Consequentialism Flashcards
Deontic concepts
Used to evaluate actions
- Right (in broad sense = not wrong)
-> Obligatory
-> required - Wrong
Value concepts
Generally used to evaluate people, objects, states of affair, and events
- Good (Intrinsic vs Extrinsic)
- Bad (Intrinsic vs Extrinsic)
Virtue and vice
- Value concepts
- Used to evaluate people – in particular, their characters
Some virtues
Compassion, kindness, benevolence
Some vices
Greed, malice, ingratitude
Praiseworthy and blameworthiness
- used to evaluate a person for some particular action they performed
- Praiseworthy vs. blameworthy is not the same and Right vs. wrong
-> Ex. a friend is supposed to help you study, but tells you the wrong info, the friend performed wrongly but does not merit blame
A comprehensive moral theory
will give a theory of value by specifying which things are good and bad, which people are virtuous which people are blameworthy and praiseworthy
Consequentialism
Whether an action is right or wrong depends only on its consequences
- Maximize goodness
- Implies the same kind of action may be right in some circumstances, but wrong in others
-> Some think this is an advantage (flexibility), some think it is a cost
Consequentialism complete defintion
For an action, A, to be right in circumstances, C, is for A to produce the best overall consequences, compared to all the relevant alternative actions the agent could perform in C.
Is consequentialism a complete moral theory? Why?
- Consequentialism = incomplete moral theory
- Doesn’t tell us which things are good meaning it doesn’t provide us with theory of value
- Should be considered as a family of theories
Why do different consequentialism theories differ?
Based on what they define as intrinsically good
Utilitarianism
For an action A to be right in circumstances C is for A to produce the greatest net well-being, compared to all the relevant alternative actions the agent could perform in C.
Utilitarianism - Theory of value
Well-being is the only thing that is objectively and intrinsically good
Utilitarianism - Theory of right/wrong action
Consequentialism view: Whether an action is right depends only on the goodness of its outcome, relative to the outcomes of the available alternatives
Utilitarianism - Who’s well-being is relevant
Everyone’s well-being carries equal weight and importance
Which consequences matter?
- The immediate or long-term consequences?
- The actual or expected consequences?
THE IMMEDIATE/ACTUAL
Utilitarianism - What does it mean for action A, to produce the “greatest net well-being”
Action A produces the greatest net well-being when the net well-being produced by A is > than the net well-being produced by all the relevant alternative actions the agent could perform
Why is Utilitarianism a comparative theory?
- The fact that A has an overall net-positive effect on general well-being isn’t enough to make it morally right
- Whether A is right also depends on what the alternatives to A are, and what those alternatives’ effects on general well-being are.
- So, to determine whether A is right, we need to not only look at the net well-being produced by A, but also compare this net wellbeing to the net well-being produced by the alternatives to A.
Consequentialism - Deathbed promise
- Suppose you promise your dying father to keep up the family business. Should you keep your promise?
- According to consequentialism the only thing that’s morally relevant in this case is the consequence (the promise) – the mere fact that you have made a promise is not morally relevant
Deathbed Promise - A1 Selling the family business
Net well-being produced by selling the family business
The decreased in well-being to your siblings, the decrease in well-being to the workers who were laid off during the transition of the business
Then, compare this to the net well-being produced by the alternatives:
- A2 = keeping the family business, and running it
- A3 = keeping the family business, but hiring someone else to run it
What exactly is well-being?
Different answers to this questions will yield different versions of utilitarianism – like how different answers to what is good yield different versions of consequentialism
Hedonism
Well-being = happiness/pleasure
Hedonistic Utilitarianism
For an action A to be right in circumstances C is for A to produce the greatest net happiness (i.e. pleasure) compared to all the relevant alternative actions the agent could perform in C.
Jeremy Betham and John Stuart Mill
Early proponents of Utilitarianism
Benthal and Mill’s account of well-being
Hedonist account of well-being:
- Hedonism: happiness/pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good, and unhappiness/pain is the only thing that is intrinsically bad
Hedonistic Utilitarianism - Theory of value
Hedonism: the only thing that is intrinsically food is happiness/pleasure and the only thing that is intrinsically bad is unhappiness
Hedonistic Utilitarianism - Theory of right/wrong action
Utilitarianism: The right action to perform is the action that produces the greatest net well-being
Mills “proof” that happiness is desirable, or good
- The only evidence that an object is visible is that people see it; and the only evidence that a sound is audible, is that people hear
- So likewise, the only evidence that something is desirable is that people that desire it
- Every person desires his/her own happiness
- So, everyone’s happiness is desirable
Critiques of Mill’s Argument - Inference from premise 1 to premise 2:
- Presupposes a uniform interpretation of the adjective therefore implausible
- Ibble obble adjectives have to with ability other have to do with merit/suitability:
-> Ex. diff btw being admirable (meriting admiration) whereas duable (means able to be done)
Premise 2:
- If people desire undesirable stuff all the time, then this argument in not plausible
Bentham on comparing amounts of pleasure and pain
Pleasure/pains differ on in quantity
The quantity of a pleasure or pain is determined by:
- Its intensity
- Its duration
- It “propiniquity” or “remoteness” (how soon it will occur)
- Its “certain or uncertainty” (how likely it is to occur)
NOTE: Contemporary Bentham esk theorists only agree with the first two
Mill - A Doctrine of Swine!
“…[S]uch a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure—no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit—they designate as utterly mean and groveling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine …”
Mill on comparing amounts of pleasure and pain
Pleasures and pains differ not only in quantity (i.e. intensity and duration), but also in quality
Different kinds of pleasure:
- Basic animal pleasure of food, drink, sex
- Pleasures that only humans experience
Mill’s test for higher quality in pleasures (in contemporary English)
- Consider everyone who has experienced both A and B and has the competences required to fully appreciate both pleasures
- If all (or most) of them prefer A over B, then A is a higher quality pleasure than B. And if all (or most) prefer even small amounts of A to huge quantities of B, then any quantity of A always outweighs any quantity of B.
Mill on comparing amounts of pleasure and pain (His conclusion)
- Mill thinks that when figuring out the net pleasure/pain produced by an action, we must take into account:
1. The quantity of the pleasures/pains produced by the action
2. The quality of the pleasures/pains produced by the action - This account of measuring and comparing pleasure and pain is imprecise. We can’t assign numerical values to amounts of pleasure and pain. But we can still make rough comparisons.
The Experience Machine
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Superduper neuroscientists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain.
Upshot: The Experience Machine teaches us that something matters to us in addition to experience—that something matters to us beyond how our lives feel from the inside
- Objection to only Hedonistic Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism: Some Difficulties
- Demandingness
- Impartiality
- No Intrinsic Wrongness Problem/Problem of Injustice (no action is intrinsically good or bad, but simply based on the results/consequences it yields)
Demandingness Objection - DELIBERATION
- According to Utilitarianism, to know whether an action is morally right, we must do four things:
- Add up all the benefits (well-being) it produces
- Add up all the harm (ill-being) it produces
- Determine balance of benefit to harm
- See whether the balance is greater than that of any other available action
-> If it is, this is the right action to carry out - The above requires a huge amount of information from us: we need to all the possible options and their results, the overall value of each of these options, and then need to compare these values to see which option would yield the best outcome
DELIBERATION Worry 1
Need to know all the options and results - results of total actions matter, which includes till the end of time (this is impossible to know; the smallest actions can have big consequences that we are unaware of when taking that action)
Response: Every moral theory needs a story about why we’re sometimes morally in the dark; we may just have less moral knowledge than we thought
DELIBERATION Worry 2
Need to know overall value of all options and compare values - we cannot spend our lives thinking about these things; we are not supercomputers and utilitarianism seems to demand this from us
Response: In most cases, we can rely on conventional wisdom to determine what to do - this comes from Mill (the thought that some types of actions we know from history tend to produce certain kinds of consequences). For example, murder does not usually lead to good results - these kinds of conventions we can rely on - relieves us of the cognitive burden of this worry
DELIBERATION - Note
Overthinking it is often at odds with doing the most good. In fact, this will often interfere with it: consequentialism itself will usually recommend against pondering these decision problems and may only rarely recommend it when extensive pondering is required
- Most of the time, it should be relatively obvious what will produce the most good
Demandingness Objection - MOTIVATION
- Do we always have to strategically aim to bring about the absolute best consequences? A plausible moral theory is one that we can live by. But asking us to be constantly benevolent, never taking a moment or two for ourselves…how many of us can be so altruistic?
- Does morality really require us to be saints in this way
- Utilitarian Reply: we shouldn’t always be strategizing about how to improve the world. Why? Because people motivated in this way usually fail to achieve their goal
-> Ex. is one who constantly strives for happiness; this only makes happiness in your life more elusive - striving to always maximize well-being in the world is usually going to make it more difficult to attain
MOTIVATION - Note
Utilitarianism offers, above all, a standard of rightness (a theory of right action; which actions are right) and not a decision procedure (how to decide what to do and how to think about what to do)
- This distinction comes from Mill
- In practice: imagine doing a complex gymnastics routine on a bar - there is a standard of correctness for the routine. Should the gymnast be thinking about the standard of correctness during the routine? No, you shouldn’t because you’ll fall off the beam. Standard of rightness for routine is not a guide on what to do; they simply specify the conditions under which the moves are correct
- Most utilitarians believe that their theory fails as a decision procedure because using the theory to guide deliberation and motivation would actually decrease goodness in the world
- Note: standard of right action AND standard of value are supposed to be objective facts in utilitarianism - but, very often, we will not always have perfect access to these facts. This may mean we end up making different choices on what to do even if we all accept the theory as objectively true
Demandingness Objection - ACTION
- Even if we don’t always have to deliberate with an eye to doing what’s absolutely best, and even if we don’t always have to have saintly, benevolent motivations, utilitarianism still says that we always have to act to maximize well-being in the world. Whenever we don’t do this, it is morally wrong. Isn’t this excessive? (Like response to Singer)
-> Utilitarian Reply: Morality is hard. The fact that the implications of the moral theory are burdensome isn’t a strike against it. That consequentialism/utilitarianism threaten the status quo may be a mark of their truth, rather than falsity (Perhaps we just have a lot to improve on in our society)
Objection of IMPARTIALITY
Some people take it to be a virtue of the theory that everyone’s interests are considered equally - everyone counts equally, no matter whether they are a celebrity or a billionaire or an impoverished person. BUT morality can sometimes seem to recommend morality. Shouldn’t you care about your friends more than strangers? Your own children more than other’s children? Shouldn’t you privilege their interests?
- Ex. pay for a family member’s surgery as opposed to paying for famine relief: utilitarianism does not allow this
Related to IMPARTIALITY
We have to take the interests of everyone into account, even evil people - so if enough people are terrible, utilitarianism can require that we allow the suffering they cause, insofar as it benefits the bad people sufficiently
Utilitarian Reply: Sometimes we give preference to our near and dear, because that’s what’s most beneficial…in those cases it might actually maximize wellbeing to privilege these people. And most often allowing terrible people to cause suffering won’t maximize well-being in the long term…that’s all we got.
Objection of NO INTRINSIC WRONGNESS PROBLEM/PROBLEM OF INJUSTICE
- Landau treats them as different, Howard treats them the same
- An action’s rightness or wrongness depends always and only on its consequences. So no actions are right or wrong irrespective of their consequences. If an action maximizes goodness, then it is right – nothing is off the table.
-> Miserable Mike: Mike is miserable, but is badly off and has a grim future. He wants to live and enjoys small pleasures here and now, but most of his life is not good and won’t get better. The world would contain less misery if he were to die. So, we must kill him (given, of course, that we avoid causing even greater harm by doing so like repercussions of being caught or causing harm to family)
-> Utilitarianism would technically recommend killing him to maximize happiness - but it seems insane to think this way
-> Transplant: similar case
Objection of NO INTRINSIC WRONGNESS PROBLEM/PROBLEM OF INJUSTICE - A Consequentialist Reply
Utilitarians have no answer: if killing maximizes well-being, you must kill. But, consequentialists more generally have a trick:
- Step 1: Note that one consequence of performing any type of act is that you will have performed an act of that type (ex. Dr Howard lecturing results in his lecturing)
- Step 2: Tinker with the theory of value; claim that killing, as a type of act, is intrinsically bad - add to the theory of value (can no longer be utilitarianism who focus only on well-being and pain)
- Step 3: Claim that killing is so bad that its badness outweighs the badness that would be produced by the alternative actions in the problematic cases (ex. Miserable Mike and Transplant)
Transplant
David can decide to kill a healthy specimen and divide up the parts to the five people, or let five people die naturally due to illness - if you kill, you end up with one killing (which consequentialists could argue is worse than five natural deaths) - if they do make that claim, they will get the right verdict. That the best consequences open to you are the ones where you refrain from killing
-> You might question the plausibility of the theory of value in this case and plausibility of Step 3 BUT at least this is a possible strategy
-> But even with this trick, the problem re-emerges:
Murderous Footbridge
Murderous Footbridge
George stands on footbridge above trolley; a villain has directed the trolley toward the five, intending to kill them. George can push the large man or refrain from doing so
- If george doesn’t kill, five other killings committed by the villain will occur
- If he does kill, only one killing will occur (to the large man)
-> What are consequentialists who believe that killing is intrinsically bad going to say? George should kill because it will minimize the total number of killings - if killings are bad, then surely five killings have to be worse than one. - Therefore, consequentialism is structurally incapable of claiming that Geotger shouldn’t kill. BUT if anyone who thought you shou;dn’t kill in the original footbridge kill will also think you shouldn’t kill in this case. But it also seems like consequentialism cannot adjust their theory of value to accommodate their verdict -
Puzzle: If you think it’s wrong to kill in Murderous Footbridge, then you think it’s wrong to perform an action that would bring about the best consequences, compared to the alternative actions available to you.
- BUT how could it be wrong to do what is best? - You think that sometimes it is impermissible to bring about the best outcome
- How could that be? One compelling idea behind consequentialism seems to be that it could never be wrong to do what is best; this has led some people to reject the idea that it’s wrong to kill in murderous footbrid