Corporate Control around the World - Aminadav, Gur, and Elias Papaioannou, 2020 Flashcards
Name three country-wide factors that indicate high or low ownership concentration in public companies.
A) Shareholder protection, GDP per capita, and legal origin
B) Firm age, stock market volatility, and government spending
C) CEO compensation, interest rates, and tax incentives
D) Inflation rate, labor union strength, and trade balance
A
What does “Corporate Control Around the World” (2020) suggest about the relationship between corporate control and shareholder protection rights?
A) Strong shareholder protection rights are unrelated to corporate control patterns.
B) Shareholder protection rights are systematically linked to dispersed ownership, indicating that corporate control can substitute for weak shareholder protection.
C) Better shareholder protection rights lead to a higher concentration of corporate control.
D) The relationship between shareholder protection rights and corporate control is inconsistent and varies widely across countries.
E) Corporate control is more prevalent in countries with strong shareholder protection rights.
B
According to the paper, which legal origin is most associated with dispersed ownership structures?
A) Scandinavian civil law
B) French civil law
C) Common law
D) German civil law
C
In which legal system do family- and government-controlled firms dominate?
A) Scandinavian civil law
B) French civil law
C) Common law
D) German civil law
B
How does GDP per capita correlate with ownership concentration?
A) There is no correlation.
B) Higher GDP per capita is associated with higher ownership concentration.
C) Higher GDP per capita is associated with lower ownership concentration, but mostly for large firms.
D) Lower GDP per capita leads to dispersed ownership.
C
What percentage of non-controlled firms have equity blocks?
A) Less than 20%
B) Around 50%
C) More than 80%
D) Exactly 60%
C
How does labor regulation correlate with corporate control?
A) Stricter labor laws correlate with more concentrated corporate control.
B) Stricter labor laws lead to more dispersed ownership.
C) Labor regulations have no significant impact on corporate control.
D) Countries with weak labor protections have higher ownership concentration.
A
What is the role of creditor rights in ownership concentration?
A) Strong creditor rights reduce corporate control concentration.
B) Weak creditor rights lead to dispersed ownership.
C) Creditor rights are largely uncorrelated with corporate control.
D) Strong creditor rights lead to more state-controlled firms.
C
Which of the following correctly describes the French civil law countries?
A) Lowest share of government-controlled firms.
B) Highest share of family- and government-controlled firms.
C) Highest share of dispersed ownership.
D) No correlation with ownership structure.
B
What is the significance of the Shapley-Shubik Index in the paper?
A) It measures the extent of shareholder protection rights.
B) It quantifies voting power in firms with multiple large shareholders.
C) It calculates GDP-adjusted ownership concentration.
D) It predicts the likelihood of government intervention in firms.
B
What kind of firms are most likely to experience dispersed ownership?
A) Small firms
B) Firms in common-law countries
C) Government-controlled firms
D) State-owned enterprises
B
What is the main driver of concentrated ownership in civil-law countries?
A) Weak shareholder protection
B) Strong minority investor protection
C) High GDP per capita
D) Strict antitrust regulations
A
How does minority shareholder protection affect ownership concentration?
A) Stronger protection leads to dispersed ownership.
B) Stronger protection leads to concentrated ownership.
C) Minority shareholder rights have no impact on ownership structures.
D) Minority shareholder rights only matter in emerging markets.
A
In which type of countries do state-controlled firms dominate?
A) Countries with strong labor protections
B) Countries with weak shareholder protections
C) Common-law countries
D) High-income countries
B
How do institutional investors affect ownership concentration?
A) Institutional investors increase ownership concentration in all countries.
B) Institutional investors foster dispersed ownership, especially in common-law countries.
C) Institutional investors have no significant impact on ownership concentration.
D) Institutional investors always favor concentrated ownership to maintain control.
B
