you haven’t violated the statute
  3. If so, is there a reason to believe the plaintiff can show breach of loyalty or bad faith
    - Burden of proof is on the defendant because 102 is an affirmative defense
    - If only a Caremark claim, 102 precludes liability and demand required
    - In the real world, the plaintiff would probably go away
    - If the defendant cannot prove that he or she was not acting in bad faith or loyalty, liability cannot be exculpated
  4. Is the liability risk high enough to excuse demand?
    - We care about this even with directors not there at the time, because to the extent that their liability risk is too high, they are always going to say no always
255
Q

Analytical Sequence

OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH /key principles

A
  1. Direct or derivative?
  2. If derivative - demand excused or required?
    - complaint creates reasonable doubt that directors could have exercised independent judgment in responding to a demand (substantial risk of monetary liability)
  3. Risk of liability analysis depends on whether 102(b)(7) clause is present
  4. If so, is there reason to believe P can show loyalty or bad faith?
    - burden of proof likely on D b/c 102(b)(7) is an affirmative defense
  5. If only care claim, 102(b)(7) precludes liability and demand required
    - In real world, P probably goes away
  6. If bad faith or loyalty, liability cannot be exculpated
  7. Liability risk high enough to excuse demand?
256
Q
4 conclusions from class twelve
KEY PRINCIPLES /review of slides
A
  1. Corporations may provide public benefit, but it has limitations and must have some benefit to the corporation (depending on jurisdiction)
  2. Corporations will typically be able to make decisions regarding operations and dividends, subject to the business judgment rule, unless such decisions seem to provide no benefit to shareholders
  3. LLC liability principles are similar to corporate law principles; de facto corporations and corporation by estoppel theories apply to LLC
  4. Operating Agreement is a contract between members and the company, therefore a forum selection clause was binding (because it was not prohibited by law)
257
Q
4 conclusions from class fourteen
KEY PRINCIPLES /review of slides
A
  1. Fiduciary duties apply to LLC members similarly to directors and partners, subject to terms of an LLC agreement in which the parties can agree otherwise
  2. Limitations of liability will be applied similarly as to corporations
  3. Directors must abide by a duty of care and duty of loyalty to have the benefit of the business judgment rule
    - – Duty of care is not breached so long as the decision is considered in good faith based on reliable information
    - – Duty of care may be breached if directors fail to inform themselves of relevant information, including through review of reports, pricing information, and value the company
  4. Even if business judgment rule does not apply, a transaction may nevertheless be saved if the deal can be deemed to be entirely fair for the company
258
Q
3 conclusions from class fifteen
KEY PRINCIPLES /review of slides
A
  1. Directors may owe a duty to creditors in special situations, including a duty not to make themselves aware or informed
  2. If a conflict of interest exists, directors owe a duty of loyalty and thus must disclose the conflict and take such action to ensure fairness in the deal
  3. Directors may owe a duty to creditors in special situations, including a duty not to make themselves aware or informed
259
Q
5 conclusions from class sixteen
KEY PRINCIPLES /review of slides
A
  1. Directors owe a duty to account for profits obtained personally in connection with transactions related to his or her company
  2. 2 Standards of Review application for Parent-Subsidiary relationships
    — Intrinsic Fairness –
    —— Used when parent has received a benefit to the exclusion of the minority shareholders of the subsidiary and at the expense of the minority shareholders of the subsidiary
    —— Burden of Proof is on defendant to show transaction is fair to corporation
    — Business Judgment Rule –
    —— Used when minority shareholders have received the same benefit of the subsidiary
    —— Burden of Proof is on plaintiff to rebut presumption
  3. When fiduciary duties conflict, directors should protect the interests of the
    investors bearing the greatest risk - see Zhan
  4. Transactions that were a product of corporation and interested directors, or a product of a corporation and interested/majority shareholders, may be ratified by a majority vote of disinterested shareholders or proof of intrinsic fairness
  5. “To act in good faith, a director must act at all times with an honesty of purpose and in the best interests and welfare of the corporation…a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders…”
260
Q
3 conclusions from class seventeen
KEY PRINCIPLES /review of slides
A
  1. Good faith is not a separate claim, but part of duty of loyalty and is brought as part of that
  2. Caremark rule requires that boards implement compliance plans when they have already had an issue or know an issue could come up
  3. Different tests may apply for demand excused depending on whether the claim is an oversight claim or whether directors were directors at the time of the underlying action
261
Q
4 conclusions from class eighteen
KEY PRINCIPLES /review of slides
A
  1. There is a distinction between direct actions (actions harming only an individual or a group of individuals) and derivative actions (actions harming the corporation) and establishment of the type of claim is necessary
  2. Most states have requirements that a shareholder must make a demand to the corporation that it take the case, which demand can be approved or rejected
    - – If rejected, shareholder can only proceed if rejection was wrongful
  3. Can file without demand, if demand would be futile or excused, but subject to certain pleading requirements
  4. Special Committees of disinterested directors may request dismissal of derivative suits, but subject to specific tests established under state law
262
Q
4 conclusions from class twenty-five
KEY PRINCIPLES /review of slides
A
  1. Close corporation is one in which stock is held by only a few people or families that is often not dealt in by buying or selling
    - – There are certain statutes that will enable anyone to create a statutory close corporation
  2. Vote Pooling Agreement and Shareholder Voting Agreements are permitted to enable minority shareholders to pool together their shares to protect their interests
  3. For a vote pooling agreement to elect officers to be valid, the directors need to be able to retain an ability to exercise their fiduciary duty
  4. The rule in McQuade is limited to situations in which there are not minority shareholders to protect