CISSP (Domain 6 - Security Architecture and Design) Flashcards by Kheun Chan

State Machine Formal Security Model

TR/DU

Trusted recovery

- Goes down and backup, no time security controls can be bypassed

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Multi-level Lattice Formal Security Model

RPC/SO

Compares roles, their permissions, and clearance levels with the sensitivity level of the object to determine access level

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Non-Interference Formal Security Model

Users are separated into different security domains

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Information Flow Formal Security Model

Looks at the information flows in a state machine

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Bell-LaPadula Security Model

pc/nru-nwd/int/exe/class/secmod

Protects confidentiality
*No read up, No write down
Dealing with internal threat
Any executed activity will always result in a secure state
Classification of subject does not change while referenced
Information flow security model

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Biba Security Model

pi/nrd-nwu/ext/cant/hier/so

Protects integrity
*No read down, No write up
Dealing with external threat
Cant depend on less trusted object
Based on hierarchical lattice of integrity levels
Subjects and objects

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Clark-Wilson Security Model

pi/wft-sod/spo/part/prog

Protects integrity
Requires a well-formed transaction and SoD
Subject->Program->Object
Partitions objects unlike Biba/Bell

Subject must go through a program to access and modify data

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Clark-Wilson 3 Integrity Goals

um/aim/mc/db

Prevent unauthorized users from making modifications
Prevent authorized users from making improper modifications
Maintains internal and external consistency

*DB’s

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4 Rules to Follow When Implementing Clark-Wilson Security Model
(prop/subp/objp/rec)

All users need to be properly ID’d and AuthN
Subjects can only access certain programs
Objects can only be accessed by certain programs
Record each transaction

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Brewer and Nash Security Model (Chinese Wall)

prev/a!b/fraud

Prevents conflict of interest
Company A cant see Company B’s data
Tries to ensure that users do not make fraudulent modifications to objects

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Graham-Denning Security Model

soc/srp/oom

How subjects and objects are created
How subjects are assigned rights or privileges
How ownership of objects is managed.

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8 Primitive Protection Rights (Graham-Denning)

co/cs/do/ds/rar/gar/dar/tar

Create Object
Create Subject
Delete Object
Delete Subject
Read Access Right
Grant Access Right
Delete Access Right
Transfer Access Right

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4 Rules to the Take Grant Security Model (Like Graham-Denning)
(sco/sdo/gao/rao)

Subject can create objects
Subject can delete objects
Grant access to owned object
Remove access to owned object

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Harrison Ruzzo Ullman Security Model (Like Graham-Denning)

More granular controls for subjects to access objects

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ISO/SEC 15408 Common Criteria

Helps reduce complexity of the ratings and eliminating the need to understand the definition and meaning of different ratings

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4 Components of ISO/SEC 15408 Common Criteria

PP/TE/ST/P

Protection Profile: Description of needed security solution (all systems should be protected by sec software)
Target Evaluation: Product proposed to provide needed security solution
Security Target: Written by vendor explaining security functionality and assurance
Packages - Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL): Security requirements bundled into packages for re-use

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Security Product Evaluation Ratings (1-7)

ft/st/mtc/mdtr/sfdt/sfvdt/fvdt

*EAL 1: Functionally tested (Works when on)
EAL 2: Structurally tested
EAL 3: Methodically tested and checked
EAL 4: Methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
EAL 5: Semi-formally designed and tested
EAL 6: Semi-formally verified, designed, and tested
*EAL 7: Formally verified, designed, and tested (Very Specific)

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Certification

Works in “my” environment

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Accreditation

Validation in production

Supervisor CPU State

km/ring/prog/both

Kernel/Protected/Privileged Mode
Ring 0
Program can access entire system
Both privileged and non-privileged instructions

Problem CPU State

um/ring/non/app

User/Program Mode
Ring 3
Only non-privileged instructions are executed
Intended for application programs

Multi-threading

Tasks don’t interfere with each other

Multi-tasking

Simultaneous execution of two or more programs

Multi-programming

Interleaved execution of two or more program by one CPU

Reference Monitor

Abstract machine that controls the access subjects have to objects

Security Kernel

Components in system that enforce the rules of the reference monitor(hardware, firmware, and software) *Admin of reference monitor

3 Security Requires of Security Kernel | IAM

- Isolated: Protected from unauthorized access - Active: Active all the time - Monitor: Evaluate reference monitor to make sure its working properly

Multi-processing

More than one CPU and they can process the request in parallel.

Trusted Computing Base (TCB)

Total combination of protection mechanisms within a computer system. Address the level of trust in a system, not a level of security

Security Perimeter of TCB

The buffer between TCB and non-TCB objects

Covert Channels

Sending information in an unauthorized manner using a medium in an unintended way - Data going over HTTP but its not web traffic

Timing Covert Channel

A process relays information to another by modulating its use of system resources

Storage Covert Channel

A process writes data to a storage location, and another process of lower clearance reads it.

5 Threats to Software and Systems | B/TA/BO/I/A

- Backdoors - Timing Attacks - Buffer Overflows - Inference - Aggregation

Back Doors

- Accessing a system by bypassing access controls - Attacker has access at any time *Maintenance Hook

Timing Attacks

- Take advantage of the time between events in a sequence | - Time of Check/Time of Use & Race Conditions

Time of Check/Time of Use (TOC/TOU)

Attack takes place after the system checks a specific file of the system before the system actually uses that file

Race Conditions

Two processes race to carry out conflicting actions at the same time. Attacker must slow/speed up one process to get to work

Data Validation

Process of reviewing data against a per-established set of criteria

Code Injection

Input must be validated for range/type/length (SQL Injection)

Buffer Overflow

If an application does not verify the amount of information being input, the data can overwrite other memory segments (Execute in privilege mode)

Inference

Act or process of deriving logical conclusions from premises known or assumed to be true (Finding Apache version)

Aggregation

A massive together or clustering of independent but similar units, such as data elements (Multiple data items together DOB & First and Last)

Countermeasure Principals - Defense in Depth (3 Things) | PTO

- People - Technology - Operations

Defense in Depth - People

Achieving information assurance beings with a senior level management commitment (typically at the CIO level)

Defense in Depth - Technology

Wide range of technologies available for providing information assurance services and for detecting intrusions

Defense in Depth - Operations

Focuses on all the activities required to sustain an organizations security posture on a day to day basis