Civil Procedure PJ Questions Flashcards
Kane Corp., a U.S. company headquartered in Nebraska and incorporated in Delaware, manufactures and markets a variety of products made from high-tech fibers. Among these products is a surgical gown for doctors that Kane advertises as providing the “highest level of protection from infectious diseases.” For many years, Kane has sold large quantities of these gowns directly to four different states’ bio-containment centers, which treat patients with infectious diseases. Texas is one of those states. Kane sources all of its fabric for these gowns from a supplier in Singapore called Singtel. Singtel supplies many other companies with its fabric in other products and does not keep track of where all of its materials end up. A group of Texas bio-containment center doctors who wear Kane’s gowns as a result of Kane’s direct sales to the state became infected with a dangerous virus. They brought a product liability suit against Kane and Singtel in Texas state court.
Which choice below states most accurately how personal jurisdiction would be analyzed for both defendants?
A) Kane would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas because of its direct sales there, and Singtel would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas because it profits from those sales.
(B) Kane would not be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas because it sells gowns to three other states besides Texas, but Singtel would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas because it blankets the world with its fabric products.
(C) Neither Kane nor Singtel would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas, because their gowns and fabric are not related to the doctors’ injuries in Texas.
(D) Kane would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas, because of its direct sales there, but Texas’ personal jurisdiction over Singtel would be uncertain.
D is the correct answer. Kane’s direct sales of gowns to the Texas bio-containment center is a classic example of purposeful availment of the benefits of the forum. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington; Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. Because it intentionally sells a large volume of gowns consistently to the forum state and makes a product that meets the unique needs of a customer in that state, Kane cannot claim to be surprised by a Texas suit based on a defect in the gowns it sold there. Jurisdiction over Singtel must be analyzed under one of the stream of commerce approaches in J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro. That’s because Singtel does not sell directly to Texas but gets its products to the state through a middleman, Kane. The Justices’ approaches in Nicastro, none of which garnered a majority, might reach different results, making personal jurisdiction over Singtel uncertain. The Kennedy plurality in Nicastro would not find jurisdiction because Singtel does nothing affirmatively to try to target customers in Texas. The Ginsburg opinion may or may not find personal jurisdiction; it would depend on Singtel’s knowledge and expectations after delivering its fabric into the stream of commerce.
A is incorrect because the Supreme Court in Worldwide Volkswagen rejected the idea that profiting constitutes purposeful availment for personal jurisdiction purposes.
B is incorrect because no group of Justices on the Supreme Court has ever said that indiscriminate blanketing across the world can constitute purposeful availment of the benefits and privileges of a particular state.
C is incorrect because under the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of California and the question facts, the injuries to the doctors in Texas are clearly related to the defendants’ Texas sales. The jurisdictional problem raised by these facts is purposeful availment, not relatedness.
Hercules Hardware Company (HHC) is a high-tech home product retailer. HHC’s operations are in Minnesota and it is incorporated there. HHC also maintains a retail sales website with national reach. One of HHC’s best-selling products is a snow-melting stair mat. Through Amazon, HHC has sold 25 of these mats in North Dakota consumers. Minnesota resident Hector Diaz bought an HHC mat at one of HHC’s Minnesota retail outlets. After deciding to move to the Pacific Northwest, Hector resold the mat to a hardware store in Montana on the drive to his new home. The store sold the mat to Montana resident Darnell Reynolds. Darnell was severely burned at his Montana home when the mat’s electrical components malfunctioned. Darnell sued HHC for product liability in a North Dakota state court, hoping to take advantage of favorable product liability laws there.
What is the most likely reason a North Dakota court would refuse specific personal jurisdiction over HHC?
(A) HHC did not target the forum of North Dakota.
(B) There is an insufficient relationship between the forum, the injury, and HHC’s activities.
(C) HHC’s operations are entirely based in Minnesota.
(D) HHC did not sell enough mats in North Dakota.
B is the correct answer. Darnell’s purchase was two steps removed from HHC’s original sale, which happened in Minnesota, not North Dakota; he did not buy the mat in North Dakota, and he was not injured in North Dakota. Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol Myers-Squibb v. California Superior Court, the “arising out of” requirement in specific jurisdiction demands “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.” Under these facts, this affiliation is lacking.
A is incorrect because purposeful availment is not the problem here; this standard would likely be met under either one of the competing stream of commerce approaches in J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro. Even under the Kennedy plurality’s view, HHC’s aggressive marketing to North Dakotans would suffice to target the forum. Ginsburg’s dissenting view would also be satisfied with HHC’s robust sales to North Dakotans, combined with regularly selling nationally through its website.
C is incorrect because a company’s operations do not need to be in a state for that state to exercise specific jurisdiction over it.
D is incorrect for the same reasons that A is incorrect.
Jake, a lifetime resident of Boston, made his first ever venture out of Massachusetts when he flew to San Francisco, California. He was unable to get a nonstop flight and so had to change planes at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City, New York. While sitting in a coffee shop at Kennedy airport, he was served with process in connection with a lawsuit filed against him by his former next-door neighbor. His neighbor, now a citizen of New York, brought suit in New York claiming that Jake had sold him a lemon—Jake’s 2005 automobile. Jake files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
How should the court rule?
(A) The court should grant the motion because the car sale was consummated entirely in Massachusetts.
(B) The court should grant the motion because Jake is a citizen of Massachusetts.
(C) The court should deny the motion because the plaintiff is a citizen of New York.
(D) The court should deny the motion because Jake was served in New York.
D is the correct answer. A court has jurisdiction over people and property within their jurisdictional borders. If a defendant is present in the jurisdiction when served with process, however briefly, that defendant will be subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction over him. This is called “tag jurisdiction” and has been ruled constitutionally sufficient by the United States Supreme Court.
Answer A is incorrect because personal jurisdiction concerns the court’s power over the defendant. More than one state may exert personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Here, Massachusetts would likely have personal jurisdiction over the parties because Jake is a lifelong resident of Massachusetts (hence, general jurisdiction) and the plaintiff had minimum contacts with Massachusetts because the transaction was in Massachusetts. However, another state may have jurisdiction over Jake because of his contacts with that state. Physical presence serves as minimum contacts under “tag jurisdiction.”
B is incorrect because a defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction in a state other than the state of citizenship, as is this case with “tag jurisdiction.”
C is incorrect because personal jurisdiction deals with the court’s power over the defendant; the plaintiff’s citizenship is irrelevant to determining the constitutionality of exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Plaintiff owns and operates a retail store in California. It licenses software from Defendant, a Texas company that specializes in security technology. Despite the software, hackers broke into Plaintiff’s financial system. Plaintiff sued Defendant in a state court in Delaware for breach of contract, choosing the forum because of its unusually long statute of limitations. Defendant did not object to personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff loses on the merits; the state court holds that Plaintiff was contributorily negligent for its injuries because it did not properly install the software. Plaintiff then filed a second lawsuit against Defendant, largely repeating the breach-of-contract claim that was dismissed in the first lawsuit, but this time filing the lawsuit in federal district court in Delaware. Defendant answers the complaint, raising the affirmative defense of claim preclusion, and asserts a counterclaim that the filing of multiple lawsuits has caused Defendant to suffer wrongful injury to reputation, and alleges special damages of lost business in excess of $75,000.
Other than filing the pair of lawsuits, Plaintiff has no contacts with Delaware. Plaintiff moves to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that no summons was served with the counterclaim.
How should the court rule on the motion?
(A) The court should deny the motion, because a compulsory counterclaim does not require an independent basis for jurisdiction.
(B) The court should grant the motion, because a permissive counterclaim requires an independent basis of jurisdiction.
(C) The court should grant the motion for lack of service of process.
(D) The court should deny the motion, because Plaintiff has effectively consented to suit in the forum state.
D) is the correct answer because the filing of a lawsuit is treated as consent by the plaintiff to personal jurisdiction in the forum “for all purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his presence.” Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938). As the Supreme Court has explained, deeming the plaintiff to have consented to personal jurisdiction in the forum in which he has elected to sue “is the price which the state may exact as the condition of opening its courts to the plaintiff” and is consistent with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Id.; see also Schnabel v. Lui, 302 F.3d 1023, 1037-1038 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] party cannot avail itself of the court’s jurisdiction, bringing claims which mandate the filing of counterclaims, and thereafter attack personal jurisdiction when judgment is entered against the party on counterclaims.”). The Plaintiff in this case availed itself of personal jurisdiction in the federal district court in Delaware by bringing suit there. By so doing, Plaintiff effectively waived any objection to personal jurisdiction he might have asserted had Defendant elected to file his counterclaim as an original claim in an independent lawsuit.
(A) is not correct because it relies on an irrelevant legal rule. Answer A deals with subject matter jurisdiction, while the motion challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant-in-counterclaim. A compulsory counterclaim is a claim made by any party against an opposing party that “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” FRCP 13(a)(1)(A). Generally, a court has power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff’s original claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Thus, while it is true that a compulsory counterclaim does not require an independent basis of subject-matter jurisdiction, this rule is irrelevant to whether the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff with respect to Defendant’s counterclaim.
(B) is not correct because it relies on an irrelevant legal rule. Answer B deals with subject matter jurisdiction while the motion challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant-in-counterclaim. A permissive counterclaim is defined as a counterclaim that does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party’s claim. See FRCP 13(b). Unlike a compulsory counterclaim, a permissive counterclaim requires an independent basis of subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See, e.g., Oak Park Trust & Sav. Bank v. Therkildsen, 209 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2000) (permissive counterclaims “require their own jurisdictional basis”). However, the circuits are now divided on this question, and some courts of appeal have held that supplemental jurisdiction may be exercised over permissive counterclaims that are logically related to the original claim over which the court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Whatever way this disagreement is resolved, it is irrelevant to whether the court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff with respect to Defendant’s counterclaim.
(C) is not correct because it misapplies the governing procedure. A party asserts a counterclaim either by pleading the counterclaim in an answer or by raising it as a reply to a prior-asserted counterclaim. A summons is not required.
Plaintiff files a claim against the defendant, a Delaware corporation with its headquarters located in New York, in federal district court in Los Angeles, California, alleging a violation of the federal antitrust statute. The federal statute contains a provision for nationwide service of process and personal jurisdiction over corporations. The defendant is a major retailer with retail shops in all 50 states and a highly interactive web page that generates hundreds of thousands of dollars of business annually from citizens of all 50 states.
Which of the following governs whether or not the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction?
A) California law, because California is the forum state.
(B) Delaware law, because the defendant is a Delaware citizen.
(C) New York law, because the defendant’s headquarters are there.
(D) The federal antitrust statute.
D is the correct answer. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1), a federal court looks to the forum state’s jurisdictional provision unless otherwise provided by federal law. Here, the substantive federal law contains its own jurisdictional provision. Consequently, the federal antitrust statute, rather than state law, applies.
Answers A, B, and C are incorrect because the federal statute provides for nationwide service of process, as authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1).
In an action filed in federal district court, the defendant refuses to waive service. The plaintiff serves the defendant by placing a copy of the summons and complaint in the hands of the defendant’s housekeeper while she is working in the defendant’s home. She forgets to turn it over to the defendant.
Is this service proper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?
(A) Yes, because the housekeeper is in the defendant’s home.
(B) No, because the defendant was not personally served.
(C) Yes, because the housekeeper is a person of suitable age and discretion.
(D) No, because the housekeeper does not reside in the defendant’s home.
D is the correct answer. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B), service is sufficient if it is delivered to the defendant’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion who resides therein. Since the housekeeper does not live in the defendant’s home, this latter requirement has not been met. While some courts have said that this defect can be cured by the fact that the defendant actually receives the notice, this defendant did not receive the process.
Answers A and C are incorrect because they do not consider the requirement that the person accepting service must reside therein, which the housekeeper does not.
Answer B is incorrect because Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B) allows for substituted service, meaning that the defendant need not be personally served so long as service is made at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there
The defendant/purchaser, a Vermont citizen, bought a television from the plaintiff/retailer, an Illinois corporation. The written sales agreement provides that the purchaser designated the company president’s secretary to receive service of process for the purchaser in any action brought by the retailer under the terms of this agreement. When the purchaser failed to make a payment, the retailer sued him for breach of contract in federal district court and served the company president’s secretary. The secretary, who was unknown to the defendant, mailed a copy of the service to the defendant’s home and the defendant received it.
Is this service proper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?
(A) Yes, because the defendant agreed to it by signing the contract and received the process.
(B) No, because this is a form contract and the service provision was in small type.
(C) No, because the secretary was unknown to the defendant and was the plaintiff’s employee.
(D) Yes, because the secretary was paid for being a recipient of service.
A is the correct answer. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(C), service can be made upon an agent authorized by appointment to receive service of process. The Supreme Court held that a service provision in a form contract can constitute an effective appointment of an agent for service of process even if the recipient is unknown to the defendant. The only requirement of the job is to transfer service to the defendant and if that job is fulfilled, the Court ruled, the service is effective. That occurred here and so the service is proper under Rule 4(e)(2)(C).
Answers B and C are incorrect because the defects alluded in the answers are irrelevant under these circumstances.
Answer D is incorrect because being paid for being the recipient is irrelevant since a service provision in a form contract can constitute an effective appointment of an agent for service of process.
Enterprise Deli, Inc., is a Missouri corporation. Its president and majority shareholder is Jon Hamm. Enterprise has its only place of business in Chesterfield, Missouri. Betty, from East St. Louis, Illinois, visits the deli and soon experiences ptomaine poisoning. She sues Enterprise Deli for negligent food processing in state court in Illinois. The sheriff of the Illinois county serves Hamm personally with the summons and complaint when he is visiting Illinois.
Which of the following is most true?
(A) By virtue of the personal service on Hamm during his trip to Illinois, the Illinois courts have personal jurisdiction over Enterprise Deli.
(B) The Illinois courts lack personal jurisdiction in this case.
(C) If Betty experienced all of her symptoms of ptomaine poisoning in Illinois, and the Illinois long arm statute covered that type of fact pattern, Enterprise Deli would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois in this case.
(D) Both B and C.
Answer choice B is the correct answer. Tag jurisdiction is proper when an individual is served in the forum state. However, this rule does not apply to officers of Corporations. For this reason, answer choice A is incorrect.
Answer choice C is incorrect because personal jurisdiction may not be based on where the Plaintiff experienced symptoms absent Defendant’s contacts with the forum. Here, there are no facts to suggest that Defendant had any contacts with the forum state of Illinois.
Because answer choice C is incorrect, the answer cannot be answer choice D.
Ping, a resident of North Carolina, seeks treatment for a rare medical condition from Doc, a medical specialist in Minnesota. After receiving treatment in Minnesota, Ping returns to North Carolina, where she dies. Ping’s estate sues Doc in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina for medical malpractice and timely serves process on Doc in Minnesota. Doc files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
How should the court rule on Doc’s motion to dismiss?
(A) The court should deny the motion because a federal court can exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the entire territory of the United States.
(B) The court should deny the motion because this is a “Foreign Injury, Local Act,” and long-arm jurisdiction is authorized by North Carolina statute.
(C) The court should deny the motion because the defendant was properly served process in Minnesota.
(D) The court should grant the motion unless plaintiff can establish that Doc advertised his medical practice in North Carolina or had sought out referrals for patients from North Carolina.
Answer choice A is incorrect because it is an incorrect statement of the rule and a long-arm statute is only one part of the personal jurisdiction analysis.
Answer choice B is incorrect because the long arm-statute is only one part of the personal jurisdiction analysis.
Answer choice C is incorrect because service in Minnesota would be relevant to personal jurisdiction if the case was filed in Minnesota.
Answer choice D is correct because because the plaintiff will need to prove that Doc has purposeful contacts with the forum.
Harry Rehnquist, a student at Bates College in Maine, grew up and went to high school in Hawai’i. He decided to attend Bates because of its lacrosse program, but he has always hated the Northeast, and nothing about his experience at Bates has changed his opinion. Two weeks after the beginning of the fall semester, outside his dorm at Bates, Harry is served with process in a lawsuit filed in Hawai’i state court. The cause of action did not arise in Hawai’i, and none of the witnesses or evidence regarding the lawsuit can be found in Hawai’i.
Can Harry successfully contest personal jurisdiction in this lawsuit on the grounds that it would be too unfair and inconvenient to force him to litigate in Hawai’i?
(A) Yes, in view of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(B) No, because the plaintiff has achieved “tag” jurisdiction over Harry.
(C) No.
(D) Yes, because the lawsuit has no contacts with Hawai’i.
The correct answer is C. Harry cannot successfully contest personal jurisdiction in this lawsuit because he is still a domiciliary of Hawai’i and subject to general personal jurisdiction in that state.
Answer choice A is incorrect because a court that has proper personal jurisdiction does not violate due process on personal jurisdiction grounds.
Answer choice B is incorrect because “tag” jurisdiction would be applicable if he was sued in Maine.
Answer choice D is incorrect because Hawai’i has general personal jurisdiction over Harry and contacts are required for specific jurisdiction.
To determine personal jurisdiction over defendants, a federal district court often must examine the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits, because:
(A) The U.S. Constitution requires the federal court to protect the due process rights of the defendants.
(B) The long-arm jurisdiction of the federal courts arises solely from state statutes.
(C) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 often requires the court to do so.
(D) The Fifth Amendment requires this analysis.
(C) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 often requires the court to do so.
State X’s long-arm statute allows the state to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who “derive revenue from goods that are used or consumed in this state, if the cause of action arises from the use or consumption of those goods.”
Would every exercise of jurisdiction that falls within the terms of this long-arm statute comport with due process?
(A) Yes, because state courts are courts of general jurisdiction.
(B) No.
(C) No, but due process would be satisfied if the defendant actually manufactured the goods at issue.
(D) No, but due process would be satisfied if the revenue that a given defendant derived from the use or consumption of the goods were very substantial.
Answer choice B is correct. Even if the long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, non-resident defendants still must have minimum contacts with the forum, the plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or relate to those contacts, and exercising personal jurisdiction must be reasonable.
Answer choice A is incorrect because this question asks about personal jurisdiction, and state courts are courts of general subject-matter jurisdiction.
Answer choices C and D are incorrect because the defendant must still have minimum contacts with the forum.
In a state court of general jurisdiction, Pete sued the Big Time Corporation for personal injuries he received in an auto collision with a truck driven by a Big Time truck driver. Doris was the president of Big Time when the accident occurred. Pete served Big Time Corporation by handing the summons to Doris on the day before she retired. In the excitement of her retirement, Doris neglected to deliver the papers to anyone else at Big Time. A default was entered against Big Time.
Other than service on Doris, Big Time never received notice of the pending lawsuit before the entry of default. Big Time now moves to quash (that is, nullify) service of process and to set aside the entry of default. Assume that the operative state rules on service of process are identical to the parallel provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Which of the following statements is most correct?
(A) Service should be quashed because Big Time Corporation did not receive actual notice of the pending lawsuit.
(B) Service should be quashed because Doris was not an officer of Big Time at the time an answer was due.
(C) Service should be quashed for reasons not stated above.
(D) Big Time’s motion to quash service should be denied.
Answer choice A is incorrect because actual notice is not required.
B is incorrect because Doris is not required to be an officer at the time the answer is due for service to be proper.
Answer choice C is correct. Service should be quashed because it was improper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (c)(2) states that “any person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may serve a summons and complaint.” Here, Pete is a party because he is the Plaintiff and he cannot properly serve Doris.
Jane sues Hans in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, asserting a state-law claim. Hans answers the complaint in a timely fashion, addressing only the substance of Jane’s allegations. Ten days later, Hans moves for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that Jane did not properly serve him with process and that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
Which of the following is most true?
(A) The case must be remanded to state court.
(B) The court must grant the motion on both grounds stated.
(C) The court now has personal jurisdiction over Hans.
(D) The court would lack personal jurisdiction over Hans because, as Mullane shows, proper notice of a lawsuit is an indispensable element of due process.
Answer choice C is correct. Because Hans failed to assert the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in his first responsive pleading to the court, he has waived this defense and the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over him.
Answer choice A is incorrect because the case was not removed from state court and there would be no motion to remand.
Answer choice B is incorrect because there is insufficient information in the fact pattern to make this the most true answer.
Answer choice D is incorrect because constructive notice is allowed in some instances so long as it is given in a manner reasonably calculated to reach the defendant.
