Collapse Flashcards

1
Q

Long Term Economic Weaknesses

A

in decline
highlighted in Novosibirsk Report 1983
crisis in agriculture because of inefficiency & infelxibility
‘For internal use only’

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Discipline

A

Key reformers brought into Politburo (Ligachev, Ryzhkov)
attack rampant alcoholism to improve productivity
mid-1980s: 15% of household spending
April 1985: ‘We can’t build communism on vodka’
legal age for consumption of alcohol raised to 21,
number of retail outlets reduced,
vineyards & distilleries destroyed,
cost of vodka tripled
BUT TAX REVENUES FELL & CAUSED SHORTAGE IN BUDGET
moonshine

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Twelfth Five Year Plan

A

traditional: increase investment & central planning to accelerate growth.
SCIENCE AND RESEARCH
WEAKNESSES:
investment skewed towards construction projects & this led to OVERSPENDS
out of date / breaking down equipment unproductive
industry slow to use technology & a drain on foreign exchange
agriculture taking up large investment with no increase in productivity; little to be gained by investing more
quantity > quality
ACCELERATION did little to address fundamental weaknesses
level of opposition to real change from apparatus
June 1986: ‘Take Gosplan… what they want, they do’
‘superministries’ to try & co-ordinate better and reduce waste but unable
reforms implemented by people who’s priveliged positions they were trying to reduce
military resistant
industy & military investment only if consumer goods suffered
or go into DEFICIT:
1985- 2.4% GDP
1986- 6.2% GDP
Afganistan & Star Wars
G’s reforms exacerbated

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Joint Ventures

A

Jan 1987

allowed foreign firms to establish businesses; Moscow McDonalds 1990
aimed to open USSR up to more modern technology

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Law on State Enterprises

A

1987

loosening of state controls over wages & prices (weakened GOSPLAN)
election in choice of manager
factories could produce what they wanted once target met

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Co-operatives legalised

A

1988

small-scale private enterprises established
set own prices
flourishing in cafes, restaurants, small shops
disguised move to more market-based economy

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Impact of perestroika

A
  • food production small increase in growth rate: 1-2% 1986-87 BUT inadequate to feed growing needs of population. ONE FIFTH IMPORTED
  • enterprises still had STATE INTERFERENCE: state decided on allocation of materials. devolving power to managers depended on ATTITUDES of state BUREAUCRATS (preferred to keep tight control to meet targets)
  • products DIVERTED from state shops (esp food) where prices were low to co-operatives that charged a much higher price; inflation; stripped state shops; bad impact on fixed income (pensioners)
  • co-opertives could find best buyer; deals withrich city authorities whilst POORER CITIES devoid of adequate food/basic stuff
  • co-operatives more productive than state so CORRUPT government officials demanded bribes for permission to continue to operate. criminal gangs extracted money through extortion rackets (rich from moonshining under G)
  • uncertainty over supplies led to HOARDING by population; shops emptied of goods as they arrived– food RATIONING in some cities (1988 meat rationed in 26/55 regions of Russia)
  • implementation of electing managers led to steep rise in wages; urban wages rose by 9% 1988 and 13% 1989
  • foreign companies keen to invest faced with endless bureaucracy that made progress slow/put investors off. end of 1990 there were nearly 3,000 joint ventures but mostly small-scale and had little impact on economy
  • reforms UNDERMINED d by officials: ignored in some cities + sabotaged. leningrad? city administration withdrew all sausages and buried them

WEAKENED STATE PLANNING APPARATUS BUT PROVIDED LITTLE TO REPLACE IT
end of 1989: economy massively in debt & approaching crisis point; G’s promise of improvement in consumer gods had not been achieved. his reforms made situation wors.e
strikes increased: workers (ie. coal miners in Don Basin) protested over unpaid wages & food shortages– SOOO gov quickly increased wages, but this was a short-term measure
wages useless if nothing to buy.

failure to bring about economic improvements undermined his political power/position. led the way to the only solution: dismantling of economic system.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

oil

A

fall in price of oil made economic situation worse.

significant: USSR become more reliant on using oil exports as source of foreign exchange
1984: oil & gas = 54% of Soviet exports

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

State Commission on Economic Reform and 500 Days Programme

A

July 1989
concluded more radical solution needed
move to market-led economy
split the Politburo (Ryzhkov called for more gradual transition)
G tried to maintain unity & hesitated over making decision

OCTOBER
SHATALIN put forward 500 Days programme; rapid move to market-led economy
rejected by Soviet government accepted by Russian parliament
divisions between central party leadership & national republics caused chaos & the economy collapsed

Soviet output declined 1/5 between 1990-91: catastrophe

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Glasnost

A

criticisms;
complaints about poor housing
details of stalin’s mass terror, the famine & the Katyn massacre
Soviet victory in WWII: myth of Great Patriotic War underined by reckless waste of human life
environmental issues: Aral Sea (irrigation schemes)

G couldnt put a halt to it once it had started
caused by chernobyl; increase in leukaemia & birth deformities; outdated equipment, secrecy & evasion: reflected weaknesses of SU

1989: population much more politicised
over 60,000 informal groups & clubs holding meetings/demos
resulted in criticism against the Party, much at G for weakness in pursuing radical reform
many powerful reformers were unwilling to defend communist party; some decided to resign

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

reforms of the party

A

separate party & state
(Nineteenth Conference of the CP June 1988) BUT Little done to get officials to chose one
lines between two had become blurred (Nomenklatura); personell of one held equivalent in other (Gorbachev: president of the Soviet Union & General Secretary of the Party (+republics)

shifting power from party to Soviets:
allocated more £ to Soviets so they could support their role. deputies elected for 5 years > 2; more security

streamlining Party;
departments of CC reduced from 20 to 9
6 new commissions created
+ streamline state: NOV 1989- G created ‘superministries’ to co-ordinate economic planning, 5 were merged to create 1 for agriculture

Clampdown on corruption:
B’s son-in-law Yuri Churbanov sentenced to 12y in prison
caused resentment in Party;
December 1986: Kunayev removed from First Secretary of party in Kazakhstan (corruption) & replaced by Kolbin (ethnic Russian)
Kazakhs rioted in support of Kunayev
order restored after several hundred protestors were killed
much blame to G; reform of party fraught with dangers

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

democratisation

A

1) Early 1987: CC meeting: G discussed idea of secret ballots for multiple candidates
2) June: limited experiment with multiple candidates in elections for local Soviets. small but significant break with practice of elections involving single candidates proposed by party
3) Nineteenth Party Conference June 1988: G announced principle of multi-candidate elections would be extended to national level with elections for the new Congress of people’s deputies
independent, supervisory role; part of G’s attempts to separate party from state
members allocated to Party and to other orgs (trade unions, Union of Writers
some seats could chose from 12 candidates but CP could control nomination process
1989: democracy taste. CHANGE. WEAKENED CP IRRETRIEVABLY.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

IMPACT ON THE UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

A

hoped democratization would strengthen support for economic reforms (against conservatives)

his failure to bring substantial reform alienated ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’: divisions undermined Gs authority

alienated reformers: Yeltsin realised Party wouldn’t carry through reforms and Plenum of the Central Committee 1987 he openly attacked his approach as being too slow. removed from Politburo.

alienated conservatives: attacked March 1988– letter published by unknown Andreeva; complained about constant undermining of work of Stalin & demoralising glasnost. Ligachev used it to attack pace of reform. sentiments supported by some of his own appointees (Chebrikov)!

factions: informal groupings started to emerge during CPD elections;
- Yeltsin formed Inter-Regional Group
- Conservatives formed Soyuz
unofficial opposition to government

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

abolition of article 6

A

CP couldnt be reformed? then end the political monopoly of the Party
‘the leading and guiding force’: enshrined one party state
target for critics (Sakharov)
Gorbachev repealed 1990 under pressure. other parties

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

ending of brezhnev doctrine

A

enforced Soviet control over eastern Europe by military action
1980-81 leader of Poland imposed martial law due to threat of Soviet intervention. G decided he wouldn’t uphold the right of the USSR to intervene in other socialist countries
At the funeral of Chernenko G told each leader he wouldnt intervene
genuinely believed this was the way to rejuvenate socialism.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Communist collapse across Eastern Europe

A

increasing pressure from publics to reform. trend of nationalism gained momentum
1989 Hungary adopted multi-party system and Polish elections returned non-COmmunist government and G offered encouragement
POLAND: Solidarity defeated CP. message.
EG: Egon Krenz refused to sanction widespread repression. 9/11 Berlin wall dismantled.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Vaclav Havel elected President
ROMANIA: Ceausescu executed Xmas

June 1979: Pope John Paul II visited Poland - ‘Do not be afraid’.
Nationalism mobilised people power against Soviet-imposed Communism/ reformers within Party asserting independence. communism collapsed.
G vital in ss asserting independence. a trend.

17
Q

factors encouraging nationalism in the USSR

seeking independence seemed more possible as the power of the Soviet Union weakened

A

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
esp. outlying areas
Soil erosion ravaged large parts of Central Asia.
industrial pollution major in Baltic republics
focal point for local people to rally against central government

INSECURITY OF LOCAL PARTY LEADERS
‘trust in cadres’ had left them privileged, and they were most threatened by Gorbachev. corruption. whereas B left them alone, G threatened their cosy lifestyle.
lended support to popular local concerns to try and maintain their position; deeply unpopular if seen as lackeys of moscow

CULTURE AND LANGUAGE
1980s: SU–
145m Russians
141m non-Russians: A range of people. strong sense of own cultural identity

18
Q

Nagorno-Karabakh

A

AZERBAIJAN - populated by ARMENIANS
ethnic tensions arose because ARMENIANS wanted to join ARMENIAN REPUBLIC.

1988: violence.
referendum received large majority for joining ARMENIA. unofficial and without consent of Soviet government.

November: ARMENIA announced NAGORNO-KARABAKH was under its control… violence… Moscow intervened & asserted control– inflamed…

showed declining power of Soviet government over outlying republics
+ ethnic clashes in Georgia (89) and Kirgizstan (90)

decline in authority produced tensions in Moldovia; nationalism alarmed Turks who feared discrimination
AND romanian & russians…?

19
Q

Baltic republics

A

much more serious. people remembered PRE 1939. occupying force…
higher education: understanding of culture
more £££

April - October 1988: Popular Fronts in all 3. Intelligentsia formed Sajudis. mass. demanded independence. 75% of Lithuania Lithuanians

Aug 1989 Anniversary of Nazi-Soviet Pact used for demos: called for its ending as had annexed the republics in 1939. Human chain across 3

1990 PF won majority in elections to Supreme Soviets in all 3.
March - Lithuania declared independence. then the others
illegal move. direct challenge to Sov gov.

Sov gov refused to acknowledge. Jan 1991 pro-Soviet communists + RA troops tried to take over TV Vilinus: at least 13 deaths BUT G said calls for independence would not be prevented as long as correct channels taken.

20
Q

Limits of nationalism

A

little demand elsewhere for breaking with the SU (save Georgia 1989)
LIMITED EXPERIENCE OF INDEPENDENCE
Ukraine - Rukh - but little support in EASTERN half
Belarussia & CAR had less experience of independence
SOVIET UNION ALLOWED A DEGREE OF AUTONOMOUS CONTROL
accomoated wishes (supported languages in schools)
REPUBLICS NET GAINERS OF SOVIET INVESTMENT
c.a.r.
ROLE OF ETHNIC RUSSIANS
60m Russians lived in republics. complicated the nationalist resurgence.

March 1991: referendum: popular support for maintaining in all republics outside Georgia & Baltics
New Union Treaty 1991 contained enough concessions for support
SU could have survived. collapse of CP =/= collapse of SU

21
Q

Russian nationalism

ultimately doomed…

A

March 1990 Yeltsin Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet – could undermine G’s New Union Treaty; called for looser CIS

Soviet State: Russian institutions fused with Soviet ones. Russian nationalism hardly a popular mass movement (intelligentsia)
BUT
Yeltsin & reformers encouraged as a method of undermining Soviet leader & CP
ie. ‘take as much sovereignty as you can stomach’ to non-Russian republics. trying to undermine Soviet government.

22
Q

Gorbachev’s failings

A

1) LACK OF VISION

aware of weaknesses, but not of solutions (econ). 1985 series of uncoordinated policies to try and address growth, then failed, so more experimentation. not considered planning.

2) NAIVETY

unintended results and naive about their likely impact. should have been prepared for the level of resistance to economic reforms from Party but it was more than he expected. didnt consider glasnost would open up floodgates for criticism

3) POWERBASE

reduced power and role of CP, so left him as leader exposed. attacked base of power without adequate replacement. President of USSR poor substitute (not elected when would have won) VS Yeltsin: popular support and elections.

4) raised EXPECTATIONS and then failed to satisfy them
5) FOREIGN POLICY assumed Eastern Europe would become regimes based on popular support. naive assumption. didnt anticipate rapid collapse and impact.

6) in key later years, made decisions that were ill judged and harmed the relationship between central gov and elites in the republics.
- Replace Kunayev with Kolbin 1986 Kazakhstan inflamed tensions.
- hesitant handling of ethnic clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh (Nov 1988 sov gov state of emergency made it worse)
- initial response to nationalism in Baltics revealed lack of clear strategy; confusion; deaths at Vilinus Jan 1991

7) INCONSISTENCY: mixed messages in speeches:
NOV 1987: anniversary: praise Stalin’s qualities whilst condemning his ‘real crimes’: tried to appeal to die-hard Stalinists but alienated liberal reformers
- critics accused him of moving from supporting & promoting reform on one hand to reigning it in and giving in to conservatives on other
- Dec 1990: removed Bakatin reformer & replaced with Pugo harliner (Minister of Interior). meant Shevardnadze (key reformer) resigned.
EVER CHANGING POSITION MADE HIM ENEMIES ON BOTH SIDES; persuaded conservatives of Coup; made it impossible for G to work with Yeltsin

8) INDECISION
Chernobyl (hesitated for several days)
poor choice of personell: May 1990 Yeltsin stood for Chairman of the Congress of People’s Deputies for the RSFSR, G supported Vlasov (dull, obvious contrast)

DALLIN: ‘destabilisation, delegitimation and disintegration’/
decline in Soviet power and institutions, people had to find alternate focal points for their identity, most powerful were national communities

23
Q

In defence of Gorbachev

A

reforms = perfectly reasonable attempts to ensure SU survival. difficulty of challenge he faced:

1) Ronald Suny: error was to attempt economic reform, democratisation and decolonising republics at same time; each had merits, but too much all together. enormous strain. BUT ALL 3 INTRINSICALLY LINKED:
- economic reform couldnt progress without political reform (that required a reduction in power of CP),
- political reform reduced hold of central govs over republics whose elites were threatened by changes to economy

2) intelligent. personal charm. succeded in bridging conservative/reformer divide and achieving broad support for reforms for most of time in power.
3) avoided using force to impose his will. not do Chinese thing (despite pressure in Baltics 1990) - risk of civil war avoided

4) chance combination of international factors
- Soviet war in Afganistan (1979) took longer to withdraw
- fall in world oil prices had severe impact on economy (econ reforms in unfavourable sitch)
- US Star wars: away from consumer goods & welfare
SOOOO his foreign policy ended cold war, provided opportunity to shift resources away from military
- 1988 Armenia earthquake 25,000 deaths

24
Q

How did Yeltsin challenge Gorbachev’s leadership?

in touch. popular support. reformer

A

1) establish firmer links with reformers & G’s critics
2) appealed to public for sympathy & support. Central Committee Plenum attack 1987 on TV. met with ROC, striking miners, organised Demos to show support for him (march 1991 200,000 Moscow in support of him)
3) comeback in CCPD elections 1989. Mayor of Moscow - organised demos - 89%. Claim to legitimacy unlike G
4) Used elections to Congress of People’s Deputies for the RSFSR 1990 to attack central soviet government