Civil Procedure Flashcards
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not afford Ron a means to compel Guest to join CreamCorp as an additional defendant because CreamCorp does not qualify as a necessary party.
Ordinarily the plaintiff is the master of her suit and gets to decide whom to sue, with whom to sue, where to sue, and what claims to bring. Thus, if a plaintiff like Guest sues only one defendant when she has claims against two defendants, ordinarily there is nothing that a defendant, like Ron, can do to compel the plaintiff to join another party.
But there are some checks on plaintiff autonomy. Rule 19, which governs the joinder of persons needed for just adjudication, authorizes joinder of defendants over the plaintiff’s objection only when:
“the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties” if the absent person is not joined, or
the absent person claims an interest in the action that would “as a practical matter” be impaired or impeded if that person is not joined, or
the person’s absence may leave any of the parties subject to a risk of multiple liability or inconsistent obligations.
fed. R. civ. p. 19(a). Where any of these criteria is met, courts and commentators commonly refer to the absent party as a necessary party, and a court is empowered to join that party, even over the plaintiff’s objection.
Application
In this case, none of these requirements is satisfied. First, CreamCorp’s presence is not necessary for the court to afford complete relief as between Guest and Ron. If Guest got sick because the oysters were contaminated, the court can afford complete relief by holding Ron liable and awarding damages to Guest. If, on the other hand, Guest became sick because the ice cream was made from unpasteurized milk, then the court can afford complete relief between Ron and Guest by refusing to hold Ron liable. Either way, complete and proper relief can be accorded as between Ron and Guest, without CreamCorp’s presence. If the jury or court finds that the oysters did not cause the food poisoning, Guest will have to initiate a separate suit to determine if she can recover from CreamCorp. While inefficient, this result does not render CreamCorp a necessary party under Rule 19. (concluding that joint tortfeasors are permissive, not necessary, parties under Rule 19(a)). In short, Guest’s ability to recover whatever (if anything) she is entitled to recover from Ron is unaffected by CreamCorp’s absence.
Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not only permits, but requires, Ron to bring his claim for the unpaid restaurant bill as a counterclaim against Guest in the context of Guest’s lawsuit against Ron because the counterclaim arises out of or relates to the same transaction or occurrence.
A claim for relief brought by a defendant against a plaintiff is called a counterclaim. Counterclaims are governed by Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 13 requires a defendant to bring a counterclaim against the plaintiff if the counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant. fed. R. civ. p. 13(a). Here, Ron’s claim to be paid for the restaurant meal arises out of the same transaction and occurrence as Guest’s claim that she became sick as a result of the meal. Both claims arose out of the meal Ron served to Guest.
Rule 13(b) further provides that an answer “may state as a counterclaim” any claim against the plaintiff “that is not compulsory.” fed. R. civ. p. 13(b) (emphasis added). Read together, these portions of the rule authorize Ron to bring a counterclaim against Guest for the unpaid $50 regardless of whether it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as Guest’s claim against Ron. Therefore, it is not necessary to determine whether Guest’s claim and Ron’s claim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence. In either case, Ron may bring the claim.
The federal district court likely would have jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim under the supple-mental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as long as the counterclaim for failure to pay the check and the plaintiff’s claim for negligence form part of the same case for purposes of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.
Whether the federal court can assert jurisdiction over Ron’s counterclaim is another matter. The counterclaim against Guest for failure to pay the $50 is a state-law claim that could not be brought on its own in federal court. While there is complete diversity of citizenship between Guest and Ron, the amount in controversy on the unpaid restaurant check claim is only $50 and doesn’t come close to satisfying the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
However, where a federal court already has jurisdiction over some claims, the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, authorizes district courts to hear claims that could not otherwise be heard in federal court if those claims “are so related to [the primary] claims in the action . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). In determining whether or not the primary claim and the supplemental claim “are so related,” most courts apply the “common nucleus of operative fact” test announced by the United States Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (stating that “[t]he state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” to be part of the same “case” for constitutional purposes).
Here, it is likely that Guest’s claim against Ron for food poisoning and Ron’s claim against Guest for the unpaid $50 arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact, namely the alleged food-poisoning incident. The reason that Guest stopped payment on the check and declined to pay for the food was that the food allegedly made her ill. See, e.g., Geisinger Medical Ctr. v. Gough, 160 F.R.D. 467, 470 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (concluding that the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff com-mitted medical malpractice was a compulsory counterclaim to the plaintiff’s claim to recover for unpaid medical bills; “[t]he counterclaim is thus an offshoot of the same basic controversy as the plaintiff’s claim and necessarily involves common issues of law and fact that would require duplicative effort if tried in a separate action”).
Section 1367 (c)
Section 1367(c) affords the district court discretion to decline to exercise supplemental juris-diction in four circumstances: “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law; (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Here, the counterclaim for failure to pay the restaurant bill does not raise any novel or complex issues of state law. The restaurant bill claim does not predominate over the more factually complex claim of food poisoning. The district court has not dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. Nor are there any compelling reasons to decline to exercise jurisdiction. Therefore, it is likely that the district court would have supplemental jurisdiction to hear Ron’s counterclaim against Guest.
