Competition Law Flashcards

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1
Q

Hofner

A

Undertaking = every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of how it is financed or its legal structure
Employment procurement is an economic activity

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2
Q

MOTOE

A

Undertakings include organisations that are publicly funded

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3
Q

1990 World Cup Decision

A

Undertakings include organisations that lack a profit motive

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4
Q

Bayer

A

Unilateral conduct by one undertaking is unlikely to amount to agreement

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5
Q

Beef Industry

A

Object of an agreement must examine its purpose in the economic context in which it operates
Subjective aims of the agreement are irrelevant

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6
Q

T-Mobile

A

It is sufficient if the object of the agreement is only capable of restricting competition

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7
Q

General Motors Nederlands

A

It is sufficient if restriction of competition is indirect

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8
Q

European Night Services

A

Effect must be examined within the actual conditions, economic context, products or services involved, and structure of the relevant market

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9
Q

Transocean Marine Paint

A

An anti-competitive measure may be lawful if its ultimate effect is to increase competition (Article 101(3)

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10
Q

Hercules Chemicals

A

It is sufficient if the undertakings have expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a particular way

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11
Q

Tepea

A

Agreements can include oral agreements

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12
Q

Treuhand

A

Conduct which may appear to be unilateral may still be found to be collusion where one party tacitly acquiesces to practices adopted by another
Even if not operating in the same market

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13
Q

Cementhandelaren

A

A decision by a trade union to adopt a system of target or guide prices is prohibited, despite members being technically free to calculate their own prices

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14
Q

ANSEAU-NAVEWA

A

A decision by a trade union to adopt a system of conformity checks and labelling was prohibited as it made imports practically impossible

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15
Q

Dyestuffs

A

Concerted practices = coordination between undertakings which knowingly substitutes practical cooperation for the risks of competition

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16
Q

Wood Pulp Cartel

A

ECJ warned against assuming too easily that parallel behaviour could amount to collusion unless concentration constitutes the only plausible explanation

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17
Q

Societé Technologique Minières

A

Collusion must actually/potentially/directly/indirectly affect trade between member states
Must have as its object OR effect the restriction of competition
Rule of reason - if measure is necessary and proportionate

18
Q

ANIC

A

Unnecessary to establish into which category of collusion the unlawful practice falls

19
Q

Brasserie de Haecht

A

Collective effect of agreements can be taken into account to determine the effect on competition

20
Q

Consten

A

Exclusive distribution agreements clearly placed limitations on freedom of trade between member states - restricted competition

21
Q

Pronuptia de Paris

A

Rule of Reason approach

Franchising agreements generally enable establishment and ultimately increase competition

22
Q

Metropole Television

A

Rule of Reason defence denied - ultimate pro-competitive effects must be examined within the context of Article 101(3)

23
Q

Völk

A

De minimis defence - undertakings must have an appreciable share of the market for there to be any appreciable effect on trade

24
Q

Crehen

A

Damages can be awarded by a national court for losses caused by agreements which breach Article 101

25
Q

BRT v SABAM

A

Imposed unfair conditions on consumers - abuse of a dominant position

26
Q

Manfredi v Lloyd

A

An individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal link between that harm and the breach of Article 101

27
Q

Hilti

A

Nail guns were specific enough to have their own market
Hilti-compatible nails and cartridges were a distinct aftermarket
Light enough to be transported over the entire EU

28
Q

Continental Can

A

Supply substitution - three metal containers belonged to same market due to ease of switching production

29
Q

Michelin

A

Two separate markets for tyres (heavy vehicles and light vehicles) - no ability to adapt production between the two
RGM was Netherlands due to practice of only using domestic suppliers

30
Q

Microsoft

A

3 types of software belonged to three product markets - large amounts of time, capital and risk incurred in developing each one
Used intellectual property rights to freeze out competition
Bundling products

31
Q

Hugin

A

Separate aftermarket of compatible products
Refusal to supply was abuse of a dominant position
Must affect trade between member states - no breach as Sweden was not part of EU at the time

32
Q

Sealink

A

RGM was Holyhead port - operating ferry link between Ireland and UK
Limited access to essential facilities - other ferry operators could only use the port on less favourable conditions (abuse)

33
Q

Alsatel

A

Whole of France (not just Lorraine region) was the RGM - similar conditions of competition across the whole country

34
Q

Nestle/Perrier

A

RGM was France due to common practice of French consumers only buying French mineral water

35
Q

Società Italiano Vetro

A

Collective dominance = joint dominance in a market by a collection of undertakings allowing them to behave independently of their competitors, consumers and customers

36
Q

Akzo Chemie

A

50%+ ill be considered a dominant position unless there are exceptional circumstances
Used predatory pricing (position of economic strength)

37
Q

Tetra-Pak

A

Exclusive patent licences over design of cartons made it difficult for new entrants to the market, predatory pricing - restricted competition

38
Q

Hoffman La Roche

A

Commercial advantage may make it difficult for others to compete - superior technology and sophisticated supply systems

39
Q

Intel

A

System of rebates to manufacturers who bought all their chips from Intel which had the effect of reducing competition and were a deprived the customer of real choice

40
Q

ABG Oil

A

Relevant temporal market - during the OPEC oil crisis, oil imports to the NL dropped by 50% - small producers were reliant on big companies to buy oil on the world market and sell it on - abuse when BP cut back supply to ABG more than other consumers

41
Q

United Branks

A

<50% market share can still be a dominant position if the market is fragmented
Dominant position = position of economic strength which enables the undertaking to prevent effective competition on the market by acting independently of its competitors, consumers and customers
Brand identification and vertical integration - indication of dominant position
Refusal to supply and excessively high prices - abuse

42
Q

British Leyland

A

Charging excessively high prices to consumers is an abuse of a dominant position if there is no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product
Potential effect on trade will suffice