Constitutional Law Flashcards
George filed suit against Al under the federal Securities and Exchange Act. While George’s suit was pending, in another case involving the federal Securities and Exchange Act, the United States Supreme Court decided that certain actions filed under the Act are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. In accordance with this decision, the federal district court dismissed George’s action and entered final judgment in favor of Al. No appeal was taken. The next day, Congress adopts legislation that permits a longer statute of limitations for such cases. The legislation provides for the reopening of final judgments such as the one against George, with instructions to apply the longer statute of limitations to cases that were pending the day before the Supreme Court was announced.
The Provision that provides for the reopening of final judgment is:
(a) Constitutional, because statutes of limitations are legislative rather than judicial
(b) Constitutional, because Congress is free to alter the limitations period for all pending and future cases.
(c) Unconstitutional, because the federal judiciary, not Congress, is vested with the power to decide cases and controversies.
(d) Unconstitutional, because application of the provision to a pending case would be an ex post facto law.
(c) Unconstitutional, because the federal judiciary, not Congress, is vested with the power to decide cases and controversies.
Pleasantville is a small community. Recently Pleasantville has experienced a substantial growth in its population. The longtime residents of Pleasantville are worried that a substantial increased in the population would threaten the quiet atmosphere. Therefore, to restrict growth, a zoning ordinance is passed designating the remaining undeveloped land in the community of Pleasantville for large, one-family dwellings only.
The Home Builders Association is an organization made up of companies specializing in building and selling small inexpensive homes. The Association’s best chance for bringing suit to enjoin application of the Pleasantville zoning ordinance would be to establish injury:
(a) To potential purchasers.
(b) To the community as a whole
(c) To the future business of the Association members
(d) To companies wishing to locate in the Pleasantville area.
(c) To the future business of the Association members
Suppose Congress enacts a uniform product liability statute to govern recovery by private parties of damages for personal injury or property loss resulting from product defects.
The Act preempts and replaces state tort law with uniform national liability standards. Suppose, further, that the Act contains no provisions addressing the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to hear cases or controversies arising under the Act.
A The federal district courts will have jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies arising under the Act, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
B The state courts will have jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies arising under the Act under various state jurisdictional statutes.
C The Supreme Court may decline to hear challenges to the statute’s constitutionality within its discretion.
D All of the above.
D All of the above.
Driving without a license is a misdemeanor in the state of Nirvana. Wells Fargo, a resident of Nirvana, delivers mail on an urban route in Easton, the largest city in Nirvana, for the United States Postal Service, an instrumentality of the United States Government.
He does not have a valid driver‟s license. If Wells Fargo continues to drive the mail truck as part of his postal service duties, may he be punished by the state for driving without a license?
A Yes, unless Wells Fargo is charged for driving on state and local roads outside of federal enclaves such as national parks and military bases.
B Yes, whether or not Wells Fargo is charged for driving without a license on state and local roads outside of federal enclaves such as national parks and military bases.
C No, because Nirvana has no authority to regulate the employment practices of a federal instrumentality.
D No, but Nirvana may tax Wells Fargo for driving without a license
C No, because Nirvana has no authority to regulate the employment practices of a federal instrumentality.
Suppose Congress enacts a uniform product liability statute to govern recovery by private parties of damages for personal injury or property loss resulting from product defects. The Act preempts and replaces state tort law with uniform national liability standards. Suppose, further, that the Act contains no provisions addressing the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear cases or controversies arising under the Act.
A The federal district courts will have jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies arising under the Act, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
B The state courts will have jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies arising under the Act under various state jurisdictional statutes.
C The Supreme Court may decline to hear challenges to the statute’s constitutionality within its discretion.
D All of the above.
D All of the above
Driving without a license is a misdemeanor in the state of Nirvana. Wells Fargo, a resident of Nirvana, delivers mail on an urban route in Easton, the largest city in Nirvana, for the United States Postal Service, an instrumentality of the United States Government. He does not have a valid driver‟s license. If Wells Fargo continues to drive the mail truck as part of his postal service duties, may he be punished by the state for driving without a license?
A. Yes, unless Wells Fargo is charged for driving on state and local roads outside of federal enclaves such as national parks and military bases.
B. Yes, whether or not Wells Fargo is charged for driving without a license on state and local roads outside of federal enclaves such as national parks and military bases.
C. No, because Nirvana has no authority to regulate the employment practices of a federal instrumentality.
D. No, but Nirvana may tax Wells Fargo for driving without a license.
C. No, because Nirvana has no authority to regulate the employment practices of a federal instrumentality.
The Federal Alien Registration Act (FAR) requires all aliens over the age of fourteen residing within the United States to register with the federal government. FAR also provides a comprehensive plan describing the terms and conditions under which aliens may enter and remain in this country. Among other things, FAR imposes rigid requirements, regarding health, education, integrity, character, and length of residence. Finally, FAR was drafted in part to comply with provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party. There is no provision of FAR that expressly preempts state law. The Alien and Registration Act of Nirvana (ARAN) does not conflict with any specific provision in FAR. ARAN does, however, impose additional reporting and registration requirements on aliens residing in Nirvana.
A. ARAN is not preempted because there is no provision of FAR that expressly preempts state law.
B. ARAN is not preempted because ARAN does not conflict with any specific provision in FAR.
C. ARAN is preempted because the federal scheme is pervasive, providing detailed regulations applicable to resident aliens.
D. ARAN is preempted because aliens may only be regulated by the United States are not subject to regulation by the state.
D. ARAN is preempted because aliens may only be regulated by the United States are not subject to regulation by the state.
California imposes an ad valorem property tax on shipping containers that are owned by shipping companies that are present in the state on “tax day.” California charges the tax for containers owned by a Japanese shipping company in a Port of Los Angeles dock on “tax day.” The tax is apportioned based on the number of days of the year that the containers are used in the state. The same containers are subject to an unapportioned property tax in Japan.
A The ad valorem property tax as applied to the Japanese shipping company is valid so long neither a treaty of the United States nor a Congressional statute has enacted legislation preventing imposition of the tax.
B The ad valorem property tax as applied to the Japanese shipping company is valid because California has apportioned its tax in a reasonable manner, even if Japan has not.
C The ad valorem property tax as applied to the Japanese shipping company is invalid because the tax lacks a sufficient nexus (“minimum contacts”) with California.
D The ad valorem property tax as applied to the Japanese shipping company is invalid because it results in multiple taxation of an entity engaged in foreign commerce due to the fact that the company must also pay Japan a property tax based on the full value of the same containers.
D. The ad valorem property tax as applied to the Japanese shipping company is invalid because it results in multiple taxation of an entity engaged in foreign commerce due to the fact that the company must also pay Japan a property tax based on the full value of the same containers.
A state imposes an annual tax of $36 per axle on all trucks that use the state’s highways.
A. The state tax is valid because the tax is imposed on all trucks that use the state’s highways, whether they are registered in the state or not.
B. The state tax is valid unless the state only prosecutes trucks from out-of-state for nonpayment.
C. The state tax is invalid because its practical effect is to discriminate against interstate commerce because trucks operating interstate must pay similar taxes to other states, while purely intrastate trucks pay the tax only once.
D. The state tax is invalid but only if the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the legitimate state interest in maintaining its roads.
C. The state tax is invalid because its practical effect is to discriminate against interstate commerce because trucks operating interstate must pay similar taxes to other states, while purely intrastate trucks pay the tax only once.
Jim, a small brewer with his only offices and facility in Florida, sells beer over the Internet to purchasers throughout the United States. Alabama imposes a sales tax on all purchases of beer by consumers placing order from within the state of Alabama, where the products are received by residents of the state in Alabama. An Alabama court orders Jim, who has no other connection with the state except for the Internet beer sales, to collect the Alabama state tax on its behalf. Jim refuses. Alabama sues Jim in a federal district court in Alabama, invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction. Jim appears to defend the suit and immediately files a motion to dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(6).
A. Jim does not have to pay the tax because there are insufficient “minimum contacts” between Jim and Alabama under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Jim does not have to pay the tax because the seller lacks a sufficient nexus with Alabama for the state to impose on the seller a duty to collect use taxes for sales made to residents of the state under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
C. Jim must pay the tax because he has waived his objection to personal jurisdiction by appearing and defending the case on the merits.
D. Jim just pay the tax because he waived his objection to personal jurisdiction by making the Rule 12(b)(6) motion without joining his Rule 12(b)(2) personal jurisdiction objection.
B. Jim does not have to pay the tax because the seller lacks a sufficient nexus with Alabama for the state to impose on the seller a duty to collect use taxes for sales made to residents of the state under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Hawaii imposes a tax on all sales of liquor made within the state, including sales to out- of-state customers. Liquor distilled within the state is exempt from the tax if made from produce grown in the state.
A The tax is invalid as applied to sales to out-of-state customers because the sale has an insufficient nexus to sustain the tax under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
B The tax is invalid even though there is a sufficient nexus because the tax scheme discriminates against out-of-state distillers.
C The tax is valid because there is a sufficient nexus to sustain the tax on sales completed “within” the state under both the Due Process and Dormant Commerce Clauses.
D The tax is valid so long as the burden on interstate commerce is outweighed by the legitimate state interest to encourage a local liquor industry
B The tax is invalid even though there is a sufficient nexus because the tax scheme discriminates against out-of-state distillers.
Montana imposes a severance tax on coal mined in the state. The tax is 30% of the value of the coal “severed,” or removed, from the ground. Most of the funds raised by the tax are placed in a trust fund for future expenditures since the revenues far exceed current budgetary needs. About 90% of Montana‟s coal is shipped out of state. The tax is imposed equally upon Montanans and out-of-staters, even though many more out-of- staters felt its incidence because most of the coal is sold to out-of-state utilities where the costs of fuel are passed through through to the out-of-state users of the electricity.
A. The tax is invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause because there is an insufficient nexus between the out-of-state electricity consumers who bear the incidence of the tax and Montana.
B. The tax is invalid because the tax discriminates against interstate commerce.
C. The tax is invalid because the 30% tax is not reasonably related to the state services provided the coal mines.
D. The tax is valid because the method of measurement of the tax – the value of the coal severed– is reasonably related to the degree of activity of the coal operator in the state, that is, the tons of coal severed.
D. The tax is valid because the method of measurement of the tax – the value of the coal severed– is reasonably related to the degree of activity of the coal operator in the state, that is, the tons of coal severed.
Laura has worked as a lawyer for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) since 1985. In 1995 she learned that throughout this period, that women‟s restrooms at the NLRB facility where she works were under secret observation by supervisors using one- way mirrors. In 1991, Congress adopted the Federal Employees Privacy Act (FEPA) which requires all federal facilities to respect the privacy rights of employees. Though FEPA does not specify that restroom surveillance falls within the scope of the Act, in 1993 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that FEPA prohibits such activity. In 1995 Laura sued three NLRB supervisors, alleging that they had violated her privacy rights under the Constitution and under FEPA. She sought an injunction against further surveillance of the women‟s restrooms, and damages. The trial court found that the defendants violated Laura‟s privacy rights under the Constitution and under FEPA.
A. Laura may not obtain a judgment against the supervisors because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
B. Laura may not obtain a judgment against the supervisors because they are absolutely immune from suit with respect to activities undertaken within the scope of their governmental employment.
C. Laura may not obtain a judgment against the supervisors regarding the period before 1991..
D. Laura may obtain the injunction against future surveillance but may not be able to obtain damages for the period before 1993.
D. Laura may obtain the injunction against future surveillance but may not be able to obtain damages for the period before 1993.
President Buchanan, a bachelor, fell in love with Monique, a White House intern. Overtaken by a passionate fantasy, the President decided that he simply had to bring her some flowers at the White House after a late night meeting with the Congressional leadership on Capitol Hill. He instructs the Secret Service to park the White House limousine and personally opens an unlocked door at “Minnie‟s Flower Shop” at 1400 Pennsylvania Ave., taking three dozen long-stem roses and leaving his credit card information at the unoccupied cash register. The D.C. police observe the incident. An indictment is brought against President Buchanan for petty theft.
A. President Buchanan is not subject to prosecution because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
B. President Buchanan is not subject to prosecution because the President of the United States is absolutely immune from suit for acts taken within the „outer perimeter‟ of his official responsibility.
C. President Buchanan is not subject to prosecution if the President reasonably did not know that his entry through the unlocked flower shop door was illegal.
D. President Buchanan is subject to prosecution because the President enjoys no immunity from criminal actions taken while in office.
D. President Buchanan is subject to prosecution because the President enjoys no immunity from criminal actions taken while in office.
Muhammad was fired from his job at the University of California after the university discovered that he was a member of a radical Islamic sect. Muhammad had been working on a project funded heavily by the federal government. In its contract with the federal government, the university agreed that no one posing a security risk would be allowed to work on the project. Muhammad sues the university in federal court under Title VII and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the university violated his First Amendment right of freedom of religion. He seeks damages of $250,000.
A. Muhammad’s suit under Title VII is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
B. Muhammad suit is barred because neither the state nor a state entity is a “person” who can be sued under § 1983.
C. Both A & B.
D. Neither A nor B.
C. Both A & B.
Governor R. Lean Torrem of Utah had his eye on the U.S. Presidency and fully intended to seek that office in 2012, but always in the back of his mind was his one past “indiscretion” five years earlier. The Governor feared that as his Presidential election effort gained more and more national media attention, media attention would be drawn to his one past “indiscretion.” Nonetheless, he continued to pursue his ambition.
The “indiscretion” involved the Governor‟s short-lived extra-marital affair with a 19- year-old campaign volunteer named Miss Always Pasionada. The Governor recently learned that Pasionada was currently managing (and occasionally performing) at a small, insignificant so-called “Gentlemen‟s Club”( aka strip joint) in Provo, Utah. In an effort to destroy Pasionada‟s media credibility, before the press discovered her or questioned her about her affair with Governor Torrem, the Governor ordered her arrest and charged her with violating the state‟s criminal pornography law. Speaking on national television from the Governor‟s mansion, Torrem told his adoring public, “Today, the state police of Utah arrested a notorious prostitute named Always Pasionada. This vile woman is personally responsible for most of the vice and smut on the west coast of our great nation. Worse yet, she is a habitual liar, who is mentally incapable of speaking the truth on any subject. My fellow Americans, this is the kind of law enforcement you can exppect for an R. Lean Presidency.”
The Governor‟s ploy seemed to work. From jail, sweet Pasionada told representatives of the press many “hot” stories about her affari with Governor Torrem; however, none of Pasionada‟s stories were believed by the press, and none were published. Angered by the disbelief exhibited by the press, Pasionada filed a defamation and false arrest suit against the state of Utah and Governor R. Lean Torrem. Of course, neither the Governor nor the State of Utah had formally or informally consented to be sued for anything.
You are the federal judge assigned to Miss Always Pasionada v. State of Utah & R. Lean Torren. You should–
A Dismiss the action against the State of Utah because of the Tenth Amendment.
B Proceed with the action against the State, but dismiss the action against the Governor because the Governor is protected by the Speech and Debate Clause.
C Dismiss the action against the State of Utah because of the Eleventh Amendment.
D Dismiss the action against the Governor because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.
C. Dismiss the action against the State of Utah because of the Eleventh Amendment.
Several employees for the Georgia Department of Transportation have brought an action in Georgia state court against the department, claiming that its compensation scheme discriminates against older workers, in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The ADEA makes it unlawful for any employer, including “a State . . .or any agency or instrumentality of a State” – to discriminate against any employee “because of such individual‟s age.” Plaintiffs seek back pay, damages, and permanent salary adjustments. The federal statutes permits actions to be brought in federal court but does not address whether or not actions may be brought in state court.
A. The case must be dismissed because of the Eleventh Amendment.
B The case must be dismissed because Congress did not expressly authorize suits under this federal law to be brought in state court.
C. The case may proceed because the ADEA was enacted to enforce civil rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
D. The case may proceed with respect to the request for permanent salary adjustments but not for back pay and damages.
A. The case must be dismissed because of the Eleventh Amendment.
Dick brings a class action in federal court against Jim Bob, executive director of the South Florida Water Management District, challenging the district‟s failure to adhere to federal time limits for processing “Everglades Restoration” permit applications. Dick, who ended up having to sell property after the delays, seeks damages from the state treasury. Florida law provides, “A person who is wrongfully denied a permit provided or administered by this state may bring suit against the state to recover damages proximately caused by that denial in a court of competent jurisdiction.”
A. The case must be dismissed because of the Eleventh Amendment.
B. The case must be dismissed because the cause of action arises under federal law.
C. The case may proceed because the cause of action arises under federal law.
D. The case may proceed because the state has waived its immunity from suit.
A. The case must be dismissed because of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Wisconsin state courts contain the following provision, enacted to prevent state and local governments from having to litigate cases without having an opportunity prior to commencement of the suit to settle: “No state court shall have jurisdiction regarding a suit against a state or local governmental entity or officer, until 120 days after the plaintiff has notified the defendant of his injury and the amount of the claim.”
Brisco was in the sixth grade at Clara Barton Elementary School, a public school in Madison, Wisconsin. On September 11, 2001, Brisco came to school wearing one small earring. The previous school year the school principal has issued a rule against the wearing of earrings by male students because he believed that this practice denoted membership in certain street gangs and increased the likelihood that gang members would terrorize other students. Brisco was reminded of this rule, but he refused to remove the earring, asserting that it was a symbol of black pride. Brisco was immediately suspended for 20 days. Immediately after the suspension, Brisco filed an action in state court in Madison, Wisconsin, under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Clara Barton School and its principal, Thomas, asserting that he had been suspended without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brisco seeks both reinstatement and damages. Defendants move to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, on several grounds.
The first grounds asserted by Defendants is sovereign immunity. How should the court rule?
A. The court should reject this grounds for dismissal because the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to an action in state court.
B. The court should reject this grounds for dismissal for both defendants only if Clara Barton School is not considered an instrumentality of the State of Wisconsin.
C. The court should grant the motion as to Clara Barton School but deny the motion as to Thomas because of the “stripping” doctrine of Ex Parte Young.
D. None of the above.
D. None of the above.
The second grounds asserted by Defendants is that Brisco did not give Defendants the 120 days notice in advance of commencing suit. How should the court rule?
A. The court should dismiss the suit without prejudice because this is a procedural matter governed by state procedural law.
B. The court dismiss the suit with prejudice because the state policy requiring notice of claim is rooted in policies unrelated to the definition of any particular substantive cause of action.
C. The court should dismiss the suit because the notice-of-claim statute does notdiscriminate between state and federal causes of action against Wisconsin state or local government entities or officers.
D. The court should reject this grounds for dismissal because the statute discriminates against the precise type of claims Congress has created under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
D. The court should reject this grounds for dismissal because the statute discriminates against the precise type of claims Congress has created under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Assume that Brisco voluntarily dismisses the claim against Clara Barton School under the state equivalent of Fed.R.Civ.P. 41. The action proceeds against Thomas only. How should the court dispose of the allegation on the merits that there has been a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?
A. The court should deny the claim because the Fourteenth Amendment only establishes liability of governments, not individuals.
B. The court should deny the claim as to damages but grant the claim as to the request for reinstatement because of the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.
C. The court should uphold the claim because Brisco did not receive constitutionally sufficient procedures prior to his suspension for more than 10 days, violating Due Process.
D. The court should uphold the claim because the policy instituted by Thomas discriminates against male students and permits earrings for female students, violating Equal Protection.
C. The court should uphold the claim because Brisco did not receive constitutionally sufficient procedures prior to his suspension for more than 10 days, violating Due Process.
Congress is given the power to “make all laws which shall be ____________ for carrying into execution” the specific powers.
necessary and proper
Congress has the general power to decide what types of cases the Supreme Court may hear, so long as it doesn’t expand the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction beyond the judicial power. True or False?
True.
Which of the following statements is not true regarding apportionment of a state ad valorem property tax on instrumentalities used to transport goods in interstate commerce?
A. A state may apportion the tax on the basis of the miles traveled within the state compared to the miles traveled out of state.
B. A state may also apportion the tax on the basis of the average number of instrumentalities in the state on tax day.
C. A state may not impose an ad valorem property tax on instrumentalities of interstate commerce to the extent that a taxpayer can prove any double taxation.
D. For purposes of the Commerce Clause, to require apportionment, a taxpayer has the burden of establishing that an instrumentality has acquired a taxable situs outside his domiciliary state.
C. A state may not impose an ad valorem property tax on instrumentalities of interstate commerce to the extent that a taxpayer can prove any double taxation.
If a state tax on interstate commerce discriminates against a natural person who is a nonresident, which of the following lists contains the constitutional clauses most likely to be relevant in determining whether the tax is valid?
A. Commerce Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause
B. Commerce Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause
C. Commerce Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
D. Commerce Clause, Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
B. Commerce Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause
Explanation
The Commerce Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause are the clauses most likely to be relevant in determining whether the tax is valid. The Commerce Clause would be relevant in determining the validity of a state tax on interstate commerce that discriminates against a natural person who is a nonresident. The negative implications of the Commerce Clause (or “the Dormant Commerce Clause”) prohibit taxes that discriminate against nonresidents.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV would be relevant in determining the validity of a state tax on interstate commerce that discriminates against a natural person who is a nonresident. This Clause places limitations on state discrimination against nonresidents regarding commercial activities.
The Equal Protection Clause would also be relevant in determining the validity of a state tax on interstate commerce that discriminates against a natural person who is a nonresident. This Clause prohibits states from unreasonably discriminating among similarly situated people.
On the other hand, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would not apply to a state tax on interstate commerce that discriminates against a natural person who is a nonresident because the Fourteenth Amendment Clause does not protect nonresidents. Rather, it prohibits states from denying their own citizens rights of national citizenship.
Ad valorem property taxes are taxes based on a percentage of the assessed value of the property in question. A Commerce Clause issue arises when the property taxed moves in interstate commerce.
Which of the following statements is true regarding a state ad valorem property tax under the Commerce Clause?
A. A state may impose an ad valorem property tax on goods shipped through interstate commerce when the goods reach their destination.
B. A state may impose an ad valorem property tax on goods moving through the state proportionate to the amount of time the goods are within the state.
C. A state may impose an ad valorem property tax on goods shipped through interstate commerce when the goods reach their destination.
D. A state may not impose a tax on instrumentalities used to ship goods through interstate commerce.
A. A state may impose an ad valorem property tax on goods shipped through interstate commerce when the goods reach their destination.
A state may impose an ad valorem property tax on goods shipped through interstate commerce when the goods reach their destination. States may not impose ad valorem property taxes on goods in transit, but they may impose such taxes once the goods come to rest.
A state may NOT impose an ad valorem property tax on goods moving through the state even if the tax is proportionate to the amount of time the goods are within the state. As stated above, states may not impose ad valorem property taxes on goods in transit.
A state MAY impose a tax on instrumentalities used to ship goods through interstate commerce. The validity of ad valorem property taxes on instrumentalities of commerce (such as airplanes, railroad cars, etc.) depends on (i) whether the instrumentality has acquired a “taxable situs” in the taxing state (i.e., whether there are sufficient “contacts” with the taxing state to justify the tax), and (ii) since the physical situs of the instrumentalities may change from state to state during the year, whether the value of the instrumentality has been properly apportioned according to the amount of “contacts” with each taxing state.
A state may NOT impose an ad valorem property tax on goods moving through the state if there is a break in the continuity of transit. As discussed above, states may not impose ad valorem property taxes on goods in transit, only on goods that have reached their final destination. A break in transit does not change this rule.
If Congress has not enacted laws regarding the subject, a state government may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce if the __________.
A. regulation does not discriminate against out-of-state competition and does not unduly burden interstate commerce
Explanation
B. Narrowly tailored to serve an important state interest
C. Rationally related to a legitimate state objective
D. The regulation is necessary to protect local businesses
regulation does not discriminate against out-of-state competition and does not unduly burden interstate commerce
Explanation
If Congress has not acted, state regulation of interstate commerce is valid if the regulation does not discriminate against out-of-state competition and does not unduly burden interstate commerce.
“Narrowly tailored to serve an important state interest” is an intermediate scrutiny standard used in some equal protection cases. It does not reflect the standard used to judge state regulations of commerce.
“Rationally related to a legitimate state objective” reflects the rational basis test used in some due process and equal protection cases and does not reflect the standard used to judge state regulations of commerce.
“The regulation is necessary to protect local businesses” does not reflect a standard used in any case; if a state regulation seeks to protect local business it generally is invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Privilege, license, franchise, and occupation taxes are cumulatively known as “doing business” taxes. States generally can impose such taxes—on companies engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, as well as on interstate companies engaged in local commerce—for the privilege of doing business within the state.
Which of the following statements is not correct as to the validity of a “doing business” tax?
A. the activity taxed must have a substantial nexus to the taxing state
B. the tax must be fairly apportioned, must not discriminate against interstate commerce
C. must fairly relate to services provided by the state.
D. The tax must be fairly apportioned and cannot be a flat tax.
D. The tax must be fairly apportioned and cannot be a flat tax.
Explanation
It is not true that a “doing business” tax (e.g., privilege, license, franchise, or occupation tax) cannot be a flat tax. Such a tax can be imposed on companies engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, as well as on companies engaged in local commerce, for the privilege of doing business in the state. Such taxes may be measured by a flat amount or may be a proportional rate based on revenue derived from the taxing state.
In either case, the tax must meet the basic requirements: the activity taxed must have a substantial nexus to the taxing state; and the tax must be fairly apportioned, must not discriminate against interstate commerce, and must fairly relate to services provided by the state.
In assessing whether a nondiscriminatory state tax on interstate commerce is valid absent any federal legislation in the area, courts will typically consider which of the following factors:
A. There is a substantial nexus between the taxpayer and the state
B. The tax is fairly apportioned
C. The tax has some reasonable relation to revenue production
D. There is a fair relationship between the tax and the services or benefits provided by the state
A, B, and D
Explanation
In assessing whether a nondiscriminatory state tax on interstate commerce is valid absent any federal legislation in the area, typically a court will consider three things:
- Whether there is a substantial nexus between the taxpayer and the state;
- Whether the tax is fairly apportioned; and
- Whether there is a fair relationship between the tax and the services or benefits provided by the state.
Whether a tax has some reasonable relation to revenue production generally will not be considered in assessing whether a nondiscriminatory state tax on interstate commerce is valid absent any federal legislation in the area. Whether a tax has a reasonable relationship to revenue production is something the courts will consider when Congress imposes a tax in an area over which Congress has no regulatory power. Because states have broad authority to regulate under the police power, state taxes generally are not subject to the reasonable relation to revenue production test.
Under the Commerce Clause, which types of taxes may be valid?
A. Sales taxes Only
B. Use taxes Only
C. Both sales taxes and use taxes
D. Neither sales taxes nor use taxes
Both sales taxes and use taxes
Explanation
Under the Commerce Clause, both sales taxes and use taxes may be valid. A sales tax is a tax on sales made within a state, and a use tax is a tax on goods purchased out of state and brought into the state for use. Sales taxes generally do not discriminate against interstate commerce and are valid. Use taxes generally will not be held to discriminate against interstate commerce if they merely seek to equalize taxes on goods purchased out of state with those purchased within the state.
Can a law that discriminates against interstate commerce be valid under the Commerce Clause?
Yes, Congress can pass laws that discriminate against interstate commerce, and the states can too if authorized by federal law
Explanation
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress can adopt laws discriminating against interstate commerce, and the states can too if authorized by federal law. Congress’s power over interstate commerce is plenary; i.e., Congress can adopt a law discriminating against interstate commerce as long as the law does not violate some other constitutional provision. And although the states generally may not adopt laws that discriminate against interstate commerce, they may do so if authorized by federal law.
Accordingly, the choices indicating that states cannot pass a law even if authorized by Congress and neither the federal government nor the states may pass a law that discriminates against interstate commerce are incorrect.
Which of the following statements about the states’ power to tax interstate commerce is not true?
A. Congress may prohibit the states from taxing a particular aspect of interstate commerce.
B. A state tax may discriminate against interstate commerce if Congress authorizes the tax.
C. A state tax might be subjected to a balancing test.
D. If Congress has not acted and the state tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce, the state tax is valid.
D. If Congress has not acted and the state tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce, the state tax is valid.
The power to regulate interstate commerce is:
A. A federal power, but states may regulate interstate commerce subject to the negative implications of the Commerce Clause
B. Exclusively federal, and states have no power to regulate any aspect of interstate commerce
C. An exclusive state power that has been reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.
A. A federal power, but states may regulate interstate commerce subject to the negative implications of the Commerce Clause
To be constitutional, a “doing business” tax (e.g., a privilege, franchise, or occupation tax imposed on businesses for the privilege of doing business in a state):
A. Must be fairly apportioned and cannot be a flat tax
B. Must fairly relate to services provided by the state and cannot be a flat tax
C. Must be fairly apportioned and must fairly relate to services provided by the state.
C. Must be fairly apportioned and must fairly relate to services provided by the state
To be constitutional, a “doing business” tax must be fairly apportioned and must fairly relate to services provided by the state. Additionally, such taxes must tax an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing state and must not discriminate against interstate commerce.
As long as a “doing business” tax meets the above requirements, it CAN be a flat tax.
If Congress has not enacted laws with regard to a specific area of interstate commerce, a state may regulate a local aspect of this interstate commerce:
A. When the state’s regulation is narrowly tailored to serve an important governmental interest
B. When the state’s regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state objective
C. When the regulation is necessary to protect local businesses
D. When the state’s regulation does not discriminate against out-of-state competition and the regulation does not unduly burden interstate commerce.
D. When the state’s regulation does not discriminate against out-of-state competition and the regulation does not unduly burden interstate commerce.