Co-Ownership Flashcards

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1
Q

Definition of co-ownership:

A

Two or more people enjoy rights of ownership in relation to a freehold or leasehold estate

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2
Q

What is the legal/equitable distinction in this context?

A

Legal co ownership includes joint tenancy

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3
Q

What is the legal/equitable distinction in this context?

A
  • Equitable co ownership includes joint tenancy or tenancy in common
  • Key distinction is that a tenant in common (unlike a joint tenant) has a “share” in the co-owned property which can be left by will or pass on intestacy.
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4
Q

What is Alienation?

A

Joint tenant transfers his share to a third party.

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5
Q

What is a Joint tenancy?

A

A joint tenancy carries the right of survivorship (jus accrescendi):
When one joint tenant dies, the entire co-owned estate “survives to” the remaining joint tenant(s).

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6
Q

Joint tenancy: Survivorship

A

Commorientes rule:
Where two or more joint tenants die at approximately the same time (e.g. in an accident) and it is impossible to determine the order in which the deaths occurred, the law presumes that the youngest survived longest.

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7
Q

Joint tenancy: no shares

A
  • Each joint tenant is “wholly entitled to the whole” of the co-owned estate or interest.
  • Burton v Camden London Borough Council [2000] 2 AC 399, per Lord Millett
  • A joint tenant does not have any identifiable “share” in the estate separate from that of any other joint tenant.
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8
Q

Joint tenancy four unites:
Joint tenancy cannot exist unless ALL the following are met:

A

Unity of Time – the interest of each joint tenant must vest at the same time.

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9
Q

Joint tenancy four unites:
Joint tenancy cannot exist unless ALL the following are met:

A

Unity of Title – each joint tenant must derive title to the land from the same document (i.e. transfer or grant) or act (i.e. adverse possession).

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10
Q

Joint tenancy four unites:
Joint tenancy cannot exist unless ALL the following are met:

A

Unity of Interest – the interest held by each joint tenant must be the same in extent, nature and duration.

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11
Q

Joint tenancy four unites:
Joint tenancy cannot exist unless ALL the following are met:

A

Unity of Possession – each joint tenant must be as much entitled to possession of every part of the co-owned land as any other joint tenant.

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12
Q

What is a tenancy in common:

A

There is no right of survivorship between tenants in common. On the death of a tenant in common, his or her “share” passes to those entitled by will or on intestacy

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13
Q

Tenancy in common: “undivided shares”

A
  • Each tenant in common holds an “undivided share” of the co-owned property.
  • Law of Property Act 1925, ss.1(6) and 36(2)
    “Share” is “undivided” in the sense that each tenant in common has a right to possession of the entirety of the co-owned property throughout the duration of the tenancy in common.
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14
Q

Tenancy in common: Unity of Possession

A

The only requirement for the existence of a tenancy in common is unity of possession.
No need to show unities of time, title and interest.

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15
Q

How do trusts work in co-ownership? (TOLATA)

A

Before TOLATA 1996, most co-owned land was held on a specific type of trust known as a “trust for sale”:

  • Express: “… Treetops is hereby conveyed to Tom and Tanya on trust for sale for the benefit of Jack and Jill as tenants in common …”.
  • Statutory: most trusts arising under the Law of Property Act 1925 were also automatically designated as “trusts for sale”.
  • A “trust for sale” imposed an immediate duty on trustees to sell the land, but gave them power to postpone sale.
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16
Q

Before TOLATA:

A

“Doctrine of conversion” – beneficiary’s interest under a “trust for sale” was therefore viewed by the courts as an interest in the sale proceeds of land (i.e. as if the trust for sale had already been “executed”), rather than an interest in the land itself.
In 1925 this made little difference to most beneficiaries because their interests in land were held for them as investments (rather than providing them with places to live).
Not until Bull v Bull [1955] 1 QB 234 that the Court of Appeal eventually acknowledged that a beneficiary under a “trust for sale” had a right to occupy land.

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17
Q

TOLATA:

A

TOLATA 1996 was introduced to provide a simplified structure for “trusts of land” covering almost all forms of beneficial interest in land.

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18
Q

TOLATA:

A

Section 1 of TOLATA defines a trust of land as follows:
(1) In this Act –
(a) “trust of land” means … any trust of property which consists of or includes land […]
(2) The reference in subsection (1)(a) to a trust –
(a) is to any description of trust (whether express, implied, resulting or constructive), including a trust for sale and a bare trust, and
(b) includes a trust created, or arising, before the commencement of this Act.”

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19
Q

Trusts of Land and Trusts for Sale

A

Statutory trusts for sale after 1st January 1997
Section 5 and Sch.2 of TOLATA 1996 provide that where a trust for sale was imposed by statute before the 1996 Act came into force, there is now a trust of land with no duty on the trustees to sell the land.
Sch.2 made amendments to ss.31, 34 and 36 LPA 1925 and s.33 Administration of Estates Act 1925 to give effect to this change.

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20
Q

Trusts of Land and Trusts for Sale

A

Express trusts for sale after 1st January 1997
Existing express trusts for sale continue and new trusts for sale may be expressly created, BUT they are treated as “trusts of land” under the 1996 Act and are substantively amended.
Section 4 of TOLATA gives trustees of land held on express trust for sale the power to postpone sale indefinitely (regardless of any contrary provision in the document creating the trust) and with no liability on trustees for postponing sale.

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21
Q

Trusts of Land and Trusts for Sale

A

Abolition of the doctrine of conversion
Section 3 of TOLATA 1996 abolishes the “doctrine of conversion” for both pre- and post-TOLATA trusts for sale (although this does not apply to trusts created by will before the Act came into force).
Therefore, a beneficiary’s interest under a trust of land can no longer be viewed merely as an interest in the sale proceeds of the land.

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22
Q

Resolution of disputes: before TOLATA

A

Under this provision, courts focused on the purpose for which the land had been acquired.
Primary obligation on trustees under a trust for sale was to sell the land, therefore the courts tended to favour a solution which gave effect to this primary obligation – i.e. ordering sale
UNLESS the land had been acquired for a particular purpose and that purpose was continuing (“doctrine of subsisting collateral purpose”).

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23
Q

Pre-TOLATA case law: “subsisting collateral purpose”

A
  • Jones v Challenger [1961] 1 QB 176
    H & W acquired house as matrimonial home, but then divorced. No subsisting collateral purpose.
    Bedson v Bedson [1965] 2 QB 666
  • H & W acquired business premises with living accommodation above to provide income and home for couple and their children. W left with children. Subsisting collateral purpose – family income.
    Re Evers’ Trust [1980] 1 WLR 1327
  • M & W acquired house as home for themselves and children. M left and W remained in house with children. Subsisting collateral purpose – family home.
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24
Q

Pre-TOLATA case law: “agreement not to sell”

A

Re Buchanan-Wollaston’s Conveyance [1939] Ch 738
Owners of four houses overlooking sea jointly purchased a strip of land in front of their houses with the aim of preserving their sea view.
Trust deed provided that co-owners would not sell or otherwise deal with the strip of land, except by majority vote.
B-W sold his house and moved away. He then applied to court for an order that the strip of land be sold and the proceeds divided.
Court of Appeal rejected B-W’s application.

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25
Q

Resolution of disputes: TOLATA 1996

A

Section 14 of TOLATA 1996 allows trustees or persons having an interest under a trust of land (e.g. beneficiaries, mortgagees) to apply to the court.
The court may make such order as it thinks fit relating to:
Nature or extent of a person’s interest in property subject to a trust of land.
Example: declaration that a beneficiary owns an x% share of the beneficial interest.
Exercise by the trustees of any of their functions.
Example: order that the property be sold and the proceeds distributed.

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26
Q

Resolution of disputes: TOLATA 1996

A

Section 15(1) outlines the factors to be taken into account by a court in exercising its jurisdiction under section 14:
- Intentions of those who created the trust;
- Purposes for which the property subject to the trust is held;
- Welfare of any minor who occupies or might reasonably be expected to occupy any land subject to the trust as his/her home;
- Interests of any secured creditor of any beneficiary.

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27
Q

Disputes between co-owners and creditors

A

Balancing interests under s.15 – beneficiaries, children and creditors:
Cases where one co-owner has forged another co-owner’s signature to obtain a mortgage loan.
Effect is to create an equitable mortgage over the forger’s share of the beneficial interest.
Lender then has locus standi under TOLATA, s.14 to apply to court for order of sale.

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28
Q

Trusts of land: bankruptcy

A

Considerations relating to secured creditors are similar to those arising in cases where a beneficiary becomes bankrupt.
Bankruptcy is a formal procedure whereby an official – “trustee in bankruptcy” – is appointed to realise the bankrupt’s assets and distribute them between the bankrupt’s creditors.
Pre-TOLATA 1996 case law established that the interests of the bankrupt’s creditors should, other than in exceptional circumstances, prevail over the interests of the bankrupt and his/her family members (In re Citro [1991] Ch 142; In re Holliday [1981] Ch 405).

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29
Q

Trusts of land: bankruptcy

A

Insolvency Act 1986, s.335A (added by TOLATA 1996)
On an application by a trustee in bankruptcy under s.14 TOLATA, court shall have regard to:
Interests of bankrupt’s creditors.
If land includes the home of the bankrupt or the bankrupt’s current or former spouse or civil partner:
Conduct of current or former spouse or civil partner in contributing to the bankruptcy;
Needs and financial resources of current or former spouse or civil partner;
Needs of any children (not limited to minors).
All other circumstances except the needs of the bankrupt.

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30
Q

Trusts of land: bankruptcy

A

Insolvency Act 1986, s.335A
Where the application is made more than one year after the start of the bankruptcy, the court must assume, unless there are exceptional circumstances, that the interests of the bankrupt’s creditors outweigh all other considerations.
What will count as “exceptional circumstances”?
No exhaustive definition, but includes medical conditions affecting bankrupt’s partner or children (but not bankrupt him/herself).

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31
Q

What impact do practical, family elements have i.e. having a child, separate
finances etc.

A

The judgement will be down to the judge and will depend on the circumstances.
- Direct cash contribution or money raised by mortgage
- contribution to deposit or legal conveyancing expenses
- Discount or reduction in purchase price

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32
Q

What is severance?

A
  • If a beneficial interest in land is conveyed to co-owners as joint tenants, the joint tenancy may later be severed.
  • Severance is possible only in equity, not at law (i.e. it is not possible to sever a joint tenancy of a legal estate).
  • Law of Property Act 1925, s.36(2)
  • Severance converts an existing joint tenancy of a beneficial interest into a tenancy in common of the beneficial interest.
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33
Q

Severance of a beneficial joint tenancy:

A

Severance brings an end to the right of survivorship in relation to the beneficial interest.
Severance cannot be brought about by will (because the right of survivorship operates automatically and immediately on death).

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34
Q

How Can severance be made?

A

Severance of a beneficial joint tenancy may be brought about by any one of the following methods:
- Notice in writing under s.36(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925
- Application of the rule in Williams v Hensman (1861) 70 ER 862
- Unlawful killing
- Merger of interests

35
Q

Severance by written notice:

A
  • Written notice takes effect as soon as it is properly served in accordance with s.196 of the LPA 1925. It does not matter whether any other co-owner actually receives the notice.
    Written notice must show an intention to bring about severance immediately.
36
Q

Severance under the rule in Williams v Hensman (1861) 70 ER 862

A

These words in s.36(2) preserve the rule in Williams v Hensman (1861), which allows severance to be brought about by:
- An act by a joint tenant operating on his or her own share; or
- Mutual agreement of all joint tenants; or
- Mutual conduct of all joint tenants.

37
Q

Rule in Williams v Hensman (1861) 70 ER 862

A

(a) An act by a joint tenant operating on his or her own share:
Transfer of a joint tenant’s “share” (i.e. a joint tenant transfers his/her “share” of the beneficial interest to a third party)
Mortgage or charge of a joint tenant’s “share” (i.e. a joint tenant mortgages or charges his/her “share” of the beneficial interest to a third party as security for a loan)
Bankruptcy of a joint tenant (on bankruptcy, the joint tenant’s “share” vests automatically in his or her trustee in bankruptcy)

38
Q

Rule in Williams v Hensman (1861) 70 ER 862

A

Mutual agreement of all joint tenants
- Agreement does not need to be in writing.
- Agreement does not need to be specifically enforceable.
- Agreement to sell the property is not in itself sufficient, but agreement to divide the sale proceeds is sufficient.

39
Q

Rule in Williams v Hensman (1861) 70 ER 862

A

Mutual agreement of all joint tenants
Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch 429
Elderly man and woman purchased freehold together as joint tenants under misapprehension as to their future relationship. Subsequent oral agreement whereby man would buy woman’s interest for a specified sum. Man died before agreement was implemented.
Hunter v Babbage [1995] 1 FCR 569
Divorcing couple reached draft financial settlement, which included agreement to sell matrimonial home and divide sale proceeds. Husband died before settlement was finalised.

40
Q

Rule in Williams v Hensman (1861) 70 ER 862

A

Mutual conduct of all joint tenants
“… any course of dealing sufficient to intimate that the interests of all were mutually treated as constituting a tenancy in common …” (Williams v Hensman (1861) 70 ER 862 at 867, per Page-Wood VC). Ch D 267

41
Q

Severance resulting from unlawful killing

A

It is a general rule of public policy that a person should not be allowed to profit from his or her own wrongdoing.
Therefore, if one joint tenant unlawfully kills another, the killer should not be allowed to profit from the application of the survivorship rule (i.e. acquire the deceased’s “share” of the property).

42
Q

Severance by merger of interests

A

Rare in Practice
Example:
- B, C and D are joint tenants for life, with remainder to A.
- B then acquires A’s remainder interest.
- B’s interest is effectively “enlarged” to a fee simple (i.e. life interest + remainder). - Therefore, there is no longer any unity of interest between B, C and D.
- C and D continue as joint tenants for life, but B becomes a tenant in common.

43
Q

Termination of co-ownership:

A
  • Partition – physical division of land (Rodway v Landy [2001] Ch 703).
  • Overreaching – sale of land with payment of capital money to two or more trustees (effect is to convert beneficial interests in land into beneficial interests in the sale proceeds of the land).
  • Sole ownership – legal and equitable title become vested in a single owner.
44
Q

Regulations of co-ownership: issues

A

Reforms introduced by the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA 1996)
Resolution of disputes between trustees, beneficiaries and/or third parties (e.g. secured creditors) relating to occupation or sale of co-owned property.
Powers and duties of trustees
Rights of beneficiaries

45
Q

Actual occupation in the context of co-ownership –

A

Land Registration Act 2002, Sch.3, para.2:
“An interest belonging at the time of the disposition to a person in actual occupation, so far as relating to land of which he is in actual occupation, …”
Don’t forget what we learnt in registered land – a claimant must have a proprietary interest in the relevant land, AND be in actual occupation of the relevant land, like in Boland.
May be overreached like in Flegg.

46
Q

Resulting Trust:

A

RT - one person, known as a resulting trustee, is the legal owner of an asset but on behalf of another person.
For example if a parent lends their child money to buy a house without a written agreement, the child holds the house, or a share of it, on “resulting trust” for the parent.
If, when asked, the child then refuses to give the parent their share, the parent is able to bring a resulting trust claim to seek their share.

47
Q

Types of Resulting Trust:

A
  • An automatic resulting trust will arise where the settlor transfers property to the intended trustee but the trust has failed for some reason. The trustee holds the legal title of the property on trust. The beneficial or equitable ownership is retained by the settlor.
  • Presumed resulting trusts arise either from voluntary transfer of the legal estate or by contribution to the purchase price. In these situations it is presumed that the person did not intend to make a gift of the property or money unless there is a clear intention that they did so intend. In such circumstances a resulting trust arises and the transferor or the person making the contribution retains or takes a share in the beneficial interest.
48
Q

Constructive Trust

A

CT - where one or more people have been wrongfully deprived of their property or assets.
An example is where the common intention between parties is not reflected by the legal ownership – so the TID lists one proprietor but others are involved!
Common in the context of the family home.

49
Q

Proprietary Estoppel:

A

The concept of proprietary estoppel is to provide a person (person A) with rights in land that they were led to believe they had by another party (person B), where denying said rights would be unjust or inequitable.
Leading judgment in this area: Thorner v Major [2009]
Three key components: assurance, reliance and detriment.
The first requirement for a proprietary estoppel claim is to show that a representation or promise has been made by person A to person B.
The representations must refer to identified property and it must be “clear enough” that the representations relate to such property. What is considered “clear enough” will always be a question of fact.
A promise of “financial security” (Layton v Martin [1986]) would fail this test as it does not relate to an identified asset.

50
Q

Laskar v Laskar

A

Facts
Zubera Laskar was a council tenant of a house in Hatfield. She had a daughter, Rini, who was currently living away from home while at university. In 1997 she used her right as a secure council tenant to purchase the property at a discount. Shortly after, she realised she could not fund the purchase alone. She and Rini reached an agreement to jointly fund the purchase.

She provided a further £3600 towards the deposit and paid the fees associated with the purchase. Rini contributed £3400. Both were joint parties to the mortgage. The property was registered in their joint names.

Zubera and Rini fell out. Rini sought an account of the rental income. The High Court held that Rini held a 4% share in the property, based on her £3400 contribution to the purchase price. The court also held that Zubera was not liable to account for the rent.

Rini appealed. Alternatively, she argued that her share should be higher: the council discount and her liability for the mortgage should be apportioned between them.

51
Q

Laskar v Laskar

A

Issue(s)
Had the judge correctly assessed Rini’s share in the beneficial title?
Was Zubera liable to account for the rent?

52
Q

Lakar v Laskar (The presumption of joint tenancy by constructive trust )

A

However, the judge failed to account for the fact that the mortgage was in the parties’ joint names. It should have been treated, therefore, as a joint contribution to the purchase price. While Rini never actually contributed to the mortgage payments, there was no prior agreement that she would not and she remained liable in principle. Taking that into account, Rini’s share in the equitable title was 33%.
However, an account is a discretionary remedy, and in this case it was still not appropriate to order a retrospective account of the rent. Most of the money had been used to pay the mortgage and upkeep. Zubera had been solely responsible for managing the property and paid any related costs out of her own money. Meanwhile, Rini had made no claim for the rent for over seven years. Rini would only be entitled to claim income from the property going forwards.

53
Q

Kinch v Bullard (1999): Joint Tenancy – Severance – Service of Notice of Intent to Sever

A

Facts
A married couple, Mr and Mrs Johnson were the beneficial joint tenants of their matrimonial home. After suffering a breakdown in their personal relationship divorce proceedings were begun. Mrs Johnson sent her husband a letter by first class post stating her intention to sever her interest and so sever the joint tenancy. However, Mr Johnson was by this time terminally ill, and realising that she was likely to outlive her husband she then destroyed the letter. Mr Johnson died a few weeks later, and Mrs Johnson then died a few months after that. The executors required the court to rule on whether or not the notice had effectively severed their joint tenancy.

54
Q

Kinch v Bullard (1999): Joint Tenancy – Severance – Service of Notice of Intent to Sever

A

Issues
Had the joint tenancy been effectively severed by the delivery of a letter in which one of the joint tenants indicated a desire to sever their interest? Whether or not this interest remained un-severed because the joint tenant later destroyed the letter before the other joint tenant read it, but after it had been delivered.

55
Q

Kinch v Bullard (1999): Joint Tenancy – Severance – Service of Notice of Intent to Sever

A

Decision/Outcome
The tenancy had been effectively severed by the delivery of the letter and notice that the tenant intended to sever their interest as provided for by s36(2) Law of Property Act 1925. Even though the wife at the time of delivery no longer wished to sever the joint tenancy, this could not prevent the notice from being effective. Under s196 Law of Property Act 1925 a notice was properly served it is left at the last known place of abode or business in the United Kingdom of the person served. Therefore, the notice of severance was effective from when the letter fell through the letterbox and it was irrelevant whether or not the wife destroyed the letter after it had been properly served.

56
Q

Harris V Goddard (1983): Spouses – Joint Tenants – Severance – Mutual Intention – Divorce Proceedings

A

Facts
Mr and Mrs Harris were married and were joint tenants of their matrimonial home. As their relationship deteriorated, Mrs Harris petitioned for divorce, and sought an order under s24Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 that an order be made to sever the joint tenancy in the matrimonial home. Prior to the hearing on this issue the husband was killed in a car crash. The wife claimed that despite the prayer in the pleadings seeking an order of this nature, the joint tenancy had not yet been severed at the time of her husband’s death and so she was entitled to the right to survivorship of the joint tenancy.

57
Q

Harris V Goddard (1983): Spouses – Joint Tenants – Severance – Mutual Intention – Divorce Proceedings

A

Issues
Whether the wife’s pleadings that the court sever the joint tenancy under s24 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 effectively severed the joint tenancy or not. Whether a prayer of petition could itself sever a joint tenancy.

58
Q

Harris V Goddard (1983): Spouses – Joint Tenants – Severance – Mutual Intention – Divorce Proceedings

A

Decision/Outcome
The joint tenancy had not been severed. The inclusion of a prayer for severance in the wife’s pleadings could not sever a joint tenancy. A written notice of an intention to sever a tenancy could be effective to sever a tenancy, but only if it was to take effect immediately as was required by s36(2) Law of Property Act 1925. In this case the inclusion of a prayer in the petition for the court to exercise its discretion under s24 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to distribute the property was simply a request that the court do so. This was to be done at a hearing, and was not therefore to take effect immediately. As such, the joint tenancy had not been severed.

59
Q

Goodman v Gallant [1986] Fam 106 Court of Appeal

A

The claimant, Mrs Goodman, had a 50% beneficial interest in the matrimonial home. Her husband held the legal title. He left the home and five years later Mrs Goodman developed a relationship with the defendant Mr Gallant who moved into the house. Two years later they entered negotiations to purchase Mr Goodman’s half share in the house. No formal valuation was undertaken but it was estimated the house was worth £17-18,000. Mr Goodman agreed to convey the property to them for £6,700. The purchasers’ declaration of trust stated that they held the property as joint tenants. Mrs Goodman later gave notice to sever the joint tenancy. She later sought to argue that she held 75% of the beneficial interest based on the fact that she already owned 50% of the beneficial interest and contributed to the purchase of the remainder.

60
Q

Goodman v Gallant [1986] Fam 106 Court of Appeal

A

Held:
Mrs Goodman was only entitled to 50% of the beneficial ownership. In the absence of fraud or mistake, the declaration of trust was conclusive as to the parties respective ownership rights. The extent of the parties relative contributions was irrelevant.

61
Q

Burns v Burns (1984): Property – Cohabitees – Common Intention – Constructive Trust – Beneficial Interest

A

Facts
The complainant, Valerie Burns, had been in a relationship and lived with the defendant, Patrick Burns, for 19 years. Despite taking his name, the couple were not married. They had bought a house together, but it was in the defendant’s name. Patrick Burns paid the purchase price and dealt with the mortgage instalment repayments. Valerie Burns did not make any financial contribution to the purchase price or mortgage, but she did pay for household bills and redecorating, as well as bringing up their two children and carrying out domestic duties.

62
Q

Burns v Burns (1984): Property – Cohabitees – Common Intention – Constructive Trust – Beneficial Interest

A

Issues
The appeal concerned whether the complainant had a beneficial interest in the property upon separation under common intention constructive trust.

63
Q

Burns v Burns (1984): Property – Cohabitees – Common Intention – Constructive Trust – Beneficial Interest

A

Decision / Outcome
The appeal was dismissed. The complainant did not have a beneficial interest in the property; it was the defendant who had paid for the acquisition of the property and mortgage instalments. The house was in Patrick Burns’ name without an express agreement that Valerie Burns would have an interest in the property. The complainant made no direct contributions to the purchase price, despite her payments for the upkeep of the home and raising their children. It was acknowledged that although the complaint may have ‘worked just as hard as the man,’ this was not a sufficient contribution to have a share in the property. Lord Justice Fox stated that even though they lived together and she carried out domestic duties, this had ‘no indication at all that they thereby intended to alter the existing property rights of either of them’ .

64
Q

Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 A.C. 107

Land Law – Trusts – Cohabitees – Constructive Trusts – Land Registration Act 1925 – Property – Equity – Common Intention – Beneficial Interest

A

Facts
The defendant, Mrs Rosset, was married to Mr Rosset, who was the sole registered owner of the property in question. Mr Rosset had bought this house with his family trust money, which had insisted on his sole ownership as a condition for using that money. Mr Rosset had secured a loan against the property from the complainant’s, Lloyds Bank. The defendant had helped in the building work and decorating of the property. However, Mr Rosset defaulted on his payments and the complainants sought repossession of the property.

65
Q

Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 A.C. 107

Land Law – Trusts – Cohabitees – Constructive Trusts – Land Registration Act 1925 – Property – Equity – Common Intention – Beneficial Interest

A

Issues
The appeal concerned whether the defendant had a beneficial interest in the house and if she was entitled to stay in the property under section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925. The complainants argued that Mrs Rosset did not have rights in the property and her renovations did not allow equitable rights in the property to arise.

66
Q

Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 A.C. 107

Land Law – Trusts – Cohabitees – Constructive Trusts – Land Registration Act 1925 – Property – Equity – Common Intention – Beneficial Interest

A

Decision/Outcome
It was held that the defendant did not have a beneficial interest in the property. Mrs Rosset did not make any financial contributions in buying the property nor for the renovations; she had only helped with the physical building and redecorating of the house. There was no discussion or agreement between Mr Rosset and Mrs Rosset regarding the ownership of the property and without express agreement, there could be no beneficial interest for the common intention needed to form a constructive trust. Mrs Rosset’s work on the house was not enough to form an equitable interest. Thus, the complainants were successful.

67
Q

Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch 429, CA

Joint Tenancy – Severance – Conditions necessary for severance

A

Facts
Mr Honick and Mrs Rawnsley bought a property as beneficial joint tenants. They had originally agreed to move into the property together. Mr Honick made a proposal of marriage to Mrs Rawnsley which she declined, and then in fact never moved into the property. She then agreed to sell her interest in the property to Mr Honick for £750. This price was originally agreed, but before the sale was completed Mrs Rawnsley changed her mind because she wanted a better price. Mr Honick then died. His estate wished to establish severance of the joint tenancy, whereas Mrs Rawnsley sought to show that the joint tenancy had not been severed and that she was entitled to survivorship of the property.

68
Q

Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch 429, CA

Joint Tenancy – Severance – Conditions necessary for severance

A

Issues
Whether or not the joint tenancy had been severed. Whether or not the parties had severed the joint tenancy by coming to an agreement on the sale of the property at a price of £750 even if this was not in fact completed.

69
Q

Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch 429, CA

Joint Tenancy – Severance – Conditions necessary for severance

A

Decision/Outcome
It was found that due to the agreement being oral the provisions of s40 Law of Property Act 1925 had not been met for the conveyance of the land. However, despite no clear ruling concerning this, it was asserted by Denning that a common intention had been formed through the parties ‘course of dealings’ which in turn severed the joint tenancy. The other judges concurred.

70
Q

Bedson v Bedson (1965)

Joint Tenants – Severance – Entitlement to equitable share

A

Facts
A husband and wife had three children and lived in the matrimonial home which was a flat above a draper’s shop as joint tenants. The husband alone owned and ran the draper’s shop, although he paid his wife a weekly wage for her employment in the shop. After suffering a breakdown in their relationship, the wife left with the children leaving the husband alone in the flat above his shop. The wife applied to the court for an order for sale and a division of the proceeds in line with their equitable interests in the property.

71
Q

Bedson v Bedson (1965)

Joint Tenants – Severance – Entitlement to equitable share

A

Issues
Was it possible to sever the joint tenancy of a matrimonial home used as a dwelling? Should the order for sale be granted and the proceeds split between the husband and wife?

72
Q

Bedson v Bedson (1965)

Joint Tenants – Severance – Entitlement to equitable share

A

Decision/Outcome
The Court of Appeal held that they would not make an order for sale because to do so would deprive the husband of his business and income. Whilst the order for a sale was refused, the joint tenancy had clearly been severed, and the resulting form of ownership was instead a beneficial tenancy in common between both the husband and wife. Where therefore, as happened here, the joint tenancy was severed, they will still be entitled to a proportionate share of the property, dependant on the number of joint tenants. In this case, because there were two joint tenants upon severance, each was entitled to a half-share in the property. In terms of recognition of this interest, the husband would pay the wife a weekly sum as a result of her interest in the property.

73
Q

City of London Building Society v Flegg [1988] AC 54, HL

Overreaching and overriding interests.

A

Facts
Here, the Maxwell Browns purchased a property, attaining half of the cost form Mrs Maxell Brown’s parents, the Fleggs. The property was placed solely under the Maxwell Brown’s name with both the Browns and the Fleggs in actual occupancy. Later, in breach of the trust created from the Fleggs’ lending of money, the Maxwell Browns sought a mortgage for the property from the claimant which they ultimately defaulted on repayments for, and so the claimant sought to repossess the house. The Fleggs attempted to halt this, claiming an overriding interest per the 1925 Land Registration Act s.70(1)(g), reasoning that they held a beneficial interest in the property arising from their contribution to the purchase price and were in actual occupation. In response, the claimants submitted this right had been overreached as the purchase contribution had been given to the Maxwell Browns as trustees.

74
Q

City of London Building Society v Flegg [1988] AC 54, HL

Overreaching and overriding interests.

A

Issue
Whether contribution to purchase price and actual occupation can amount to an overriding interest, or whether such rights can be overreached.

75
Q

City of London Building Society v Flegg [1988] AC 54, HL

Overreaching and overriding interests.

A

Decision / Outcome
Whilst at first instance the Court found for the claimant, the Court of Appeal found for the Fleggs. Upon final appeal, the House of Lords found for the claimant, viewing that the Fleggs’ rights in the property per se had been overreached, and thus their rights attached to the property’s sale value. In the leading judgment, Lord Oliver emphasised the risks to financial institutions of ‘unsuspected hazards’ should they be bound by unregistered rights.

76
Q

Bull v Bull [1955] 1 QB 234

Constructive trusts arising from join tenancies

A

Facts
A mother and son jointly purchased a property, however the son contributed a greater proportion of the original purchase price and took on full legal title to the house. Both parties intended to live in the property on the agreement that the mother would occupy two rooms of the house and the son being the principle user of the remainder. After some time the parties had a disagreement and the son subsequently asked his mother to cease occupation of the property

77
Q

Bull v Bull [1955] 1 QB 234

Constructive trusts arising from join tenancies

A

Issue
Whether the mother was entitled to continue occupying the house until it was sold, on the grounds that she was a tenant in common and thus entitled to have her co-possession of the property recognised. Further, how ought the law approach ownership where the parties in question have contributed unequally.

78
Q

Bull v Bull [1955] 1 QB 234

Constructive trusts arising from join tenancies

A

Decision/Outcome
Here, the Court held, with Lord Denning presiding, that the son was holding the property jointly on trust for his mother and himself and that the presumption of sale should not interfere with the mother’s right of occupation before then. Thus, where property is owned by tenants in common, all tenants are entitled to enjoy the benefits of the property and thus a constructive trust can be identified as existing. Further, ownership was considered generally to reflect each parties’ contributions to the purchase price, where there was no significant factor to indicate otherwise. Significantly, the legal principle of fairness was focused upon by the Court.

79
Q

Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18

LAND LAW – PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL – REQUIREMENTS

A

Facts
The claimant had worked on the defendant estate’s farm for over a decade without pay, believing that he would inherit the land when the defendant died. While the defendant once gave the claimant a bonus stating that it was for his ‘death duties’, he never explicitly told the claimant he would inherit. Under the original will, the property would have passed to the claimant, but the defendant retracted this will and died intestate. The claimant argued he should inherit the property due to proprietary estoppel.

80
Q

Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18

LAND LAW – PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL – REQUIREMENTS

A

Issues
A person will have an inchoate ‘equity’ in land if they can establish proprietary estoppel: that the land-owner made an unequivocal representation that the individual had an interest in the property, which that individual relied on to their detriment, such that it would be unconscionable for the land-owner to renege on his assurance.

The issue in this case was whether proprietary estoppel can arise in the absence of an explicit representation of proprietary interest.

81
Q

Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18

LAND LAW – PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL – REQUIREMENTS

A

Decision / Outcome
The House of Lords held that the claimant had established proprietary estoppel.

The House of Lords held that it is possible for a representation to be made by conduct alone, so long as that conduct conveys the message to a reasonable person sufficiently clearly that the claimant was to have a proprietary interest in the land. This was to be determined by all relevant circumstances, including the context of any representations or conduct, the relationship between the parties and their understanding of the context. In most cases where the message behind the conduct is somewhat ambiguous, the House of Lords thought this would not normally act to defeat proprietary estoppel.

On these facts, the conduct gave a sufficiently clear representation of proprietary interest to give rise to estoppel.

82
Q

Mortgage Corporation v Shaire [2001] Ch 743, ChD

Conditions for orders of sale for family homes under TOLATA.

A

Facts
Fox and Shaire held a property as joint tenants in law and as tenants in common in equity, with ownership divided as 25% and 75% respectively, in reflection of their contributions to the purchase price for the property. Fox proceeded to mortgage the property, forging Shaire’s signature, but subsequently defaulted on his mortgage payments. The mortgage was found to be valid only for Fox’s 25% share of the property. Thus, the claimants applied to the Court for an order to Shaire to sell the property so as permit the claimant to claim the money owed by Fox, as per the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, s. 14.

83
Q

Mortgage Corporation v Shaire [2001] Ch 743, ChD

Conditions for orders of sale for family homes under TOLATA.

A

Issues
Could the claimants rely on TOLATA s. 14 to enforce the sale of a property so as to recoup the cost of the defaulted mortgage repayments.

84
Q

Mortgage Corporation v Shaire [2001] Ch 743, ChD

Conditions for orders of sale for family homes under TOLATA.

A

Decision/Outcome
The Court found for the defendant, asserting that TOLATA had altered the law’s approach from the earlier method of allowing interests to attach to trust of sale, instead allowing for them to attach to trust of land. Moreover, the relevant factors to be considered prior to a sale order under s. 15 of TOLATA had altered, and there was no presumption that such a sale ought be ordered to permit the judiciary greater discretion in reaching a fair and equitable conclusion, particularly in cases concerning the family home, as noted by Neuberger J. Thus, instead of ordering sale, the defendant was ordered to assume Fox’s repayment obligations.