Consciousness Flashcards
Are there minds according to Behaviourism?
Maybe.
But only behaviour should be studied and “mind-talk” should thus be translated into behavior to be studied
Are there minds according to computationalism?
Yes.
And they can be implemented anywhere
Are there minds according to connectionism?
Yes.
And for what we know now they depend on brain-linke structures
Are thre minds according to predictive processing?
Yes.
And they are dependent on brains that build models of the world (and update them based on prediction error)
What is the attentional blink?
A phenomenon or experiment where the participant fails to detect a second target stimulus when it has been presented in a close temporal proximity to the first target.
This effect of missing the second stimuli often only occurs when the first target has been successfully detected.
* When T2 appears within a short interval (about 200-500 milliseconds) after T1, the likelihood of detecting T2 drops significantly. This interval is referred to as the “blink” period.
What is conscious awareness? (Related to the attentional blink)
The attentional blink highlights the interplay between attention and conscious perception. Even when T2 is presented and enters the sensory system, it may not reach conscious awareness due to the attentional limitations imposed by processing T1.
What is a contrastive analysis?
Contrastive analysis is a research method used to pinpoint the differences between conscious and unconscious brain states. It involves comparing brain activity associated with conscious experiences to brain activity when the same stimuli are not consciously perceived.
* The brain activity of whether the stimuli was perceived or not is recorded either by fMRI, EEG or MEG.
Which parts of the brain is more active when we consciously see a stimuli than when we haven’t?
The fronto-parietal area is where we see most as well as the visual cortex.
Who is Thomas Nagel?
Thomas Nagel is an American philosopher from the 1930’s, and is most known for his critique of material reductionist accounts of the mind in relation to his book “What it is like to be a bat”
What was Thomas Nagels belief of consciousness?
Nagel’s point is that consciousness inherently involves subjectivity. To be conscious is to have experiences that have a specific, qualitative character from the first-person perspective - “Something it is like”
EXAMPLE: In his paper, Nagel uses the example of a bat to illustrate his point. He argues that even if we understand all the physical processes and behaviors of a bat, we cannot fully comprehend what it is like to be a bat. The bat’s experience of the world, particularly through echolocation, is fundamentally different from human experience, highlighting the subjective nature of consciousness.
Nagel’s critique suggests that any purely reductive or functional account of the mind will be incomplete because it leaves out the essential feature of consciousness: the subjective experience.
What is Thomas Nagels belief of machines having consciousness?
Nagel points out that functional and intentional descriptions could theoretically apply to robots or automata that behave like humans but lack any subjective experience. This means such descriptions are insufficient for capturing what it means to be conscious.
Nagel’s critique suggests that any purely reductive or functional account of the mind will be incomplete because it leaves out the essential feature of consciousness: the subjective experience.
What are the two kinds of consciousness and how are they defined?
Phenomenal consciousness:
* Related to the content (Semantics)
* Related to the “feel”
* Does not fit an input-output model
Access
* Availability to other systems, e.g. reasoning, memory, vision etc.
* Fits and input-output model.
Is conscious experience possible/expected in Behaviourism?
Strategy: Translate metal words into behaviour: X desires P e.g: If X is in the vicinity of P, X will try to obtain P
Issue: How do we operationalise conscious experience? (How would it manifest in behaviour?)
* Behaviourism struggles with operationalizing conscious experience because it focuses solely on observable behavior. Conscious experience, by definition, involves subjective phenomena (qualia) that are not directly observable. Thus, behaviorism has difficulty explaining how subjective experiences manifest in behavior without reducing them to mere behavioral patterns
Is conscious experience possible/expected in Computationalism?
Strategy: Information processing task
Issue: Is conscious exprience information processing? Does it fit into an input-output model? Why would there be something it is like to process information?
* Computational models often rely on input-output frameworks, which may not account for the intrinsic quality of subjective experience
Is conscious experience possible/expected in Connectionism?
Strategy: Build brain-like networks can emulate mindful behaviour
* Example: Creating artificial neural networks that can perform tasks similar to human cognition
Issue: Even if we accept that semantics emerge from the distributed networks as high-dimensional vectors, how and why would a brain-like model instantiate conscious experience?
* While connectionist models can explain how semantic understanding might emerge from neural activity, they do not inherently explain how or why these processes would give rise to conscious experience.
* it’s unclear how and why these models would have subjective experiences, as opposed to merely simulating them.