Committing to Human Rights Standards (Final) Flashcards
“Appropriate” ratification (logic of appropriateness)
States will do what they think is appropriate based on their state identity, and international persuasion/emulation. Government/party identity and domestic politics plays a role.
“Strategic” ratification (logic of consequences)
Behavioural choice made taking into account the expected consequences of that course of action vs an alternative course of action. Take the course of action that aligns more with my interests. States will ratify a treaty because the benefits outweigh the costs of ratifying that treaty.
International socialization and State identity formation: World Society school
States play a social role in politics, and given the role that they have chosen for themselves they are going to act out a script of what to say or do, which will help decide if they ratify treaties or not. These scripts are “World models of progress and justice set forth as universalistic scripts for authentic nation-statehood”. These scripts come from processes of socialization that lead to the internalization of those normative models by states.
International socialization and State identity formation: Mechanisms of socialization (inter-trans-national interactions)
Inter states and societal actors that interact with each other across trans national boundaries. International conferences and organizations that promote human rights (learning): States learning about why HR’s are important given the asymmetrical power that exists between them and individuals. Expert theorizing on the value of human rights (epistemic communities): have a higher level of sophistication, involve more expertise knowledge than just conferences. Ratifiers as “reference group” (emulation): A group of states for other states to model and look up to. State linkages with TANs and human rights organizations (embeddedness): Help ruling elites internalize the value of HR and come perhaps themselves HR advocates over time.
Domestic socialization, identity formation and agenda-setting: From domestic socialization to ratification of HR treaties
Ratification as affirmation of leader/party identity:Party of affirming my identity in front of others.
Ratification as extension of a principled domestic legislative/policy agenda: Once you have a HR agenda going on domestically, the ratification of a HR treaty may become the inevitable next step. This tends to induce the govt to be normatively consistent.
Ratification as the result of domestic advocacy/lobby: the govt elites receive pressure form advocacy groups. As a result, those ruling elites over time will start internalizing HR discourse.
Domestic socialization, identity formation and agenda-setting: Ratification of human rights treaties as a tool of domestic socialization
Ratification to socialize domestic groups/audience: A move to try to persuade certain domestic groups about the importance of HR.
Ratification to shape/push domestic (HR) legislative/policy agenda: The govt can ratify the HR treaty to send a signal to the opposition by telling them that we now have a legal commitment to the rest of the world - if we don’t pass this bill that you are opposing we may be in violation of intl law.
“Strategic” ratification: International politics
Great-power coercion or inducement (uncommon). Short-term expressive benefits (not uncommon): Either positive or negative inducement.
“Strategic” ratification: Domestic politics
Lock-in effects (against non-democratic political threats): Tie the hands of the state in terms of HR practices through ratification. Domestic institutional barriers (veto players, political costs).
“Strategic” politics International and Domestic politics
(Long-term) compliance costs. Uncertainty about the commitment’s evolving breadth (interpretive autonomy). Reversibility costs (international prestige, jurisprudential stickiness). Identity politics (government/party/leader ideological signalling): Send a signal about and identity that you want to show you have, show that your party is loving of HR to secure votes, using ratification or non-ratification strategically to signal your identity.
Why ratify a human rights treaty? Sincere ratifiers
Doing what they say they are doing. Identity driven; treaty legitimation; costless decision; lock-in effects. Ratify because their identity, interests, preferences are in line with the treaty, they may want to give intl support to the treaty, expecting others to join in on that support.
Why ratify a human rights treaty? Strategic ratifiers (false positives)
Short-term expressive benefits vs. (low) long-term compliance costs; risky (accountability: breach visibility, enforcement).
Why not ratify a human rights treaty? Sincere non-ratifiers
Not puzzling. Doing what they say they are dong. Identity-driven; treaty de-legitimation; costly decision.
Why not ratify a human rights treaty? False negatives
Institutional/political costs; no substantial benefits.
False positives: Why do rights-abusing governments sometimes ratify? Expected benefits
Expected benefits: Good image (domestically and internationally), IO membership conditionality, greater access to gains from international cooperation (foreign aid, trade, investment), divert attention of human rights monitors and get rid of their monitoring.
False positives: Why do rights-abusing governments sometimes ratify? Uncertain costs
Visibility of treaty violations: False positives will tend to be false positives when it comes to treaties that they can easily violate and get away with, as opposed to treaties that it would be harder for them to violate and get away with.
Human rights monitors’ focus (ratification vs. practices): Monitors may not be focusing on you for your ratifications, but on your actual HR practices.
Probability and significant of enforcement (vulnerability): Material vulnerability of the state (how others can punish you for the violation in material terms. Social vulnerability: The ability of others to exert harm on your status or prestige in the intl community (soft power).If you are powerful enough so that your vulnerability is relative low (China) you can ratify a HR treaty you don’t intend to comply with.
Short time horizons: If you can push costs into the future and enjoy the benefits now, that might make sense for a govt.
False negatives: Why do rights-respecting governments refrain from ratification? Legislative veto players (the ratification process)
Monists: See intl and domestic law as the same (civil law systems tend to be monists). Dualist: See them as separate systems (common law systems tend to be dualist). Legislative players will veto during ratification process.
False negatives: Why do rights-respecting governments refrain from ratification? Subnational veto players (federalism)
Have to take into account both the legislative accord involved but also the subnational actors involved.
False negatives: Why do rights-respecting governments refrain from ratification? Ex post legal integration (judicial system)
- Adjustment costs: The law practitioners in common law systems are not accustomed to the idea of incorporating the intl agreement, and they may have ism resistance to this way of making law.
- Uncertainty costs (interpretive autonomy: You don’t know how domestic courts will interpret thees treaties, and you may not have control over them. You may rather no ratify it due to the uncertainty of what that really may become.
- Reversibility costs (stickiness of judicial decisions in common law systems): In common law systems, judicial decisions are legally binding. Judicial decisions in a case may give an interpretation to that treaty that the govt does not like. Interpretive risk.
Simmons Theory of rationally expressive ratification: Some evidence
- Democracy increases the probability that a government will commit itself to a human rights treaty (preference effects: the influence of various preference son how human rights are interpreted, applied, or prioritized).
- For the CAT, CEDAW, and CRC, newly transitioned democratic polities are most likely to ratify sooner than well-established democracies (lock-in effects).
- Common-law countries ratify at a much lower rate than do civil law countries and other legal systems (ex post effects).
- Customized ratification (Reservations, understandings, decisions) are the prerogatives of the rich: wealthy countries are the ones that make the most use of RUDs, in order to see the potential problems and the need to mold the commitment to your liking, you need to have legal experts and resources.
