Constitutional Law Flashcards

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1
Q

constitutional immunity

A

While the federal government and its agencies are immune from state taxation and state regulation, states may nevertheless collect a nondiscriminatory tax on persons who deal or contract with the federal government. The Supreme Court has ruled that a state property tax is valid when applies upon a building owned by the United States but used by a contractor.

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2
Q

substantial nexus

A

In determining the validity of a state tax affecting interstate commerce, courts will consider whether there is a substantial nexus between the activity taxed and the taxing state. Here, however, the facts do not indicate the taxes discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce. The manufacturer is based in New York and is working out of a building in New York. Because the manufacturer’s case is purely intrastate, this answer is not the best choice.

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3
Q

Tenth Amendment

A

The Tenth Amendment provides that powers not granted to the federal government by the Constitution, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or the people. Here, the facts do not indicate that Congress enacted the legislation with the intention of preempting state law. The states’ power to regulate was not restricted by some federal exclusivity in the subject matter. Therefore, the New Jersey regulation is a valid exercise of general police power pursuant to the Tenth Amendment’s principle of federalism.

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4
Q

If a state law discriminates on its face between in-state and out-of-state economic actors, the state must show that:

A

(1) the regulation serves a compelling state interest; and (2) the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

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5
Q

If a state law merely incidentally burdens interstate commerce, the state must show that:

A

(1) the regulation serves an important state interest; and (2) the burden on interstate commerce is not excessive in relation to the interest served.

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6
Q

The doctrine of sovereign immunity.

A

Sovereign immunity precludes suits against the sovereign (here, the state) without its consent. However, state officials can be sued to enjoin them from enforcing unconstitutional statutes.

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7
Q

impairment of the obligations of public contracts by the state may be justified by …

A

a showing of necessity.

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8
Q

The Contract Clause provides that…

A

…no state shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts.

However, a state may impair the contractual rights of parties to public contracts if the state meets a high burden of proof.

When an important state interest is at stake and no less restrictive means exist to advance that interest, the state may exercise its police power in a manner that impairs contract rights if the state can show:

the impairment is necessary to serve an important and legitimate public interest, and

the regulation is a reasonable and narrowly tailored means of promoting that interest.

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9
Q

Where states act as market participants, meaning the states themselves are actually participating in the markets that they are regulating …

A

…then states do have the ability to discriminate between in-state and out-of-state actors.

i.e. Because the state owns the art college, it may charge more to out-of-state applicants without running afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause restrictions.

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10
Q

the field of international relations is under the power of …

A

….federal government

The legislative and executive branches have constitutionally mandated powers over foreign affairs.

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the authority to declare war, raise and support armies, and maintain a navy. Congress is also empowered to give advice and consent to the president concerning treaties made by him with foreign nations; the Senate must approve all treaties by a two-thirds vote.

Under the president’s Article II powers, the executive branch is authorized to make treaties and to appoint and receive foreign ambassadors.

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11
Q

privileges and immunities rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

A

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from making or enforcing “any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”

The clause’s scope is limited to the rights of federal citizenship, including the right to petition Congress, the right to vote in federal elections, and the right to interstate travel.

The clause does not extend to the right to employment.

The clause protects only citizens.

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12
Q

property right in public employment under the Fourteenth Amendment

A

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects only existing interests in public employment, not future rights.

A person has a protected property interest in public employment if the person is an employee who may only be terminated for cause.

An at-will public employee has no protected property interest in public employment.

If an employee has a protected property interest in continued public employment, the employee is entitled to procedural due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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13
Q

Supremacy Clause…

A

…prohibits a state from regulating the federal government or its agencies, except where the federal government consents to the state regulation or the state regulation is not inconsistent with existing federal policy.

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14
Q

Under federal property power of Article IV, Section 3…

A

…Congress can “dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.”

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15
Q

While the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated several of the provisions of the bill of rights and made them applicable to the states, there were some rights that remain unincorporated and not applicable to the states. Among these unincorporated rights is …

A

…the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases.

Therefore, a state is not obligated to provide a trial by jury in a civil case.

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16
Q

The Equal Protection Clause only applies to…

A

…actions of the federal government and the states. T

he company, a private citizen, cannot violate the Equal Protection Clause, even though the company sells most of its products to the federal government.

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17
Q

state action can be found in the actions of private actors

A

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Generally, such constitutional rights can only be violated by government action. However, state action can be found in the actions of private actors where the government and private entity are so closely related that the action by the private party fairly can be treated as action by the government.

Here, the bookstore was interrelated to the government purpose of serving as a resource to the unemployed and attracting people to the Department’s Columbia office. Based on this interplay, the court may find the bookstore’s exclusion of the jobseeker was a violation, even though no government agency was directly discriminating.

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18
Q

Assistance to religion or religious groups in the form of tax exemptions …

A

…is scrutinized to determine whether the law has a secular purpose and effect and avoids excessive government entanglement (Establishment Clause - Lemon Test)

A tax exemption that applied to religious groups among other nonprofit organizations would be upheld, but a tax exemption that applied solely to religious groups would be invalidated.

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19
Q

Privileges and Immunities Clause under Article IV, Section II

vs.

Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

A

This clause prohibits states from discriminating against nonresidents (based upon the fact that they do not reside in the state) with respect to rights and activities that are fundamental to the national union.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that state laws requiring employers to give hiring preferences to in-state employees over out-of-state employees are unconstitutional on this basis.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall make or enforce any law which abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, but the Supreme Court has found that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has very limited application. It does not apply to a state passing legislation disfavoring out-of-state employees.

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20
Q

intermediate scrutiny standard of review

A

state must prove that the measure is substantially related to the achievement of an important state interest

“Substantially related” means that an exceedingly persuasive justification must be shown.

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21
Q

Generally, the substantive due process doctrine is used to evaluate government regulations that affect fundamental rights of personhood. However, economic regulations may also be challenged as violative of substantive due process guarantees. What scrutiny?

A

The Supreme Court has held that challenges to economic regulations on substantive due process grounds are to be subjected to deferential rational basis scrutiny, with a challenger having the burden of proving that a regulation lacks a rational connection to a legitimate government interest.

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22
Q

The right to marry is a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution, and thus laws that restrict that right will be subject to strict scrutiny. To pass strict scrutiny, a law must be …

A

…justified by a compelling government interest, be narrowly tailored to achieve that goal or interest, and be the least restrictive means for achieving that interest.

i.e.

The state determined that the cost and time involved with adjudicating domestic cases involving people who married prior to turning 22 to be so great that it threatened to completely disrupt the state’s domestic court system.

That state intended the law only to apply to citizens under the age of 22 due to the fact that citizens over the age of 22 have a significantly lower rate of divorce and of having children dependent on welfare programs than the rest of the population.

The state undertook an exhaustive study to determine that the six hours of counseling and interview with the magistrate was the minimum amount of time and resources necessary to create any significant impact on divorce rates among those who marry at a young age.

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23
Q

State laws discriminating against legal aliens are subject to strict scrutiny, and those discriminating against illegal aliens are subject to rational basis review. However, the Supreme Court has established a special in-between rule for the children of illegal aliens.

A

In Plyler v. Doe, the Court held that a stringent version of the rational basis test applies to evaluate a state law interfering with the right of illegal alien children to free public education. Under this test, the measure being challenged will not be upheld unless it furthers some substantial goal of the state.

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24
Q

While it is true that alienage is a suspect classification, federal laws that discriminate against aliens are…

A

not subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review applicable to discriminatory state laws.

This is because Congress has broad plenary power to regulate immigration. Federal laws that discriminate on the basis of alienage are subject only to a rational basis analysis (i.e., the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff to show that the measure being challenged serves no legitimate government interest or is not rationally related to any legitimate interest).

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25
Q

n order to trigger intermediate scrutiny in an equal protection case, the plaintiff must show that …

A

…there was a discriminatory motive to the challenged action.

While the creation of the charter schools appears to be neutral with regard to gender, the statement that they were created in order to lower the ratio of males in the classroom indicates that there was a discriminatory intent behind their creation.

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26
Q

Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause

vs.

Commerce Clause

A

Discrimination against citizens or residents in regard to an essential economic right or liberty triggers Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis, whereas general economic discrimination against a business or entity is more often viewed using a Commerce Clause analysis.

i.e. The fisherman is being denied the right to pursue employment as a sea cucumber harvester because he is a nonresident of State A.

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27
Q

What is bill of attainder?

A

A bill of attainder is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial upon named individuals, or an easily ascertainable group, for past conduct.

The state statute here retroactively imposes criminal penalties on easily ascertainable members of a group (Libertarians). As such, the statute is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. The state statute here retroactively imposes criminal penalties on easily ascertainable members of a group (Libertarians).

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28
Q

The Speech and Debate Clause provides that…

A

…members of the U.S. Congress “shall not be questioned in any other place” for “any speech or debate in either house” [U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 6]. In other words, the senator’s statements on the floor of the Senate are privileged, so the suit will not succeed.

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29
Q

Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

A

The U.S. Congress has authority to enact legislation to eliminate interferences with equal protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enact laws to enforce constitutionally guaranteed civil rights. While Congress cannot prohibit private conduct infringing Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, it can prohibit state action and private action conducted in concert with state officials that rises to the level of state action.

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30
Q

The government may not punish an individual by denying benefits or imposing burdens based on religious belief. Thus…

A

…state cannot deny unemployment benefits to a person whose religious faith requires her not to work on her Sabbath [Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)].

This would infringe on the employee’s free exercise right.

The court hearing the employee’s case may only look into the sincerity of her beliefs, not the truthfulness of the beliefs. As long as the employee’s beliefs are sincere, she qualifies for unemployment benefits because she did have cause to refuse to work. Any interest the state may have in withholding benefits is outweighed by the infringement on the employee’s constitutional right.

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31
Q

As a general rule, federal taxpayers do not have standing to challenge allegedly unconstitutional federal expenditures. However, the Supreme Court created an exception to this rule in Flast v. Cohen [392 U.S. 83 (1968)], which held that a federal taxpayer has standing to challenge federal expenditures to aid parochial schools where:

A

(1) the taxpayer is challenging the expenditure of money by Congress under its taxing and spending power, and (2) the expenditure allegedly violates the Establishment Clause
i. e. the taxpayer’s suit alleges an unconstitutional governmental preference of one religion over another.

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32
Q

Where state criminal proceedings are pending, the federal court will abstain in a suit seeking an injunction against the state prosecution. This principle has been extended to cases:

A

(1) where state civil proceedings have commenced, and (2) where civil contempt hearings have begun.

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33
Q

Example of a case involving political question?

A

The Supreme Court has ruled that a claim that a state has redrawn electoral districts to benefit one political party is a political question and, therefore, is non-justiciable. This is because there are no manageable judicial standards for deciding when a political party has been unfairly advantaged when electoral districts are redrawn.

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34
Q

If a state court judgment can be supported on an adequate and independent state ground, the Supreme Court will not take jurisdiction. When adequate and independent state grounds will not apply?

A

Where a state court’s decision is based upon a federal interpretation of a similar federal law, adequate and independent state grounds will not apply, and the Supreme Court may review.

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35
Q

What is adequate and independent state ground?

A

Where a state court clearly states that a state law violates other state law or a provision of the state constitution, that decision will be an adequate and independent state ground (regardless of whether the opinion also decides that the state law violates a federal law as well).

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36
Q

The Commerce Clause has been used as the vehicle to uphold laws aimed at barring racial discrimination in activities connected with interstate commerce.

A

he Supreme Court has held that racial discrimination in private businesses has a significant impact on interstate commerce, and thus Congress has the power to regulate this conduct under the Commerce Clause.

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37
Q

Pursuant to its war and defense powers, Congress has broad authority to initiate whatever measures it deems necessary to provide for the national defense. This includes…

A

…the power to establish military courts and tribunals.

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38
Q

A congressional act purporting to be a tax should be upheld as a valid exercise of the taxing power provided that it does..

A

…raise revenue (the objective test) or that it was intended to raise revenue (the subjective test).

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39
Q

The commerce power authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, even if…

A

…the regulation is discriminatory or imposes an undue burden. As long as the enacted regulation can be rationally construed as a regulation of the channels or facilities of interstate commerce or activities that may have a national economic effect in the aggregate, the regulation will be upheld as constitutional.

Congress has broad authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause [U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 8]. Any enacted regulation that can be rationally construed as a regulation of the channels or facilities of interstate commerce or activities that may have a national economic effect in the aggregate will be upheld as constitutional.

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40
Q

loyalty qualifications differences

A

SC invalidated an Arkansas statute requiring teachers to file an affidavit listing “every organization to which they have belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five years” as overbroad.

Similarly, SC invalidated a Florida statute requiring public employees to swear, “I have not and will not lend my aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party” as vague and ambiguous.

On the other hand, an oath that public employees will “support the Constitution of the United States and will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States by force, violence, or by any illegal or unconstitutional means” was held valid.

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41
Q

There is a constitutionally protected property interest in the entitlement to continued attendance at a public school. In Goss v. Lopez [419 U.S. 565 (1975)], the U.S. Supreme Court stated that …

A

…a significant suspension for disciplinary reasons (e.g., 10-day duration) cannot be imposed without at least a minimum form of hearing before the suspension is imposed.

However, a student is not entitled to a trial-type hearing when his dismissal or suspension is with just cause.

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42
Q

Congress enacted a statute, over the President’s
veto, that granted Congress the power to
compel the President to remove United States
troops from foreign territory when such troops
have for 60 days been engaged in hostilities and
there has been no formal declaration of war. The
statute also provided that Congress may force
the President to withdraw the troops before the
60 days have elapsed by a two-thirds majority
vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
to that effect.
Which of the following statements best
describes the likely result of judicial review of
the constitutional validity of this statute?

A

(D) T he statute is constitutionally suspect.

Action having the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including executive branch officials, must be subjected to the possibility of presidential veto. [Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983)]

Although the President (or his predecessor) had the opportunity to veto the statute, the passage of a Senate committee decision that shortens the time that the President may use the troops would have the purpose and effect of altering the rights and duties of the President, which accrue to him by virtue of his rather extensive military powers, and would not be subject to a presidential veto.
For this reason the statutory provision may be an unconstitutional legislative veto of executive
action.

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43
Q

Congress’s property power

A

Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution

gives Congress the power to dispose of all property belonging to
the federal government.

There are no express limits placed on this power, and a disposal has never been invalidated on the ground that it places a competitor of the purchaser at a disadvantage.

i.e.

selling US Navy vessels

The federal government may exercise its property powers to acquire control of free-roaming animals on public land. The federal government does not, however, have inherent
authority over or ownership of all “free-roaming wildlife.” A state may, in turn, assert some rights over animals within its borders. That power must, nevertheless, give way in the face of a valid exercise of federal power.

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44
Q

While the Equal Protection Clause is not applicable to the
federal government, …

A

..equal protection guarantees are applicable through the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

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45
Q

The most likely method the United States could use to impose a uniform child custody law on all
the states is through …

A

…the taxing and spending power, making an allocation of funds available to each state that adopts the uniform law.

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46
Q

COMMERCE CLAUSE VS. ARTICLE IV
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

A
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47
Q

Any conflict between an act of Congress and a treaty is resolved by

A

order of adoption;
i.e., the last in time prevails.

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48
Q

the balance of power between the President
and Congress over the Armed Forces

A

The Constitution makes the President the commander in
chief of the armed forces, but it gives Congress the power to declare war and raise an army and navy.

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49
Q

he power of Congress to investigate is coextensive with

A

the power to legislate created by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.

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50
Q

Can Congress regulate the rates that banks charge for interest?

A

Congress may regulate, under the Commerce Clause, anything that has a substantial economic effect upon interstate commerce. The rates that banks charge for interest certainly affect interstate
commerce or may simply constitute commerce in its broad sense. In either case, the regulation is clearly within Congress’s commerce power.

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51
Q

Under Article II , Section 2, Congress may (not) appoint members
of a body with administrative or enforcement powers.

A

may not

Such persons are “officers of the United States” and must be appointed by the President with senatorial confirmation unless Congress has vested their appointment in the President alone, in federal courts, or in heads of departments.

i.e., selection of two members of the commission by a committee of the House of Representatives
would violate the Appointments Clause because the commission has investigative and
administrative powers.

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52
Q

“cases and controversies”

v.

advisory opinions

A

The Supreme Court has interpreted the constitutional power of the federal courts to hear “cases and controversies” to mean that federal courts may not render advisory opinions.

i.e.

Congress has enacted a law providing that all disagreements between the United States and a state over federal grant-in-aid funds shall be settled by the filing of a suit in the federal
district court in the affected state. The law further provides: “The judgment of the federal court shall be transmitted to the head of the federal agency dispensing such funds, who, if
satisfied that the judgment is fair and lawful, shall execute the judgment according to its terms.”

Under
the law here, the district court’s decision is not binding on an agency dispensing funds, because the agency head is given discretion to decide whether the court’s judgment is fair. Therefore,
the judgment is merely advisory and so is not within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

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53
Q

A man was arrested in a state for armed
robbery. A combined preliminary hearing to
determine probable cause and initial appearance
was held within 20 hours of his arrest. Probable
cause was found, and bail was properly denied
under the state’s Bail Reform Act. A state statute
provided that when a defendant is in custody,
his trial must begin within 50 days of his arrest.
After 50 days had passed since the man’s arrest
and no trial had been held, he filed a motion for
dismissal for violation of his right to a speedy
trial under the state constitution, which tracked
verbatim the speedy trial provision of the United
States Constitution. The trial judge held that
he was bound to follow federal interpretations
of the speedy trial provision and granted the
man’s motion on that basis. On appeal, the state
supreme court agreed with the trial judge. The
state prosecutor seeks to challenge the ruling in
the United States Supreme Court.
If the Supreme Court thinks that the state
court wrongly decided that the man was
denied his right to a speedy trial under federal
standards, how should it proceed?

A

(D) Reverse the decision and remand the case to be decided on the independent state grounds only.

The Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the case, because it has jurisdiction to hear appeals from a state’s highest court concerning the constitutionality of a state statute,

the state court’s decision was not based on independent state grounds (a federal court will not hear a case that can be based on adequate and independent state grounds; rather, it would dismiss the case or remand it to the state for clarification); the decision was based on federal case law interpreting an identical federal provision.

Thus, jurisdiction was proper and the Court could reverse the state court decision and hold that a 50-day delay does not violate the federal Constitution.

However, the case should be remanded so that the state
may decide whether the delay was too long under state law, since a state is free to provide its citizens with more civil protection than is required by the federal Constitution.

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54
Q

Woman who wants an abortion named her doctor as the only D in the case. Can a federal court hear this case?

A

The federal court should dismiss the action because there is no case or controversy. The federal courts will not issue advisory opinions and so will not hear collusive actions. The fear is that if
interested parties are not on both sides of an issue, the court will not have an opportunity to fairly address all of the sides to each issue.

Here, there is no interested party opposing the pregnant
woman, and so the federal court should dismiss.

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55
Q

SC’s original vs. appellate jx

A

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. Congress may neither restrict nor enlarge the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.

In all other cases, such as maritime disputes, the Supreme Court has only appellate jurisdiction, which Congress has extensive power to regulate and limit.

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56
Q

The Supreme Court will hear a case from a state court only if…

A

…it turned on federal grounds. If it finds adequate and independent state grounds for the decision, it will refuse jurisdiction.

i.e. the facts state that the state decision was based on a provision of the state constitution. The fact that the state provision is similar to the federal Equal Protection Clause is irrelevant to determining whether the decision here was based on state law, since the state court did not base its decision
on interpretation of the federal provision, but rather interpreted the state provision.

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57
Q

ripe for review

A

Someone seeking a declaration that a statute is unconstitutional must demonstrate that she has engaged (or will engage) in specific conduct, and that the challenged statute poses a real and immediate danger to her interests.

The court will not determine the constitutionality of a statute when the statute has not been enforced and there is no immediate threat that it will be enforced. Thus, if the state statute is not likely to be enforced, it is not a substantial threat to the parents and so they will be unable to demonstrate any real and immediate harm (or threat thereof) to their interest.

i.e. The parents’ child is nine months old and the statute cannot be violated before the child turns age three. Therefore,
this case is not ripe, and this choice gives the state a chance to defeat the parents’ argument.

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58
Q

The leader of a controversial religious sect,
which had been characterized by the government
as a “religious cult,” sought to broaden his
influence by running for the state legislature.
The state had no provision barring members
of the clergy from serving as legislators. The
leader took advantage of the state’s liberal voter
registration laws by having many of his followers
move into the district a month before the
election. The leader’s subsequent victory in the
race prompted a citizens’ group to file a lawsuit
in federal district court. The suit, invoking the
Establishment Clause, sought to enjoin the state
legislature from seating the leader in the legislature
or expending any state funds to provide him
with legislative privileges. The legislature moved
to dismiss the lawsuit.
Should the court grant the legislature’s
motion?

A

The court should grant the legislature’s motion because the Eleventh Amendment generally prohibits a federal court from hearing a private party’s claim against its own or another state
government.

This jurisdictional bar includes actions against a state government for injunctive or declaratory relief where the state itself, rather than state officials, is named as a party.

Here,
the citizens’ group is seeking an injunction against the state legislature itself rather than a state
official. Thus, the action would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

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59
Q

Constitutional provisions applying only to fed/state gov.

A
  • Equal protection claims are made against the federal government pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has held that this provision implicitly includes a requirement for equal protection.
  • Both constitutional provisions referring to privileges and immunities apply to state government conduct and are never used against the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deny any citizen the privileges or immunities of national citizenship. Article IV provides that no state shall deny citizens of other states the privileges and immunities it accords its own citizens.
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60
Q

ARTICLE IV—PRIVILEGES OF STATE CITIZENSHIP

v.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—PRIVILEGES OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP

A

ARTICLE IV—PRIVILEGES OF STATE CITIZENSHIP

The Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibits discrimination by a state against nonresidents.

Note: Corporations and aliens are not protected by this clause. (In contrast, corporations and aliens are protected by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the Dormant Commerce Clause.

  1. Only “Fundamental Rights” Protected
    The Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prohibits discrimination by a state against nonresidents of the state when the discrimination concerns “fundamental
    rights”—i.e., rights relating to important commercial activities (such as pursuit of a livelihood) or civil liberties. However, the Clause applies only if the discrimination is intentionally
    protectionist in nature.
  2. Substantial Justification Exception
    The state law may be valid if the state has a substantial justification for the different treatment.
    In effect, the state must show that nonresidents either cause or are part of the problem that the state is attempting to solve and that there are no less restrictive means to solve the
    problem.
  3. Note—Relationship to Commerce Clause
    Although the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause may apply different standards and produce different results, they tend to mutually
    reinforce each other. Consequently, they both have to be considered in analyzing bar exam questions

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—PRIVILEGES OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP

States may not deny their citizens the privileges or immunities of national citizenship (e.g., the right to petition Congress for redress of grievances, the right to vote for federal officers, and the right to interstate travel). Corporations are not protected by this Clause.

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61
Q

Under the Contract Clause, which limits the ability of states to enact laws impairing the obligation of contracts, there is no impairment unless…

A

….the law is retroactive.

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62
Q

A federal district court judge was accused of misconduct in office and was impeached by the House of Representatives. At trial in the United States Senate, the judge was convicted and
removed from office. Nevertheless, the President directed the Attorney General to institute criminal proceedings against the judge. After presentation to a federal grand jury, an indictment
was issued against the judge and signed by the Attorney General. At the opening of his trial, the judge moved to have the indictment dismissed.
How is the trial judge most likely to rule?

A

The trial judge will most likely deny the motion to dismiss the indictment.

The Fifth Amendment right to be free of double jeopardy for the same offense applies to subsequent criminal actions, but
not to civil actions or impeachment proceedings, which are distinct from criminal proceedings.

Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution specifically states that a conviction by impeachment does not prevent the party convicted from being subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to the law.

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63
Q

When answering questions about individual rights, what question should I ask first?

A

Is there government action?

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64
Q

A state may not impose on candidates for office a fee that renders it impossible for … to run
for office.

A

indigents

Even as applied to nonindigent candidates, an unreasonably high filing fee that is not
tailored to promote a substantial or overriding state interest might be held invalid. However, even
a reasonable and otherwise valid fee would have to be waived for an indigent candidate unable to pay the fee.

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65
Q

The Equal Protection Clause and voting districts

A

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state dilution of the right to vote by malapportionment of electoral districts.

This rule applies to electoral districts for local governmental bodies as well as for the state legislature.

When a local government establishes voting districts for the election of representatives, it must establish districts that do not have a significant variance in the number of persons in each district.

i.e., the large town districts have twice as many persons as the small town districts, creating an unconstitutional dilution of the large town citizens’ right to vote.

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66
Q

Under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution,

A

states must give full faith and credit to the judgment of another state if the judgment is

final,

on the merits,

and rendered by a court with jurisdiction.

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67
Q

Does a sales tax enacted by state apply to a purchase by a federal agency operating within the state?

A

As a direct tax on the federal government, the sales tax is invalid unless Congress has consented
to such a tax.

The Court has indicated that while the states may not directly tax or regulate the federal government, they may indirectly do so by adopting taxes or regulations on persons dealing with the federal government, as long as the tax or regulation does not unduly burden the federal government.

i.e. state will win a suit when it imposes tax on an owner of a restaurant located in a national park

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68
Q

When can one state sue another state?

A

A state can sue another state to protect its natural
resources for the benefit of its own citizens.

Under Article III,
the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over controversies between two states.

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69
Q

The United States Government, as well as its agencies and instrumentalities, is immune from state regulation that interferes with federal activities, functions, and programs.

To the extent
that state regulations substantially interfere with an authorized federal program, the state laws must yield.

A

i.e.

The director, as an agent of the federal government, was carrying out a duly authorized program of the Department of Agriculture by conducting sales of surplus government
food at a federally owned warehouse.

To sustain the power of the town to prosecute the director
for not having a retail food sale license would give the town overriding authority over the selection of personnel to administer a federal program, as well as over the means by which this program is to be implemented.

Thus, the licensing requirement would substantially interfere with the proper functioning of this federal program by directly interfering with a federal employee in the carrying
out of his orders.

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70
Q

May Congress constitutionally regulate wages and hours of state and local employees under its commerce power?

A

Yes.

The Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 vests in Congress broad powers to regulate any activity, local or interstate, which either in itself or in combination with other activities has a substantial economic effect upon, or effect on movement in, interstate commerce.

Under this approach, Congress clearly has the power to regulate wages and hours of those employed by private employers. This power has been held applicable to
state and local governments;

Congress can therefore require state or local governments to follow the provisions of federal legislation requiring a state or private employer to pay overtime wages to its employees.

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71
Q

A state passes a law allowing terminally ill
patients to use marijuana under limited circumstances.
Federal law, however, provides that
marijuana may not be used under any circumstances.
The state sues in federal district court,
arguing that marijuana is beneficial for the
terminally ill and should be permitted under
these circumstances, despite the federal prohibition
of marijuana use throughout the United
States.
How should the federal district court rule?

A

The court should rule that the federal statute preempts the state law. Under the Supremacy Clause, a valid federal regulation supersedes any state action that conflicts with it, as is the case here.

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72
Q

A state passed a law providing that legislative
staff members in the state legislature were
to receive an hourly wage that was less than
the federal minimum wage. A legislative staff
member filed suit in federal court challenging
this state law.
Which of the following is the strongest
argument in support of the staff member’s
constitutional challenge?

A

The strongest argument is that the minimum wage law applies to both private sector and state employees.

Generally, the Tenth Amendment provides that powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states.

Under the Tenth Amendment, the court will usually uphold federal legislation that applies both to the private sector and to state governments,

but will generally not uphold attempts by Congress to regulate the states as states.

Here, the federal minimum
wage law applies to all private and government employers. Thus, it will be upheld.

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73
Q

The federal accounting office issued a call for
competitive bids for a contract to supply 3,000
four-wheel drive utility vehicles without antipollution
devices and with engines with a displacement
of 4,000 cubic centimeters. A supplier in a
state won the contract as low bidder and began
manufacture of the vehicles. However, the state’s
statutes require that automobiles manufactured
in that state be equipped with antipollution
devices and have a maximum displacement of
2,500 cubic centimeters. The supplier files suit in
state court, seeking a judicial declaration that the
state statute may not be enforced as to it.
How should the court rule?

A

Application of the statute would violate the Supremacy Clause. Because the state statute conflicts with the terms of the federal contract, the federal contract must take precedence, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause and principles of federal immunity from state regulation.

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74
Q

In response to a tremendous increase in
begging in the downtown area of a city, the
city council enacted an ordinance that required
anyone soliciting for charitable contributions of
any sort in any public place to wear an identity
card issued by the local police department.
Identity cards could be obtained by completing
an affidavit providing the applicant’s identification
and address information and further
affirming that the applicant was not soliciting
for personal use and belonged to a recognized
charitable organization.
A member of an anti-tobacco charitable
organization wishes to solicit contributions by
similarly minded persons for use in his organization’s
campaign against public smoking. He
does not want to comply with the identity card
ordinance. He comes to you for legal advice and
asks whether he should challenge the ordinance
in federal court.
Should you advise that the ordinance is constitutional?

A

The ordinance is probably unconstitutional because it violates free speech rights under the First Amendment.

The Supreme Court has held that a charitable appeal for funds involves a variety of speech interests protected by the First Amendment. In one case, an ordinance that prohibited
door-to-door solicitation by organizations that did not use at least 75% of their receipts for charitable purposes was struck down by the Court.
The present ordinance would probably run afoul of the same rule, because in effect it prohibits all charitable solicitation absent relatively burdensome compliance with its registration provisions. The ordinance is also vulnerable because it limits the right of solicitation to those who belong to “a recognized charitable organization.”

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75
Q

A city ordinance prohibits the distribution of
pamphlets “on public sidewalks or other public
areas when foot traffic is sufficiently heavy and
the manner of distribution of the pamphlets
causes obstruction of the foot traffic so as to
result in spillover onto public streets where
vehicular traffic creates a danger to human
life.” The state fair is held at fairgrounds whose
entrances lie along a busy multilane street.
A demonstrator was distributing pamphlets
advocating repeal of the federal milk price
support program at the state fair. He attracted a
crowd of about 10 farmers and children outside
the fairgrounds entrance at which he stood, but
most of the few fairgoers entering the fair at
that late afternoon time simply ignored him.
When one of the dairy farmers became irate and
threatened to “knock his block off,” the demonstrator
was arrested by a fair security guard
and subsequently prosecuted under the city
ordinance.
Which of the following statements is correct
regarding the city ordinance and the demonstrator’s
prosecution?

A

Substantially overbroad or vague statutes regulating First Amendment rights are void on their face, and persons may not be prosecuted for their violation even if their conduct might otherwise be subject to valid regulation.

Conversely, statutes that reasonably regulate the time, place,
and manner of speech in public forums may be unconstitutional if applied in situations where the First Amendment activity is unreasonably infringed.

Here, the statute is a valid time, place, and manner restriction because it is content-neutral, it is narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest, and it leaves open alternative channels of communication.

It is not too vague when read as a whole, because pedestrian traffic is “sufficiently heavy” when the foot traffic spills
over into public streets because of the obstruction. However, it is being applied to circumstances that do not provide any reasonable basis for regulation of the speech.

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76
Q

Regulation of truthful advertising of a
lawful activity is valid only if it

A

serves a substantial government interest,

directly advances that interest, and

is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.

i.e.

The consumption of alcohol is a valid activity and the ordinance here does not address deceptive advertising. While the city may argue that discouraging drinking is a substantial government interest, it might have a difficult time proving that the ordinance here advances that interest. More importantly, given that the ordinance amounts to a total ban on advertising outside of stores selling liquor, the city would have a difficult
time arguing that the ordinance is narrowly tailored.

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77
Q

Is there a basis a First Amendment claim against the bus
company operated under a franchise granted to it by the city council?

A
The Supreme Court has ruled that the grant of a franchise is not sufficient to create state action. [Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison (1974)] Thus, there is no basis for a First Amendment claim against the bus company.
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78
Q

Oath: “I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am not now
a member of any organization that advocates
illegal acts, nor will I become a member of any
such organization while I am a licensed private
investigator in this state.”

A

Oaths similar to this membership oath have been struck down as overbroad. The state has a compelling interest only in preventing knowing membership with the specific intent to further unlawful aims. Persons cannot be denied a license because of mere membership in a particular group, and the state statute here addresses mere membership.

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79
Q

While the government may limit the amount of contributions
that an individual may contribute to a candidate’s campaign, it may not

A

limit contributions to groups that lobby for or against matters before the legislature, because the Supreme Court has
found that such a law does not serve a sufficiently important interest to outweigh the restraints that it puts on the First Amendment freedoms of speech and association.

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80
Q

The validity of a law that regulates elections is determined by a balancing test.

What is it?

A

If the law regulates “core political speech,” rather than the process surrounding elections, strict scrutiny is applied (i.e., the law must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest).

The Supreme Court has held that a state law prohibiting
campaigning on election day is invalid as applied to a newspaper editorial urging voters to vote a certain way, because the right to comment on political issues is an essential element of free speech. The state statute at issue here is similar to the law that was held invalid by the Court;
thus, its enforcement should be enjoined on free speech grounds.

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81
Q

A state legislature enacted an excise tax on
any automobile sold in the state that had not
been manufactured within the state. The tax
was intended to ease the desperate plight of the
thousands of auto workers suffering layoffs,
plant closures, and pay cuts from lost sales
to foreign competitors. The tax was graduated,
from 5% of the sales price of inexpensive
automobiles down to 1% for automobiles selling
for more than $100,000. A corporation that
manufactures automobiles in a neighboring state
brought an appropriate action in federal court to
enjoin enforcement of the automobile tax statute
as to its products.
Which of the following is the strongest constitutional argument supporting the invalidity of the special tax?

(A) It is an undue burden on interstate commerce.

(C) It violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection of the privileges and immunities
of national citizenship.

A

(A) The strongest argument against the tax is that it burdens interstate commerce. The Commerce
Clause of the Constitution gives Congress very broad power to authorize or forbid state taxation that affects interstate commerce.
Unless approved by Congress, state taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce are invalid. The special tax here does not pass muster because it directly discriminates against out-of-state competition. Thus, the tax violates the Commerce Clause and (A) is correct.

(C) is incorrect because the Fourteenth Amendment clause protecting the privileges and immunities of national citizenship does not apply here. The clause protects only those rights attributable to being a United States citizen, e.g., the right to petition Congress. The clause is inapplicable here.

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82
Q

The Appointment Clause of the Constitution
permits Congress to vest appointments of inferior officers only in

A

in the President,

the courts,

or the heads of departments.

Enforcement is an executive act; therefore, Congress cannot appoint its own members to the commission to exercise enforcement powers.

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83
Q

Executive privilege…

A

…is an inherent privilege necessary to protect the confidentiality of presidential communications. Under this privilege, presidential documents and conversations are presumptively privileged, but this privilege must yield to a demonstrated need for such materials as evidence in a criminal case in which they are relevant and otherwise admissible. [United States v.
Nixon (1974)] Although the Supreme Court has not expressly decided that the privilege must also yield to a demonstrated need for evidence in a pending legislative proceeding, such an extension of Nixon is likely.

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84
Q

Congress has the power to regulate alarm installation companies under the
Commerce Clause because the clause permits Congress to regulate any local or interstate activity
that, either in itself or in combination with other activities, has an effect on interstate commerce.

A

Burglar alarm companies use instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as phone lines and
have a cumulative effect on interstate commerce even though some may only do business locally.
Hence, their activities can be regulated by Congress.

Also

Congress has the right to prohibit completely the transportation of “harmful” substances in the channels of commerce. Congress could also otherwise regulate the manufacture and use of harmful drugs as part of its regulation of commerce.

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85
Q

Congress does not have the power to legislate for the general welfare—there is no federal police power—but rather Congress has the power to …

A

…spend for the general welfare.

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86
Q

The United States Surgeon General was cited
for contempt for refusing to answer questions as
part of a Senate investigation regarding an issue
in the Food and Drug Administration.
His contempt citation will be dismissed if he
can show which of the following?

A

His contempt citation will be dismissed if he can show that the questions do not relate to any
matter concerning which the Senate may legislate. Congress’s power to investigate is limited to matters on which it can legislate. Therefore, if the Surgeon General can demonstrate that the questions concerned matters upon which Congress could not legislate (not an enumerated power under Article I, Section 8), then this contempt citation must be dismissed.

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87
Q

The Necessary and Proper Clause is usually a wrong choice because…

A

the Necessary and Proper Clause only broadens
congressional power authorized under some other provision; it does not itself create the power to
act.

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88
Q

Article II , Section 2 provides that the President shall nominate, and with the advice and consent
of the Senate shall appoint, ambassadors and other officers of the United States.

A

The section also provides that Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

Under separation of powers principles, however,
Congress may not vest in itself any broader appointment powers than what is provided for by the Constitution. Where Congress has not vested the appointment power in courts of law or the heads of departments, it is not permitted to restrict the candidates that the President may nominate for appointment. Thus, the Senate’s attempt here to exert some control over the President’s choice of lower-level diplomatic representatives is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers.

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89
Q

Congress determined that zebra mussels posed a great threat to the economic
welfare of the Great Lakes region and passed a
statute requiring all Great Lakes water intakes
to be coated with a special chemical compound
that repels zebra mussels. Studies by biologists
at a major state university showed that while
the special chemical compound was toxic to other aquatic life. The biologists recommended that Great Lakes intake pipes be coated with a less toxic and less expensive copper-based paint. Great Lakes states adopted laws permitting municipal water districts to coat their intake pipes with copper paint.
Can municipalities using copper-based paint
on their intake pipes successfully be prosecuted
for violating the federal law?

(B) No, because the municipalities are taking
effective steps to combat zebra mussels in
compliance with the spirit and purpose of
the federal law.

(D) Yes, because Congress may adopt laws
regulating navigable waters.

A

(D) The cities can be prosecuted because state or local government action that conflicts with valid federal laws is invalid under the Supremacy Clause. The federal law here could be found valid as an exercise of the commerce power (Congress can regulate any activity that either in itself or in combination with other activities has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce) or under the admiralty power (Congress can regulate all navigable waterways). The action of the municipalities directly conflicts with the directives of the federal law and can therefore be stopped.

(B) is incorrect because the fact that the copper paint may be as effective as the special
compound does not change the result. The action by the municipalities can be prohibited under the Supremacy Clause.

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90
Q

A town in a rural state facing financial difficulties
passed a variety of “sin taxes,” including
one aimed at electronic game arcades frequented
by local juveniles. The tax is a one cent per
game tax imposed on the manufacturers of
the games based on the estimated number of
plays over a machine’s lifetime. There are no
electronic game manufacturers in the state.
Which of the following constitutional provisions
would support the best argument against
enforcement of the tax?

(C) The Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV.
(D) The Commerce Clause.

A

(D) The best argument against enforcement of the tax is that it violates the Commerce Clause.

_If Congress has not adopted laws regarding a subject, local governments are free to tax or
regulate local aspects of the subject area as long as the tax or regulation does not discriminate against interstate commerce *or* unduly burden it.
_

Here, the tax does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, since it does not single out interstate commerce for taxation in order to
benefit the local economy. However, it could be argued that the tax unduly burdens interstate
commerce. A local tax will be held to unduly burden interstate commerce if the locality’s need for the revenue does not outweigh the burden on interstate commerce.

The Supreme Court will consider whether there is a substantial nexus between the activity or property taxed and the taxing state, whether the tax is fairly apportioned, and whether there is a fair relationship between the tax and the benefit the taxed party receives from the state.

Here, there is little nexus between the manufacturer and the town. The facts indicate that out-of-state manufacturers’
machines are used in the town, but do not indicate whether the manufacturers conduct
any selling activity in the town. Similarly, nothing indicates that there is a relationship between the tax and any benefit that the manufacturers derive from the town. Thus, the tax would
probably be unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.

(C) is not a good argument because the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prohibits states from discriminating against out-of-state residents when a fundamental right is involved, and the tax here does not differentiate between residents and nonresidents.

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91
Q

The power to regulate foreign commerce lies exclusively with…

A

…Congress.

i.e.

A state that adopts legislation requiring private vendors to favor United States products over foreign products may be acting outside the scope of its powers.

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92
Q

Due to a notable increase in prostitution
arrests in the state, the state legislature has
enacted new regulations for massage parlors.
The new law requires that all workers at any
massage parlor or similar business be licensed
by the state attorney general.
Is this requirement constitutional?

(A) Yes, because it is within the proper scope
of the exercise of the police powers of the
state.

(D) No, as a violation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV.

A

(A) The licensing requirement is constitutional. The state may “within the proper purpose of the exercise of its police powers” require licensing of anyone who deals with the public in general,
and the Supreme Court has been particularly liberal when the state is attempting legislation that is remedial in effect to cure a social evil that exists within the state.

(D) is wrong because there is no indication that the state is treating nonresidents differently than those residing in the state. (Note also that the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause does not protect corporations.)

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93
Q

A state or local government may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce if such regulation:

A

(i) does not discriminate against out-of-state competition to benefit local economic interests;

i.e. state statute is applied evenhandedly
(i.e., it does not merely regulate the activities of out-of-state lobster fishers while exempting
in-state fishers from those same regulations).

and (ii) is not unduly burdensome (i.e., the incidental burden on interstate commerce does not outweigh the legitimate local benefits produced by the regulation).

94
Q

An employee of the United States Department
of Labor was instructed by his superior to
solicit subscriptions to the Department’s bulletin
on a door-to-door basis in the city in which
he worked. While doing so, the employee was
arrested for violation of a city ordinance that
prohibited commercial solicitation of private
residences.
What is the employee’s best defense?

A

(A) The employee’s best defense is intergovernmental immunity.

State and local governments cannot tax or regulate the activities of the federal government. This principle is often termed “intergovernmental immunity.”

The arrest and prosecution of a federal employee who was on the job violates this principle, which is based on the supremacy of the federal government and federal law.

95
Q

A state Occupational Health and Safety Board
recently issued regulations valid under its statutory
mandate requiring that all employers in the
state provide ionizing air purification systems
for all employee work areas. These regulations
replaced previous guidelines for employee air
quality that were generally not mandatory and
did not specify the method of air purification
used.
The requirements regarding air purification
systems are likely to be unconstitutional as
applied to which of the following employers?
(A) A wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese
corporation with seven retail outlets within
the state.
(B) The state supreme court, which recently
completed construction of its new courthouse
with a non-ionizing air purification
system which the builder is contractually
bound to maintain for the next three years.
(C) A United States Armed Forces Recruiting
Center located adjacent to the state capitol
building.
(D) A privately operated community service
center funded by donations and constructed
through use of a loan provided by the
United States Veterans Administration and
repayable to that agency.

A

(C) The armed forces recruiting center is least likely to be required to comply with the new state law.
A state has no power to regulate activities of the federal government unless Congress consents
to the regulation.
Accordingly, agents and instrumentalities of the federal government, such as the armed forces recruiting center, are immune from state regulations relating to performance of their federal functions.

96
Q

The federal government contracted with a
number of communications utilities to install
fiberoptic communication lines between major
federal offices across the country. The utilities,
which maintained ownership of the
lines, contracted with the federal government
to install the lines on a “cost plus fixed fee”
basis, whereby all installation costs would be
reimbursed by the government. One such line
was installed in a state’s capital city, where
the Department of the Interior maintained its
western regional office. The state imposes a tax
on the installation of all communication lines in
the state, including fiberoptic cable lines. It seeks
to impose the tax on the line running to the
federal office.
Will the state be permitted to impose the tax?
(A) Yes, because the tax is indirect and nondiscriminatory.
(B) Yes, because the tax is a valid exercise of
state power under the Tenth Amendment.
(C) No, because the tax burdens the activities of
the federal government.

A

(A) The state may impose a tax on the fiberoptic line.

A state tax levied directly against the property
or operation of the federal government without the consent of Congress is invalid.
_However,
nondiscriminatory, indirect taxes on the federal government or its property are permissible if
they do not unreasonably burden the federal government.
_

Because this tax is not levied directly against the government, but rather against the provider of a service that the government is obtaining, and is levied on all communications lines in the state, the tax is valid. The fact that the economic burden of the tax will ultimately be borne by the government under the “cost plus” contract does not invalidate the tax.

(B) is wrong because the Tenth Amendment provides that powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states.
This limits Congress’s power to regulate the states but does not serve as an independent grant of power to the states. Both the federal government and the state government have the power to tax, but the federal law is supreme in this area.

(C) is wrong because not every state tax that burdens the federal government is invalid. A nondiscriminatory tax on a service provided to the federal government by a private entity does not appear to be an unreasonable burden on the operation of the federal government.

97
Q

A group of doctors filed suit in federal
court against the United States government to
challenge a new statute that places caps on the
amount that doctors, hospitals, clinics, and other
medical facilities may charge patients to perform
specifically enumerated procedures. The government filed a motion to dismiss the doctors’ suit, arguing that the doctors lack standing to pursue their case.
Which of the following is LEAST relevant in
determining whether the doctors have standing?
(A) A ruling in the doctors’ favor would result in removal of the price caps.
(B) Enforcement of the price caps would reduce
the doctors’ profits by an average of 4%.
(C) The statute placing the caps on the enumerated procedures provides that doctors shall have standing to challenge the price caps.
(D) Eighty percent of all doctors charged more
for the specified procedures than the price
caps allow.

A

(C) The least helpful argument is that the statute setting the price caps provides that doctors shall
have standing to challenge them. Standing is a jurisprudential doctrine designed to limit the cases federal courts will hear to those brought by parties with a true interest in the litigation. Standing requires a party to have a concrete stake in the outcome of the litigation. While Congress can, by statute, create new rights, injury to which may be sufficient for standing, Congress may not simply confer standing. Thus, an argument simply that the statute confers standing on the doctors is not very helpful.

(A) is incorrect because one of the requirements to establish standing is redressability. An argument that a ruling in a party’s favor will eliminate the party’s injury is the essence
of redressability.

(B) is incorrect because a party has standing only if he can show that he has suffered an injury in fact. The injury does not have to be great—but it must be some concrete and particularized injury that will affect him in an individual way, and not just the generalized harm we all suffer from the government’s or a private party’s actions. An argument that the doctors’
profits will be reduced by an average of 4% is a sufficiently concrete injury to establish standing.

(D) is incorrect because a party has standing only if there is a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct of which he complains. The fact that 80% of all doctors charged more than the price caps allow for the specified procedures subject to the caps shows a causal link between the statute and the doctors’ reduction in income. Thus, (D) would help the doctors establish standing.

98
Q

Pursuant to its power under the Commerce
Clause, Congress adopted legislation prohibiting
employers from requiring any employee to work
more than a 12-hour day. The legislation also
provided that any employee whose rights under
the legislation were violated by his employer
could bring a cause of action for damages
against the employer in the federal district court
in the district where the employee resided.
The legislation defined “employer” to include
“all commercial employers, all charities that
compensate workers for their time, and all state
and local governments.”
A state required its police department’s
paramedics to work a 24-hour shift because of
the nature of the job. They would then be off
for 48 hours. A paramedic for the state’s police
department was unhappy with this arrangement
and preferred to work a regular 10- or 12-hour
day. A friend of the paramedic told him about
the federal legislation discussed above, and
the paramedic immediately brought an action
against the state in federal district court.
The district court should hold:

(C) Against the paramedic, because the federal
legislation was not enacted pursuant to
Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.
(D) Against the paramedic, because Congress
has no power to remove the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court.

A

(C) The court should hold against the paramedic because the Supreme Court has permitted Congress to remove the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit only when it acts to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment generally prohibits a federal court from hearing private parties’ claims against the government, including claims for damages such as the paramedic’s claim here. While Congress’s power to prevent discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment has enabled it to abrogate state immunity, it has no such power under the Commerce Clause. [See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996)] Hence, the court should dismiss the action as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and (A) is therefore incorrect.

(D) is incorrect because Congress does have power under certain circumstances to remove the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. _Under the power given to Congress in the enabling clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (and perhaps the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments), it could pass a*ntidiscrimination legislation* that permits a state to be sued in federal court._

99
Q

A federal statute just signed into law by the
President provided that school districts no longer
needed to recognize the tenure of elementary
school teachers—all tenured teachers would
lose their status and would be treated the same
as nontenured teachers. The effect of the law
would be to
allow all tenured teachers to be
fired more easily if their performance was not
adequate. The law also allowed the salaries of
tenured teachers to be lowered, at least until a
new contract with the teachers could be negotiated.
_The law had a two-year grace period before
it was to take effect
_
, to give schools and teachers time to adjust to the law; however, it specifically provided that once it is in effect, school board actions under the law supersede any existing contract terms.
A public elementary school district is in the
first year of a three-year union contract with
its teachers. The school board has stated that
it plans to abolish tenured positions as soon
as the law takes effect. The union, believing
that numerous terms of the contract will be
invalidated when the law takes effect, filed an
action in federal court on behalf of the teachers,
asking for an injunction to prevent the school
board from abolishing tenured positions and for
a declaratory judgment stating that the law is
invalid.
Should the federal court hear the case?
(A) No, because a ruling on the law at this
point is premature.
(B) No, because the union does not have
standing to sue on behalf of the teachers.
(C) Yes, because the federal law encourages
improper interference with a contract in
violation of the Contract Clause of the
Constitution.
(D) Yes, because the teachers’ rights and
benefits are threatened by the law and the
school board’s stated plans.
Question 6
As part of a deal to raise the federal debt
limit, Congress passed a statute by a greater
than two-thirds vote in both houses giving the
President authority to cancel particular spending
provisions that are contained within legislation
that he signs into law. The statute provided
that Congress could override the President’s
decisions only by a three-fourths vote. As soon
as the statute went into effect, a Senator who
had voted against the statute filed suit in federal
district court, challenging its constitutionality.
Is the Senator likely to succeed in her lawsuit?
(A) Yes, because the President does not have
the constitutional power to exercise a line
item veto.
(D) No, because the statute passed by more
than a two-thirds vote in both houses of

A

(A) The federal court should not hear the case because it is not yet ripe for review.

A federal court will not hear a case unless there exists a “case and controversy.” This has been interpreted to mean, among other things, that a plaintiff generally is not entitled to review of his claim unless he has been harmed or there is an immediate threat of harm. This is to prevent the federal courts from hearing unnecessary actions. There is no immediate threat of harm to the union here because the law does not take effect for another two years. Before that happens, Congress might change the law or repeal it altogether, or the school board may decide to keep the old contract system after all. T

100
Q

As part of a deal to raise the federal debt
limit, Congress passed a statute by a greater
than two-thirds vote in both houses giving the
President authority to cancel particular spending
provisions that are contained within legislation
that he signs into law. The statute provided
that Congress could override the President’s
decisions only by a three-fourths vote. As soon
as the statute went into effect, a Senator who
had voted against the statute filed suit in federal
district court, challenging its constitutionality.
Is the Senator likely to succeed in her lawsuit?

(A) Yes, because the President does not have
the constitutional power to exercise a line
item veto.

(C) No, because the Senator lacks standing to
challenge the statute.

A

(C) The Senator will not succeed because she lacks standing to challenge the statute.

The Supreme Court has held that members of Congress lack standing to challenge a law authorizing the President to exercise a line item veto (such as the statute here), reasoning that the injury is not concrete and personal, but rather is institutional in that it is shared by all members of Congress. [Raines v. Byrd (1997)]

(A) is incorrect even though it is a true statement. The Supreme Court has ruled that the President has no power to exercise a line item veto of just part of a bill because it violates the Presentation Clause of the United States Constitution; the President must either approve or reject
a bill in toto.
However, (A) is not the best choice here because the Senator is not a proper person to bring the challenge.

101
Q

Under Article III , Section 2, the United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all cases…

Which of the following suits would not fall
within the United States Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction under Article III , Section 2?

(A) A suit seeking to assert the interest of state
citizens in retaining diplomatic relations
with a foreign nation.
(B) A suit seeking to protect a state’s timber
from allegedly illegal cutting by residents
of another state.
(C) A suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of an
allegedly unconstitutional executive order
that will greatly limit the state’s authority to
make policy decisions regarding admission
to state universities.
(D) A suit by the United States Government
seeking to enjoin state construction of a
bridge over a navigable waterway.

A

….affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and

in which a state is a party.

In (A), the state is not really seeking to advance or protect any interest of its own. Rather, the state is attempting to act in parens patriae (i.e., to act as a representative of its citizens, thereby asserting their interests). Thus, the state is not an actual party in this case in the sense that the Supreme Court has traditionally required to justify exercise of original jurisdiction.

(B) would be a proper case for institution under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction because it involves an attempt by a state to protect its own economic interest rather than to assert the interests of its citizens in a representative capacity.

Similarly, (C) sets forth a situation in which a state is attempting to defend its asserted right to render decisions affecting admissions policies relative to its own state universities. Thus, in (C) the state is an actual party to the case.

Finally, (D) describes an attempt by the federal government to prevent state construction of a bridge (presumably pursuant to the admiralty power). Clearly, this case involves an alleged grievance that will be directly committed
by a state. Therefore, the state is an actual party.

102
Q

A group of parents advocating abstinence
among teenagers developed a seminar that it
presents to middle school students throughout
the country. The seminar includes lectures by
trained professionals accompanied by slides,
some of which depict explicit sexual activity
between nude males and females. Parents are
required to give their consent before any child
may participate. A school administrator invited
the group to present its program. However, a
law in the state in which the school is located
provides in its entirety, “It is unlawful to sell,
give, or display to any person under the age of
17 any lewd or obscene article, picture, or depiction.”
The local district attorney learned of the
planned presentation and threatened to prosecute
the school’s administrative board and program’s
presenter under the state statute if they carried
out the planned program. The school’s administrators
seek relief in federal court.
Which of the following statements regarding
the likely result of the case is correct?
(A) The federal court has power to grant a
declaratory judgment that the statute is
unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied
to the program.
(C) The federal court is more likely to grant
an injunction or declaratory relief after the
state criminal prosecution has commenced
than beforehand.

A

(A) The federal court may grant a declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional.

A federal court has the authority to issue a final judgment declaring the rights and liabilities of parties (i.e., a declaratory judgment) only if there is an actual controversy. A complainant must show that he has engaged (or wishes to engage) in specific conduct and that the challenged governmental action poses a real and immediate danger to his interests.

Here, the school administrators are planning to
present a program of sex education and they are presented with an immediate danger of criminal
prosecution from the district attorney. This threat of prosecution presents an immediate threat of
interference with the administrators’ First Amendment rights; i.e., as is commonly stated in the First Amendment context, their rights have been “chilled.” Thus, there is an actual dispute such as would authorize a court to issue a declaratory judgment that the state criminal statute (under which a prosecution is genuinely threatened) is unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied.

(C) is incorrect because the commencement of a state criminal prosecution actually makes it less likely that a court will grant an injunction or declaratory relief. Generally, a federal court will
not enjoin pending state criminal proceedings because of principles of equity, comity, and federalism.
Thus, commencement of a state criminal prosecution would have the opposite effect of that described in (C).

103
Q

Article III , Section 2 of the Constitution extends the
federal judicial power only to “cases and controversies”; the Supreme Court has interpreted
this requirement to prohibit rendition of advisory opinions. The opinion sought here is advisory
because the law in question has not yet been passed.

A

Had the legislation already been passed in its
present form, the Court could have rendered a declaratory judgment even if the state had not yet
attempted to enforce the law, because the “controversy” would be genuine.

104
Q

The President of the United States accepted an
invitation to give a commencement address at a
small, Midwestern university in its auditorium.
Pursuant to school rules, no one is permitted
to bring posters, banners, or signs of any kind
larger than the size of a piece of notebook paper
into any event at the auditorium. The main
purpose of the rule is to prevent obstruction of
the view within the auditorium. Nevertheless,
at the commencement ceremony, a student in a
front row balcony seat unfurled a banner that he
had hidden in his coat with a message supporting
the President. The student was promptly arrested
and charged in municipal court with trespassing.
The student filed suit in federal court to enjoin
the municipal prosecution and to have the
trespass ordinance declared unconstitutional as
applied to him.
Will the federal court likely hear the student’s
case?
(A) Yes, if he argues that the trespass ordinance
is invalid on its face.
(B) Yes, if he argues that the prosecutor had no
hope of conviction and was proceeding to
harass him.
(C) No, if the prosecution argues that the
student lacks standing.
(D) No, if the prosecution argues that the case
involves a political question.

A

(B) The federal court will hear the student’s case if the student argues that the prosecutor was
merely trying to harass him.

The federal courts generally will abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings, such as the one here, even if they have jurisdiction over the case.

For purposes of this rule, a case is deemed to be pending as soon as it is filed. Thus, the federal court would ordinarily not hear the student’s claim here until after the state prosecution has ended.
However, there is an exception to the general rule—a federal court will hear an action to enjoin a pending state court prosecution if it is being conducted in bad faith; e.g., merely to harass the defendant. Thus, (B) is correct.

(A) is incorrect because the abstention rule does not distinguish between claims that ordinances are invalid on their face and claims that they are invalid as applied.

105
Q

Press and broadcasting companies can be subject to general business taxes, but a tax applicable only to the press or based on the content of a publication will not be upheld absent ….

A

… a compelling justification.

Mere need for revenue probably is not a sufficiently compelling interest.

106
Q

As a general rule, conduct that is intended to communicate is not immune from reasonable
government regulation, even though it takes place in a public forum such as a park.

Test?

A

The noncommunicative impact of speech-related conduct in a public forum can be regulated to further an important government interest independent of the speech aspects of the conduct as long as the incidental restriction on the ability to communicate that message is narrowly tailored to further the interest in question, so that alternative channels for communicating the message are available.

i.e.

The prevention of litter, as a means of maintaining public facilities in usable condition and protecting property values, is an important enough government interest to allow some type of regulation. The ban on littering is narrowly tailored to accomplish its purpose, unlike, for example, a ban on distributing leaflets that may end up on the ground. The regulation probably would not have precluded the defendant even from dumping the barrel if she had picked up the trash after her speech was over.

107
Q

A woman belonged to an extremist political
group that advocated the overthrow of the
United States government. Among the woman’s
grievances against current government was a
belief that young people were being brainwashed by public school curricula. To end this practice, the woman decided to run for the local school board in the next general election so that she would have a voice in future curricula decisions. The election laws of the city where the woman resided required all candidates for the school board to sign a loyalty oath and file it with the town clerk in order to have their names placed on the ballot for the next school board election. When the woman arrived at the clerk’s office to file her candidacy, she was informed of the loyalty oath requirement and was shown the
oath. The woman read the oath and objected to
the requirement that she sign it. Which of the following statements is correct as to whether the city may constitutionally require the woman to sign the oath in order to have her name placed on the ballot?

(A) The loyalty oath requirement is valid if the
candidate must merely affirm that she does not advocate the violent overthrow of the state or federal governments.
(B) The loyalty oath requirement is valid if the candidate must merely affirm that she will oppose the violent overthrow of the state or federal governments.

(C) The loyalty requirement is valid if the
candidate must merely affirm that she has
never been a member of any organization
dedicated to the violent overthrow of the
state or federal governments.

A

(B) The loyalty oath is valid if it merely requires the candidate to affirm that she will oppose the
violent overthrow of the government.

The government may require employees and other public officers to take a loyalty oath. Such an oath must not be overbroad, so as to prohibit constitutionally protected activities, nor can it be vague.

An oath has been upheld that requires state employees to oppose the overthrow of the government by force, violence, or by an illegal or
unconstitutional method. [Cole v. Richardson (1972)] This type of oath (which is virtually the
same as that set forth in (B)) was deemed to be similar to an oath requiring the taker simply to
commit herself to live by the constitutional processes of our system.

(A) is incorrect because it has been held that a loyalty oath that disavows advocating the violent overthrow of the government as an abstract doctrine is invalid. The First Amendment prohibits statutes regulating advocacy that are not limited to advocacy of action. [Communist Party v. Whitcomb (1974)] The oath in (A) appears to be overbroad in that it regulates mere advocacy of violent overthrow of the government, rather than regulating only advocacy of action. Therefore, the oath is invalid.

(C) is incorrect because only knowing membership in an organization with specific intent to further unlawful aims is unprotected by the First Amendment. [Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967)] The oath in (C) would in effect punish mere membership in an organization, without showing knowledge of, or a specific intent to further, any unlawful aims of the organization.

108
Q

A city passed an ordinance prohibiting
persons on a public sidewalk within 100 feet of
a health care facility from approaching those
seeking access to the facility for purposes
of protest, education, or counseling. The day
after the city’s new ordinance became effective,
a person advocating against abortion went
to an abortion clinic within the city, stood 25
feet from its entrance, stopped the first woman
whom she saw about to enter the clinic, and gave
her a leaflet espousing the leafletter’s religious
views and discouraging abortion. The leafletter
was promptly arrested for violating the city’s
ordinance. At trial, the leafletter challenges the
ordinance on First Amendment grounds.
How should the court rule on the leafletter’s
First Amendment defense?

(B) In favor of the city, because the ordinance is
reasonable as to time, place, and manner.
(C) In favor of the leafletter, because the
ordinance infringes on the freedom of
speech.

A

(C) The court should rule in favor of the leafletter, because the ordinance is not a valid time, place,
and manner restriction on the exercise of First Amendment rights.

The First Amendment protects the freedoms of speech and assembly; however, the protection is not absolute. The government is allowed to adopt regulations concerning the time, place, and manner of the exercise of speech and assembly in public forums and designated public forums to facilitate order and to protect other important government interests. To be valid, such a law must:

(i) be content-neutral;

(ii) be narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest; and

(iii) leave open alternative channels of communication.

The ordinance here is content-neutral because it prohibits all protesting, educating, and counseling around health care facilities and not just such conduct concerning a particular message.

It serves an important government interest— unimpeded access to health care facilities.

However, it is not narrowly tailored because it restricts more speech than necessary to ensure access to health care facilities. _In McCullen v. Coakley (2014), the Supreme Court held that a “buffer zone” law prohibiting leafletters from approaching patients within 35 feet of any abortion clinic in the state was too broad a speech restriction when the state could try
other measures, such as targeted injunctions._The Court had upheld a state buffer-zone law similar to the one in this fact pattern in Hill v. Colorado (2000). However, the Court evaluates the constitutionality of such laws on a very case-specific basis, and in McCullen the Court indicated that it is more likely to uphold such measures as narrowly tailored if the measures attempt to remedy a specific problem at a particular facility or facilities, rather than impose a blanket speech restriction statewide.

(B) is incorrect for the reasons explained above. Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in public forums are allowed; however the buffer-zone ordinance here is not narrowly tailored and therefore fails the second prong of time, place, and manner.

109
Q

A critically acclaimed movie that had received
a number of awards opened in a small town. The film had portrayals of nudity and scenes involving sexuality, but its advertising was very tasteful and concentrated on its critical acclaim and its receipt of seven Academy Award nominations. Nevertheless, when the movie opened in
the small town, there was a public outcry against
it, including picketing. The town, which had been founded in the late nineteenth century by a fundamentalist religious group, remained very
conservative and highly religious, and was the
only community in the state where a consensus of the community would find the movie to be
obscene. The town prosecutor went to the local
court seeking an injunction to halt the showing
of the movie. The theater owner refused to
voluntarily stop showing the film and appeared in court to defend against the proposed injunction.
What is the owner’s best defense?

(A) The proper “community standards” should be those of the entire state rather than of the town.
(B) The film has some redeeming social value.
(C) The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment prevents the state from enforcing a particular set of religious beliefs.
(D) The film has proven artistic merit.

A

(D) The theater owner’s best defense is that the film has proven artistic merit.

The First Amendment generally protects the right of freedom of speech, and this freedom includes the right to show movies. Thus, to enjoin the showing of the movie here, the city will have to prove that the speech involved is unprotected speech. Obscenity is the category of unprotected speech most relevant here. The Court has defined obscenity as a depiction of sexual conduct that, taken as a whole, by the average person, using contemporary community standards:

(i) appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
(ii) portrays sex in a patently offensive way; and
(iii) using a rational, reasonable person standard, does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

If the theater owner shows that the film has proven artistic merit, it cannot be held to be obscene because the third element of the above definition will have failed.

(A) is not as good an argument as (D) because the Supreme Court has held that while a statewide community standard may be used, it is not mandatory—a local community standard is sufficient to evaluate whether the film is “patently offensive.” Thus, the town’s community standards would be sufficient.

(B) is not as good an argument as (D) because it is not sufficient that there is some redeeming social value; it must have serious redeeming value, as indicated above. For example, it would not be sufficient that an otherwise obscene movie included short tips on the importance
of brushing teeth.

(C) is not a good argument. The Establishment Clause forbids the government from adopting a law or program that establishes religion. It is inapplicable here because the town is not trying to enforce a particular set of religious views; rather, it is trying to prohibit obscenity. The Supreme Court has held that the government has a legitimate interest in prohibiting obscenity,
and the fact that this happens to coincide with the beliefs of a particular religious group does not render such bans void.

110
Q

A recent law school graduate was offered a
job as an aide by a state legislator. The legislator
told the graduate that before she could begin
working, she had to take the following loyalty
oath: “I swear to uphold our state and federal
Constitutions; to show respect for the state and
federal flags; and to oppose the overthrow of
the government by violent, illegal, or unconstitutional means.” The graduate told the legislator that the oath is unconstitutional and refused to take the oath. Is the graduate correct?

(A) Yes, as to the promise to uphold the state
and federal Constitutions.
(B) Yes, as to the promise to respect the flag.
(C) Yes, as to the promise to oppose the
overthrow of the government.
(D) No, as to all three provisions.

A

(B) The graduate is correct as to the promise to respect the flag, but incorrect as to the other two
promises.

The Supreme Court has upheld oaths requiring government employees to oppose the violent overthrow of the government and to support the Constitution; hence, (A) and (C) are incorrect.
However, it has held that government employees cannot be required to show respect for the flag, as a person might refuse to salute the flag on religious grounds. Thus, (B) is correct and (D)
is incorrect.

111
Q

Because of budget shortfalls, a state governor
recently signed a bill shortening the period for
which state unemployment benefits are available.
The defendant gave a speech across the
street from the governor’s mansion, denouncing
the law. In his speech, the defendant urged
the crowd to rush across the street, drag the
governor from his mansion, and show him how it
feels to be homeless. A police officer who heard
the defendant’s speech arrested the defendant
and he was charged with violating a state statute
that makes it a crime to “make a threat against
any state official in the performance of his duty.”
If the defendant defends on constitutional
grounds, the court will likely find the statute:

(C) Constitutional if limited to true threats.
(D) Constitutional under the fighting words
doctrine.

A

(C) The court will likely find the statute constitutional if limited to true threats.

The Constitution does not protect true threats, defined as speech meant to communicate an intent to place a person in fear of bodily harm.

(D) is incorrect because the law here does not appear to be a fighting words statute, e.g.,
personally abusive epithets inherently likely to incite an immediate response.

112
Q

With the stated aim of protecting minors from the perceived evils of offensive but not necessarily obscene materials, a state legislature enacted a statute banning the commercial licensing of video arcade games with a specifically defined degree of sexual content. Under the statute, the owner of a chain of shopping mall video arcades in the state was denied licenses for a number of video games that he wanted to install at his arcades. He challenges the statute in federal district court.
Will the court find the statute constitutional?

(A) Yes, because for materials accessible to minors,
the state may adopt a different standard
for determining whether the material
is offensive or obscene than the standard it
applies for adults.
(B) Yes, because the statute precisely defines
the type of content that is prohibited in the
video games.
(C) No, because narrower means are available
to deny minors access to the objectionable
material without affecting rights of adults.
(D) No, because some of the banned video
games may have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value, as determined
by contemporary community standards,
and thus do not fall within the definition of
obscenity.

A

(C) The statute will probably be found to violate the First Amendment because it is overbroad.

The state can adopt a specific definition of obscenity applying to materials sold to minors, even though the material might not be obscene in terms of an adult audience. However, government may not prohibit the sale or distribution of material to adults merely because it is inappropriate for children.

Here, there is no indication that the state has attempted less restrictive means of keeping
minors from the objectionable video games, such as requiring arcade operators to put these
games in a limited access area and monitor their use. While an outright ban on these games may
be the most certain means of denying minors access to them, the denial of adult access to them indicates that the statute will probably be found unconstitutional.

(A) is incorrect even though it is a true statement. As indicated above, a statute designed to protect minors must be narrowly drawn to avoid a First Amendment violation.

(B) is incorrect because the fact that the statute
precisely defines the content that is prohibited indicates only that it probably is not unconstitutionally vague; it does not affect its overbreadth problem.

(D) is incorrect because, as indicated above,
restrictions on materials available to minors do not necessarily have to satisfy the constitutional
test for obscenity.
In addition, (D) misstates the test: the element of serious social value is determined by a national standard, rather than community standards.

113
Q

A state prohibits publication of the identity of victims of sexual crimes, but allows trials of such cases to be televised, as long as the victim’s
face is blocked out. Recently, the nephew of a
United States Senator was accused of raping a woman at his family’s estate in the state. Because of the notoriety of the senator’s family, the press was eager to enlighten the public as to all aspects of the case. A reporter for a metropolitan
newspaper published in the state discovered the name of the nephew’s victim from a police report that inadvertently included the victim’s name, and the newspaper published the victim’s identity in the next edition of the paper. The reporter and the paper were fined $2,500 for violating the statute. If the reporter and the paper challenge the fine, how should the court rule?

(C) For the reporter and the paper, because the
state does not have a compelling interest
in prohibiting the dissemination of the
lawfully obtained information here.
(D) For the reporter and the paper, because the
First Amendment allows the press to print
any information that it legally obtains.

A

(C) The reporter and the paper should prevail.

The Constitution prohibits Congress or the states from abridging freedom of the press. While this freedom is no greater than the freedom of speech granted to all citizens, the information printed by the paper here is protected. The media may not be punished for publishing a true fact once it is lawfully obtained from the public records or is otherwise released to the public. It does not matter that the release was inadvertent.

(D) is incorrect because it is too broad; freedom of the press is not absolute. For example, the press would not be allowed to reprint copyrighted material regardless of whether it was legally obtained.

114
Q

As part of legislation enacted for the stated purpose of improving science skills of schoolchildren, Congress appropriated funds to permit public school teachers who had been certified by state school districts as science lab instructors to provide supplemental science instruction to any students in either public or private schools who did not have access to science lab resources. To help ensure content neutrality, the statute required the instructors coming to the private schools to use portable science labs supplied by the public school districts, which contained the equipment and experiments that the instructors used for the same purpose in the public schools. A citizens’ group filed suit in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of funding the science teachers for private schools, alleging that most of the private schools covered by the statute were religiously affiliated schools. No members of the group have any children in
either public schools or private schools affected
by the statute. How is the court likely to rule?

(A) Dismiss the case on the pleadings, because
the citizens’ group does not have a sufficient stake in the controversy to have standing to challenge Congress’s expenditure, which was authorized under its power to spend for the general welfare.
(B) Decide the case on the merits in favor of the government, because the legislation defines the context in which instruction can be provided in private schools so as to avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.
(C) Decide the case on the merits in favor of
the citizens’ group, because the appropriation’s
primary effect advances religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.
(D) Decide the case on the merits in favor of
the citizens’ group, because the court will
presume that any instruction provided

A

(B) The court will probably decide in favor of the government on the merits.

Programs of aid to religiously affiliated grade schools and high schools are subject to the same three-part test as are other laws under the Establishment Clause:

The program must (i) have a secular purpose,

(ii) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and

(iii) not produce excessive government
entanglement with religion.

With respect to the first prong of the test, most of the time such programs (including this one) will have a secular purpose—to aid education.

With respect to the second prong, the program may be deemed to have a primary effect that advances religion if it results in governmental indoctrination of religion or defines its recipients by reference to religion.
Here, the statute establishes a religiously neutral program that funds a supplemental service for
the schools, and offers the instruction to all disadvantaged students regardless of whether they choose to attend public or private schools. [See Agostini v. Felton (1997)—government program providing remedial education services to all disadvantaged children at their schools, including children at parochial schools, held not to violate the Establishment Clause] Thus, (C) is incorrect.

(D) is incorrect because the courts will not presume that the instruction provided by this program will be influenced by religion. Furthermore, with respect to the “excessive entanglement” prong of the test, there is no indication that the program requires detailed monitoring of the government employees to prevent them from incorporating religion in their instruction—the equipment and experiments that they use in the private schools are the same as they use in the public schools.

(A) is incorrect because the citizens’ group has standing to challenge the expenditure on behalf
of its members, who have a right to sue based on their status as federal taxpayers.

The one recognized exception to the rule that people do not have standing as taxpayers to challenge the way tax dollars are spent by the federal government is if the expenditure was enacted under Congress’s taxing and spending power and allegedly exceeds the specific limitation on that power found in the Establishment Clause.

That exception applies here because the citizens’ group is alleging that the federal appropriation is an unconstitutional attempt to provide government funds to religiously affiliated schools.

115
Q

To provide low-cost housing to the unemployed, a city has a policy of leasing empty city-owned buildings to social agencies that promise to convert or rehabilitate the buildings into habitable, low-cost apartments and to pay the city 10% of any net profit made from rentals. A church entered into such an agreement with the city and converted one of the city’s abandoned office buildings into 50 small, low-cost apartments. The lease agreement used by the church provides, among other things, that the lessee must affirm a belief in God. The lease agreement was submitted to the city for approval prior to its use by the church, and it was approved. On the first day that the church made the apartments available for rent, the plaintiff, an avowed atheist, applied to lease a unit. The plaintiff’s application was denied for the sole reason that the plaintiff refused to affirm a belief in God. If the plaintiff brings suit against the church on the ground that the required affirmation of a belief in God violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, who likely will prevail?

(B) The plaintiff, because the purpose and
effect of the church’s policy results in a
violation of the Establishment Clause.
(C) The church, because freedom of religion is
not protected against acts of private individuals
or groups or a private institution.

A

(B) The plaintiff will likely prevail because the policy violates the Establishment Clause.

The First Amendment prohibits laws respecting the establishment of religion. Governmental action that does not contain a sect preference will pass muster under the Establishment Clause if it has a secular purpose, its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does not require excessive government entanglement with religion.

The church’s action will be considered to
be state action here because of the significant involvement between the church and the city.

(The city is leasing the building to the church, the church shares profits with the city, and the church submitted its lease forms to the city for approval.)

Requiring a lessee to affirm a belief in God appears to have no secular purpose.

Moreover, its primary effect probably is to advance religion. Therefore, the church’s action will be found to have violated the Establishment Clause.

116
Q

An attorney was employed by the United States Department of Health and Human Services in a regional office located in a tobaccogrowing
state. A labor contract between the agency and the clerical workers union contained a policy providing for termination of union employees only for certain specified grounds.
The attorney, however, was not a member of
the union and not covered by such a policy. The
attorney was angered by the regional director’s
refusal to adopt a no-smoking policy for
employees and visitors in the office. She posted a notice in the employee cafeteria ridiculing what
she called the hypocrisy of an agency promoting
health issues and nonsmoking programs while
refusing to provide its employees with those
same opportunities. The notice prompted a great
deal of debate among the employees and was
brought to the attention of the regional director,
who was very displeased. Which of the following statements is most accurate regarding the director’s right to dismiss the attorney?

(A) The attorney has a liberty interest in the
exercise of her First Amendment rights
that entitles her to a hearing to contest the
grounds of her dismissal.
(D) The attorney has both a liberty interest
and a property interest that entitles her to a
pre-termination evidentiary hearing.

A

(A) If the attorney is fired, she has a right to a hearing to determine whether her First Amendment rights were violated by her dismissal.

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a person has a liberty interest in the exercise of specific rights provided by the Constitution, *including freedom of speech.*

If a government employer seeks to fire an employee for speechrelated conduct when the speech involved a matter of public concern but is not made pursuant to her official duties, the courts must carefully balance the employee’s rights as a citizen to comment on a matter of public concern against the government’s interest as an employer in the efficient performance of public service.

Under the Court’s expansive interpretation of what is a public issue in this context [see Rankin v. McPherson (1987)], the attorney’s statement would probably qualify. At the very least, she can make a sufficient showing that her termination violates her free speech rights to be entitled to a hearing on the issue under procedural due process principles. [See Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District (1979)]

(B) is wrong because the attorney does not
appear to have a property interest in her job.

_A public employee who is subject to removal *only for “cause”* has a property interest in her job and generally must be given notice of the charges against her that are to be the basis for her job termination, and a pre-termination opportunity to respond to those charges._

Here, however, the attorney did not have a property interest in her job; she could have been dismissed for no reason at all. She was not covered by the labor contract between the agency and its clerical workers, and there appears to be no other basis for her to claim
an entitlement to continued employment.

(C) is wrong because the attorney is entitled to a hearing as long as she can raise a prima facie claim that her speech, which was regarding an important health issue and the perception of her agency, was on a public issue and therefore protected by the First Amendment.

(D) is wrong for two reasons. As discussed above, the attorney does not have a property interest in her job. Also, due process does not necessarily entitle her to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing; a post-termination evidentiary hearing is probably sufficient. [See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985)]

117
Q

A state statute has detailed classifications of
civil servants for both state and city positions.
It provides that all civil servants who have been
employed for over 18 months may be dismissed
only for “misconduct” and also requires that
state and city agencies comply with all procedures set forth in any personnel handbook issued by that agency. The personnel handbook of the state tollway authority sets forth detailed procedures for dismissal of civil servant employees. The handbook provides that written notice of the grounds for dismissal must be given to the employee prior to dismissal, and that the
employee must, on request, be granted a postdismissal hearing within three months after the dismissal takes effect. An employee is entitled to present witnesses and evidence at the postdismissal hearing, and is entitled to reinstatement and back pay if the hearing board decides that the employer has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the dismissal was justified. A state tollway employee who had been employed for three years recently was fired. After an investigation by state auditors, the
employee was notified by registered letter that
he was being dismissed because of evidence
that he took bribes from construction firms in
exchange for steering contracts to them. He was
informed of his right to a hearing and requested
one as soon as possible. Three weeks after his
dismissal, the state personnel board conducted
a hearing at which the employee denied the
charges and presented witnesses to attest to his
honesty. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
board upheld his dismissal, finding that it was
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
If the employee files suit in federal court challenging his dismissal on constitutional grounds, will he be likely to prevail?

(A) Yes, because the employee had a right to a
pretermination hearing at which he could
present witnesses to support his side of the
story.
(B) Yes, because the employee had a right
to have an opportunity to respond to the
charges prior to his dismissal.
(D) No, because the procedures taken for termination
of the employee’s job satisfied due
process requirements.

A

(B) The employee will likely prevail because the procedures taken to terminate his employment did not satisfy due process.

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a public employee who is subject to removal only for “cause” under a statute, ordinance, or personnel document has a property interest in continued employment that cannot be taken away without due process of law.

The Court has held that such an employee generally must be given notice of the charges and a pretermination opportunity to respond to those charges.

The employee must also be given a subsequent evidentiary hearing regarding the termination (with reinstatement if the employee prevails). [Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985)]

Here, the employee was notified of the charges but was not given any opportunity to respond to the charges until after his termination. Hence, his termination did not satisfy due process requirements.

(A) is incorrect because the employee does not have to be given a full, formal hearing before his termination, as long as he is given oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to tell his side of the story.

(D) is incorrect because, as discussed
above, the procedures followed here did not satisfy due process standards. T_he Supreme Court has held that an employee can be suspended from his job without a prior hearing if the government has a significant reason for removing the employee from the job and providing him with only a post-termination hearing._ [Gilbert v. Homar (1997)—campus police officer suspended after being arrested and charged with felony drug offense]

Here, however, there is no substantial reason
why the employee could not have been given the opportunity to respond to the charges prior to
dismissal.

118
Q

A state enacted health care legislation to
provide comprehensive insurance coverage on
prescription drugs for all of its citizens. The
legislation provided state reimbursement for the
cost of all prescription drugs with one exception— a drug commonly known as the “abortion
pill,” which was prescribed to induce early term
abortions without surgery. All other prescription
drugs for pregnant women were covered. A pregnant woman who had received a prescription for the drug and was subsequently denied reimbursement filed suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the legislation. Which of the following best describes the appropriate standard by which the court should review the constitutionality of the state legislation?
(A) Because the state legislation does not
improperly discriminate against a suspect class or burden a fundamental right, the woman will have to show that the legislation is not rationally related to any legitimate state interest.
(C) Because the state legislation impinges on a woman’s constitutional right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy, the state will have to show that the legislation does not constitute an undue burden on that right.

A

(A) The court should require the woman to show that the legislation is not rationally related to any
legitimate state interest.

The Supreme Court has held that the right of privacy includes the right of a woman to have an abortion under certain circumstances without undue interference from the government. However, neither federal nor state government is required to grant medical benefit payments for abortions, even if it grants benefits for childbirth services. The Court has held that a state’s failure to provide funding for a woman’s abortion decision does not constitute interference with her constitutional right to make that decision; hence, such legislation is valid unless the plaintiff can show that it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. [See Maher v. Roe (1977)]

(C) is wrong because, as discussed above, legislation excluding abortion-related expenses from government funding has been held not to constitute interference with a woman’s constitutional right to choose to have an abortion. Therefore, the undue burden test does not apply.

119
Q

A city’s water board election laws provide that, although members of the board are elected at large, one member of the board is required to live within each of the five designated water
districts within the city. The city’s population
was more or less evenly distributed among the
districts when this election law was enacted. A
resident and registered voter of the city investigated the district residency requirement and discovered that most of the city’s newer residents had moved into the same two water districts, so that the city’s population was no longer evenly distributed among the five water districts. Instead, 80% of the city’s residents lived within its central and eastern water districts, while the other 20% of the city’s residents were scattered among its three other, more rural, districts. If the resident files suit in federal court
challenging the constitutionality of the residency
requirement, how will the court most likely rule?
(A) The residency requirement is unconstitutional
because it impairs the voters’ equal
protection rights, in that it gives the voters
in the less populous districts more effective
representation on the water board.
(B) The residency requirement is unconstitutional
because it violates the candidates’
equal protection rights.
(C) The residency requirement is constitutionally
permissible because the water board
members do not exercise legislative power.
(D) The residency requirement is constitutionally
permissible because the water board
members are elected at large.

A

(D) The residency requirement is permissible because the water board is elected at large.

_The Equal Protection Clause prohibits state dilution of the right to vote, so that when a governmental body establishes voting districts for the election of representatives, *the number of persons in each district may not vary significantly.* This is known as the principle of “one person, one vote.”_ This principle applies to almost every election where a person is being elected to perform normal governmental functions (e.g., an election for trustees for a junior college district). However, the principle of one person, one vote generally is inapplicable where there is an at-large system of election (except where the system is adopted for discriminatory purposes).

Here, the water board members are elected by all of the qualified voters in the city in an at-large system (rather than having the voters of each individual district select one board member apiece), and no discriminatory intent is evident. Thus, the statutory provision requiring board members to reside in each of the five districts does not result in an imbalance or a dilution of the voting rights of the citizens of the city. Consequently, (A) is incorrect, and (D) presents an accurate statement of the constitutionality
of the residency requirement. (Note that the answer might be different under federal statute because the city would have to prove a valid, nondiscriminatory purpose.)

(C) is incorrect even though it reaches the correct result. While the Supreme Court has exempted special purpose water storage districts from the one person, one vote requirement, the basis of the decision was the specialized nature of the entity. The constitutional requirements apply not only to legislators, but also to elected administrative and executive officials.

(B) is incorrect because, even assuming that the residency requirement violates the candidates’ equal protection rights, the resident would not have standing to raise the issue. Generally, a claimant must assert his own constitutional rights
and cannot assert the rights of third parties.

120
Q

The state passed a law stating that “only
persons living with their parents or guardians
who are bona fide residents of the state shall be
entitled to free public education; all others who
wish to attend public schools within the state
may do so, but they must pay tuition of $3,000
per semester.” A 15-year-old girl moved in with
her friend so that she could attend the public
schools in the state, and the state legislature
passed the tuition statute just as she completed
her junior year. The girl wants to complete her
senior year in the state high school, but cannot
afford to pay tuition. If the girl sues in federal court to strike down the tuition statute, is the court likely to rule that the statute is constitutional?

(B) Yes, unless the girl can show that the statute is not rationally related to a proper state interest.

(D) No, because it interferes with the girl’s
fundamental right to interstate travel.

A

(B) The court is likely to rule that the statute is constitutional.

A bona fide residence requirement, such as this statute, that is not based on a suspect classification and does not limit the exercise of a
fundamental right, is judged by the rational basis test. Thus, (A) is incorrect. The statute provides
free education for all children who are bona fide residents of the state. Thus, it uniformly furthers
the state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by residents.

(D) is incorrect because this statute does not impair the right of interstate travel. Any person is free to move to the state and establish residence there. This statute does not deter people from moving into the state.

121
Q

The police department of a small city has jurisdiction within the city limits and over a defined portion of the surrounding rural communities within the county. A farmer lives in one of the rural communities receiving police protection from the city. The farmer does not pay
any tax to the city directly, but a portion of the
farmer’s county property tax is turned over by
the county to the city in order to support the
city’s police department. The farmer’s property was vandalized several times over the past several months, and the farmer became unhappy with the police protection that the city was providing. After his complaints to the police department and city hall did not improve the situation, the farmer wanted to vote against the mayor in the next election, but a city ordinance provides that only residents of the city may vote in city elections. If the farmer brings a suit to compel the city to allow him to vote in the city’s mayoral election, is he likely to prevail?

(A) No, because the resident voting limitation
appears to be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.
(B) No, but only if the city can prove that the resident voting limitation, which affects a fundamental right, is necessary to a compelling interest.

A

(A) The farmer is not likely to prevail because the rational relationship test applies.

Although the right to vote is a fundamental right, laws prohibiting nonresidents from voting are generally valid, provided that they meet the minimal scrutiny, or “rational basis,” standard. Under this standard, a law will be upheld as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Limiting the voters in a city’s mayoral election to residents of the city serves the interests of efficiency and prevents persons with little personal interest in the city from voting. Thus, a court would likely uphold the ordinance.

Answer (B) is incorrect because it sets out the strict scrutiny standard.
While voting is a fundamental right and governmental action affecting fundamental rights generally is reviewed under strict scrutiny, that is not the case with laws limiting voting to residents.

122
Q

A city passed an ordinance prohibiting
all of its police officers and firefighters from
“moonlighting” (working a second job). The
ordinance was passed to ensure that all police
officers and firefighters were readily available
in case an emergency should arise and for
overtime work when the situation warranted it.
Other city employees, including members of the
city council and the city manager, had no such
restrictions placed on secondary employment.
A police officer who wanted to moonlight as a
dancer at a nightclub within city limits brought
suit in federal court, alleging that the ordinance
violated her constitutional rights.
Will the court likely find the ordinance constitutional
as applied to the police officer?

(B) No, because the singling out of police officers and firefighters violates equal protection.

(D) Yes, because there is a rational basis for the
ordinance.

A

(D) The ordinance is constitutional under the rational basis standard. Because the ordinance is not related to the exercise of a fundamental right or based on a suspect trait, it need only rationally
relate to some legitimate governmental interest.

Under the Equal Protection Clause, which is
implicated because the ordinance treats some city employees differently from others, a governmental classification must be necessary to promote a compelling state interest when it relates to who may exercise a fundamental right or when it is based on a suspect trait (e.g., race or national origin). If a quasi-suspect classification (e.g., gender or legitimacy) is involved, the classification will be upheld if it is substantially related to an important government interest. In all other cases, the classification is valid if there is any conceivable basis on which it might relate to any legitimate governmental interest. This “rational basis” test is used for all classifications that relate only to matters of economics or social welfare. The right of police officers and firefighters to hold second jobs is not a fundamental right that will trigger strict scrutiny. In addition, the ordinance is not based on a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. Therefore, the validity of the ordinance is judged according to the “rational basis” test. A party attacking a classification under this test bears the difficult burden of demonstrating to the court that the classification does not have a rational relationship to a legitimate interest of government. The ordinance is intended to and
does in fact promote the legitimate governmental interests of public safety and social welfare—it
increases the likelihood that there will be sufficient numbers of police and firefighters to deal with emergencies. Thus, the ordinance is valid.

(B) is incorrect. Although the ordinance treats police officers and firefighters differently from other city employees, this treatment, as discussed above, is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests.

123
Q

A state that is subject to severe winters generally
allows the use of studded tires between
October 1 and March 31. However, the legislation
allows counties to opt out and prohibit
the use of studded tires year round, because
studded tires tend to tear up pavement more
than nonstudded tires, thus necessitating more
frequent road repairs. No other state in the
region allows use of studded snow tires at all.
The state law contains one exception: it excludes
“doctors” from any county ban on the use of
snow tires because they might have to cross
county lines in emergencies. After the passage
of the legislation, only one county in the state
invoked its right to ban the use of studded snow
tires.
A lawyer who lives in the state was angered
that the legislature had given special privileges
to doctors but not to lawyers. One January day,
with studded tires on his car, he drove from his
home county, which allowed use of studded tires,
into the county that banned them. A sheriff’s
officer noticed the lawyer’s studded tires and
cited him. After being convicted and fined, the
lawyer appealed.
What is the lawyer’s best argument for getting
the ban invalidated?
(A) The statute interferes with his fundamental
right to practice his profession in violation
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV.
(B) The statute violates his right to travel.
(C) The statute violates the Commerce Clause
by placing an unreasonable restraint on
interstate commerce.
(D) The ban on studded snow tires is not rationally
related to a legitimate state interest
because it will likely result in an increased
loss of life.

A

(D) The best argument for getting the law invalidated is that it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The lawyer would argue that the statute violates equal protection because it singles out one class of citizens for special treatment. Because neither a fundamental right nor a suspect nor quasi-suspect class is involved here, the case would be decided under the rational basis standard. For a law to be held invalid under the rational basis standard, the plaintiff must show that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Toward this end, the lawyer might argue that the law will really cost more money than it will save, perhaps because the resulting number of injuries due to the absence of studded tires will more than offset the money saved in road repair. (This argument will likely fail, however, because courts give legislatures broad discretion in making such determinations, and the statute does appear to be rational. Nevertheless, this is the lawyer’s best argument.)

(A) is incorrect because the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV applies only to discrimination by a state against nonresidents, and here the lawyer is a resident of the state that enacted the legislation.

(B) is incorrect because nothing in the facts indicates that the right to travel is involved—at least not the constitutionally protected right to travel. The right to travel involves interstate travel, and here, the legislation concerns only
an intrastate travel issue.

(C) is incorrect because there is no unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce. If Congress has not allowed or prohibited state regulation in the area, a nondiscriminatory state regulation will be upheld only if its burden on commerce does not outweigh a legitimate local interest.

Here, because no other state allows studded snow tires, the ban does not
discriminate against out-of-state vehicles and does not burden commerce. (If other states allowed these snow tires, there might be a viable Commerce Clause issue.)

124
Q

A statute passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President authorizes a federal agency to select a site for and to construct a monument honoring members of the capitol police force killed in the line of duty. The statute appropriates the necessary funds but provides that the funds may not be expended until both houses of Congress have adopted a concurrent resolution, not subject to presentment to the President, approving the agency’s plans for the monument’s location and design.

Is the provision requiring further congressional approval before expenditure of the funds constitutional?

A. No, because decisions regarding the placement and design of government-owned structures are an exclusively executive function with which Congress may not interfere by any means.

B. No, because the provision amounts to an unconstitutional legislative interference with an executive function.

C. Yes, because Congress may attach reasonable conditions to its appropriation of funds to executive departments, and its special interest in the members of its own police force makes the provision a reasonable condition.

D. Yes, because the provision is part of a statute that was passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President.

A

(B) is correct.

The enactment of laws by Congress requires passage of the law in both houses (bicameralism) and approval of the law by the President (that is, the presentment requirement) or an override of a presidential veto.

Here, Congress passed a law and the President signed it, but Congress sought further control by requiring expenditures to be approved specifically by Congress without presentment to the President. Such a requirement usurps the power of the executive branch to execute laws and places it in the hands of Congress in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

(A) is incorrect. Under the Spending Clause, Congress certainly has the power to adopt a law specifying where a monument should be placed, and if such a law were passed by Congress and the President signed the law, it would be valid. However, that is not what happened here. Here, the law left it to an agency to select a site.

(C) is incorrect for the reasons stated above; requiring subsequent Congressional approval of agency site selection is unconstitutional.

(D) is incorrect for the same reason.

125
Q
A
126
Q

On the basis of scientific studies showing a causal relationship between the consumption of “red meat” (principally beef) and certain forms of cancer, a federal statute prohibits all commercial advertising of red meat products. The statute does not, however, restrict the sale of red meat products. Producers of red meat have challenged the statute as a violation of their free speech rights protected by the First Amendment.

Is the court likely to find the statute constitutional?

A. No, because it does not serve a substantial government interest.

B. No, because it is more extensive than necessary to serve the government interest in preventing certain cancers.

C. Yes, because it does not affect speech protected by the First Amendment.

D. Yes, because it serves a legitimate government interest in protecting public health

A

(B) is correct. The regulation here involves commercial speech.

Commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, but the Court tests regulation of commercial speech under a special test.

The Court first asks whether the speech is about a lawful activity and is truthful and not misleading. If these conditions are not satisfied, the speech has no protection.

If they are satisfied, the regulation will be valid only if it

(1) serves a substantial government interest,

(2) directly advances that interest, and

(3) is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest (that is, there is a reasonable fit between the means chosen and the ends sought).

Here, the sale of red meat is allowed and so the producers are looking to advertise about a lawful activity. The regulation bans all commercial advertising. While the regulation serves a substantial government interest (that is, discouraging the consumption of a product linked to cancer), the regulation imposes a complete ban on advertisement. A complete ban will never be found to be narrowly tailored.

(A) is incorrect. The government will no doubt be found to have a substantial interest in preventing cancer. (C) is incorrect. As indicated above, commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment. (D) is incorrect. First, it is not enough merely that the interest served is legitimate - it must be substantial. And second, even if a legitimate interest were enough, that is only one prong of the test, and the regulation here would still fail because it is not narrowly tailored.

127
Q

A state law provides for an award of damages against anyone who publishes the name of a rape victim. Pursuant to that law, a woman sued a local newspaper in state court after the newspaper identified her as a rape victim.

The state trial and appellate courts rejected the claim, holding that the state law was invalid under both the state constitution and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The state supreme court affirmed, holding specifically: “We think that this well-intentioned law very likely violates the First Amendment of the federal Constitution. We need not, however, decide that issue, because the law assuredly violates our state constitution, which provides even greater protection to the right of the press to report the news.” The woman petitioned for review in the U.S. Supreme Court.

Is the U.S. Supreme Court likely to review the state supreme court judgment?

A. No, because the First Amendment prohibits the imposition of liability for the publication of truthful information.

B. No, because the judgment of the state supreme court rests upon an adequate and independent state-law ground.

C. Yes, because the Supremacy Clause does not permit a state to create rights greater than those conferred by the federal Constitution.

D. Yes, because the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction extends to cases arising under federal law.

A

(B) is correct.

The Supreme Court will hear a case from a state court only if the case turns on federal grounds. The Court will not hear a case if it finds adequate and independent nonfederal grounds to support the state decision. A ground is adequate if it is completely dispositive of the case, and it is independent if it does not rely on federal law.

Here, the state court held that its decision rested solely on interpretation of its own constitution, and the state court decision completely disposed of the matter. Thus, it would be a waste for the Supreme Court to hear the case, because even if it decided the law was constitutional under the First Amendment, the law would remain unconstitutional under the state constitution.

(A) is incorrect both because it is overbroad (for example, truthful publication of material in violation of another’s copyright can be punished) and because the Court will not waste its time on a case where its decision will not change a result because the case rests on adequate and independent nonfederal grounds.

(C) is simply not true. The Supremacy Clause does not prevent states from creating rights greater than those conferred by the federal Constitution - the federal Constitution is a floor and not a ceiling. It provides the minimal level of protection. States are free to provide greater protection.

(D) is true but irrelevant. The Supreme Court does have appellate jurisdiction to hear cases arising under federal law, but the Court does not have to hear every case. Under the doctrine of strict necessity, it will not hear a case like this one, that rests on adequate and independent, nonfederal grounds.

128
Q

The Supreme Court has held that the Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government from adopting a statute that compels the states to enact or enforce a regulatory program.

A

Under our system of federalism, the federal government cannot order state governments to adopt particular laws.

129
Q

The Tenth Amendment provides that ….

A

… powers not delegated to the United States nor prohibited to the states are reserved to the states.

The Supreme Court has held that the amendment generally prohibits the federal government from regulating states alone. However, states can be regulated through laws that apply generally. For example, under Congress’s commerce power, the federal government can require state governments to pay employees the federal minimum wage, like any other employer.

Moreover, it has been held that under Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the federal government may restrict state activities that the federal government determines would violate civil liberties.

130
Q

A police officer was employed on a city’s police force for 10 years. When the officer accepted the job, the city’s employee benefit plan provided a death benefit to the spouse of any employee who died as a result of any job-related injury. Last year, the city amended its employee benefit plan to deny its death benefit in cases where the death “was caused by the employee’s refusal to accept, for any reason other than its excessive risk to life or health, reasonably available medical care prescribed by a physician.”

After this amendment took effect, the officer was shot while on duty. Because of a sincerely held religious belief, the officer refused to allow a prescribed blood transfusion and, as a result, died from loss of blood. When the officer’s spouse applied for the death benefit, the city denied the application on the basis of the amendment to the employee benefit plan.

The officer’s spouse has challenged the amendment, claiming that, as applied to the officer, it violated the officer’s constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.

Is the court likely to find the amendment to the employee benefit plan constitutional as applied to the officer?

A. No, because it effectively discriminates against a religious practice.

B. No, because it violates the vested contractual rights of city employees who were hired before the amendment took effect.

C. Yes, because it does not single out religious reasons for the denial of benefits and is a reasonable limitation on the award of such benefits.

D. Yes, because it imposes a condition only on the award of a government benefit and does not impose a penalty on an individual’s conduct.

A

(C) is correct. The court is likely to find the amendment to the employee benefit plan constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.

The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from punishing someone (which includes denying a benefit) on the basis of the person’s religious belief. However, the Supreme Court has held that the prohibition applies only to government conduct that targets conduct specifically because it is religiously motivated; a religiously neutral regulation that incidentally burdens religious conduct is valid, and the government need not include an exemption for religiously motivated instances of the regulated conduct.

Here, the city amended its employee benefit plan to deny death benefits when death resulted from an employee’s refusal to accept medical care. Nothing in the facts indicates the change was adopted in order to target the employee’s religious beliefs; rather, the change seems to be a religiously neutral law that happened to burden the police officer’s religious belief against accepting blood transfusions. Therefore, the amendment is constitutional.

(A) is incorrect. Incidental discrimination against religious practices is not prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause.

(B) is incorrect. This choice raises a Contract Clause issue while the officer’s spouse challenged the benefit plan amendment under the Free Exercise Clause. Moreover, the Contract Clause merely limits the ability of states to enact laws that retroactively impair contract rights. Here, nothing indicates the city enacted any law or that the employee had a perpetual right to the death benefit the officer originally had.

(D) is incorrect. Its reasoning is wrong - the Free Exercise Clause applies to denial of benefits as well as impositions of penalties.

131
Q

A valid treaty between the United States and a foreign country provides for the elimination of all tariff barriers between the two countries. It authorizes the president of either country to issue a proclamation nullifying any state or local laws in that country that have the effect of impeding imports from the other country.

The foreign country uses the metric system of measurement, and thus all goods produced there and exported to the United States are packaged in metric sizes, such as liters and kilograms. A law of a state in the United States requires all goods sold in that state to be packaged in traditional American sizes, such as quarts or pounds. Because the state law substantially impedes imports from the foreign country, the President of the United States has issued a proclamation nullifying the state law pursuant to the treaty.

Is the President’s proclamation valid?

A. No, because the Constitution vests in Congress the exclusive authority to specify binding legal standards for weights and measures, and the President therefore lacks constitutional authority for the proclamation.

B. No, because the principles of federalism embedded in the Constitution prohibit the President from taking action to invalidate a state law.

C. Yes, because it is authorized by a valid treaty of the United States and is not prohibited by any provision of the Constitution and, therefore, is the supreme law of the land.

D. Yes, because the President has inherent authority to nullify any state law that substantially impedes commerce between the United States and another country.

A

(C) is correct.

The U.S. Constitution, federal laws, and treaties are the supreme law of the land; state laws that are in conflict with the supreme law are invalid.

Here, a valid treaty gives the President the power to nullify state and local laws that impede imports between the signatory nations. There is nothing in the Constitution that would prohibit such a law; indeed, the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce both among the states and with other nations.

(A) is incorrect as Congress is free to delegate its authority, and here it has delegated its authority to the President. Moreover, if (A) is true and Congress has exclusive authority to specify weights and measures, the state law setting required weights and measures would be invalid anyway.

(B) is simply not true. As stated above, the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties are the supreme law of the land. These can certainly give the President authority to invalidate state laws that interfere with federal objectives that are within the powers of Congress, such as objectives under the Commerce Clause.

(D) is incorrect because it is overbroad. The President has no such inherent power. It would be for the courts to decide if a state law impedes commerce between the United States and another country.

132
Q

The federal government recently constructed a radio telescope in Puerto Rico. In addition to receiving radio signals, the telescope was set up to beam radio waves far out into space. As part of the bill providing for operational funding for the facility, Congress provided for a program to “inform any aliens who might be listening in outer space of the ‘American Way of Religion.’” A $10 million appropriation was provided; any religious group whose membership exceeded 500 members in the United States was permitted to prepare a five-minute presentation, and the federal government would pay for the recording of the presentations and broadcast them into space using the transmitter in Puerto Rico. The President signed the bill and it became law. A religious group with a large following in Europe, but only 100 members in the United States, protested and filed suit.

Will the court find the religious broadcasts to be constitutional?

A

The court will find that the requirement of a minimum number of members violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

The Establishment Clause prohibits any law “respecting an establishment of religion.”

While usually a three-part test based on Lemon v. Kurtzman is used to determine whether legislation creates improper government involvement with religion, the “compelling government interest” test is used if a law or government program discriminates among religions.

Here, the law differentiates among different religious groups, allowing only those with larger memberships to record presentations. There is no compelling government interest for discriminating among the religious groups in this way; thus the legislation is unconstitutional.

(A) is incorrect despite the fact that the federal power to regulate commerce could be interpreted as extending to commerce with outer space should the occasion arise. Nevertheless, the commerce power does not override independent constitutional restrictions (e.g., the Establishment Clause) on the conduct in question here.

(B) is an incorrect statement of law. The federal commerce power cannot be used to abrogate freedom of speech or to discriminate in favor of religious groups. An exercise of the commerce power generally is subject to all limitations placed on government by the Constitution, including those of the First Amendment.

(D) is incorrect. Regardless of merit, almost all expenditures made by Congress are permissible under its spending power. [U.S. Const. art. I, §8] Rather than limit the power only to spending for accomplishment of other enumerated powers, this provision grants Congress broad power to spend for the “general welfare” (i.e., any public purpose). As long as the expenditure is not conditioned on requiring a recipient to forgo an individual constitutional right, it is within the spending power of Congress.

133
Q

A town in a rural state facing financial difficulties passed a variety of “sin taxes,” including one aimed at electronic game arcades frequented by local juveniles. The tax is a one cent per game tax imposed on the manufacturers of the games based on the estimated number of plays over a machine’s lifetime. There are no electronic game manufacturers in the state.

Which of the following constitutional provisions would support the best argument against enforcement of the tax?

A

The best argument against enforcement of the tax is that it violates the Commerce Clause.

If Congress has not adopted laws regarding a subject, local governments are free to tax or regulate local aspects of the subject area as long as the tax or regulation does not discriminate against interstate commerce or unduly burden it.

Here, the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce, since it does not single out interstate commerce for taxation in order to benefit the local economy. However, it could be argued that the tax unduly burdens interstate commerce.

A local tax will be held to unduly burden interstate commerce if the locality’s need for the revenue does not outweigh the burden on interstate commerce.

The Supreme Court will consider whether there is a substantial nexus between the activity or property taxed and the taxing state, whether the tax is fairly apportioned, and whether there is a fair relationship between the tax and the benefit the taxed party receives from the state.

Here, there is little nexus between the manufacturer and the town. The facts indicate that out-of-state manufacturers’ machines are used in the town, but do not indicate whether the manufacturers conduct any selling activity in the town. Similarly, nothing indicates that there is a relationship between the tax and any benefit that the manufacturers derive from the town. Thus, the tax would probably be unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.

(A) is not as good an argument as (D) because the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the states from treating similarly situated persons differently without sufficient justification. Where a classification does not involve a suspect or quasi-suspect class or a fundamental right, the classification will be upheld as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. While the tax here singles out arcade game manufacturers for special tax treatment, no suspect or quasi-suspect class is involved, nor is a fundamental right affected. Thus, the tax will be valid under the Equal Protection Clause because it is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of raising revenue.

(B) is not a good argument because substantive due process requires that laws not be arbitrary. When laws do not involve a fundamental right, they will be held valid under the Due Process Clause as long as they are rationally related to a legitimate government interest. As established above, no fundamental right is involved and the tax is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Thus, under the Due Process Clause the tax may be enforced.

(C) is not a good argument because the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prohibits states from discriminating against out-of-state residents when a fundamental right is involved, and the tax here does not differentiate between residents and nonresidents.

134
Q

A state bans the use of disposable diapers to reduce the volume of nonbiodegradable material in its landfills. The ban was a boon for diaper services within the state, but many parents of young children were displeased with the use of conventional diapers. With support from retail establishments that lost business from the disposable diaper ban, a grass roots coalition formed to fight the ban funded a study showing that the trucks and cleaning supplies used by diaper services within the state harmed the environment more than disposable diapers. The coalition and retailers then filed suit seeking to have the ban on disposable diapers declared unconstitutional.

If the court strikes down the statute, on which of the following constitutional provisions would its decision most likely be based?

(A) equal protection

(B) Due Process Clause

(C) Impairment of Contracts Clause

(D) privileges and immunities covered by the Fourteenth Amendment

A

Of the choices presented, the only likely basis to strike down the statute is under the Due Process Clause as a violation of substantive due process.

Substantive due process tests the reasonableness of a statute; it prohibits arbitrary governmental action.

Under substantive due process, when government action limits a fundamental right, the government must prove that the action is necessary to promote a compelling interest. If a fundamental right is not involved, the challenging party must prove that the act is not rationally related to any legitimate government interest.

The retail sale of diapers is not a fundamental right, and so a challenger must prove that there is no rational basis for the statute. Almost any law can be justified under the rational basis standard. The law need not be the best law for accomplishing the government’s goal. Thus, even if it is true that the disposable diaper ban causes more pollution than it prevents, because the ban is rationally related to reducing the volume of trash in landfills, the challenge is unlikely to succeed. Nevertheless, none of the other choices states a viable ground for invalidating the statute, and so (B) is the best choice.

(A) is wrong because equal protection applies where a statute or governmental action treats similar people in a dissimilar manner (i.e., classifies people), and here there is no classification—under the statute no one can sell disposable diapers for use within the state. Thus, an equal protection argument is not applicable.

(C) is wrong because the Impairment of Contracts Clause prohibits only the substantial impairment of existing contracts (and there are exceptions even where there is substantial impairment), and nothing in the facts indicates that forbidding the retail sale of disposable diapers would substantially impair any existing contract.

(D) is wrong because the privileges and immunities covered by the Fourteenth Amendment are those attributes peculiar to United States citizenship (e.g., the right to petition Congress for redress or the right to vote for federal officers). The statute here does not affect such rights.

135
Q

A fee simple owner of a restaurant provided in his will that the property should go on his death “in fee simple to my friend, but if during my friend’s lifetime my son has children and those children are alive when my friend dies, then to said living children.” When the owner died, the friend took over the restaurant.

If the son has children and one or more of them are alive when the friend dies, who will take title to the restaurant at that time?

A

The interest given to the son’s children does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities because the interest will vest, if at all, within 21 years after the life of the friend.

Pursuant to the Rule Against Perpetuities, no interest in property is valid unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after one or more lives in being at the creation of the interest.

In the case of a will, the perpetuities period begins to run on the date of the testator’s death, and measuring lives used to show the validity of an interest must be in existence at that time.

Here, the interest given to any of the son’s children who are born during the friend’s lifetime and who survive the friend must vest, if at all, on the death of the friend (who is a life in being at the time of the owner’s death). Thus, this interest will vest, if it does vest, within 21 years after the friend’s life, and is therefore not in violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities.

***

The interest of the son’s children is not vested. Their interest is a shifting executory interest rather than a remainder because it divests the fee simple estate of the friend and his heirs. The friend has a fee simple subject to an executory interest because the estate will remain with his heirs if none of the son’s children are alive when the friend dies. The friend’s death while the son’s children are alive divests the interest of the friend’s heirs; it is therefore a shifting executory interest rather than a remainder.

136
Q

On February 1, the owner of a bowling alley read in a magazine an ad from a major manufacturer of bowling balls offering sets of 40 balls in various weights and drilled in various sizes for $10 per ball. The owner immediately filled out the order form included in the ad for the 40 balls and deposited it, properly stamped and addressed, into the mail. On February 2, the bowling alley owner received in the mail a letter from the manufacturer, sent out as part of its advertising campaign, stating in relevant part that it will sell the bowling alley owner 40 bowling balls at $10 per ball. A day later, on February 3, the manufacturer received the bowling alley owner’s order. On February 4, the balls were shipped.

On what day did an enforceable contract arise?

A

The contract arose when the balls were shipped. The general rule is that an offer can be accepted by performance or a promise to perform unless the offer clearly limits the method of acceptance.

Here, the offer would be the bowling alley owner’s order, because a magazine ad is usually held to be merely solicitation to accept offers rather than an offer. Thus, the manufacturer accepted and the contract was formed when it shipped the balls.

137
Q

A state’s department of education provides musical equipment to any public or private school in the state that requests it. A private religious school applied for and received musical equipment under this program. The school exclusively uses the equipment to teach its students to perform religious music.

Which of the following is the best argument supporting the constitutionality of the state’s policy of providing musical equipment to this private religious school?

A The teaching of religious music in private schools is not constitutionally prohibited.

B The purpose and effect of the music program is secular and does not entangle government and religion.

C Private religious schools fulfill an important educational function.

D The state’s refusal to provide musical equipment to private religious schools would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by discriminating against their students in favor of students in public schools.

A

The strongest argument would be that the program has a secular purpose and does not entangle government with religion.

The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from taking action respecting the establishment of religion. Where no sect preference is involved, government action will be upheld if it serves a secular purpose, its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does not produce excessive government entanglements with religion.

(A) is a true statement—it is not unconstitutional to teach religious music in private schools—but the Constitution prohibits government from providing such aid to religious schools.

(C) is irrelevant for similar reasons—although private religious schools might fulfill an important educational function, they still will run afoul of the Constitution unless the above three-part test is met.

(D) is incorrect because the state is compelled by the Establishment Clause not to provide certain types of aid to religious schools; in such cases, the Free Exercise Clause is not violated so long as the law is general in nature, which is the case here

138
Q

Adherents of a particular religion whose tenets focused mostly on business practices forbade women from studying their sacred texts. A group of college students who were adherents of that religion applied to use an empty room at their state college to study sacred texts. The school permitted numerous student groups to use its facilities for extracurricular activities during times when classes were not in session. However, the school administration denied the requests from the group in question, claiming that it would be in violation of a state statute forbidding any group using public facilities to discriminate on the basis of race or gender. The students brought an action in federal court challenging application of the statute to them by the school administration.

If the court finds the actions of the school valid, what is the most likely reason?

A Permitting the religious group to hold the meeting in a public school facility would violate the Establishment Clause, applicable to the state under the Fourteenth Amendment.

B The statute is the least restrictive means of advancing the state’s compelling interest in ending discrimination by groups using public facilities.

C Allowing student groups to use classroom facilities when classes are not in session does not constitute state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.

D The right of freedom of association does not apply to groups involved in business and commercial activities.

A

If the school’s action is valid, it will be because the state statute is the least restrictive means of advancing the state’s compelling interest in ending discrimination by groups using public facilities.

While schools are generally not public forums, they may become a designated public forum by being held open to student groups for meetings. In that case, the First Amendment may be violated if a college restricts use of its classrooms based on the content of a student group’s speech. To justify content-based regulation of otherwise protected speech, the government must show that the regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest that cannot be satisfied by less restrictive means. Similarly, the right to associate for expressive purposes is not absolute. At the very least, the right may be infringed to serve a compelling government interest, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.

Here, the state’s interest in not allowing its facilities to be used by groups practicing discrimination of various types is compelling. [See Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984)] The denial of access to the student group based on the students’ religious principles, while it may be viewed as content-based discrimination, is the most narrowly drawn means of advancing the state’s interest. [See Bob Jones University v. United States (1983)]

(A) is incorrect because a school does not violate the Establishment Clause by permitting a religious student group the same after-class access to its facilities that other student groups have. [Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001)] (C) is incorrect because the actions of administrators of a state college in allowing or denying access to its facilities is clearly state action that brings the Fourteenth Amendment into play. (D) is incorrect. While the right to join together for expressive or political activity, which is protected by the First Amendment, may be less strong for large organizations that engage in both commercial and expressive activity than for smaller and more selective groups, it is still a recognized right. [See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra] Furthermore, the student group’s discussion of business activity in this case is tied to its religion. Hence, the association rights of the student group are based on freedom of religion as well as freedom of expression. The state would probably have to show a compelling interest to support a restriction on the group’s association rights.

139
Q

Obsenity - standards

A

Obscenity, which is not protected speech under the First Amendment, is defined by the Supreme Court as a description or depiction of sexual conduct that, taken as a whole, by the average person, applying contemporary community standards, appeals to the prurient interest in sex, portrays sex in a patently offensive way, and—using a national reasonable person standard—does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

140
Q

A man from a foreign country obtained a doctorate in political science from a state university and applied to teach there. The man was denied employment at the university under a state law requiring all teachers within the state to be United States citizens.

Is the state’s citizenship requirement constitutional as it applies to the man?

A Yes, because states have the right to set minimal standards for state employees under the Tenth Amendment.

B Yes, because a university political science teacher would exert a great deal of influence over the attitudes of students toward government, the political process, and citizenship.

C No, because the citizenship requirement is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

D No, because the citizenship requirement is not necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.

A

A state generally may not discriminate against aliens absent a compelling state interest, and no compelling interest is served by prohibiting aliens from teaching at a state university.

(A) is incorrect.

The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states power not granted to the federal government. The Constitution vests the power to regulate aliens in Congress, and thus the states do not have power to control aliens under the Tenth Amendment.

(B) is incorrect because it states the standard that the Supreme Court has applied to primary and secondary school teachers.

The Supreme Court has upheld state statutes prohibiting aliens from teaching primary or secondary school on the rationale that teachers at the elementary and high school level have a great deal of influence over the attitudes of young students toward government, the political process, and citizenship. It is doubtful that the Court would extend this rationale to university teachers.

(C) is incorrect because it states the wrong standard. If state discrimination against aliens relates to participation of aliens in the functioning of state government, the rational basis test applies. Merely teaching political science at a state university is not equivalent to participating in the political process.

141
Q

A tax is valid under the Commerce Clause if:

A

(i) the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce;
(ii) there is a substantial nexus between the activity taxed and the taxing state;
(iii) the tax is fairly apportioned; and
(iv) the tax fairly relates to services or benefits provided by the state.

142
Q

A foreign student who had entered the United States on a student visa four years ago was notified by federal immigration authorities that he was subject to being deported because his visa had expired. Federal law provided that an alien who is subject to being deported has the right to appear before an administrative officer appointed by the Attorney General’s office for a hearing on whether he should be deported. This officer, appointed by the executive branch of the government, has the right under law to make a final order concerning whether the alien should be deported. After a hearing, the administrative officer entered an order allowing the student to remain in the United States as a permanent resident.

However, a congressional rule permitted the House of Representatives, by resolution, to deport “undesirable aliens.” After the administrative judge entered his order, the House passed a resolution that the student should be deported. The student petitioned the federal court to declare the legislative resolution invalid.

Should the court find the resolution to be valid?

A Yes, because Congress has plenary powers with regard to aliens and naturalization.

B Yes, because aliens are not “citizens” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

C No, because the federal law removed congressional power with regard to aliens in this circumstance, and the resolution of the House violates the separation of powers doctrine.

D No, because the student was denied due process when he was not given a hearing before the House of Representatives.

A

The court should find the resolution invalid.

While Congress has broad power to delegate, the separation of powers doctrine forbids Congress from trying to control the exercise of the power delegated in various ways, such as by overturning an executive agency action without bicameralism (i.e., passage by both houses of Congress). By enacting the federal law allowing the administrative law judge to enter a final order with regard to aliens, Congress has given up any control it may have had previously in these situations. The resolution by the House here is an unconstitutional legislative veto that violates the separation of powers doctrine.

(A) is incorrect because, while Congress does have plenary power over aliens with regard to immigration and naturalization, here it has given up control over this area by enacting a law allowing an administrative officer appointed by the executive branch to make a final order concerning whether an alien should be deported.

(B) is incorrect because the fact that aliens are not citizens has no bearing on whether the House resolution violated the Constitution.

(D) is incorrect because, while resident aliens are entitled to notice and hearing before they can be deported, the student did receive a hearing before the administrative officer. There is no requirement that persons affected by legislative action have the right to be heard by the legislative body taking the action. Thus, the better argument as to why the resolution was invalid is based on separation of powers.

143
Q

Congress enacted a statute that purported to ban all discrimination against African-Americans in any commercial transaction taking place within the United States.

Would the statute most likely be held constitutional?

A Yes, under Thirteenth Amendment provisions barring badges or incidents of slavery.

B Yes, because the federal government has an important interest in furthering the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

C No, because Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause do not extend so far as the statute would require.

D No, because commercial transactions are not among the privileges or immunities of national citizenship.

A

The statute is constitutional as a legitimate exercise of congressional enforcement powers under the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment.

The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery. The Enabling Clause of the amendment has been held to confer on Congress the authority to proscribe almost any private racially discriminatory action that can be characterized as a badge or incident of slavery.

Because the statute at issue bans all discrimination against African-Americans in commercial transactions, it necessarily reaches private conduct. Such congressional action is constitutionally permissible pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.

(B) is incorrect. Application of the Fourteenth Amendment has been limited to cases involving state action. [See United States v. Morrison (2000)] The statute here reaches private action, and so the Thirteenth Amendment is the correct source for the law, since that amendment addresses private action.

(C) is incorrect because, even if Congress’s power over interstate commerce would not reach every commercial transaction, the statute would be enforceable under the Thirteenth Amendment, as discussed above.

(D) is incorrect because it is irrelevant. While it is true that the commercial transactions here are not among the privileges or immunities of citizenship (which include rights such as the right to petition Congress for redress and the right to interstate travel), the law can be based on the Commerce Clause or the Thirteenth Amendment, and thus is constitutional.

144
Q

A man who belonged to an ancient religion whose rituals require the use of bald eagle feathers traveled to an area where bald eagles were known to roost. After searching the area, he found a fallen eagle feather and returned home. A few weeks later, the man showed the feather to an acquaintance, who happened to be a state park ranger, and explained how the feather was obtained. The ranger informed the man that a state anti-poaching law makes any possession of a bald eagle feather without a special permit a crime. The ranger then cited the man for possession of the feather and confiscated it.

At the man’s trial for violating the state bald eagle feather possession statute, which of the following constitutional arguments is most appropriate for the prosecution to make?

A The statute is a neutral law that only incidentally burdens the man’s rights under the First Amendment.

B The Free Exercise Clause applies only to belief and not to conduct.

C The government has a substantial and important interest in protecting bald eagles and there is no other feasible way to achieve the legislative purpose.

D Making an exception for the man on religious grounds would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

A

The best argument for the prosecution is that the Free Exercise Clause does not afford a right to a religious exemption from a neutral law that happens to impose a substantial burden on a religious practice, if the law is otherwise constitutionally applied to persons who engage (or fail to engage) in the particular conduct for nonreligious reasons.

Here, the state law interferes with the man’s religious beliefs. However, the statute prohibits any possession of a bald eagle feather without a permit. Thus, the state should argue that the law was enacted to protect eagles and not merely to interfere with the religious beliefs of people such as the man here.

(B) is incorrect because it is too broad. Conduct is protected (although the protection is limited). For example, the government cannot punish conduct merely because it is religious (although if the law affects both religious and nonreligious conduct, it is generally valid). [See, e.g., Employment Division v. Smith (1990)]

(C) is incorrect because it states the former rule in these cases. In the past, the Court used a balancing test to determine whether a religious exemption had to be granted from a law with a secular purpose that happened to burden religious practices or beliefs. The Court would consider the severity of the burden, the strength of the state’s interest, and the existence of alternative means. Now, however, the Court no longer uses a balancing test in actions involving state laws; the state need not establish a strong interest or a lack of alternative means if the challenged statute is neutral.

(D) could be successfully argued, but its chances for success are not as certain as for the argument in (A).

The Establishment Clause prohibits laws respecting the establishment of religion. If a law includes a preference for one religious sect over another, the law will be held invalid unless it is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest.

If there is no sect preference, the law is valid if:

(i) it has a secular purpose;

(ii) its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and

(iii) it does not produce excessive government entanglement.

Here, no sect preference appears, because nothing indicates that an exception would apply only to members of the man’s religion. It could be argued, however, that the only purpose for an exemption here is to favor religious believers over nonbelievers. If that is the purpose, the exemption would not have a secular purpose and would fail the secular purpose test above. On the other hand, the state could argue that free exercise of religion is also protected, and an exemption protects sincerely held religious beliefs. [See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder (1979)] Thus, the outcome of the argument in (D) is uncertain, and (A) is the state’s most appropriate argument.

145
Q

During a presidential campaign, a candidate’s campaign manager secretly engaged in activities that may have violated both state and federal laws. After the candidate was elected President, the FBI investigated the manager’s activities as well as whether the President was involved. After the campaign manager was indicted in federal court, but before trial, the President granted a blanket pardon to the campaign manager for “all federal crimes that may have been committed in the past 20 years.”

Is the pardon valid?

A Yes, because the pardon power is an unqualified power (except as to impeachment).

B No, because a presidential pardon that interferes with an inquiry into the President’s own actions constitutes an obstruction of justice.

C No, presidential pardons must relate to specific crimes; the President cannot issue blanket pardons.

D No, because a President’s pardon power is limited to crimes that allegedly took place while the President is in office

A

The pardon is valid. Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution grants the President the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.

This pardon power is not subject to control by Congress, and it includes the power to commute a sentence on any conditions the President chooses (as long as the conditions do not offend some other constitutional provision).

(B) is incorrect because even if the action of issuing the pardon amounted to the crime of obstruction of justice (a questionable assumption), the pardon itself would not be invalidated. The power to pardon is a constitutional power, superior to laws found in statutes.

(C) is incorrect because the pardon power is not so limited. Blanket pardons are valid.

(D) is also incorrect because the pardon power is not so limited. Presidents may pardon offenses that occurred before the President took office.

146
Q

Shortly after a professor at a state university completed her second year of teaching, she was informed that her contract was not being renewed for the following year. By state law, a professor does not acquire tenure until after she has completed three consecutive years of teaching. Before acquiring tenure, state law does not require either a statement of reasons or a hearing when a professor’s contract is not renewed, and the university administration refused to give either to the professor.

Which of the following, if established, sets forth the strongest constitutional argument that the professor could make to compel the university to furnish her a statement of reasons for the failure to rehire her and an opportunity for the hearing?

A She purchased a home in anticipation of renewal of her contract, because most professors who had taught two years were rehired.

B She had been voted the most popular professor on campus in each of her first two years of teaching.

C She was the only teacher at the university whose contract was not renewed that year.

D There is evidence to indicate that the decision not to rehire the professor was not based on her ability to teach.

A

The strongest argument the professor could make is that the decision was not based on her ability to teach.

The professor is an at-will employee, and under most circumstances may be discharged “for any reason or no reason at all.” Thus, normally, evidence regarding the motives for dismissal is irrelevant. The question here, however, is what the strongest argument is that the professor could make, and (D) creates at least an inference that an impermissible motive might be present (gender, free speech, etc.).

(A) is a weaker answer because the professor has no property interest in continued employment; a mere expectation of continued employment is not enough, even when coupled with reliance (her buying a house). There must be a legitimate claim or entitlement—created by a contract or clear policy—that employment can be terminated only for cause. The bases alleged in (B) are arguably irrelevant; the professor’s popularity may or may not have anything to do with her ability, and even if it does, she remains an at-will employee.

(C) might under some circumstances offer an argument, but there could be any number of valid explanations for keeping others and letting a particular professor go, including budget constraints, subject needs, etc.

(D) is, accordingly, the strongest of the possibilities.

147
Q

A state legislature enacted a statute providing for loaning certain textbooks on secular subjects to students in all public and private schools. In accordance with the statute, the state board of education distributed textbooks to a private school that offered religious instruction and admitted only Caucasian students.

Which of the following is the strongest argument against the constitutionality of free distribution of textbooks to the students at the private school?

A A state may not constitutionally aid private schools through distribution of textbooks.

B Segregation is furthered by the distribution of textbooks to these students.

C The distribution of textbooks advances religion because it is impossible to separate their secular and religious uses.

D The distribution of textbooks fosters excessive government entanglement with religion.

A

The strongest argument is that state provision of textbooks to the segregated private school violates the Equal Protection Clause by giving state support to a racially segregated educational process. This may not be a winning argument but it is clearly the best of the lot. (A) is wrong because it is far too broad. A state may, under many situations, aid a private school through distribution of textbooks. This may be permissible even if the private school is religiously affiliated, as discussed below. (C) and (D) are parts of the test for violation of the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court has held that a state lending textbooks on secular subjects to all students, including those at religious schools, does not violate the Establishment Clause. Thus, (C) and (D) are incorrect.

148
Q

To combat rising unemployment, a state offered a $25,000 prize to anyone who could devise a scheme to create at least 200 jobs within the state and demonstrate its viability. While hiking through a national park within the state, a geologist noticed rock containing titanium. Knowing that titanium was commonly used in military aircraft built within the state and that mining and refining titanium could provide the state with thousands of jobs, the geologist chipped out a sample of the ore and took it back to the state employment division. After reviewing the geologist’s ideas, the state announced in a press release that he was the first recipient of the $25,000 prize. Within a few days, the federal ranger in charge of the valley from which the sample was taken had the geologist arrested for violating a federal law making it illegal to remove any “plants, animals, or minerals from federal lands.” The geologist was convicted and fined $5,000. He appeals the conviction to the federal court of appeals, claiming that the fine is unconstitutional.

How should the court rule?

A For the geologist, because the state has a compelling interest in reducing unemployment and the federal statute unreasonably interferes with the state interest.

B For the geologist, because removing the ore was a purely intrastate act and had no effect on interstate commerce.

C For the government, because the federal statute providing for the fine is constitutional under the Property Clause of Article IV, Section 3 of the federal Constitution.

D For the government, because the federal statute providing for the fine is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

A

The court should affirm the geologist’s conviction. The fine is constitutional under the Property Clause, which gives Congress the power to “make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.” This power permits Congress to acquire and dispose of all kinds of property, and to protect its property with a law such as the one here.

149
Q

Executive privilege

A

Executive privilege is an inherent privilege necessary to protect the confidentiality of presidential communications. Under this privilege, presidential documents and conversations are presumptively privileged, but this privilege must yield to a demonstrated need for such materials as evidence in a criminal case in which they are relevant and otherwise admissible. [United States v. Nixon (1974)] Although the Supreme Court has not expressly decided that the privilege must also yield to a demonstrated need for evidence in a pending legislative proceeding, such an extension of Nixon is likely, and none of the other alternatives is at all accurate.

150
Q

A comprehensive federal health-care reform statute created a Federal Health Policy Board, which was directed to monitor the fees charged for various medical procedures covered by insurance. The board also had the power to subpoena records to determine whether fee increases were a true reflection of cost increases. Nothing in the statute provided for caps on fee increases.

Because of the continuing escalation of health-care costs while the statute was being debated, several states had passed health-care legislation on their own. One state passed legislation that prohibited most fee increases of 10% or more per year for specified health-care services covered by insurance, and created a health-care review board to regulate these costs and impose monetary penalties on health-care providers or insurers that tried to circumvent the cap.

Which of the following would be the best basis for finding the state provision unconstitutional?

A The federal legislation was passed after the state legislation and therefore supersedes it.

B The Federal Health Policy Board was constituted with many of the same powers as the state board but was not given the power to impose sanctions.

C The state provision impairs existing contracts between health-care providers and insurers in violation of the Contract Clause.

D Health-care fee caps create an undue burden on interstate commerce even in the absence of federal regulation.

A

The fact that the federal board was similar to the state board but was not given the power to restrict fee increases and impose sanctions in an otherwise comprehensive bill suggests that such provisions in the state law violate the Supremacy Clause.

A state law may fail under the Supremacy Clause even if it does not directly conflict with a federal statute or regulation if it interferes with the achievement of a federal objective or the federal regulations occupy the entire field. Where the federal laws are comprehensive or a federal agency is created to oversee the field, preemption will often be found. T_he fact that the health-care legislation was comprehensive but the federal board was not given regulatory or enforcement power suggests that Congress did not want specific restrictions in these areas and may have wanted free-market principles to determine fee increases at the outset._ The state board’s power to impose these restrictions may violate the Supremacy Clause under these circumstances.

(A) is incorrect because the fact that the federal legislation was passed later does not automatically mean that the state legislation has been superseded. In areas of concurrent legislative power, a state regulation will be upheld if it does not conflict with and is not preempted by federal legislation.

(C) is incorrect because the Contract Clause prevents only substantial impairments of existing contracts by state legislation, and only if the legislation does not serve an important and legitimate public interest or is not a reasonable and narrowly tailored means of promoting that interest. Here, the law has a prospective effect only, and even if existing contracts between health-care providers and insurers are affected by the legislation, the other requirements for the Contract Clause to apply are not likely to be satisfied.

(D) is incorrect because states may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce in the absence of federal regulation as long as the regulation is nondiscriminatory and does not unduly burden interstate commerce, which is a case-by-case balancing test. Here, the legislation appears to be nondiscriminatory and there are insufficient facts to establish that it would constitute an undue burden; hence, (B) presents a stronger argument than (D).

151
Q

The Appointments Clause of the Constitution permits Congress to …

A

… vest appointments of inferior officers only in the President, the courts, or the heads of departments.

Enforcement is an executive act; therefore, Congress cannot appoint members of a commission that exercises enforcement powers.

i.e.

The safety commission consists of some members appointed by Congress. This commission therefore violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution because it has enforcement powers, since it can prosecute violations. Legislative power can be delegated even under vague guidelines without creating an unconstitutional delegation.

152
Q

Congress created the National Agency for Burglar Alarms (“NABA”), giving it the power to regulate both burglar alarm hardware and installation personnel. NABA adopted a regulation requiring that all burglar alarm installation companies be licensed, and providing that anyone installing an alarm without a license could be fined. The regulation also provided that any company in the installation business on the day the regulation was adopted automatically would receive a license, but to obtain a license thereafter, an applicant would have to show that he has worked as an installer at a licensed company for at least three years.

A man who has been installing alarm systems for eight years sold his installation business a few months before the NABA regulation was adopted and went to work for the purchaser servicing his old accounts. A few months after the NABA regulation was adopted, a representative from a national department store chain approached the man with an offer to hire him as an independent contractor to revamp the chain’s alarm systems. The man quit his job and applied for a NABA installer’s license. His application was denied because he was not in business on the day the NABA regulation was adopted and had worked for a licensed installer for only a few months. The man decided to install the alarm systems anyway.

Can the man properly be fined for installing alarms?

response - incorrect

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A Yes, because the NABA was established under Congress’s power to legislate for the general welfare, and Congress may take whatever steps are necessary and proper to enforce its laws.

B Yes, because the regulation falls within the scope of Congress’s commerce power, and Congress may delegate its authority to regulate as it has done here.

C No, because the regulation interferes with the man’s fundamental right to earn a living without a substantial justification and so violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.

D No, because a government agency cannot itself levy fines for a violation of its regulations.

A

The man can be fined. Congress has the power to regulate alarm installation companies under the Commerce Clause because the clause permits Congress to regulate any local or interstate activity that, either in itself or in combination with other activities, has an effect on interstate commerce. Burglar alarm companies use instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as phone lines and have a cumulative effect on interstate commerce even though some may only do business locally. Hence, their activities can be regulated by Congress. The delegation to the NABA is valid because Congress has broad discretion to delegate its legislative power; the Supreme Court will uphold almost any delegation of congressional power. Therefore, the man can be fined. (A) is incorrect because it improperly mixes two concepts. Congress does not have the power to legislate for the general welfare—there is no federal police power—but rather Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare. (C) is incorrect because, even assuming that the regulation here interferes with the man’s right to make a living, it would not violate the interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV because the clause restricts states, not the federal government. (D) is incorrect. Congress can provide that violation of an agency’s regulations is a criminal offense that can be enforced through the imposition of fines. Furthermore, an agency has the power to impose civil fines and penalties for a violation of its regulations.

153
Q

A town with a population of 30,000 merged with a city of 60,000. To protect voting rights of the citizens of the former town, a proposal was made that for a period of 20 years, beginning at the date of the merger, the city council of the merged city would consist of six persons. Each formerly separate municipality would be divided into three council districts. Each district from the former town would have approximately 10,000 residents, and each district from the former city would have 20,000 residents. A mayor would be elected at large. Before this proposal was placed on the ballot, the state attorney general issued an advisory opinion stating that the proposal was not in violation of any state statutory or constitutional provision. The proposal was placed on the ballot and was carried by large majorities in both the town and the city, and the districts were carved out.

Three taxpayers filed suit to enjoin the holding of an election with council districts of such disparate proportions. The suit reached the state supreme court, which ruled that the governmental formula was constitutional under both the state and United States Constitutions. The plaintiffs wish to take the case to the United States Supreme Court.

How should the Supreme Court proceed?

A Rely on the attorney general’s opinion and not hear the case on its merits.

B Not hear the case, because it was decided below on an independent state ground.

C Not hear the case, but remand it to federal district court.

D Hear the federal issues involved, but decline to rule on state issues.

A

The Supreme Court may grant certiorari to review a case from the highest court in a state that can render an opinion on the matter if a state statute’s validity is called into question under the federal Constitution. [28 U.S.C. §1257] The Court may decide the federal issues, but cannot rule on the state law issues.

(A) is incorrect for several reasons: (i) the attorney general evaluated only the proposal’s validity under the state constitution; and (ii) even if her opinion had addressed the proposal’s federal constitutional validity, the Supreme Court is not bound by advisory opinions of state attorneys general.

(B) is incorrect even though the state supreme court may have had an independent state ground for finding the law constitutional under its state constitution. The Supreme Court will refuse to hear the case only if the state ground is adequate by itself to support the decision as well as independent, so that the Court’s review of the federal ground for the decision would have no effect on the outcome of the case (such as if the state court had found the law invalid under both the state and federal Constitutions). Here, the Supreme Court’s review of the state court opinion on the law’s federal constitutional status may have an outcome on the case regardless of the state court’s decision on the state constitutional issue; the Court therefore will hear the federal issues involved. (C) is incorrect because 28 U.S.C. section 1257 provides that appellate review of a matter from a state’s highest court is to the Supreme Court by petition for a writ of certiorari, rather than to a federal district court.

154
Q

Congress passed a law imposing a 50% excise tax on each pack of cigarettes manufactured for sale in the United States. An amendment was successfully added to the original bill requiring that all proceeds from the tax be used for antismoking advertisements. The amendment included severability language (indicating that if the amendment were stricken for some reason, the remainder of the law should stand). The various tobacco companies were required to pay the tax directly to the federal government. A tobacco company filed suit in the appropriate federal court, contending that the tax should be struck down as a violation of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.

Is the court likely to find the tax constitutional?

A No, because it does not provide equal time for the tobacco companies to present their side of the smoking controversy.

B No, because it abridges the First Amendment rights of tobacco manufacturers by forcing them to pay for messages with which they may not agree.

C Yes, because the amendment is severable from the tax bill.

D Yes, because the tax does not force the tobacco companies to speak.

A

The tax is constitutional because it represents a proper exercise of the power of Congress to tax and spend for the general welfare.

Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress may tax and spend to provide for the general welfare.

A congressional tax measure will be upheld if it bears some reasonable relationship to revenue production or if Congress has the power to regulate the taxed activity.

Congress may spend for any public purpose, not merely the accomplishment of other enumerated powers.

The tax at issue here bears a reasonable relationship to revenue production. Also, the purchase and sale of cigarettes in the United States is subject to congressional regulation, as an activity having a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. Thus, the tax itself is valid. The amendment to the original tax bill is also valid, as a reflection of a congressional determination to use the proceeds of the tax for the promotion and implementation of an antismoking program, presumably in furtherance of public health. This is a public purpose for which Congress can spend pursuant to the General Welfare Clause.

Although people (and corporations) cannot generally be forced to convey a message with which they disagree, they can be forced to pay taxes that fund messages with which they disagree. Therefore, (D) is correct. (C) is incorrect because it implies that the amendment is not constitutional. The amendment does not violate the First Amendment because it does not compel speech. It only compels paying taxes, which are then used to fund government speech. Therefore, the constitutionality of the tax does not hinge on the severability of the amendment. (A) is incorrect because there is no “fairness doctrine” under the Constitution; that is, when Congress determines a course of action pursuant to its power to tax and spend for the general welfare, it need not provide equal time for opponents of the action to express their views. (B) is incorrect because the tax in no way abridges the First Amendment rights of the manufacturers. As explained above, while the freedom of speech is very broad and includes the freedom to not speak and to refrain from endorsing views with which one does not agree, it does not invalidate the tax here because the tax does not force the tobacco companies to endorse the stop-smoking clinics or the government’s antismoking stance. Neither does the tax forbid or control the tobacco manufacturers from endorsing a pro-smoking message. The manufacturers’ First Amendment rights are simply not burdened here.

155
Q

A township located in a farming community was composed mostly of persons belonging to a specific religious sect. To help instill proper respect for authority in children, which was a central tenet of the sect, and to maintain order in the classroom, the local school board allowed teachers to inflict corporal punishment. Such punishment was inflicted on a fourth grader in a township school immediately after his teacher saw him pulling a girl’s hair. Neither he nor his parents belonged to the religious sect. When the boy’s parents learned of the incident, they hired an attorney. Rather than suing the teacher for battery as permitted under state law, the attorney brought an action against the teacher under a federal statute providing a cause of action for damages against any government employee who deprives a person of his constitutional rights.

Should the court find the policy allowing corporal punishment to be constitutional?

A No, because the punishment policy violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause.

B No, because the boy was denied any kind of hearing, in violation of his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

C Yes, because under the doctrine of parens patriae states may impose any punishment they see fit.

D Yes, because the punishment was not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

A

The punishment here is constitutional because it does not violate any constitutional provision.

The best answer reflecting this reasoning is (D)—there was no Eighth Amendment violation here—because paddling students as a disciplinary measure has not been found to be cruel and unusual punishment.

(A) is incorrect because there is no Establishment Clause violation here. Under the Establishment Clause, if there is no sect preference, government action generally will be upheld if the action serves a secular purpose, its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does not excessively entangle government with religion. There is no sect preference under the school board’s corporal punishment rule here, the rule has the secular purpose of maintaining order in the classroom (the fact that this coincides with the tenets of a local religion does not change that conclusion), its main purpose neither advances nor inhibits religion, and there is no excessive entanglement.

(B) is incorrect because there has been no deprivation of procedural due process. The Supreme Court has held that although corporal punishment may involve a liberty interest, no hearing is required prior to inflicting such punishment; the possibility of a common law action in tort is sufficient procedural protection. [Ingraham v. Wright (1977)]

(C) is incorrect because it is too broad. The doctrine of parens patriae allows the state to stand in the shoes of a parent, but even a parent may not impose any punishment he sees fit (e.g., a parent may not break a child’s arm as punishment for stealing).

156
Q

The United States Surgeon General was cited for contempt for refusing to answer questions as part of a Senate investigation regarding an issue in the Food and Drug Administration.

His contempt citation will be dismissed if he can show which of the following?

A As a member of the executive branch, he is immune from prosecution.

B If he answered the questions, he could be subject to dismissal from his position as Surgeon General.

C The questions do not relate to any matter concerning which the Senate may legislate.

D The questions do not relate to any matter concerning current or planned legislation.

A

Congress’s power to investigate is limited to matters on which it can legislate.

Therefore, if the Surgeon General can demonstrate that the questions concerned matters upon which Congress could not legislate (not an enumerated power under Article I, Section 8), then this contempt citation must be dismissed.

157
Q

Congress’s spending power - test

A

Congress may “regulate” states through the spending power by imposing conditions on the grant of money to state or local governments.

Such conditions will not violate the Tenth Amendment merely because Congress lacked the power to directly regulate the activity that is the subject of the spending program if the conditions

(i) are clearly stated;
(ii) relate to the purpose of the program; and
(iii) are not unduly coercive.

Here, the condition is clearly stated and appears to be related to a goal of the highway program—safer highway travel.

158
Q

Congress enacted legislation intended to protect children from unsafe car seats. The act established a commission to supervise the manufacturing and sale of car seats, and empowered the commission to promulgate car seat safety regulations. The commission members were also required to investigate safe and sound methods of installing child car seats. The commission’s chairperson was designated as an Undersecretary of Health and Safety; the President appointed two commissioners from child safety groups; and the three major car seat manufacturers chose one commissioner each, who were then appointed by Congress to the commission.

For its violation of the commission’s rules with regard to car seat manufacturing, a car seat manufacturer was fined $5,000, to be paid immediately without a trial on the merits. The manufacturer files suit in the federal court to enjoin the commission’s enforcement of this rule.

Which of these is the manufacturer’s best argument in support of its contention that the rule was illegal?

A Regulations concerning criminal conduct cannot be made by agency rules, but must be made by federal statute.

B The appointment of the commissioners was illegal; therefore, the rules promulgated by the commission are invalid.

C Because the fine was potentially $5,000 for violation of the rule, the manufacturer had a right to a trial by jury.

D The presumptive fine violated the manufacturer’s rights of equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

A

The appointment of the commissioners was illegal.

The Appointment Clause of the Constitution permits Congress to vest appointments of inferior officers only in the President, the courts, or the heads of departments.

Enforcement is an executive act; therefore, Congress cannot appoint its own members to the commission to exercise enforcement powers. A duly appointed commission does have the power to make rules and regulations governing the subject matter for which it is appointed. Those rules are not “criminal” statutes in this case. Thus, (A) is wrong. (C) is wrong because Congress may establish new public rights and actions that may be adjudicated by agencies, without juries. (D) is wrong because there is no actionable discrimination.

159
Q

An employee of the United States Department of Labor was instructed by his superior to solicit subscriptions to the Department’s bulletin on a door-to-door basis in the city in which he worked. While doing so, the employee was arrested for violation of a city ordinance that prohibited commercial solicitation of private residences.

What is the employee’s best defense?

A Intergovernmental immunity.

B The First Amendment freedom of expression as it applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

C The Equal Protection Clause as it applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

D The city ordinance effectively restricts interstate commerce.

A

The employee’s best defense is intergovernmental immunity.

State and local governments cannot tax or regulate the activities of the federal government. This principle is often termed “intergovernmental immunity.”

The arrest and prosecution of a federal employee who was on the job violates this principle, which is based on the supremacy of the federal government and federal law. (B) is not a bad answer because door-to-door solicitation is protected by the First Amendment. However, at best, (B) would subject the city’s actions to strict scrutiny and allow the city to prevail if it could prove that its action was necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. In contrast, (A) would automatically invalidate the city’s enforcement of the law against the employee, and so (A) is a better answer. (C) is irrelevant because the Fourteenth Amendment’s restriction on the states has to do with persons, not the federal government, and here there is no claim that the city was discriminating against the employee. The city’s ordinance, as briefly described, does not seem to provide the basis for an equal protection claim. (D) is wrong because nothing in the facts shows any burden on interstate commerce. Moreover, at most such a claim would trigger heightened scrutiny; it would not automatically invalidate the enforcement of the law as would (A).

160
Q

A small group of terrorists hijacked a foreign airliner. Ten prominent bankers from the United States were among the airline passengers. The terrorists demanded that three individuals imprisoned in a state prison be released. Although these individuals were properly convicted of violation of state laws, the terrorists contended that they were political prisoners and that their convictions were merely a subterfuge to prevent them from inciting the local populace. After negotiations between the State Department and the terrorists, the President of the United States agreed to release the three prisoners in return for the freedom of the 10 bankers. He issued official pardons and ordered that the prisoners be released.

What is the strongest argument that the President’s order is invalid?

A The President lacks the power to enter into executive agreements with non-state actors.

B Executive orders do not enjoy supremacy unless they are passed into law by Congress or signed and approved as treaties.

C Executive orders affecting only named individuals are invalid because they are bills of attainder.

D The President lacks the power to pardon the prisoners.

A

The strongest argument against validity is based on federalism principles.

Under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the President has the power to “grant reprieves and pardon offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachments.” Thus, the President’s pardon power is limited to violations of federal law. The President has no authority to pardon those convicted of state crimes or held in state custody. The President lacks the authority to grant these pardons.

Although the President’s ability to negotiate treaties only extends to dealing with other nations, (A) is wrong because the President possesses other powers that would allow him to negotiate such deals. For example, the President’s powers as Commander in Chief and other inherent powers (such as the ability to negotiate executive agreements) would justify this action. (B) is wrong because, under the doctrine of federal supremacy, federal law will govern state law when there is an inconsistency between the federal and the state laws. Therefore, the governor could be required to do an act that is a violation of state law, but a requirement of federal law.

(C) is wrong because a bill of attainder is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial on individuals who are designated either by name or in terms of past conduct. Here, even if the President’s act were considered “legislative,” it does not inflict punishment.

161
Q

There is a fundamental right to marry for persons inside the United States. Does it apply to illegal aliens?

Do children of illegal aliens have right to public education?

A

Yes, strict scrutiny applies.

Yes, intermediate scrutiny spplies.

162
Q

. Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to

A

to establish post offices and post roads.

This power grants Congress a monopoly over the delivery of mail.

No other system for delivering mail—public or private—can be established absent Congress’s consent.

163
Q

An attorney was employed by the United States Department of Health and Human Services in a regional office located in a tobacco-growing state. A labor contract between the agency and the clerical workers union contained a policy providing for termination of union employees only for certain specified grounds. The attorney, however, was not a member of the union and not covered by such a policy. The attorney was angered by the regional director’s refusal to adopt a no-smoking policy for employees and visitors in the office. She posted a notice in the employee cafeteria ridiculing what she called the hypocrisy of an agency promoting health issues and nonsmoking programs while refusing to provide its employees with those same opportunities. The notice prompted a great deal of debate among the employees and was brought to the attention of the regional director, who was very displeased.

Which of the following statements is most accurate regarding the director’s right to dismiss the attorney?

A The attorney has a liberty interest in the exercise of her First Amendment rights that entitles her to a hearing to contest the grounds of her dismissal.

B The attorney has a property interest as a public employee that precludes her from being fired without notice and an opportunity to respond.

C The attorney has no right to a hearing because her statements were not an expression of views on public issues.

D The attorney has both a liberty interest and a property interest that entitles her to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.

A

If the attorney is fired, she has a right to a hearing to determine whether her First Amendment rights were violated by her dismissal.

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a person has a liberty interest in the exercise of specific rights provided by the Constitution, including freedom of speech.

If a government employer seeks to fire an employee for speech-related conduct when the speech involved a matter of public concern but is not made pursuant to her official duties, the courts must carefully balance the employee’s rights as a citizen to comment on a matter of public concern against the government’s interest as an employer in the efficient performance of public service. Under the Court’s expansive interpretation of what is a public issue in this context [see Rankin v. McPherson (1987)], the attorney’s statement would probably qualify. At the very least, she can make a sufficient showing that her termination violates her free speech rights to be entitled to a hearing on the issue under procedural due process principles. [See Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District (1979)]

(B) is wrong because the attorney does not appear to have a property interest in her job.

A public employee who is subject to removal only for “cause” has a property interest in her job and generally must be given notice of the charges against her that are to be the basis for her job termination, and a pre-termination opportunity to respond to those charges.

Here, however, the attorney did not have a property interest in her job; she could have been dismissed for no reason at all. She was not covered by the labor contract between the agency and its clerical workers, and there appears to be no other basis for her to claim an entitlement to continued employment.

(C) is wrong because the attorney is entitled to a hearing as long as she can raise a prima facie claim that her speech, which was regarding an important health issue and the perception of her agency, was on a public issue and therefore protected by the First Amendment.

(D) is wrong for two reasons. As discussed above, the attorney does not have a property interest in her job. Also, due process does not necessarily entitle her to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing; a post-termination evidentiary hearing is probably sufficient. [See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985)]

164
Q

Commerce Clause

A

Pursuant to Article I of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to regulate commerce “among the several states.” Congress may regulate “channels” of interstate commerce (highways, waterways, and air traffic), instrumentalities of interstate commerce (cars, trucks, ships, airplanes, etc.) and activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce. Under this cumulative effect doctrine, Congress has the power to regulate any activity, whether carried on in one state or many, which has any appreciable effect (whether direct or indirect) on interstate commerce.

Here, the fireworks in question is similar to the wheat in the case of Wickard v. Filburn [317 U.S. 111 (1942)], in which the Supreme Court found that federal commerce power allowed for the regulation of the amounts of wheat that a farmer grew on his own land and intended wholly for his own consumption because many merchants doing the same thing would have a substantial cumulative effect on interstate commerce. As such, the regulation will be upheld.

165
Q

Is it within Congress’s power to confer standing by statute?

A

The doctrine of standing requires that a litigant have a concrete, personal stake in the outcome. The generalized interest of a citizen in requiring his government act constitutionally has never been deemed to be a sufficient basis for conferring standing. Direct, individuated harm–different from the citizenry at large–is required. The case of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife [504 U.S. 555 (1992)] held there was no standing because of an inadequate showing of a sufficient likelihood that plaintiffs would be injured in the future by destruction of endangered species abroad. The so-called “injury in fact” standard was mandated by the case and controversy requirement of Article III. As a result, it is beyond the power of Congress to confer standing by statute upon a particular class of persons who would not otherwise satisfy the Article III requirement.

In brief, Congress does not have the authority to simply expand federal court jurisdiction and grant standing to “anyone who wishes challenge” the drug enforcement statute. A private citizen would be required to show a direct and personal injury by application of the statute.

166
Q

Sections 9 and 10 in Article I of the U.S. Constitution bar both federal and state legislatures from passing bills of attainder. A bill of attainder is

A

a legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial upon named individuals or an easily ascertainable group for past conduct.

i.e.

The legislative act in this question named the person to be punished and revoked his license to practice medicine in the state without giving him notice and a hearing. The revocation was unconstitutional, and the group should prevail

167
Q

The Senate has the power to confirm Supreme Court nominees, but the Constitution does not impose an obligation on the Senate to hold confirmation hearings or vote on nominees.

A

The Constitution says that unless the Senate gives advice and consent, the nominee cannot be appointed, but it does not require the Senate to do anything in response to the nomination.

The relevant text is the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2, which provides: “[The president] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States…”

This language makes the Senate’s consent a prerequisite to presidential appointments, but it does not place any duty on the Senate to act, nor does it describe how it should proceed in its decision-making process. Even if the word “shall” in the clause is read as mandatory, “shall” refers only to things the President does.

Instead, the Senate’s core role in appointments is as a check on the President, which it exercises by not giving consent–a choice it can make simply by not acting.

An executive order is a directive from the President that has much of the same power as a federal law. The U.S. Constitution gives the President authority to create laws, or decide how an existing law should be carried out, through the use of executive orders. Because executive orders do not require congressional approval, the President can set important policy while sidestepping public debate. Executive orders may be used for a broad range of issues, from environmental conservation and protection to prohibiting discrimination and sending troops to other countries. An executive order may be issued for any domestic policy issue, as long as it does not step on the toes of Congress’ powers under the Constitution.

168
Q

The Supremacy Clause relevant facts

A

Not relevant

Whether the state regulation contains a provision resolving potential conflicts between state and federal law is irrelevant to the court’s determination of whether the state regulation is preempted by federal law. The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law is the supreme law of the land, and inconsistent state law is preempted if it is expressly prohibited or if Congress has intended the federal law to provide a comprehensive regulatory scheme.

Relevant

Evidence that the regulation of insecticides is a matter traditionally left to the states is highly relevant to the court’s determination of the regulation’s constitutionality. If the state regulation does not directly conflict with federal law and Congress has not expressly prohibited the state regulation, the court is more likely to uphold the regulation if the matter has traditionally been one of state or local concern, absent evidence of congressional intent to occupy the field or the need for uniformity.

Evidence of the consistency or supplementary nature of the state regulation assists the court in determining whether the state regulation is impliedly preempted and, therefore, is highly relevant. If there is no direct conflict between state and federal law, and if federal law does not expressly prohibit the state law, the court will examine whether a consistent or supplemental state law should be allowed to co-exist with federal law, based on whether the federal law is intended to be comprehensive (i.e., intended to occupy the field) or is necessary for uniformity of regulation.

Whether compliance with the state and federal regulations is mutually exclusive. Evidence that the state and federal regulations address the same subject matter and are incompatible indicates to the court that the state regulation is in conflict with federal law and is void under the Supremacy Clause, so it is highly relevant.

169
Q

IS the state statute that imposes the equivalent of a one-year residency requirement on incoming students to the state university system constitutional?

A

Courts apply strict scrutiny to any state regulation that discriminates against exercising the right to vote. Here, the state statute imposes the equivalent of a one-year residency requirement on incoming students to the state university system. There are less restrictive means by which the state could guarantee that only bona fide residents vote in local elections. For example, the state could shorten the residency requirement or ask for additional proof of intent to establish residency.

A state may, in some instances, have a compelling interest in denying an entire class of people the right to vote. For example, states may restrict or prohibit participation by aliens in state political processes, and states may deny ex-felons the right to vote. The state may also prohibit individuals who have not reached the age of majority from voting. Thus, this answer is incorrect in its blanket statement that the state can never deny the franchise to a particular class of people.

170
Q

A tax will be upheld under the taxing power provided it …

A

raises revenue in fact or is intended to raise revenue, even if the activity taxed is affected negatively by the tax.

i.e.

A 23% gas tax will have a substantial negative impact on all areas of transportation, including commercial and personal travel. The only situation in which the court could invalidate the tax provision is where the tax legislation is actually a regulation masquerading as a tax. However, even in this situation, the tax legislation will be upheld as long as revenue is being raised. In the case of the gas tax, revenue is being raised to stabilize the Medicare system. Therefore, the tax is likely to be held constitutional.

171
Q

A split decision by the Supreme Court effectively upholds the ruling of the last court to have heard the case.

A

In the event of such a tie, the Court typically issues what’s known as a percuriam decision.

When a 4-4 deadlock does occur, the case is deemed not to have set any sort of precedent. Tradition holds that the Court’s per curiam opinion in such ties is usually very, very terse, often consisting of no more than a single sentence: “The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court.”

172
Q

The Supremacy Clause prohibits the states from

A

regulating the federal government unless the federal government explicitly permits the state regulation or the state regulation is not inconsistent with existing federal policy.

i.e.

The U.S. Postal Service is a federal governmental entity. The State B statute requiring mail carriers to obtain a state driver’s license to operate postal trucks interferes with postal workers’ delivery duties, thereby violating the Supremacy Clause. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down a similar Maryland statute.

The police power reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment is subject to limitations, including those imposed by the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Thus, State B will not prevail simply on the basis of its Tenth Amendment police power. Thus, this answer is incorrect.

173
Q

In an effort to protect the dwindling California condor population, Congress enacted the Condor Preservation Act, which made it illegal to take or sell any part of a California condor. The constitutionality of the Act is challenged by a seller of gifts and artifacts, including artifacts made out of California condor feathers.

Is the statute valid?

A No, the statute violates due process because the absolute prohibition on sale is an effective taking under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause without just compensation.

B No, because the statute is discriminatory as applied.

C Yes, because the statute is rationally related to interstate commerce.

D Yes, because the statute is designed to protect a dwindling national resource.

A

The statute is valid because it is rationally related to interstate commerce. Regulating the sale of an item made from a California condor clearly affects commerce. Thus, Congress can act under its broad commerce power. The regulations do not compel surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint on them. Neither does the statute prohibit all economic uses of the property (e.g., the artifacts can be displayed in the store, admission can be charged to view them, etc.). Thus, there is no taking of a property right without just compensation. Therefore, Congress’s power to regulate is proper, even though it diminishes the opportunity to make a profit. Thus, (A) is incorrect. (B) is not supported by the facts—there does not appear to be a discriminatory application of the statute. (D) states the right conclusion, but for the wrong reason. The statutory authority here lies in Congress’s broad power to regulate interstate commerce.

174
Q

Press and broadcasting companies can be subject to general business taxes, but …

A

a tax applicable only to the press or based on the content of a publication will not be upheld absent a compelling justification (i.e. advertising beer or cigarettes).

175
Q

Due to budget shortages and a critical need of funding to fight a war, Congress enacted a $25 tax on each person flying into an airport in the five most popular vacation destinations in the country, as determined by Congress. The tax was implemented, and officials in the five destinations were outraged, fearing that the number of vacationers to the taxed destinations would decrease due to the tax.

If the tax is challenged in federal court by an official with standing, is the most likely result that the tax will be held constitutional?

A No, because it makes it significantly more difficult for persons to travel between the states.

B No, because the tax unfairly discriminates against certain vacation destinations by taxing them and not taxing other, similar vacation destinations.

C Yes, because the tax is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.

D Yes, because Congress has plenary power to impose taxes to raise revenue.

A

The destination tax will likely be held constitutional under Congress’s taxing power. Congress has the power to lay taxes under Article I, Section 8, and a tax measure will usually be upheld if it bears some reasonable relationship to revenue production or if Congress has the power to regulate the taxed activity. Despite the protest from the officials of the affected locations, the tax here does appear to be related to revenue production and so will be upheld.

(C) is incorrect because it is based on the wrong standard—the compelling interest test does not apply here.

(A) is incorrect because the extent of the right to travel is not clearly defined.

The Supreme Court has established that the right to travel from state to state is a fundamental right that may be violated by state laws designed to deter persons from moving into a state; however, the Court has not specifically applied this rule to the federal government or to the type of tax legislation present here. The state cases involved treating old vs. new residents differently for purposes of voting or some government benefit, which may have violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or treating outsiders differently from residents, which may have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Neither clause is applicable to the federal government, so neither analysis is appropriate.

(B) also is incorrect. While the federal government is not subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is prohibited from unfair discrimination by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Grossly unreasonable discrimination by the federal government could be held to violate due process, but a $25 tax on flights to popular vacation destinations probably does not. The tax is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of revenue production and so will likely be upheld.

176
Q

A mother and father instructed their son who just turned age 14 to report to a community woodworking shop instead of school. A state law requires all children to attend school until the age of 16, and the woodshop does not qualify as a school under state law. Because the parents did not report their son’s absence, a truant officer visited the family and warned them that parents who willfully refuse to comply with the mandatory attendance law are subject to a $500 fine and up to 30 days in jail for each day of noncompliance. The parents listened, but informed the officer that they could not comply with the state law because of their religious views, under which woodworking is an essential spiritual pursuit. The following day, the 14-year-old again went to work in the community woodshop instead of to school. His parents were then arrested and charged with violating the state mandatory school attendance law.

At the parents’ criminal trial, which of the following may the court constitutionally consider in determining whether First Amendment protection applies to the parents’ views?

A Whether the parents’ belief system is related to an organized group that gathers regularly to express or celebrate the belief system.

B Whether the parents’ beliefs are derived from a traditional religion.

C Whether the parents’ belief system includes recognition of a supreme being.

D Whether the parents’ belief system occupies a place in their lives similar to that occupied by orthodox religious beliefs.

A

Although the validity of religious beliefs cannot be questioned, the role a belief system plays in a person’s life can be examined to determine whether the beliefs are indeed religious. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits punishing people for their religious beliefs. When a person claims that he is being punished for his religious beliefs, the court may consider whether the person challenging the law sincerely holds those beliefs. Thus, the court may consider whether the parents’ beliefs play a role in their lives similar to that of orthodox religious beliefs.

177
Q

Congress enacted a statute appropriating money to the states on condition that the states use the money to support “public performances of classical ballet open to the public.” The statute provided that the money was not to be used to support any other type of dance, and that tickets to any performance paid for with these funds were to be distributed to the public on a first come, first served basis.

A state that accepted a grant of $500,000 under the federal statute gave half of the grant to a state-sponsored ballet company. The company had been started 20 years earlier as part of a state effort to bring culture to poor, inner-city areas. By state law enacted when the company was formed, no less than 35% of the tickets to each performance of the ballet company must be distributed to the inner-city school systems to be given to minority school children.

Is the state’s method of distributing tickets to the state ballet company’s performances constitutional?

A Yes, because the state ballet company is state-operated and the doctrine of federalism prohibits the federal government from directly interfering with state operations.

B Yes, because the state ballet ticket distribution system substantially conforms with the underlying purpose of the federal ticket distribution scheme.

C No, because the state distribution system violates the Supremacy Clause.

D No, because the state distribution system violates equal protection.

A

The state ticket distribution system is unconstitutional because of the Supremacy Clause.

A valid act of Congress supersedes any state or local action that conflicts with it. The act here is valid because Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare, and in so doing may place conditions on grants as it sees fit. The state law directly conflicts with the federal law because the federal law requires that tickets be distributed on a first come, first served basis, and the state law requires that 35% of the tickets be given to minority school children. Because the state law conflicts with the federal law, it is invalid.

(A), based on the Tenth Amendment, is incorrect because, even if Congress lacks the power to directly regulate the distribution of the tickets in question, the regulation here would still be valid as a spending power condition. The Supreme Court has held that Congress may condition grants under the spending power even where it cannot directly regulate, as long as the conditions are (i) clearly stated, (ii) related to the purpose of the program, and (iii) not unduly coercive. [See South Dakota v. Dole (1987)—conditioning federal highway grants on prohibiting minors from drinking]

(B) is incorrect because the Supremacy Clause invalidates all conflicting state laws where there is a clash, no matter how complementary the state law may be viewed.

(D) is incorrect because the state program probably is valid under the Equal Protection Clause. State programs that favor racial and ethnic minorities are subject to the same strict scrutiny standards as programs that discriminate against minorities: They must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest. There is a compelling government interest in remedying past discrimination, and the facts indicate that the ballet company was established to remedy the prior lack of cultural opportunities that existed in the inner city. The program also appears to be narrowly tailored, and so would likely survive an equal protection challenge.

178
Q

Article II, Section 2 provides that the President shall nominate, and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint, ambassadors and other officers of the United States.

A

The section also provides that Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

Under separation of powers principles, however, Congress may not vest in itself any broader appointment powers than what is provided for by the Constitution. Where Congress has not vested the appointment power in courts of law or the heads of departments, it is not permitted to restrict the candidates that the President may nominate for appointment.

179
Q

A state statute makes it a felony for anyone in the corridors or on the grounds of any building in which a court may be in session to make a speech or carry a sign intended to improperly influence judicial proceedings. During a murder trial, a friend of the defendant was arrested under the statute for carrying a sign on the steps of the courthouse bearing the message: “Free the defendant or the judge will die.”

Can the friend constitutionally be convicted under the statute?

A No, because the statute could apply to others whose speech is constitutionally protected.

B No, unless she personally intended to harm the judge.

C Yes, if there was a clear and present danger that the judge would be influenced by the sign.

D Yes, because the statute does not violate the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.

A

The friend can constitutionally be convicted because the statute does not violate the First Amendment.

Certain public property (e.g., public streets or parks) is so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that speech thereon can be regulated only by content neutral proscriptions.

Other places controlled by the government, however, are not so historically linked to speech activities, and in such locations free speech might interfere with the intended use of such locations. Thus, the government can regulate access to these limited public forums and nonpublic forums based on the subject matter of the speech, as long as the regulation is reasonably related to the purpose served by the property and is not designed merely to suppress a particular point of view.

A courthouse and its grounds is not a public forum. (The surrounding sidewalks are, but that is not in issue here.)

The statute, although based on the subject matter of speech, is viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to the courthouse purpose of promoting a stable, orderly atmosphere in which judicial proceedings can take place free of improper outside influence or coercion. Thus, the statute is valid and the friend can be convicted for her actions.

(A) is wrong because it is based on an overbreadth argument and the statute here is not overbroad. A regulation of speech that restricts substantially more speech than necessary is unenforceable, even if the speech in question could have been properly restricted by a narrower statute. This doctrine is inapplicable here because the statute is not overbroad: it reaches only speech in the courthouse or on its grounds and only that speech that might improperly influence the judicial proceedings; it does not limit all speech at that location.

(B) is wrong because the friend’s intent to harm the judge is irrelevant. The statute makes it a crime to make a speech or carry a sign intended to influence the judicial proceeding. The statute does not require that the violator intend to harm anyone. Because the state is entitled to regulate speech or conduct in the courthouse or on its grounds that might interfere with the judicial proceedings, it is entitled to convict the friend for her actions here regardless of her intent to harm the judge.

(C) is wrong because it improperly applies the “clear and present danger” test to these facts.

Under the current version of the “clear and present danger” test, a state cannot forbid advocating the use of force or violation of law unless such advocacy is

(i) directed to producing or inciting imminent lawless action, and

(ii) likely to produce such action.

The state statute here does not purport to punish advocacy of force or lawlessness, but rather seeks to further the purpose of maintaining the stability and integrity of the judicial proceedings by regulating access to certain nonpublic areas. Therefore, the restrictions are constitutionally valid and the “clear and present danger” test is inapplicable.

180
Q

A state statute provides: “Any merchant desiring to sell within this state any product or goods manufactured outside of the United States must (i) obtain a special license from the state for $50 and (ii) clearly mark the goods as to specify their country of origin.” The statute makes it a misdemeanor for any merchant to willfully sell goods without complying with these statutory requirements.

Which of the following statements is correct regarding the constitutionality of the statute?

A The portion of the statute requiring the license fee can be sustained on the ground that reasonable inspection fees are proper; but the balance of the statute is invalid.

B The portion of the statute requiring that the goods be labeled as to country of origin can be sustained because it only requires disclosure; but the balance of the statute is invalid.

C The statute is constitutionally valid as long as the burden on foreign commerce is minimal and is justified by legitimate state interests.

D The statute is unconstitutional in its entirety.

A

The statute is an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause. Regulation of foreign commerce is exclusively a federal power because of the need for the federal government to speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments. The existence of legitimate state interests underlying state legislation will not justify state regulation of foreign commerce. The state statute, in imposing requirements for a license costing $50 and for a clear marking of goods as being from a foreign country, clearly is an attempt by the state to restrict or even eliminate the flow of such goods in foreign commerce. Thus, the statute is unconstitutional. (A) is incorrect because even if the $50 fee represents a reasonable inspection fee, the fee would still constitute an interference with foreign commerce. In addition, the facts do not indicate that the license fee has anything to do with inspection, or that the amount of the fee bears any relation to legitimate inspection purposes. (B) is incorrect because the labeling requirement imposes a burden on goods that flow in the stream of foreign commerce. Although this burden may be relatively small, it is still impermissible in light of the exclusive power held in this area by the federal government. (C) is incorrect because it states factors that would be relevant in a matter involving regulation of interstate commerce, rather than foreign commerce. Congress’s power over interstate commerce is shared with the states, so that a state law may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce if it does not discriminate against out-of-state competition to benefit local economic interests and its incidental burden on interstate commerce does not outweigh the legitimate local benefits arising therefrom. However, Congress’s power over foreign commerce is exclusive, so that factors such as a minimal burden on foreign commerce and the presence of legitimate state interests will not save a state law from a challenge based on the power to regulate foreign commerce.

181
Q

A public school teacher was hired without a written contract. The school district handbook provides that all newly hired employees are at-will employees for their first year of service and may be dismissed for any reason or without reason. Six months after being hired, the teacher was dismissed without any prior notice or a hearing.

Which of the following, if true, most strongly supports the teacher’s argument that she should have been afforded notice and a hearing before dismissal?

A She was the only newly hired teacher not to have survived the probationary period for the past three years.

B There is no evidence that teachers with permanent status are any more competent than this teacher.

C The teacher moved her household from out of state in reliance on an oral promise by the school board that the job would be permanent and that she could be dismissed only for cause.

D She was the only teacher there over the age of 50.

A

The teacher’s argument is most strongly supported if she moved in reliance on an oral promise that she could be dismissed only for cause.

Under the Due Process Clause, a person has a right to notice and a hearing if the government deprives the person of life, liberty, or property. The Supreme Court has held that a government employee will have a property interest in continued employment only if the employee has a legitimate claim to (as opposed to a mere expectancy of) continued employment. To have such a claim, there must be a contract, clear practice, mutual understanding, etc., that the employee can be terminated only for cause.

If someone in a position of authority promised that the teacher could be dismissed only for cause and the teacher relied on this promise by moving, a case can be made that the teacher had a legitimate claim to continued employment despite the employee handbook.

(A) would also support the contention of a legitimate claim to continued employment. If every teacher over the past three years has survived the probation period, an argument can be made that there was a policy of retaining all newly hired teachers. However, this argument is weaker, factually, than the contract argument and so is not as good an answer choice as (C). (B) and (D) are incorrect because they are irrelevant—whether other teachers are more or less competent or younger than the teacher involved here does not factor into whether the teacher here has a legitimate claim to continued employment. The teacher needs to point to a contract or policy providing for dismissal only for cause.

182
Q

To provide jobs for its citizens, stimulate future tourism, and help the environment, a state legislature enacted a statute authorizing the state’s department of parks and recreation to hire up to 5,000 persons to plant trees on land in the state that has been denuded of trees by overlogging. Among other things, the statute provides that resident aliens may be employed only if no United States citizens are available to fill the necessary positions.

In a challenge to the constitutionality of that provision by a plaintiff with standing to raise the claim, which of the following constitutional provisions would be most helpful to the plaintiff?

A The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

B The reserved powers of the state under the Tenth Amendment.

C The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

D The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.

A

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the most helpful provision. State classifications based on alienage that do not involve alien participation in the self-government process are suspect under the Equal Protection Clause and are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. They will be upheld only if the government can show that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. While the state’s interests here in providing jobs, stimulating future tourism, and helping the environment may be compelling, it cannot be said that these goals can be achieved only by discriminating against resident aliens. Thus, the legislation would be found unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. (A) is wrong because the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the privileges and immunities of United States citizens, not aliens. (B) is wrong because, even if applicable, the Tenth Amendment could only help the state (by reserving to the state powers that are not delegated to the federal government); it does not carry any prohibitions. (D) might provide a viable argument, as a statute that affects a fundamental right can be struck down under the Due Process Clause under the same strict scrutiny test as set out above under the Equal Protection Clause. However, it is a less direct argument than (C) because strict scrutiny applies under the Due Process Clause only if the challenger can show that a fundamental right is involved.

183
Q

A city council and park board announced joint plans to tear down some old buildings and erect a park. Before the contracts were made, in order to garner the greatest political benefit from such projects, the city council adopted an ordinance requiring that 35% of the work force of contractors working on city-funded projects be residents of the city.

One of the contractors working on the park project employed several people from the city, but he and most of his employees came from a town in a neighboring state that was a few miles west of the city. When the city projects inspector discovered that the contractor did not employ the required 35%, he told the contractor that if he did not hire a sufficient number of city workers within 20 days the contractor would forfeit the opportunity to work on the project. The contractor immediately filed an action in federal court seeking to have the employment requirement declared unconstitutional.

Of which party should the court rule in favor?

A The city, because it is acting as a “market participant” here.

B The city, because there is a rational basis for favoring city residents here.

C The contractor, because the requirement interferes with his rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.

D The contractor, because the requirement interferes with his Contract Clause rights.

A

The court should rule in favor of the contractor because the pursuit of a livelihood is a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the requirement here substantially interferes with that right.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prohibits states and municipalities from discriminating against residents of other states. Not all discrimination is prohibited—only that which substantially interferes with important commercial activities or civil liberties. The Supreme Court has held that the right to pursue a livelihood is a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and also has held that a requirement that private contractors on city projects employ a certain percentage of city residents substantially interferes with the right. [See United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden (1984)]

(A) is incorrect because there is no market participant exception under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. _The market participant exception arises from the Commerce Clause and is not appropriate in privileges and immunities analysis. [_See United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, supra]

(B) is incorrect because the fact that a rational basis exists for the requirement does not justify it. The Supreme Court has stated that the Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibition on discriminating against nonresidents may be overcome if there is substantial justification for the discrimination. The exception will apply if nonresidents are causing a problem (e.g., unemployment) and the discrimination is the least restrictive means of combating the problem. It is not apparent from the facts here that the city has an unemployment problem or that nonresidents are causing the problem. In any case, the choice states the wrong standard. Therefore, (B) is incorrect. (D) is incorrect because the Contract Clause is a limitation on states’ rights to modify existing contracts retroactively; it is unrelated to a state’s power to regulate contracts prospectively, which is the case here since the resident employee restriction predated the contractor’s contract.

184
Q

After months of bilateral talks, the President entered into a treaty with a foreign nation previously designated by the President as a terrorist state. Under the treaty, the foreign nation agreed to curtail its nuclear testing program and the United States agreed to lift trading sanctions against the foreign country. The treaty was approved by a vote of more than two-thirds of the Senate. Subsequently, it was revealed that the government of the foreign nation had been sponsoring the copying and black market trade of products patented in the United States and protected by international law. Outraged, Congress approved a bill purporting to repeal the treaty. When the bill was presented to the President, he vetoed it, citing national security interests. Both houses of Congress then repassed the bill by a more than two-thirds vote.

As a result of the foregoing, which of the following statements is correct?

A The treaty is still valid, because it was both negotiated by the President and passed by Congress.

B The treaty is still valid, because the President still supports the treaty and the President’s power over foreign affairs is paramount.

C The treaty was effectively repealed, because acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land, and any United States treaty in conflict with a congressional act is invalid.

D The treaty was effectively repealed, because the repeal was approved over the President’s veto after the treaty was made.

A

The treaty was effectively repealed because the bill was passed over the President’s veto. Valid treaties are on a “supremacy parity” with acts of Congress, meaning that they are both considered to be the “supreme law of the land.” If a conflict exists between them, it is resolved by order of adoption—the last in time prevails. Here, the bill to repeal the treaty was approved by Congress over the President’s veto by a more than two-thirds vote. Thus, the President’s veto was overridden, and because the bill was passed after the treaty, the bill prevails. (A) is incorrect because, as stated above, acts of Congress and treaties are on a supremacy parity—the fact that a treaty is approved by both the President and the Senate does not make it supreme over conflicting legislation that is validly enacted at a later point. (B) is incorrect because of the parity rule discussed above. It is true that the President’s power over foreign affairs is paramount, and the President might be able to enter into an executive agreement to get around the repeal of the treaty, but such a possibility does not change the status of the treaty in question. (C) is incorrect because, although it states the correct result, its rationale is too broad. Acts of Congress are on parity with treaties; they do not automatically invalidate all treaties (e.g., treaties that are entered into after the act of Congress is approved).

185
Q

As part of a deal to raise the federal debt limit, Congress passed a statute by a greater than two-thirds vote in both houses giving the President authority to cancel particular spending provisions that are contained within legislation that he signs into law. The statute provided that Congress could override the President’s decisions only by a three-fourths vote. As soon as the statute went into effect, a Senator who had voted against the statute filed suit in federal district court, challenging its constitutionality.

Is the Senator likely to succeed in her lawsuit?

A

The Supreme Court has held that members of Congress lack standing to challenge a law authorizing the President to exercise a line item veto (such as the statute here), reasoning that the injury is not concrete and personal, but rather is institutional in that it is shared by all members of Congress.

The line-item veto, or partial veto, is a special form of veto power that authorizes a chief executive to reject particular provisions of a bill enacted by a legislature without vetoing the entire bill.

186
Q

In general, a taxpayer has no standing to challenge the expenditure of federal funds. The major exception to this rule is where

A

the taxpayer alleges that the expenditure was enacted under Congress’s taxing and spending power, and exceeds some specific limitation on that power, in particular the Establishment Clause.

Here, by providing federal tax money to parochial schools, there may be excessive entanglement with religion and thus a violation of the Establishment Clause. Thus, the woman would have standing to contest this federal expenditure. The woman would not have to have children to make this challenge. However, she would have to be a taxpayer.

187
Q

Although it is a federal power, states may regulate interstate commerce subject to the negative implications of the Commerce Clause. The negative implications (also called Dormant Commerce Clause) generally prohibit states from

A

discriminating against out-of-state business or unduly burdening interstate commerce.

188
Q

Exception to the general rule under the Commerce Clause prohibiting states from discriminating against out-of-state competition:

A
  • When a state acts as a market participant, it generally is not restricted by the Commerce Clause; it may favor its own citizens, such as by distributing state-owned resources only to residents or paying residents more for something than it would pay an a nonresident (although such conduct might violate the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause).
  • When a regulation is necessary to further an important, noneconomic state interest such as health or safety, it is excepted from the general rule of the negative implications of the Commerce Clause prohibiting discrimination against out-of-state competition.
189
Q

A regulation favoring local governments when performing government functions, such as exempting local bonds from state tax while subjecting bonds of other states to a tax, is excepted from the negative implications of the Commerce Clause.

A

All of the other choices would be invalid under the negative implications of the Commerce Clause:

  • A regulation prohibiting out-of-state wastes from being accepted in private landfills discriminates against out-of-state business,
  • as does a regulation requiring operations to occur in the state, such as requiring all milk sold within the state to be pasteurized in the state, and
  • the negative implications of the Commerce Clause also prohibit regulations protecting local businesses, such as ones placing a surcharge on out-of-state products.
190
Q

The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) issued a lengthy set of regulations regarding personal radar detectors. The regulations deal with the safety of such detectors and the frequencies on which they may operate, so as not to interfere with FCC-licensed radio and television stations or with radar used by commercial airliners and private aircraft.

May a state constitutionally ban the use of radar detectors on its roads?

A

States may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce as long as the local regulation does not conflict with, or is not preempted by, federal regulation and the regulation meets the following tests:

(i) the regulation does not discriminate against out-of-state competition in order to benefit local economic interests, and

(ii) the incidental burden on interstate commerce does not outweigh the local benefits of the regulation.

In this case, the federal regulations do not conflict with the state ban and are not so comprehensive as to preempt nonconflicting state regulation. With regard to the two-part test, the first standard is met because the regulation is not discriminatory against out-of-state products (because it bans all radar detectors regardless of origin). The second part is a balancing test, in which the court will consider whether the regulation promotes legitimate state interests and whether less restrictive alternatives are available.

Here, the ban clearly promotes the state’s legitimate interest in highway safety by making it harder for speeding motorists to evade detection. Anything less than a ban would not be effective in preventing the use of the detectors, and their use makes radar, the state’s best means of preventing speeding, much less effective. On balance, the ban’s local safety benefits outweigh its burden on interstate commerce and transportation.

191
Q

The state legislature of state A enacted legislation prohibiting the use of tractor-trailer rigs weighing more than 100,000 pounds gross, on the basis that superheavy trucks rapidly degrade the state’s roadways and pose a greater safety danger than smaller trucks. A trucking firm that frequently uses state A’s highways for trips between state B and state C purchased several tractor-trailer rigs weighing over 100,000 pounds when loaded. The trucking firm brings an action for declaratory relief in federal court in state B, seeking to have the state A legislation declared unconstitutional. It presents expert testimony that the heavier trucks are no less safe than smaller models. State A produces no evidence, but asserts that the legislation is justified as an exercise of its police power.

How should the trial court rule?

A

The legislation violates the Commerce Clause.

As a general matter, a state may regulate in ways that impact on interstate commerce as long as the regulation does so only indirectly and the benefits outweigh the burdens imposed by compliance with the regulation. [Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. (1981)] When, as here, only a bare assertion that the regulation would increase safety is involved, a court will generally find that the regulation is invalid. This does not mean that a state could not prevail if it proved that the benefits of the regulation do in fact outweigh the burdens. Indeed, the Court intimated that such would be the case in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (1959). But state A has not made a sufficient showing here, and the trucking firm has presented colorable “expert” evidence to the contrary.

192
Q

Large semi-trailer trucks use one of two basic designs of tires. There are some differences in the two designs of the tires, but both are deemed to be equally safe by independent testing labs. A state has enacted a statute banning the use of one of the tire types. The other tire design is legal and available for sale in all states. A trade association of interstate trucking firms has brought suit to have the statute declared unconstitutional. The state argues that no burden exists because the other tire design can be used in all states.

How should the Court rule on the constitutionality of the statute?a

A

The statute banning the use of one of the tire designs is an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce even though an equally safe alternative is available in all 50 states.

If Congress has not enacted laws regarding a subject, a state may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce if the regulation:

(i) does not discriminate against out-of-state competition to benefit local economic interests; and (ii) is not unduly burdensome (i.e., the incidental burden on interstate commerce does not outweigh the legitimate local benefits).

The facts do not suggest that Congress has regulated the subject of truck tires on state roads. The facts also do not indicate whether either tire design is manufactured in the state, so discrimination in favor of local economic interests is absent. The final test is a balancing test to determine whether the regulation is unduly burdensome, and here the regulation probably will fail. In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines (1959), the Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois statute requiring trucks to use contour mudguards rather than flat mudguards. One aspect of the burden on commerce in that case was that another state required flat mudguards rather than contour mudguards, precluding trucking companies from using one type of mudguard in all 50 states and indicating that the safety benefits that Illinois was claiming for contour mudguards had not been conclusively established. In this case, because the other tire design is legal in all 50 states, the burden on interstate commerce is not as great. Nevertheless, it is still significant. By not permitting equally safe alternative types of tires, which might be cheaper or more readily available, the state is imposing an undue burden on all trucking companies in other states whose trailers might at some time pass through the state. On the other side of the equation, the Illinois mudguard regulation in Bibb arguably was a safety measure, which is an area of legitimate local concern.

Here, there is no evidence of any safety benefit; both types of tires have been deemed equally safe by independent testing labs. On balance, therefore, the statute is unconstitutional because its incidental burden on interstate commerce outweighs any legitimate local benefits.

193
Q

The state of Blue enacted a statute to protect its faltering lobster industry. The statute provides that no lobster shall be taken from lobster beds lying within three miles of the state shoreline unless the lobster is at least one pound in weight. The statute’s one-pound limitation is intended to enable young lobsters to reproduce before being caught. At the same time, Congress enacted a lobster conservation act that provides $5 million for research funds to develop and improve breeding grounds for lobsters. The federal act imposes a special excise tax of $1,000 on each lobster caught in violation of state law if later shipped in interstate commerce. A lobsterman who lives in the state of Green, which is just south of the state of Blue, crossed over into waters lying within three miles of the Blue coastline. He was arrested by state Blue law enforcement officers for taking lobsters that weighed less than one pound. The man defended the charge by challenging the constitutionality of the state Blue statute.

Which of the following results is most likely?

A

The statute will be upheld because it does not discriminate against out-of-state economic interests and it is not unduly burdensome.

A state or local government may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce if such regulation: (i) does not discriminate against out-of-state competition to benefit local economic interests; and (ii) is not unduly burdensome (i.e., the incidental burden on interstate commerce does not outweigh the legitimate local benefits produced by the regulation). The state of Blue statute does not discriminate against out-of-state elements of the lobster fishing industry. The statute is designed to maintain the lobster population by allowing lobsters to reproduce. By maintaining the lobster population, the state is attempting to further the legitimate interest of reviving its faltering lobster fishing industry, rather than trying to protect a local business against interstate competition. In addition, the statute is applied evenhandedly (i.e., it does not merely regulate the activities of out-of-state lobster fishers while exempting in-state fishers from those same regulations). Therefore, the statute does not discriminate against interstate commerce. The statute may impose some incidental burden on interstate commerce by requiring out-of-state lobster fishers to refrain from taking lobsters weighing less than one pound from lobster beds within three miles of the state shoreline. However, this burden should not result in any great difficulty for out-of-state lobster fishers who wish to catch lobsters in state Blue waters. There is nothing especially burdensome or restrictive about the statute’s provisions, and certainly the incidental burden that does exist does not outweigh the state’s legitimate interest in maintaining its lobster population and the vitality of its lobster fishing industry. Consequently, the statute is not unduly burdensome. Because the statute is not unduly burdensome and is nondiscriminatory against out-of-state competition, it does not violate the Commerce Clause.

194
Q

If a judge has an interest in a case before her that causes a serious risk of bias, or actual bias, a procedural due process concern arises.

A

The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment (applicable to the federal government) and the Fourteenth Amendment (applicable to the states) provide that the government shall not take a person’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Due process contemplates fair process/procedure, which requires at least an opportunity to present objections to the proposed action to a fair, neutral decisionmaker (not necessarily a judge). If a judge has an interest in a case that causes a severe risk of bias, or actual bias, the procedure is not fair and the Due Process Clause is violated.

195
Q

a government employee who may be fired only for cause has a legitimate claim to continued employment and thus has a property interest in her job, while an at-will employee has, at best,

A

a unilateral expectancy of continued employment and no property interest

196
Q

A business license is a valid property right

A

and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government may deprive a person of property.

197
Q

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a public employee who is subject to removal only for “cause” under a statute, ordinance, or personnel document has a property interest in continued employment that cannot be taken away without due process of law.

A

The Court has held that such an employee generally must be given notice of the charges and a pretermination opportunity to respond to those charges. The employee must also be given a subsequent evidentiary hearing regarding the termination (with reinstatement if the employee prevails). [Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985)]

198
Q

A STATE LAW that denies government benefits to an individual based on alienage is subject to

A

strict scrutiny and will be upheld only if the state proves the discrimination is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. Generally, alienage classifications made by states are subject to strict scrutiny. (However, there is an exception where the law is related to participation in the self-government process. Such laws are subject only to the rational basis test.)

199
Q

Intending to encourage long-time resident aliens to become American citizens, a state passed a law denying numerous state and municipal jobs to persons who had been resident aliens for longer than 10 years. Those already in the state had to apply for American citizenship within a year after the law took effect. Persons who had acquired resident alien status prior to achieving the age of majority had until age 30 to acquire such status or be automatically disqualified from obtaining such a job. A 40-year-old man who has been a resident alien in the state for 15 years applied for a job as a police emergency response telecommunications expert. He had not filed for citizenship within the one-year grace period.

May the state constitutionally rely on the statute to refuse to hire the man?

A

The law probably is unconstitutional as applied to the man in question.

An equal protection issue is involved. Under the Equal Protection Clause, state classifications based on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny and so must serve a compelling interest to be constitutional. No compelling purpose seems to be present here. (A) is incorrect because, although there is an exception from the strict scrutiny standard where a state or local government discriminates against aliens when hiring persons for jobs involving “self-government” processes, the job here (emergency communications for a police department) is a technical position and probably would not be found to be related to the self-government process; in any event, the statute applies to all positions and not just to jobs involving only the self-government process.

200
Q

The Privileges or Immunities Clause prohibits states from denying their citizens the rights of

A

national citizenship, which includes the right to travel. Other rights protected include the right to petition Congress for redress of grievances, the right to vote for federal officers, and the right to enter public lands.

201
Q

Freedom of speech is not a right of national citizenship under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In The Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court held that

A

rights of national citizenship do not include all of the rights in the Bill of Rights, although some rights under the Bill of Rights may be held applicable to the states as incidents of due process.

202
Q

The right to earn a living is

A

not a right of national citizenship under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although the right is protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, which limits states from discriminating against nonresidents.

203
Q

The right to an attorney is not a right of national citizenship under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A

Although the right is included in the Bill of Rights under the Sixth Amendment, as discussed above, the Supreme Court held in The Slaughterhouse Cases that rights of national citizenship do not include the Bill of Rights.

204
Q

A state law prohibits physicians from practicing medicine within the state without a state license. Among other things, the grant of a state license requires a physician to have been a resident of the state for at least one year. A physician moved to the state from a nearby state and immediately applied for a license to practice medicine. Although otherwise qualified, the physician’s request for a license was denied based on the residency requirement. The physician brought suit, alleging that the residency requirement violated the United States Constitution.

Will the physician likely succeed?

A

The physician will succeed. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying their citizens the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. This includes the right to travel, and the Court has held that the right to travel includes the right of newly arrived citizens to enjoy the same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by other citizens of the state. A state law that distinguishes between new residents solely on the length of their residency will serve no legitimate state interest. Thus, a law limiting medical licenses to persons who have resided in the state for a year runs afoul of the clause. (A) is incorrect. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prohibits discrimination by a state against nonresidents. Here, the physician is a resident of the state discriminating against him. Hence, the Article IV privileges and immunities protection does not apply.

205
Q

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV protects against discrimination by a state in favor of its own citizens when it affects a fundamental right, such as the pursuit of a livelihood. Any statute that results in such discrimination violates the Clause unless the state shows that it has a substantial justification for the discriminatory treatment. In effect, it must show that nonresidents either cause or are part of the problem it is attempting to solve, and that there are no less restrictive means to solve the problem.

A

The state does not have to show a compelling interest for the discrimination. It must show an “important” one, a lower standard.

206
Q

A state located in the southern half of the United States experienced a strong influx of retirees, due in part to its mild winters and in part to the generous health benefits that the state historically provided to its elderly residents who fell below the federal poverty line. The state’s Office of Budget Management determined that the influx of retirees would bankrupt the state’s health care benefit fund within five years. To preserve the fund and ensure the health of its citizens, the state revised its health care statute to make persons ineligible for coverage until they have lived in the state for at least one year.

If a retiree who was denied benefits because she just moved to the state challenges the constitutionality of the statute in federal court, is she likely to prevail?

A

The court will likely find that the one-year residency requirement is unconstitutional because it burdens the right to travel.

An individual has a fundamental right to travel from state to state, and a state law that is designed to deter persons from moving into the state is likely to violate the Equal Protection Clause (as well as the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause). When a state uses a durational residency requirement (a waiting period) for dispensing benefits, that requirement normally should be subject to the strict scrutiny test, and usually will be found not to have satisfied the test. One such requirement that has been invalidated on this basis is a one-year waiting period for state-subsidized medical care, such as the one here. [See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974)]

The Supreme Court has specifically held that a state’s interest in fiscal integrity is not sufficient to justify a one-year waiting period for welfare or health benefits.

The states have no constitutional duty to provide health care benefits for those below the poverty line. However, once a state chooses to provide such benefits, it may not do so in a manner that violates the Constitution, and, as explained above, the restriction here violates the right to travel.

The privileges and immunities protection of Article IV prohibits discrimination by a state against nonresidents when fundamental national rights are involved. Here, the restriction differentiates between residents. While that could violate the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, Article IV is not implicated.

207
Q

Incitement

A

Speech may be punished or banned under the clear and present danger test whenever it is directed to producing or inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action. That call to lawlessness has to be “now” and it must be under circumstances likely to produce the action in order to be unprotected speech.

208
Q

A statute that prohibits “abusive language” is overbroad and thus not an enforceable fighting words statute. Lots of language that is “abusive” is protected speech.

A

Statements meant to place a person in fear of bodily harm and statements likely to incite physical retaliation are both classic examples of fighting words subject to government regulation.

Conduct undertaken with the intent to cause fear of bodily harm (e.g., cross burning) is considered to be a form of fighting words, even though there is no actual spoken threat. This is because the conduct is intended to convey a message that is unprotected by the First Amendment.

209
Q

After a state supreme court overturned the conviction in a murder case for failure to give proper Miranda warnings, a reporter asked the murder victim’s father to comment on the case as he exited the supreme court building. The father made the following statement: “Each one of the so-called supreme court justices is worse than a murderer, because they make it possible for more sons and daughters to be murdered. I’d like to see every one of them strung up, like they should have done to the creep who was set free, and if someone will give me a rope I’ll go in there and do it myself.”

A state statute proscribes, with criminal penalties, “the making of any threat to the life or safety of a public official for any act the official performed as part of the official’s duties in office.”

Which of the following is correct regarding the statute?

A

The statute is not unconstitutional. True threats are not protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, content-based restrictions on speech are permitted in cases where the speech creates a clear and present danger of imminent lawless action. A state can forbid advocating the use of force or of law violation if such advocacy (i) is directed to producing or inciting imminent lawless action, and (ii) is likely to produce or incite such action. Thus, a statute proscribing threats to the life or safety of a public official, such as the statute here, is valid. However, it cannot constitutionally be applied to the victim’s father. It is doubtful that the father’s words will be interpreted as a true threat of immediate harm. In context, the speech seems to be more a political commentary, which would be protected by the First Amendment. The father appeared to be merely venting his outrage. There was no indication that the father’s words were inciting imminent lawless action or were likely to produce such action. It does not appear that the father was actually threatening the justices with harm or inciting anyone to storm into the court building. Thus, his speech was protected and (B) is incorrect.

210
Q

After the failure of a state bill granting gay and lesbian couples the right to marry, 30 students from a local university marched on the state capitol to protest, carrying signs with slogans such as “let gays marry” and “no religious tyranny.” As they marched, about 15 people began following them, shouting anti-gay remarks. At the capitol building, they were met by 50 officers in full riot gear. The leader of the students addressed his followers in the park across the street, vigorously denouncing the legislature’s actions, which caused the counter-protestors to become more vocal. The officer in charge told the leader that he must end his speech because a riot was about to start. The leader refused and was arrested and convicted of disorderly conduct.

If the leader appeals his conviction on constitutional grounds, will the conviction be reversed?

A

The speaker’s conviction will be reversed.

A park is a public forum.

The government can limit rights of speech in such a forum only when there is a serious and imminent threat to the public order.

It can restrict the speech of a speaker because of an unruly audience only in the rare case when the police are absolutely unable to control the crowd. [See Feiner v. New York (1951)]

In this question, the conditions under which the police can prevent a speaker from continuing because of an unruly crowd have not been met. There were 50 police officers who would have been able to restrain or subdue anyone who appeared to be intent on committing violence.

211
Q

Because of budget shortfalls, a state governor recently signed a bill shortening the period for which state unemployment benefits are available. The defendant gave a speech across the street from the governor’s mansion, denouncing the law. In his speech, the defendant urged the crowd to rush across the street, drag the governor from his mansion, and show him how it feels to be homeless. A police officer who heard the defendant’s speech arrested the defendant and he was charged with violating a state statute that makes it a crime to “make a threat against any state official in the performance of his duty.”

If the defendant defends on constitutional grounds, the court will likely find the statute:

A

The court will likely find the statute constitutional if limited to true threats. The Constitution does not protect true threats, defined as speech meant to communicate an intent to place a person in fear of bodily harm.

(A) is incorrect. While prior restraints are disfavored under the First Amendment, because true threats are not protected speech, the statute does not constitute a prior restraint. (B) is incorrect. While a state may forbid speech that poses a clear and present danger of imminent lawless action, that is not the only type of unprotected speech under the First Amendment. (D) is incorrect because the law here does not appear to be a fighting words statute, e.g., personally abusive epithets inherently likely to incite an immediate response.

212
Q

The Supreme Court has held that businesses selling material that is sexually explicit, although not necessarily obscene, may be regulated through land use ordinances designed to reduce the secondary effects of such businesses. Thus, a zoning ordinance prohibiting the location of adult bookstores and theaters in areas close to residential zones and restricting such theaters to a limited area of the city is

A

permissible if it is designed to promote substantial government interests (e.g., property interests) and does not prohibit all such entertainment in the community. [City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. (1986)] Because the city’s ordinance is a legitimate part of its zoning scheme and does not prevent the businesses from operating in other areas of the town, it will probably be upheld. (A) is incorrect because it is too broad. The type of regulation in this question cannot be based simply on what residents find “offensive”; only regulations that are based on substantial government interests and do not entirely prohibit the activity have been permitted by the Supreme Court.

213
Q

Forums definitions

A

A public forum is public property that historically has been open to speech-related activity. Examples include sidewalks and public parks.

A designated public forum is public property that usually is not used for speech-related activity, but that the government has opened for such activity at particular times (e.g., a public school gym that can be reserved by the public for use when not being used by the school).

A limited public forum is public property that usually is not used for speech-related activity, but that the government has opened up for such activity for a particular purpose (e.g., a school gym that has been opened up to host a political debate).

Nonpublic forum is public property not open for speech-related activity. A county office building would be an example of a nonpublic forum except to the extent that it is specifically opened to the public for speech-related activities.

214
Q

For a governmental regulation of speech in a public or designated public forum to be valid, which of the following is not necessary?

A

The regulation must be content neutral, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest, and the regulation must leave open alternative methods of communication in order to be valid. Keep in mind, however, that even if these requirements are met, the regulation may be invalidated for other reasons, such as for being vague or overbroad.

215
Q

To be valid, a time, place, and manner regulation of a limited public forum must be

A

viewpoint neutral and rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.

216
Q

A state statute makes it a felony for anyone in the corridors or on the grounds of any building in which a court may be in session to make a speech or carry a sign intended to improperly influence judicial proceedings. When the head of a street gang was on trial for murder, a gang member was arrested for carrying a sign on the steps of the courthouse warning that if the gang leader was not freed, “the judge will die.”

May the gang member be convicted of violating the state statute?

A

The gang member can be convicted because the statute does not violate the First Amendment. Certain public property (e.g., public streets or parks) is so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that speech thereon can be regulated only by content-neutral proscriptions. Other places controlled by the government, however, are not so historically linked to speech activities, and in such locations free speech might interfere with the intended use of such locations. Thus, the government can regulate access to these limited public forums and nonpublic forums based on the subject matter of the speech, as long as the regulation is reasonably related to the purpose served by the property and is not designed merely to suppress a particular point of view. A courthouse and its grounds are not a public forum. (The surrounding sidewalks are, but that is not in issue here.) The statute, although based on the subject matter of speech, is viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to the courthouse purpose of promoting a stable, orderly atmosphere in which judicial proceedings can take place, free of improper outside influence or coercion. Thus, the statute is valid and the gang member can be convicted for his actions. (A) is wrong because it is based on an overbreadth argument and the statute here is not overbroad. A regulation of speech that restricts substantially more speech than necessary is unenforceable, even if the speech in question could have been properly restricted by a narrower statute. This doctrine is inapplicable here because the statute is not overbroad: It reaches only speech in the courthouse or on its grounds and only that speech that might improperly influence the judicial proceedings; it does not limit all speech at that location. (C) is wrong because it improperly applies the “clear and present danger” test to these facts. Under the current version of the “clear and present danger” test, a state cannot forbid advocating the use of force or violation of law unless such advocacy is (i) directed to producing or inciting imminent lawless action, and (ii) likely to produce such action. The state statute here does not purport to punish advocacy of force or lawlessness, but rather seeks to further the purpose of maintaining the stability and integrity of the judicial proceedings by regulating access to certain nonpublic areas. Therefore, the restrictions are constitutionally valid and the “clear and present danger” test is inapplicable.

217
Q

A group of students held a demonstration against the proliferation of weapons in space in one of the city’s parks. The defendant spoke at the demonstration, and to make a point during her speech, she walked over to one of the trash barrels and dumped the contents out on the ground. As she did so, she told her listeners, “This is what outer space is starting to look like, cluttered with the trash of nuclear weapons.” The meeting broke up 15 minutes later. The students left the park peacefully, but no one bothered to pick up the trash or right the overturned barrel. The defendant was arrested pursuant to the city’s littering ordinance, which carried fines of up to $500 and was strictly enforced. She was convicted and fined $500. The defendant brings an appropriate appeal to have her conviction set aside on constitutional grounds.

Is the defendant likely to succeed?

A

The anti-littering ordinance will be upheld because it furthers an important government interest unrelated to the content of the communication and is narrowly tailored to the furtherance of that interest. As a general rule, conduct that is intended to communicate is not immune from reasonable government regulation, even though it takes place in a public forum such as a park.

The noncommunicative impact of speech-related conduct in a public forum can be regulated to further an important government interest independent of the speech aspects of the conduct as long as the incidental restriction on the ability to communicate that message is narrowly tailored to further the interest in question, so that alternative channels for communicating the message are available.

The prevention of litter, as a means of maintaining public facilities in usable condition and protecting property values, is an important enough government interest to allow some type of regulation. The ban on littering is narrowly tailored to accomplish its purpose, unlike, for example, a ban on distributing leaflets that may end up on the ground. The regulation probably would not have precluded the defendant even from dumping the barrel if she had picked up the trash after her speech was over.

(B) is incorrect because it is too broad; some speech-related conduct cannot be punished (e.g., burning a flag). The critical distinction is whether the offense relates to the communicative content of the conduct or to state interests independent of its communicative aspects.

218
Q

A city zoning board recently denied a request from the local library for a variance needed to expand the library building. An angry library patron went to the library, stood next to the front door, and handed each person entering a leaflet asking the person to contact each city zoning board member named in the leaflet and threaten to vote the member out of office unless the member changed his or her vote regarding the library’s request for a zoning variance. The head librarian noticed the patron handing out the leaflets and asked her to stop, correctly explaining that the distribution was in violation of a city ordinance. The patron refused to comply, and the head librarian summoned the police. When an officer arrived, the librarian again asked the patron to stop distributing leaflets, but the patron again refused. The officer then arrested the patron for violating a city ordinance. At trial, the patron defended against the charges by claiming a violation of her First Amendment rights.

Which of the following variations of fact would be most helpful to the patron’s First Amendment claim?

A

The most helpful additional fact for the patron is that the head librarian allowed other people to distribute leaflets at all hours. Although the government may adopt reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in public forums and designated public forums, such restrictions must be content-neutral.** The head librarian’s allowing some people to distribute leaflets at all hours shows that the restriction here is probably being used **as a content regulation**, which would be prohibited under these facts. Additionally, if the head librarian is allowing others to distribute leaflets at all hours, **the discriminatory application of the ordinance might also violate the Equal Protection Clause.** (A) is not very helpful because the fact that the patron was informed once of the rule would be sufficient to give her notice that she was violating the law. There is no requirement that persons be warned twice that they are violating speech regulations. (B) might help the patron because she could claim that because the library is surrounded by a public forum (sidewalks), the front door step also is a public forum. **This argument will probably fail, however, because the Supreme Court has never made such a holding (and indeed has held that although the sidewalks around the Supreme Court building are public forums, the Supreme Court building itself is not a public forum). This fact might even hurt the patron, because it indicates that alternative public forums were readily available. (D) is not very helpful because political fundraising receives no more First Amendment protection than pure political speech; indeed, more regulation is allowed in the fundraising arena.

219
Q

A public high school publishes a weekly newspaper as part of its journalism class. The student editor-in-chief of the paper wrote an article supporting the legalization of marijuana and showed it to his faculty advisor. The advisor told the editor that while this issue was receiving a lot of media attention in their community, in order to discourage drug use, school policy prohibited the paper from including any drug-related articles. The advisor then told the editor not to include the article in any edition of the paper.

A few days later, the editor and faculty advisor were preparing to upload the electronic files for the paper to their printer. The advisor was momentarily called away, and the editor quickly replaced an article on clothing styles with his article on the legalization of marijuana. When the paper came out, the article was the talk of the school. After a brief investigation, the student was removed from his position as editor-in-chief. The student brought suit against the school, claiming that his removal was a violation of his First Amendment rights under color of law.

How should the court rule on this issue?

A

The Supreme Court has held that curriculum-based public high school activities are not public forums.

Content regulation of nonpublic forums is allowed as long as the regulation is viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose. The court should rule for the high school.

Here, school policy prohibited all discussion of drugs in the school newspaper and was therefore viewpoint neutral. Moreover, the school could argue that prohibiting discussion of drugs in the school paper discourages drug use, a legitimate school interest. Thus, the court should rule for the school. à why not public schools from lecture p. 64

220
Q

The Free Exercise Clause

A

The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from punishing conduct just because it is religious. If the intent of the law is to interfere with religion, or if the law punishes conduct solely because it is religious, the law is invalid. For example, a law may not prohibit ritual slaughter of chickens while otherwise allowing the slaughter of chickens.

The Free Exercise Clause does NOT prohibit laws of general applicability unless they have an exception for religiously motivated conduct. Religiously neutral laws of general applicability generally are valid under the Free Exercise Clause without religious exemptions with two historic exceptions: the Amish must be exempted from mandatory schooling beyond eighth grade, and workers fired for refusing to perform tasks on religious grounds may not automatically be exempted from unemployment compensation.

The Free Exercise Clause does NOT prohibit government regulations that interfere with religious practices unless the government can prove that the regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest or that the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve an important government objective. These choices reflect higher standards (strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny, respectively) than is currently used in Free Exercise cases. Older cases purportedly applied strict scrutiny, but the Supreme Court seemed often to have to stretch to find a compelling interest in such cases.

A program whereby, once weekly, the schoolday ends one hour early so that interested students may participate in voluntary religious classes in a separate location from the school is valid. (A similar program held in the school itself has been struck down, because turning the classrooms over to religious instructors was found to promote religion.)

A voluntary moment of silent prayer or meditation at the beginning of the schoolday is invalid as promoting religion. It is irrelevant that the exercise is voluntary and that it is silent.

Posting of the Ten Commandments in a public school pursuant to legislature’s declaration that the posting is for a secular purpose is invalid. The Supreme Court ruled that this program clearly served a religious purpose in spite of the legislature’s statement.

A school policy whereby students themselves decide whether to hold a student invocation (invocation is used to mean a spell or a prayer that calls upon a higher power) ceremony prior to athletic events in invalid. The policy promotes religion and allowing the students to vote does not negate the policy’s effect.

221
Q

The council of a city with a rich and diverse heritage established a city-run ethnic sculpture garden. City residents and groups were encouraged to erect statues and other displays in the garden depicting ethnic, cultural, and religious heritages. Many of the displays included religious symbols. The city maintained the property and administered the affairs of the garden. While the garden was paid for primarily by a small admission fee, the city contributed about $1,000 each year for the garden’s upkeep from general city funds.

If a local citizen brings an action in federal court challenging the city’s funding of the garden, how should the court rule?

A

The city may continue to operate the garden because the display is not primarily religious in nature.

Government action challenged under the Establishment Clause will be found invalid unless the action (i) has a secular purpose, (ii) has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (iii) does not involve excessive government entanglement with religion. This is known as the Lemon test. This test is met here: The secular purpose is to promote pride in heritage and perhaps to encourage people to learn about the heritage of others. The primary effect does not promote or inhibit religion, but merely acknowledges the religious backgrounds of the city residents. Finally, the maintenance and administration of the garden by the city does not constitute excessive entanglement between government and religion.

Establishment Clause cases not involving a sect preference are resolved under the above three-part test and not under the compelling interest test.

222
Q

A church developed a sex education program for children of church members, ages 12 to 16. The program included lectures and slides, including some slides depicting explicit sexual activity between males and females. Parents would be required to give their consent before any child could participate. The program was conducted by the church board, consisting of the minister, a doctor, and a psychologist. The church board called the program “an integral part of involving the church in the real world of a teenager.”

A state statute provides in relevant part, “It is unlawful to sell, give, or display to any person under the age of 17 any lewd or obscene article, picture, or depiction.”

If the church board members are convicted of violating the above statute and they appeal, what is the likely outcome?

A

The convictions will be reversed if it can be shown that the statute is being applied only to interfere with religion.

The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from punishing religious belief. The Clause prevents government from punishing conduct merely because it is religious and from regulating conduct for the purpose of interfering with religion. However, the Clause does not prohibit government from regulating general conduct, even if the regulation happens to interfere with a person’s ability to conform conduct to sincerely held religious beliefs. Thus, if it can be shown here that the statute is not really a regulation of general conduct but rather is being applied only to interfere with religion, the convictions will be reversed. (D) is incorrect because the church board would have standing. All that is required is a concrete stake in the outcome of the litigation; having been prosecuted for violating the statute, the board’s stake is about as concrete as it can get.

223
Q

One person one vote principle as applied to congressional and state governments districts

A

Regarding congressional districts, almost exact mathematical equality between the congressional districts within a state is required under the one person, one vote principle.

The rationale is that voting is a fundamental right, diluting one person’s vote compared to another’s raises equal protection concerns, and there is no compelling interest that would justify more than a couple of percentage points difference from district to district.

Regarding state government districts, almost exact mathematical equality between districts is NOT required under the one person, one vote principle.

In state government districts, the variance from district to district may not be unjustifiably large. But this is a much more lenient standard than the almost exact mathematical equality standard.

224
Q

The police department of a small city has jurisdiction within the city limits and over a defined portion of the surrounding rural communities within the county. A farmer lives in one of the rural communities receiving police protection from the city. The farmer does not pay any tax to the city directly, but a portion of the farmer’s county property tax is turned over by the county to the city in order to support the city’s police department.

The farmer’s property was vandalized several times over the past several months, and the farmer became unhappy with the police protection that the city was providing. After his complaints to the police department and city hall did not improve the situation, the farmer wanted to vote against the mayor in the next election, but a city ordinance provides that only residents of the city may vote in city elections.

If the farmer brings a suit to compel the city to allow him to vote in the city’s mayoral election, is he likely to prevail?

A

(A) The farmer is not likely to prevail because the rational relationship test applies.

Although the right to vote is a fundamental right, laws prohibiting nonresidents from voting are generally valid, provided that they meet the minimal scrutiny, or “rational basis,” standard. Under this standard, a law will be upheld as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Limiting the voters in a city’s mayoral election to residents of the city serves the interests of efficiency and prevents persons with little personal interest in the city from voting. Thus, a court would likely uphold the ordinance.

225
Q

A state’s constitution authorizes a state reapportionment board to redraw state legislative districts every 12 years. During the most recent reapportionment process, consultants had provided the board with two alternative plans for reapportionment. One plan provided for districts with less than a 3% difference in proportional representation between districts. The other plan was drawn up to conform state legislative districts as nearly as possible to county borders, resulting in differences in proportional representation between districts of up to 12%. The current apportionment of legislative districts results in differences of up to 15% between districts. The board ultimately selected the reapportionment plan based on county borders, and this plan was approved by the state legislature.

A Caucasian resident and registered voter of the state brought a constitutional challenge to the reapportionment in federal court. His claim is based on the fact that, as a result of the plan that the board selected, the percentage of the African-American voting population in the district in which he lives increased from 45% to 55%. Had the other plan been selected, the percentage would have been unchanged in his district.

In the absence of a federal statute applicable to the state, is the resident likely to prevail?

A

The resident will not prevail because the reapportionment plan does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

That provision has been interpreted to prohibit state dilution of the right to vote, so that whenever a governmental body establishes voting districts for the election of representatives, the number of persons in each district may not vary significantly.

However, for the purpose of electing representatives to a state or local governmental body, the variance in the number of persons included in each district can be greater than that permitted for congressional districts.

If the deviation from mathematical equality between districts is reasonable and tailored to promote a legitimate state interest, the law establishing the districts will likely be upheld.

The Court has held that maintaining the integrity of local political subdivision lines when establishing legislative districts is a legitimate state interest, as long as the final apportionment is substantially based on population. [See Mahan v. Howell (1973)—16% variance upheld]

Here, the reapportionment attempted to conform legislative districts as nearly as possible to county borders and had a maximum variance of 12%. Thus, it will probably withstand the resident’s challenge.

226
Q

A town adopted an ordinance providing that a person must have been a resident of the town for at least one year to be eligible to vote in school board elections. A resident who moved to the town seven months ago attempted to register to vote in the school board elections scheduled for the next month. However, the town clerk refused to register the resident because he will not have resided in the town for a full year prior to the election. The resident filed a class action suit on behalf of all of the new residents of the town, challenging the validity of the one-year residency requirement.

Which of the following statements is correct?

A

The resident’s suit is not moot even if the matter will not be decided until after the election because other members of the class might have a live controversy. Under the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution, there must be a real, live controversy at all stages of the suit. If through the passage of time, the controversy between the parties is resolved, the case is said to be moot. However, there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine.

In a class action, it is not necessary that the suit by the named plaintiff be viable at all stages, as long as the claim is viable by some member of the class. Thus, the suit here would not be moot.

Moreover, the residency requirement here violates the resident’s fundamental rights to vote and to interstate travel. A restriction on the right to vote is subject to strict scrutiny and is valid only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest (otherwise the restriction violates the Equal Protection Clause by treating new residents differently from old residents). Relatively short residency requirements (e.g., 30 days) have been upheld as being necessary to promote the compelling interest of assuring that only bona fide residents vote. However, the Supreme Court has struck down longer durational requirements for lack of a compelling justification. Thus, the one-year requirement here probably unconstitutionally impinges on the right to vote. The residency requirement also impinges on the fundamental right to travel in the same manner (i.e., it discourages people from migrating by denying them the right to vote without a compelling reason). Thus, the requirement is invalid.

227
Q

A recent law school graduate was offered a job as an aide by a state legislator. The legislator told the graduate that before she could begin working, she had to take the following loyalty oath: “I swear to uphold our state and federal Constitutions; to show respect for the state and federal flags; and to oppose the overthrow of the government by violent, illegal, or unconstitutional means.” The graduate told the legislator that the oath is unconstitutional and refused to take the oath.

Is the graduate correct?

A

The graduate is correct as to the promise to respect the flag, but incorrect as to the other two promises.

The Supreme Court has upheld oaths requiring government employees to oppose the violent overthrow of the government and to support the Constitution. However, it has held that government employees cannot be required to show respect for the flag, as a person might refuse to salute the flag on religious grounds.

228
Q

Under Article III, Section 2, the United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all cases

A

Under Article III, Section 2, the United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all cases

229
Q

A critically acclaimed movie that had received a number of awards opened in a small town. The film had portrayals of nudity and scenes involving sexuality, but its advertising was very tasteful and concentrated on its critical acclaim and its receipt of seven Academy Award nominations. Nevertheless, when the movie opened in the small town, there was a public outcry against it, including picketing. The town, which had been founded in the late nineteenth century by a fundamentalist religious group, remained very conservative and highly religious, and was the only community in the state where a consensus of the community would find the movie to be obscene. The town prosecutor went to the local court seeking an injunction to halt the showing of the movie. The theater owner refused to voluntarily stop showing the film and appeared in court to defend against the proposed injunction.

What is the owner’s best defense?

A

The theater owner’s best defense is that the film has proven artistic merit.

The First Amendment generally protects the right of freedom of speech, and this freedom includes the right to show movies. Thus, to enjoin the showing of the movie here, the city will have to prove that the speech involved is unprotected speech.

Obscenity is the category of unprotected speech most relevant here. The Court has defined obscenity as a depiction of sexual conduct that, taken as a whole, by the average person, using contemporary community standards:

(i) appeals to the prurient interest in sex;

(ii) portrays sex in a patently offensive way; and

(iii) using a rational, reasonable person standard, does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

If the theater owner shows that the film has proven artistic merit, it cannot be held to be obscene because the third element of the above definition will have failed.

230
Q

A federal statute just signed into law by the President provided that school districts no longer needed to recognize the tenure of elementary school teachers—all tenured teachers would lose their status and would be treated the same as nontenured teachers. The effect of the law would be to allow all tenured teachers to be fired more easily if their performance was not adequate. The law also allowed the salaries of tenured teachers to be lowered, at least until a new contract with the teachers could be negotiated. The law had a two-year grace period before it was to take effect, to give schools and teachers time to adjust to the law; however, it specifically provided that once it is in effect, school board actions under the law supersede any existing contract terms.

A public elementary school district is in the first year of a three-year union contract with its teachers. The school board has stated that it plans to abolish tenured positions as soon as the law takes effect. The union, believing that numerous terms of the contract will be invalidated when the law takes effect, filed an action in federal court on behalf of the teachers, asking for an injunction to prevent the school board from abolishing tenured positions and for a declaratory judgment stating that the law is invalid.

Should the federal court hear the case?

A

The federal court should not hear the case because it is not yet ripe for review. A federal court will not hear a case unless there exists a “case and controversy.” This has been interpreted to mean, among other things, that a plaintiff generally is not entitled to review of his claim unless he has been harmed or there is an immediate threat of harm. This is to prevent the federal courts from hearing unnecessary actions. There is no immediate threat of harm to the union here because the law does not take effect for another two years. Before that happens, Congress might change the law or repeal it altogether, or the school board may decide to keep the old contract system after all.

B) is incorrect because the union would have standing. An association has standing if (i) there is an injury in fact to its members that would give them standing, (ii) the injury is related to the organization’s purpose, and (iii) neither the nature of the claim nor the relief requested requires participation of the individual members in the lawsuit. All three of the conditions are met here; thus, the union would have standing.

(C) is incorrect because the Contract Clause does not limit federal power, only state power, and because the state would be acting pursuant to a federal law here, there would be no Contract Clause violation. Moreover, even if the Contract Clause limited the state’s actions here, it still is not clear that there would be a constitutional violation. The Clause bans only substantial interference with existing contracts (i.e., destruction of almost all of a party’s rights under a contract), and it is not clear here that the impairments would be sufficiently substantial.

231
Q

A new federal law prohibited the use of various pesticides in areas with a certain population density near navigable waters. A city located in the southeastern United States was plagued by a sharp increase in disease-carrying mosquitoes. The city’s board of health recommended that all residential areas be sprayed with a pesticide proven to be highly effective against mosquitoes. Despite the fact that the federal law would prohibit use of that pesticide in these areas, the city council passed an ordinance adopting the board of health plan, relying on the opinions of several independent experts that the health benefits of reducing the mosquito population outweighed the risks of spraying. An environmentally minded citizen of the city brought an action in federal court challenging the ordinance.

Assuming that the citizen has standing, is the court likely to find the ordinance valid?

A

Congress’s power to regulate commerce has been construed broadly, so that it may regulate any activity, local or interstate, that either in itself or in combination with other activities has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. If Congress has determined that the use of chemical pesticides and their runoff into waterways (which are channels of interstate commerce) will have an overall detrimental impact on the environment, this determination will be sufficient in this case to satisfy the standards established by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the law probably is a valid exercise of the commerce power. Any state or local action that conflicts with a valid act of Congress is invalid under the Supremacy Clause.

(A) is incorrect because while the police power (the power to adopt regulations for the health, safety, and welfare of citizens) belongs to the states, a police power regulation that conflicts with a federal law is invalid under the Supremacy Clause.

232
Q
A