China and the Islamic World Flashcards
Rubin 2011
Interest rate restrictions - institutional (not cultural), rooted in religious circumstances, politics and fragmentation. Institutions as the rules of the game, politics as the balance of power.
Differences in the institutional arrangements of Islam and Christianity; Islamic religious leaders held more political authority (political leaders depended on them). In particular, eventually became officially legal in C when commerce had disempowered the church (but pol leaders already ignored it). Inhibited development of financial markets, as well as institutions generally.
Incremental deviations mitigated need for greater change. Suggests roots in the fragmented history of Christianity (lack of strong Christian law),
Blaydes and Chaney 2013
The feudal system as key to achieving good institutions. Institutional, with roots in fragmentation and circumstance. “Political origins of institutional divergence”. Politics as the balance of power.
European rulers depended on landed nobility for troops (peasants and a self-funding warrior class), and so had to submit certain power to them (soft contract). Results in a better bargain, and less incentive to rebel. Longer term, enabled institutional development and reform. Islamic rulers utilised mamluks - slave soldiers - and so did not have to give up power in a bargain with elites. Created incentives to rebel. Hence, ruler duration was much longer in the West (this is the evidence) from around 900 onwards.
System emerged due to difficulty in extracting taxes from elites, so troops used instead. Feudalism resulted in: less rents flowing the the sovereign, increased rents to his rivals, and greater decentralisation of power. Set groundwork for unique EU institutions of property rights and parliaments.
Alternative: smaller EU states could maintain balance of power (no correlation, endogenous)
Landes 2006
China’s culture and ruling structure meant it failed to make use of or value innovation. It also failed to incorporate Western technologies due to its superiority complex. Cultural argument, but this culture is clearly institutionally driven by politics.
China was characterised by an interfering state (and an inefficient one, prohibiting geog and professional mobility, and int trade). State sought to avoid technological innovation as a threat to power (Acemoglu political losers), no incentives to do so - innovation was a source of fear for the innovator. Cultural superiority resulted in aversion to foreign technology (missionaries stressed the link between knowledge and religious truth).
Emphasises culture - link to differences in incentives of collectivist and individualist. But evidently a function of politics and institutions.
Kuran 2004
ME is and was underdeveloped due to inefficient and entrenched institutions.
Inhibited the development of a growth-friendly state (waqf reduced public goods, inheritance and lack of corporations reduced powerful commercial interests), as well as commercial development in itself (no corporations, hard to continue a project after death since all heirs must consent). Institutions also very inflexible (waqf), and often partial solutions to problems (property expropriation) which reduced demand for greater change (restriction of the sovereign).
Evidence in that when Jews and Christians able to follow their own laws and institutions, they massively outperformed. Also became the conduit of relation to Europe (risk of endogeneity).
Modern link: cannot just transplant a legal system without cultural background of certain ideas of responsibility and procedural fairness (instability created corruption). Modernisation with a weak civil society meant the state took the lead in key industries that were private and more successful in the West; again reinforcing the infirm system of society.
Ma 2004
Japan developed much faster than China, due to a better focus by elites on state and institutional reform, and on absorbing foreign knowledge. Link to Landes and perceived cultural superiority. Link to effect of political balance of power (in Japan, key interest groups supported development).
Example: silkworm production. Japan was below China (Yangzhi) before 1900, but rapidly outstripped it afterwards. Explained by Japanese active incorporation of Western sciences, while China did not (eg had a non-native translation of an outdated Italian book, while the Japanese had microscopes).
Japan was modernising against W Imperial challenges, while China was attempting to re-instate neo-confucianism. Resulted in divergent state policies, public good provision, market development. Govt supported selective breeding, and enabled Japan to break its resource constraints with modern technology and transport. Key factor was newly available capital (public, physical, social)
Source of divergent response in the power of different interest groups? China had markets and okay institutions, but poor incentives. Or was it just Japanese readiness to embrace better technology from a cultural perspective.
Shiue and Keller 2007
Markets in China and Europe. Comparable market development by late 18thC, but better in England. Hard to isolate this difference as cause of the IR. Argues then that the institutional differences contributing to this cannot be said to have been key to the IR.
Furthermore, integration levels diverged as the IR occurred, implying they are coincidental rather than sequential.
Still possible that other institutions were important. Noth 1981, state has two faces, one creating a legal framework for transactions, and the other instrumenting resource transfers from one group to another. China lacked institutions for incentivise innovation and support technological development (distinct from market ones).
Bosker et al 2012
Between 800 and 1800 the urban centre of the world shifted from Baghdad to London. Why did this major shift in urbanisation (development) occur?
Change in trade patterns (geog location, but not agri endowments), differences in institutions.
Regress urbanisation against variables over geography and institutions. Key variables are land-based links (ME) and water links (EU). Implies the shift in trade pattern and technology (ships over camels) disadvantages the ME. Key factor is change in trade patterns, and failure to adopt to new trade technologies. Universities significant for EU but not ME, suggesting divergence in ability to value and utilise human capital (institutions). Also significance for existence of participative institutions.
Fails to track causes of divergence in institutions, or why they failed to adapt etc.
Chaney 2015
Tracks the military decline of the Ottoman Empire by proxying with the ransom levels of the Corsairs. Deems the Corsairs a representative of Ottoman power as they were the means of technological transmission, and most advanced naval force.
Finds ransoms to decline (more fishermen) after late 17C (1675), corresponding to other major Ottoman military setbacks. Timing and evidence implies decline was related to inability to incorporate or match EU technologies. Corsairs lacked the HC to incorporate them, and the Ottomans also lacked the institutional framework to accommodate organisational advances
Allen et al 2011
Was there a difference in living standards between Europe, China, Japan, and India on the eve of the IR? Yes, W EU far ahead (London). China comparable to E or S Europe (lagging regions) in 18C. But by early 20C, all of Europe went ahead. Living standards no higher in the most developed areas of china (calculated by real wages).
Implications? Not many, just
