Cognitive Approach (SL) Flashcards
Multi Store Memory
Glanzer and Cuntiz (1966)
Aim: To investigate the existence of separate memory stores in short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory (LTM) by examining the serial position effect in free recall.
Method:
Participants: 240 U.S. Army enlisted men.
Procedure:
Participants were presented with a list of words (15 words) that they were asked to recall in any order (free recall task).
The researchers manipulated the recall conditions:
Immediate recall condition: Participants recalled the words immediately after hearing them.
Delayed recall condition: Participants waited 30 seconds before recalling the words. During the delay, they had to count backward (a distractor task to prevent rehearsal).
Results:
Immediate recall condition:
Participants showed both primacy effect (better recall of the first few words) and recency effect (better recall of the last few words).
Delayed recall condition (30-second delay):
The recency effect disappeared, but the primacy effect remained.
Conclusion:
The primacy effect occurs because earlier words are rehearsed and transferred into long-term memory (LTM).
The recency effect occurs because later words are still in short-term memory (STM).
When STM is disrupted (with a delay and a distractor task), the recency effect disappears, but the primacy effect remains, supporting the idea that STM and LTM are separate stores.
The findings support Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968) multi-store model of memory, which suggests information moves from sensory memory → STM → LTM through rehearsal.
Working Memory Model
Baddeley (1975)
Aim:
To investigate whether short-term memory (STM) has separate components for processing verbal and visual-spatial information, supporting the Working Memory Model (WMM).
Method:
Participants performed two tasks simultaneously:
Tracking a moving light (a visual-spatial task).
Either:
A verbal reasoning task (using the phonological loop), OR
A second visual-spatial task (using the visuospatial sketchpad).
Results:
Participants could easily perform the verbal reasoning task while tracking the light.
However, performance declined significantly when attempting two visual-spatial tasks at the same time.
Conclusion:
Verbal and visual-spatial tasks use different components of working memory.
The phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad operate separately, meaning we can do one verbal and one visual task at the same time without interference.
However, doing two tasks that rely on the same system (e.g., two visual-spatial tasks) overloads working memory, reducing performance.
This supports Baddeley & Hitch’s (1974) Working Memory Model, which suggests that STM is not a single store but consists of separate, specialized systems.
Study ONE example of schema theory
Bransford and Johnson (1972)
Aim:
To investigate how providing context affects comprehension and memory recall of information.
Method:
Participants: Divided into three groups.
Procedure:
All participants listened to the same passage of abstract information, which was difficult to understand.
Groups received different levels of context before hearing the passage:
No Context Group: Heard the passage without any prior explanation.
Partial Context Group: Heard the passage after being given a vague title.
Full Context Group: Saw a clarifying image before hearing the passage.
After listening, participants recalled as many ideas as possible from the passage.
Results:
No Context Group: Recalled the fewest ideas (~3 out of 14).
Partial Context Group: Had slightly better recall but still struggled (~4 ideas).
Full Context Group: Recalled significantly more (~8 ideas).
Conclusion:
Schemas help with understanding and memory recall by providing context that organizes new information.
When people lack a schema (No Context Group), they struggle to process and remember new information.
When a relevant schema is activated (Full Context Group), comprehension and recall improve.
Study ONE model in thinking and decision-making
Alter (2005)
Aim:
To investigate how cognitive load affects decision-making and whether people are more likely to make automatic or deliberative decisions under different conditions.
Method:
Participants: 40 university students.
Procedure:
Participants were shown a series of decision-making tasks and asked to choose between two options.
The researchers manipulated cognitive load by either:
Low Cognitive Load: No additional task.
High Cognitive Load: Asking participants to memorize a seven-digit number while performing the task, thereby increasing cognitive load.
The task was to decide which photograph was better based on aesthetic preferences. One group was asked to make the decision based on deliberate reasoning, while the other group made their decision under high cognitive load, requiring a quicker response.
Results:
Under low cognitive load, participants made more reasoned and thoughtful choices (deliberative decision-making).
Under high cognitive load, participants were more likely to make intuitive decisions based on heuristics or automatic processing.
Conclusion:
Cognitive load affects decision-making by shifting the type of processing used:
Low load promotes deliberative thinking (thoughtful, slower).
High load promotes automatic processing (quicker, relying on heuristics).
This suggests that cognitive resources are limited, and when people are overwhelmed or distracted, they are more likely to rely on automatic thinking and less likely to engage in careful, deliberative decision-making.
Study ONE example of reconstructive memory
Loftus and Palmer (1974)
Aim:
To investigate how leading questions (specific phrasing) could influence eyewitness testimony and alter memory recall, specifically in relation to the speed of a car accident.
Method:
Participants: 45 college students, divided into 5 groups of 9 participants.
Procedure:
Participants watched a video of a car accident involving two cars.
After watching the video, participants were asked to recall details of the accident, with a critical question: “How fast were the cars going when they [verb] each other?”
The verb used in the critical question was varied across the groups:
Group 1: “Smashed”
Group 2: “Collided”
Group 3: “Bumped”
Group 4: “Hit”
Group 5: Control group (no question about speed, just asked to recall the accident).
One week later, participants were asked if they had seen any broken glass (there was none in the video).
Results:
The verb choice significantly affected the estimated speed of the vehicles:
Participants who heard the word “smashed” estimated the highest speed (mean = 40.8 mph).
Participants who heard the word “contacted” estimated the lowest speed (mean = 31.8 mph).
A follow-up question about broken glass:
Participants who heard the word “smashed” were more likely to falsely recall seeing broken glass (16 out of 50), compared to those who heard “hit” or “contacted” (7 out of 50).
Participants in the control group (no speed-related question) rarely reported seeing glass (6 out of 50).
Conclusion:
Leading questions (e.g., the verb used) can alter eyewitness memory and influence how people remember events.
The misinformation effect was demonstrated, showing that the language used in questioning can influence the reconstruction of memories.
Memory recall is not a perfect reproduction of events but rather a reconstructive process influenced by external factors like question wording.
Study ONE bias in thinking and decision-making
Kahneman & Frederick (2002)
Aim:
To investigate the role of cognitive biases in decision-making, specifically examining how people’s decisions are influenced by the anchoring effect and other heuristics.
Method:
Participants: College students.
Procedure:
The study included two main tasks that involved the participants making decisions based on probabilistic information.
Task 1: The Anchoring Task:
Participants were presented with a sequence of numbers (e.g., 1, 2, 3, etc.) and asked to estimate the product of all the numbers in the sequence (from 1 to 8).
In one condition, the first number presented was a high number (e.g., 8), and in the other condition, the first number was a low number (e.g., 1).
Participants were then asked to provide their estimate of the product (which is actually impossible to calculate accurately without a calculator).
Task 2: The Risky Decision Task:
Participants were asked to choose between two options for a monetary gamble, one involving a risky choice and the other a sure outcome. The study analyzed whether the participants’ choices were influenced by framing effects (i.e., how the options were presented).
Results:
In Task 1 (Anchoring Effect):
The estimates for the product of the numbers were significantly higher when the high number was presented first (anchoring the participants’ thinking to a higher value).
This showed that people’s estimates were influenced by the first piece of information they were given, even though it had no logical relevance to the actual product calculation.
In Task 2 (Risky Decision-Making):
Participants’ decisions were also affected by how the problem was framed. When the risky choice was framed as a potential loss (e.g., a probability of losing money), people tended to avoid the gamble. When framed as a potential gain, they were more willing to take the risk.
Conclusion:
Cognitive biases such as anchoring (relying too heavily on the first piece of information) and framing effects (the way information is presented) significantly influence people’s decision-making.
People do not always make rational decisions and instead rely on heuristics (mental shortcuts) that can lead to systematic errors in judgment.
Study ONE example of the effect of emotion on a cognitive processes
Sharot et al (2007)
Aim:
To investigate the role of the amygdala in the formation of flashbulb memories by examining how people’s memories of the 9/11 terrorist attacks were influenced by emotional proximity to the event.
Method:
Participants: 24 participants (12 in New York, 12 in London).
Procedure:
Participants were shown a series of emotionally charged and neutral words while undergoing an fMRI scan (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging).
They were then asked to recall their personal memories of the 9/11 attacks.
The study specifically focused on whether participants who were in close proximity to the event (New Yorkers) had different brain activation patterns compared to those who were farther away (Londoners).
Results:
New Yorkers (closer to the event):
Participants showed greater amygdala activation when recalling their memories of the 9/11 attacks, suggesting a strong emotional impact.
They also reported more vivid and detailed memories of the event, consistent with the idea of flashbulb memories, which are memories that are particularly vivid, detailed, and long-lasting due to their emotional significance.
Londoners (farther from the event):
London participants showed less amygdala activation when recalling 9/11 and reported less vivid and emotional memories of the event.
Their memories were still significant but lacked the emotional intensity seen in those directly affected by the event.
Conclusion:
Emotional proximity to a traumatic event plays a critical role in the vividness and emotional intensity of the memory.
The study provided neurobiological evidence that flashbulb memories are associated with heightened amygdala activity, which is involved in processing emotions, especially those tied to significant, often traumatic, events.
This suggests that the amygdala plays a critical role in the formation of flashbulb memories, especially when those memories are tied to highly emotional and personal experiences.
