Civ Pro Cases pt 2

Question 1

Stratford v. Zurich Insurance

Answer 1

Dentist/insurance fraud claim.

Pleading standard for fraud/mistake must be higher under Rule 9(b) - pleading with particularity required.

Question 2

Jones v. Bock

Answer 2

Prisoner claim, unsure who had burden of proving defendant exhausted prison procedure before filing suit.

Exhaustion is generally treated like an affirmative defense, and will also be treated as one in this case - meaning the prisoner is not specifically required or demonstrate exhaustion in complaint

Question 3

Christian v. Mattel

Answer 3

Christian’s attorney attempted sanctions. Mattel attorneys tried to show the lawsuit was frivolous by presenting evidence.

While he acted unreasonably, Rule 11 sanctions are limited to signed pleadings, written motions, and other papers - it does not authorize sanctions for discovery abuses and misstatements made during oral presentations.

Question 4

Beeck v. Aquaslide

Answer 4

Suit for injury from waterslide. Defendant realized after SOL that it was not their product, asked for leave to amend/separate trials - court granted.

15(a) In the absence of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, or undue prejudice, the leave sought should be “freely given” when justice requires.
The courts have read this phrase to mean (a) that the would-be amender should have a good reason for not getting the pleading right the first time; and (b) that allowing the change now shouldn’t hurt the other side too much.
Test: The court should freely give leave when justice requires UNLESS bad faith or prejudice against the opposing party.

Rule 42: Evidence of plaintiffs’ injuries and damages would clearly have taken several days of trial time and because of the severity of the injuries, may have been prejudicial to the defendants claim of non-manufacture

Question 5

Moore v. Baker

Answer 5

15(c) Relation back:
Initial claim: lack of informed consent
Amended complain: negligence during operation

Court:
An amendment relates back to the original filing when the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out or attempted to be set out in the original pleading.
Critical determination in Rule 15c is whether the original complaint gave notice to the defendant of the claim now being asserted.
No relation back here - Nothing in the original claim of lack of informed consent reference negligence by Baker during or after surgery.

Rule 15 Relation Back Factors:
Notice/warning to defendant
Close timing/simultaneous
Move from broader to narrower claim
Pieces of claims overlap
Timing of the motion and ability to do additional discovery

Question 6

Bonerb v. Richard Caron Foundation

Answer 6

Rule 15(c) Relation back:
Initial complaint: Negligently maintained basketball court caused him to sustain injuries.
Amended complaint: Counseling malpractice

Court:
Test: common nucleus of operative fact/”a claim that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading.”
It is true that a claim for professional malpractice invokes a different duty and conduct, but the original complaint advised of the same transaction which could give rise to different theories of negligence.
These allegations not only gave defendant sufficient notice of the general facts surrounding the occurrence, but also alerted defendant to the possibility of a claim be based on negligent performance of professional duties.

Question 7

Favale v. Roman Catholic Diocese

Answer 7

Plaintiff claims sexual harassment from principal at school - wrongful hiring claim.

Court holds that the testimony related to principals anger management and psychological treatment would have no bearing on a claim for negligent supervision or negligent hiring because the wrongful conduct of which the defendant would have had notice was not the same type of conduct that caused the plaintiff’s harm.

Question 8

Hickman v. Taylor

Answer 8

Preemptively, defense attorney interviewed survivors of a boat crash. Later, they decided to sue and survivors lawyer wanted the interview information.

Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.

Work Product of a Lawyer:
Preparation work is reflected in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impression, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible things
Where relevant and non privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney’s file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one’s case, discovery may be properly had.

Question 9

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg

Answer 9

Zubulake sued former employer for gender discrimination and while on notice of suit, USB deleted relevant emails, destroyed back ups, and failed to produce responsive emails.

Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation they should:
First, counsel must issue a “litigation hold”
Second, counsel should communicate directly with the “key players” in the litigation - tell them of their preservation duty and constantly remind
Finally, counsel should instruct all employees to produce electronic copies of their relevant active files.

Question 10

Mueller v. Swift

Answer 10

Muller was fired and recorded meeting of being fired, then clipped the recording and sent to attorney & laptop damage made the evidence unrecoverable. Held Plaintiff’s loss or destruction of the recording constitutes sanctionable spoliation of evidence.

TEST: A spoliation sanction is proper where:
(1) A party has a duty to preserve evidence because it knew or should have known that litigation was imminent, and (2) The adverse party was prejudiced by the destruction of evidence.

Whether to sanction the court consider:
(1) The degree of culpability of the party who lost or destroyed the evidence, and (2)The degree of actual prejudice to the other party.

Question 11

Security National Banks v. Abbott Laboratories

Answer 11

Following a review of deposition transcripts, the court found “hundreds of unnecessary objections and interruptions” by Counsel during deposition.

Under Rule 26(g), judge sanctioned lawyer by requiring him to make a video on proper deposition tactics.

Question 12

Celotex Corp v. Catrett

Answer 12

​​Catrett alleging that the death of her husband resulted from his exposure to asbestos manufactured or distributed by 15 names companies. Celotex moved for SJ stating that respondent “failed to produce evidence that any Celotex product was the proximate cause of the injuries alleged.” Court found Catrett failed to show sufficient evidence to establish essential elements of her case that makes summary judgment proper.

Hold:
Court found Catrett failed to show sufficient evidence to establish essential elements of her case that makes summary judgment proper.
Plaintiff must prove defendant caused it/that there is a dispute of fact

Question 13

Anderson

Answer 13

Must view all evidence by nonmovant as true and draw inferences in nonmovant favor.

Question 14

Matsushita

Answer 14

To overcome SJ, nonmoving party must show more than a “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

It has to be something real.

Nonmoving party must have more than a scintilla of evidence.

Question 15

Tolan v. Cotton

Answer 15

Excessive force claim against Cotton. Cotton (cop) moved for SJ. SJ should not have been granted because:

“the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences drawn in his favor.” and they used Cottons evidence, not Tolans.

The court should have acknowledges and credited Tolan’s evidence with regard to the lighting, his mother’s demeanor, whether he shouted words that were an overt threat, and his positioning during the shooting.

Question 16

Scott v. Harris

Answer 16

Car pursuit which ended in crash caught on camera. Cop moved for SJ stating that no evidence of excessive force, Harris (nonmovant) states he was of no threat and remained in control of his car.

Holding:
Video evidence conclusively disproved nonmovants evidence against SJ motion.
When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for SJ

Question 17

Conte v. Emmons

Answer 17

Facts: DA’s office investigated Conte, Conte’s business failed and he claimed they interfered with his contracts.

Significance:
Appellants moved for JMOL and then RJMOL - both denied.

In order to find for a tortious interference with contract claim, plaintiff must prove all elements. Here, Appellants are entitled to a JMOL because no reasonable juror could have properly inferred from the elements that at least two elements were satisfied: intent and causation.

This is a high standard and generally the movant must be able to show a “complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict such that the jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture.”

Question 18

Unitherm

Answer 18

Facts: Fight over patent. ConArga moved for a JMOL and it was denied, verdict was entered for Unitherm. ConAgra neither renewed JMOL or filed MNT and instead they directly appealed to circuit court. Appellate court reviewed and remanded for a new trial.

Significance:
A post verdict motion is necessary because the determination of whether a new trial should be granted or judgment entered under Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel of the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.

A party may only pursue on appeal a particular avenue of relief available under Rule 50(b), namely, the entry of judgment or a new trial, when that party has complied with the Rule’s filing requirements by requesting that particular relief below.

Question 19

Lind v. Schenley

Answer 19

Facts: Lind said company promised him an increase in pay and then broke that promise. Schenley filed JMOL, and after verdict for Lind, a RMOL and a MNT. DC judge granted the 50(b) and in the alternative granted the MNT.

Significance:
While the trial judge has a responsibility for the result at least equal to that of the jury, he should not set the verdict aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence and order a new trial simply because he would have come to a different conclusion if he were the trier of fact.

Jury believed the testimony of the plaintiff and the court substituted its judgment for that of the jury on this issue and thereby abused its legal discretion.

Where a trial is long and complicated, a jury verdict should be scrutinized more closely by the trial judge. But here the subject matter is simple and easy to comprehend.

Question 20

Frier v. City of Vandalia

Answer 20

Facts:
Case 1: Replevin Claim - Frier vs. City - Frier lost in State court
Case 2: Due Process (fed claim) - Frier v. City - Fed court

Significance:
Transactional Test: same transaction or occurrence?

“Causes of action are identical where the evidence necessary to sustain a second verdict would sustain the first (where causes of action are based upon a common core of operative facts)”

Here, the replevin theory contained the elements that make up a due process theory, and therefore the courts of Illinois would treat both theories as one “cause of action”.

Question 21

Taylor v. Sturgell

Answer 21

Facts:
Herricks sought to collect information on a plane and was denied request.
Less than a month later, Taylor files request seeking the same documents. DC held Taylor’s suit was barred under claim preclusion - holding that a party may be bound by a judgment if they were “virtually represented” by a party.
Record shows that the two men are “close associates” and the used the same lawyer and Herrick gave documents to Taylor. Making the same arguments

Significance:
Disapprove of the doctrine of preclusion by “virtual representation” and hold that the judgment against Herrick does not bar Taylor from maintaining this suit.

Question 22

Gargallo v. Merill Lynch

Answer 22

Facts:
Case #1: Lynch filed suit to collect from Gargallo, Gargallo filed counterclaims alleging violation of federal securities law (fed claim). State dismissed Gargallo’s counterclaim with prejudice for refusal to comply.

Case #2: Gargallo filed suit in fed court for violation of federal securities law based on same transactions in counterclaim from case #1.
DC dismissed on claim preclusion grounds.

Significance:
Dismissal with prejudice (disciplinary dismissal) does count as a final judgment.
BUT - the state court did not have subject matter JDX and it could not be preclusive because they didn’t have power to decide in first place.

A federal court must decide whether to give claim preclusive effect to a s state judgment by determining whether the state court would give preclusive effect to such a judgment.

Question 23

Illinois Central Gulf RR v. Parks

Answer 23

Facts:
Case 1: State court, J&B v. RR for negligence/consortium bc of injuries to B, Judgment for B for personal injuries/judgment against J.
Case 2: State court, J v. RR, negligence now for J’s injuries.

Significance:
This would be precluded in fed and on exam!
Illinois Central failed its burden of showing that the judgment against Jessie in the prior action could not have been rendered without deciding that Jessie was contributorily negligent in the accident which precipitated the two lawsuits.

He lost - yes, but we don’t know why he lost in 1st case. He could have lost because he didn’t satisfy his burden of proof or for other reasons. It wasn’t litigated and decided because we don’t know what they based their ruling on.

Question 24

Parklane Hosiery v. Shore

Answer 24

Facts:
Case 1: SEC v. Parklane, Issue: misleading proxy statement, Judgment for SEC - injunctive & declaratory relief
Case 2: Shore v. Parklane, Issue: SAME misleading proxy statement, Sought damages, rescission, and cost.

Issue: Can Parklane be precluded from re-litigating the falsity of the proxy statement? Yes.

Significance:
Since the petitioners received a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate their claims in the SEC action, the contemporary law of collateral estoppel leads inescapably to the conclusion that the petitioners are collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of whether the proxy statement was materially false and misleading.
This does not mean Shore wins, they just don’t have to prove falsity.

Parklane factors - considering adequate opportunity and incentive to litigate in case 1:
Incentive to litigate fully and vigorously in 1st case. Are subsequent suits foreseeable?
No significant differences in procedure opportunities from case 1.
Consistency with previous decisions. Was the judgment in case 1 inconsistent with previous rulings?

Offensive vs. Defensive estoppel

Question 25

Cordero v. Voltaire

Answer 25

Facts:
Employees filed suit to recover unpaid wages. Defendant asserted counterclaims for fraud, theft, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty.
Employees move to dismiss counterclaims for lack of subject matter JDX.

Significance:
Supplemental JDX permits a federal court to entertain a claim over which it would not have an independent basis of subject matter JDX.

DC should have supp JDX over all other claims so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.

1367 supersedes case law on supplemental JDX, and it is no longer the case that permissive counterclaims must be supported by an independent basis for JDX, but rather must only meet the test for supplemental under 1367.

Thus, we should only consider whether the state law claims are so related to a federal claim as to form part of the same case or controversy.

Question 26

Mosley v. General Motors Corp

Answer 26

Facts: Ten plaintiffs brought suit alleging rights were denied by GM by reason of their race.

Significance:
Rule 20: A person may join in one action if:
(A) They assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any questions of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.

The rule imposes two specific requisites to the joinder of parties: (1) must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence; and (2) some question of law or fact common.

Here, both met:
Plaintiffs have asserted a right to relief arising out of the same transactions or occurrences.
A question of fact or law common to all the parties will arise in the action. This rule does not require that all questions of law and fact raised by the dispute will be common.

Question 27

Price v. CTB

Answer 27

Facts: Price sued Latco for breach of construction contract stating structure built by Latco was defective. Latco moved to file a Third Party Complain against ITW (nail manufacturer) stating they defectively designed the nails used in the construction.

Significance:
A defendant may assert a claim against anyone not a party to the original action if that third party’s liability is in some way dependent upon the outcome of the original action.

The only issue before the court is whether there exists a legal basis to implead ITW, not whether ITW is, in fact, liable to Latco. And since Rule 14 allows the defendant to implead a third party who “may be liable” all is good here.

Question 28

Temple v. Synthes Corp

Answer 28

Facts: Temple underwent surgery and sued Synthes the manufacturer of the plate/screw that went into her back and then broke off. Synthes filed MTD for failure to join necessary parties (doctor/hospital) under Rule 19.

Significance:
Joint tortfeasors are not necessarily parties under Rule 19.

As potential joint tortfeasors with Synthes, the doctor and hospital were merely permissive parties.

“A tortfeasor with the usual “joint-and-several” liability is merely a permissive party to an action against another with like liability.”