Chapter 7 Flashcards

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1
Q

social cognition

A

one’s cognitions (thoughts, inferences) about people and social situations

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2
Q

social-cognitive development

A

development of one’s cognitions about people and social situations

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3
Q

Inanimate vs. Animate objects

A
  • Infants (at least as young as 7 months) show surprise when inanimate objects move on their own
  • Recognize that self-produced motion is characteristic of living things
  • can be categorized into domain-specific laws (core knowledge: inanimate objects = contact principle (naive physics module); animate objects = action at a distance (naive psychology module)
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4
Q

theory of mind (TOM)

A
  • Involves the ability to infer and reason about the mind or mental states
  • Eg. Emotions, desires, goals, intentions, knowledge, thoughts, beliefs
  • In one’s self or in someone else
  • Aka: “mind”-reading (not ESP), naïve psych, folk psych, mental state attribution, social perspective taking, role-taking, mentalizing
  • essential for social interaction
  • Prerequisite is to distinguish things with and without mental states
  • previously though that TOM emerged late in development (~4 yrs), but research now suggests very young children actually do have limited understanding of mental states
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5
Q

why do we need TOM?

A
  • To interpret other’s actions -> Understanding what a person is thinking, feeling, believes, etc. Helps us interpret their behaviour (ex. Sarah’s missing dog and the squirrel in the shed)
  • To predict other’s actions -> Understanding what a person is thinking, feeling, believes, etc. Helps us predict their behaviour (within limits)
  • Successful communication -> requires appreciating what the other person knows, doesn’t know, and how knowledge can be acquired (ex. Teaching)
  • Selective social learning -> knowing who knows more or who knows what (ex. Mom knows more about putting on makeup than dad)
  • To manipulate others’ thoughts and actions (Ex. Deception, tricks, and surprise)
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6
Q

false belief

A
  • Argued to be the best test for concept of mind
  • Requires understanding that the mind represents the world -> not a copy of the world; can be inaccurate or incomplete
  • And the understanding that people can misrepresent reality –> people can believe things that are simply not true
  • ex. displacement tasks, unexpected contents task, appearance-reality task
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7
Q

displacement tasks

A
  • AKA: Sally-Ann or Maxi Tasks
  • test false beliefs
  • young children (3-4) don’t understand that Sally might have a false belief about where her ball is located after Ann moves it
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8
Q

unexpected contents task

A
  • AKA: Smarties Task
  • test false beliefs
  • young children say they think Smarties will be in the Smarties box, but then they open it up and see pencils. Then they say that they knew all along it was pencils. They also don’t understand that their friend might have a false belief about what’s in the Smarties box (pencils)
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9
Q

appearance-reality task

A
  • tests false beliefs
  • when you show kids a rock-like object that’s actually a sponge, they think it’s a rock. Then you let them touch it and discover that it’s actually a painted sponge. Then they’ll tell you that they knew it was a sponge all along, and that their friend who hasn’t felt the “rock” yet will also think it’s a sponge
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10
Q

classic belief task results

A
  • 4 year-olds succeed at this task, 3 year-olds fail
  • this indicates that children younger than four may not understand that people can hold beliefs that are false
  • however, alternative explanations are possible
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11
Q

alternative explanations for false belief task results

A
  • Radical shift theory: conceptual change view -> children prior to the age of four are unable to attribute belief states to themselves and others; lack concept of false beliefs – kids have a “copy-theory” of the world (the mind = reality)
  • Processing demands theory: More continuous view of development -> Young children fail these tasks because they lack the attentional, mnemonic, linguistic, or other processing resources (ex. curse of knowledge)
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12
Q

curse of knowledge

A
  • a difficulty appreciating a more naïve perspective as the result of being biased by one’s own knowledge
  • Ex. Trivia questions, car salespeople, anagram study -> if you give people (including adults) anagrams with answers, they’ll predict it’ll take people who don’t have the answers a lot less time to figure out the answer than it actually does
  • Ex. Getting people to predict probability of Obama winning election, then ask them again after he wins to remember what their prediction was -> they literally can’t remember, even with cash incentives to be honest -> they say their prediction was higher than it was -> This could be part of why children can’t predict what their friend will think is inside the box, and give the opposite answer of what they thought was in the box
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13
Q

autism spectrum disorder (ASD)

A
  • Fits under core knowledge viewpoint
  • DSM-IV definition – a “Triad of Impairments”: 1) impaired communication 2) Impaired social cognition 3) Restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped patterns of behaviours, interests, and activities
  • Difficulties fall along a spectrum ranging from very mild to very severe
  • Can never be cured/outgrown
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14
Q

ASD facts

A
  • Prevalence: anywhere from 1 in 4,000 to 1 in 68
  • Rates have increased lately, not because there are more cases of autism but because we’re getting better at detecting it
  • 5 times more common in boys
  • 40% of autistic children also have cognitive delays
  • Diagnosis can happen around age 2-3, but on average happen between 4-6 (higher-functioning ASD is usually diagnosed later as the problems associated with it aren’t visible until later in life when there are more peer interactions)
  • Affects every race and SES
  • A small percentage are autistic savants = profound capabilities
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15
Q

Asperger’s syndrome

A
  • higher-functioning ASD
  • No clinically significant delays in language or cognition
  • Deficits seem specific to social interaction
  • Asperger’s Syndrome not classified within the DSM-V (classified within ASD)
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16
Q

1st impairment: communication

A
  • Up to 40% are mute
  • Those who speak show unusual patterns:
  • Echolalia = repeating words or phrases
  • Pronoun reversal
  • Monotone voice, lack of emotion when speaking
  • Pragmatic deficits (eg. Don’t understand sarcasm or jokes)
  • Misuse of words (eg. “hot” for stove and only stove)
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17
Q

2nd impairment: social functioning

A
  • Little eye-contact
  • Low social-emotional reciprocity: not as “cozy, cuddly” as other children
  • Less awareness of social norms (eg. Acceptable behaviour)
  • Typically prefer playing by themselves (being social comes with a lot of unpredictability)
  • Lack of pointing and gestures (protoimperative and protodeclarative pointing)
  • The MOST reliable sign of autism is a problem with social functioning
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18
Q

2 types of pointing

A
  • Protoimperative: you need something, so you point at it (ex. Pointing at a spoon to eat with)
  • Protodeclarative pointing: pointing at something novel/something you notice (ex. Airplane in the sky)
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19
Q

3rd impairment: restrictive behaviour

A
  • Unusual behaviour patterns (eg. Emotional outbursts)
  • Repetitive actions and insistence on routines
  • Perseveration/stimming = repetitive actions
  • Sensory sensitivities (enhanced/hypersensitive and/or reduced/hyposensitive)
  • Special interests and preoccupations (ex. Numbers, science, reading, etc.)
  • Attachment to unusual objects
  • Lack pretend play
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20
Q

hypersensitive vs. hyposensitive

A
  • Hypersensitive: acutely aware of sensory input, don’t need a lot to feel something (ex. Small hugs are more than enough)
  • Hyposensitive: under-aware of sensory input, need a lot of sensory input to feel something (ex. Need bear hugs)
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21
Q

what contributes to autism?

A
  • Psychodynamic theory: bad parenting – no!
  • Vaccines – no! (Timing of autism diagnosis often coincides with timing of vaccinations, which makes it appear as if an effect is there)
  • Advanced paternal age – yes!
  • Genetics – yes! (~77% concordance in monozygotic twins, higher rate in siblings (~20% also autistic), multiple chromosomes involved (polygenic), 10% have other genetic conditions)
  • Environmental triggers – yes! (Exposure to microbes? Toxins? thaliomide? Some unknown factors?)
  • Some evidence that 3rd week of pregnancy is critical (eg. Ear placement) -> autism is happening really early on in pregnancy (so it’s NOT caused by things that happen later in life like bad parents or vaccines)
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22
Q

Common Theories of Mechanisms underlying autism characteristics

A
  • Central coherence
  • Extreme Male Brain
  • Theory of Mind Impairments
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23
Q

Central coherance

A
  • Embedded figures task, upside down puzzles
  • Global vs. Local focus
  • Children with autism do better on embedded figures tasks because they have a local focus**
  • Individuals with ASD have a weak central coherence** -> too focused on the parts, not able to look at the whole pictures
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24
Q

Extreme male brain

A
  • Levels of testosterone, early puberty**
  • “very male” cognitive/emotional profile
  • Morphology (eg. Finger length)
  • Better at skills that males tend to do better on (‘systemizing’ skills: math, science, computers) and worse at skills that females tend to do better on (‘empathizing’ skills: verbal, social-emotional, reading others)** -> Systemizing skills are more predictable than empathizing skills
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25
Q

theory of mind impairments

A
  • Recall triad of impairments: they go together to create an impairment and a lack of theory of mind in a child
26
Q

ASD: TOM Behaviour Impairment results in…

A
  • Preference for social isolation
  • Preference for routines (because they’re predictable) and interests in non-social objects that can be understood (eg. Fascination with numbers, math, and physical ‘systems’)
  • Poor attachments
  • No pretend play
  • all because their inability to reason about mental states of others makes the social world incredibly difficult to predict
27
Q

ASD: TOM Communication Impairment results in…

A
  • Lack joint attention/gaze following -> results in mislabeling
  • Difficulty reasoning about intentions
  • Difficulty with pragmatic aspects of language (eg. Sarcasm; tend to interpret literally)
  • Impaired understanding of nonverbal communication (eg. Body language)
28
Q

ASD: TOM Social Interaction Impairment results in…

A
  • Failed false belief tasks (ex. Sally-Ann task)
  • no social referencing
  • Poor ‘mind-reading’ (ex. Reading the mind in the eyes lab task -> Individuals with autism tend to not monitor gaze when watching social interactions (show preference for mouth and other moving parts like hands**, picture sequencing tasks, moving triangles task (typical children can attribute mental states to the triangles, whereas kids with ASD can’t attribute mental states to them)
  • this is a well-established deficit in TOM
29
Q

picture-sequencing tasks

A
  • physical causal events – kids with ASD are good at this b/c it doesn’t involve mental state reasoning
  • character’s desires and goals – kids with ASD are good at this b/c it doesn’t involve mental state reasoning
  • characters false beliefs (ex. Sally-Ann type tasks) – kids with ASD are bad at this because they have to infer and reason with other’s people’s mental states (understanding that what one person infers and reasons is different than what someone else infers and reasons)
30
Q

adult false belief experiment

A
  • Sally-Ann task using 4 locations instead of two
  • “Vicky places violin into blue box and goes outside. While Vicky’s outside, her sister Denise moves the objects around”
  • In one condition (“Cursed”), participant knows which box it got put in. In the other condition (“No Curse”), participant doesn’t know
  • Results: No Curse: 71% of participants say she’ll look in the blue box; Cursed: Only 59% of participants say she’ll look in the blue box
  • So even adults struggle with false belief tasks, although we do have Theory of Mind
31
Q

video: a change of mind

A
  • gave examples of different ‘theory of mind’ tasks (Ex. Mean monkey, ribbons in the juice box)
  • also showed the color/shape masking task, which is NOT a theory of mind task. 
32
Q

colour/shape matching task

A
  • Kids are asked to sort cards by colour. After a few turns, they’re asked to sort cards by shape, but they continue to sort by colour (or vice versa). 
  • Whatever rule they learn first is the one they stick to
    Researchers show that even though they understand the new rules, they can’t apply them because they can’t inhibit the first set of rules
  • featured in the video “a change of mind”
33
Q

3 camps in TOM development

A
  • Nativists: there is a theory of mind module (TOMM), a hypothesized brain mechanism devoted to understanding other human beings
  • Empiricists: interactions with other people are crucial for developing theory of mind
  • Interactionist: Theory of mind module, plus general information-processing skills and social interaction, are necessary for children to understand minds
34
Q

core knowledge: naive psych

A
  • Modular (TOMM)
  • Domain specific, fast and mandatory, restricts info flow, characteristic breakdown
  • Universal (but doesn’t mean it’s all the same - but varies subtly across cultures; the WEIRD bias skews our perspective. Ex: “Opacity of Mind” perspective in Fiji -> believe it’s rude to try and figure out what others are thinking -> action matters more than thoughts)
  • Innate (Doesn’t necessarily present itself at birth -> just means that it’s a biological contribution)
35
Q

TED Talk: Rebecca Saxe

A
  • believes that the TOMM is located in the RTPJ (Right Temporal Parietal Junction)
  • Dedicated neural system for processing people’s mental states (thoughts, beliefs, intentions)
  • Gradual improvements in ToM across development
  • described sandwich task and adult false belief task
  • used TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) to affect RTPJ and see consequences
36
Q

Sandwich task

A
  • false belief task in TED Talk
  • Ivan leaves sandwich on treasure chest, leaves. Sandwich blows into ground. Joshua comes and puts his own sandwich on treasure chest. Leaves. Ivan returns. Which sandwich will he take?
  • 3-year-olds: one on the ground
  • 5-year-olds: one on the chest
  • also showed TOM is critical for moral judgements: 3-year-olds & 5 year-olds think Ivan took Joshua’s sandwich because he was mean, but 7-year-olds understands that he didn’t know which one was his -> not mean to take it
37
Q

Adult False Belief task from TED Talk

A
  • If Grace believes the substance is poison and puts it in her friend’s coffee, adults studied believed she should get a lot of blame, even if it ends up being sugar and her friend is fine
  • If Grace believes the substance is sugar and puts it in her friend’s coffee, adults studied believes she should get little blame, even if it ends up being poison and her friend dies
  • Outcome isn’t always what matters most -> it’s peoples’ intentions
38
Q

nonverbal false belief tasks

A
  • Use violation of expectation paradigm to test false belief in babies
  • Twist on Sally Ann task -> in True belief condition, Sally is there to watch the watermelon move from the dark to the light box. In false belief condition, Sally is not there to witness it move. Sally then either reaches to the light or the dark box.
  • In infancy, babies pass these violation of expectation false belief tasks -> infants are surprised and look longer when she reaches to the light box (in the FB condition) since she shouldn’t know that the watermelon moved
  • Puzzling – why do they pass nonverbal false belief tasks so early in development, but fail verbal ones until age ~4?
39
Q

elicited vs. nonelicited false belief tasks

A
  • some tasks (eg. Anticipatory looking tasks) show false belief understanding even in verbal tasks before 4 year olds (so it can’t just be language that makes it hard)
  • ex.He et al.: Sally is doing crafts with kids, she puts scissors into a box. Sally leaves. Anne comes in and puts the scissors into her pocket.
  • In 1 condition, Anne “thinks out loud” by asking where Sally will think she scissors are to herself
  • In the second condition, Anne directly asks that question to the child
  • In control condition, Sally doesn’t leave, so she sees the scissors get moved
  • non-elicited/spontaneous (and control) = successful, elicited = failure
40
Q

why does eliciting make it harder? (3 different accounts)

A
  • Tacit/implicit vs. Explicit accounts
  • processing demands account
  • Response selection
41
Q

Tacit/Implicit vs. Explicit account

A
  • Tacit/implicit = unconscious processing
  • Explicit = conscious processing
  • Two different systems are tapped?
42
Q

Processing demands account

A
  • Some false belief system is tapped but other processes are also being tapped
  • Inhibition: attention is drawn to child’s own perspective and requires more inhibition to reason about the others’ perspective
  • When they’re put on the spot and asked a question, they start thinking more about themselves “I’ve been asked a question” -> can’t inhibit the thoughts of themselves to focus on Sally
43
Q

response selection account

A
  • cognitive resources are required to actively think about the answer one is going to give
  • When they’re asked a question, they think about what they’re going to reply: “What am I going to say? How will I reply?” This takes focus away from Sally
44
Q

false belief and theory of mind

A
  • there is more to passing false belief tasks than just theory of mind (e.g., attention, language, memory, inhibition, overcoming the curse of knowledge, response selection… even before kids pass false belief tasks, they can reason a bit about mental states)
  • and there is also more to theory of mind than just false belief tasks (e.g., understanding goals, desires, bias, how knowledge is acquired)
45
Q

2 categories of mental states

A
  • dispositional

- epistemic

46
Q

dispositional

A
  • orientation towards reality
  • Goals and intentions, desires and preferences
  • Ex. You can hate cheese and I can love it, but we both accept the reality that it is cheese (in this case, epistemic states are the same, but dispositional states differ)
  • this state is easier for kids to understand than epistemic
47
Q

epistemic

A
  • representations of reality
  • can be incomplete or inaccurate
  • Knowledge vs. Ignorance (Ignorance = incomplete representation)
  • Beliefs and false beliefs (False beliefs = inaccurate representation or misrepresentation)
  • Ties into the autism cartoons – the one that the autistic kids struggle the most with is understanding epistemic states (false belief tasks)
48
Q

dispositional states studies

A
  • pulling the weight: infants will imitate actions of actors even when they don’t see completed action (actors try to pull part of weight off, when weight is given to infants they pull it off), but they don’t imitate goals of the mechanical device -> suggests that they infer that people (not objects) have mental states (intentions, desires, goals)
  • arm reaching for ball rather than bear: We expect goals for humans, but not for mechanical/inanimate things -> different pattern of results
  • Broccoli vs. Goldfish crackers: Infants chose which one they’d like more, Then researcher chooses the opposite (Ie. If kids like fish crackers, researcher will pick up cracker and say “ew, yuck”, then pick up the broccoli and go “mmm, yum”). Researcher put out hand in between the two bowls, asks: “can you give me one?” -> 14-month-olds give her what they like; 18-month-olds give her what she like (they understand others have different desires)
49
Q

examples of epistemic states

A
  • At ages 2 and 3 they understand that same knowledge can be acquired through looking (looking leads to knowing) (Ie. They know that if one girl can look inside the box but the other one can’t, only the girl that looked inside the box will know what really in there)
  • Other knowledge (unobservable properties, ie. Names) cannot be known through looking (Ex. Dr. Birch’s stuffed animal study)
  • Kids prefer to learn from someone who is confident rather than uncertain
50
Q

Birch’s stuffed animal study

A
  • she brought a stuffed dog into the lab and “found” another one while she was playing with the kid
  • She then turned around and asked them to bring her Jessie
  • Kids brought her the dog she came with b/c they understand that she wouldn’t know the name of the other dog
51
Q

late accomplishments (epistemic mental states)

A
  • Failure to distinguish what is known from different senses (vision vs. Touch vs. Hearing) -> Ex. If you let someone touch a ball and someone look at the ball, kids will understand that the guy who looked at the ball can tell you what colour it is fairly early on, but it’s later in development that they understand the guy who touched the ball could give you information too (ie. If the question is whether the ball’s wet or dry, the guy who touched the ball could tell you)
  • Interpretive theory of mind (age ~7): 2 people see the same thing, but can have a different perspective -> Realize the mind interprets events and people can interpret the same thing differently (Ex. People can interpret movie plots differently)
  • Bias: people might see what they want to see
    (Ex. 2 judges are judging a photo-finish running race, but one judge is a participant’s mom -> can kids understand that one judge should be more credible than the other? (Can start understanding this around ages 7-9))
52
Q

individual differences: those with advanced TOM tend to…

A
  • Have more siblings, particularly older siblings OR are more likely to engage in imaginary play
  • have better language skills
  • have better executive function skills (ie. Inhibition)
  • have greater academic achievement
  • have more prosocial behaviour
  • have fewer relationship problems
53
Q

environment matters: 4 sources of support for TOM

A
  • Twin studies: MZ (Identical) vs. DZ (fraternal) twins -> correlation in theory of mind is about equal
  • Longitudinal studies: Quality of early family interactions predicts variation (ie. If parents talk about mental states)
  • Cross-cultural studies: Cultural variations in timing and sequence of TOM milestones
  • Traning studies: Ex. Parental use of mental state language to train their kids to have better TOM
54
Q

2 types of play

A
  • pretend play

- sociodramatic play

55
Q

pretend play

A
  • make-believe activities where kids create new symbolic relations (eg. object substitution -> bananas as phones)
  • ~18 months of age
56
Q

sociodramatic play

A
  • aka role-playing
  • kids engage in mini-dramas with others
  • ~30 months, continues into preteen years
57
Q

imaginary friends

A
  • can be ordinary but invisible children or fanciful creatures
  • kids with imaginary friends:
  • Do not differ in personality or IQ from those who don’t
  • Are more likely to be firstborn or only children
  • Watch relatively little TV
  • Be verbally skillful
  • Have advanced theories of mind
  • imaginary friends are present in the majority of children (~63%), and some continue to have them until preteens
58
Q

red ball on a hill experiment

A
  • red ball with eyes tries to roll up the hill but fails. Blue square with eyes helps ball up hill, and yellow triangle with eyes pushes it down the hill.
  • Babies (within the first year of life), when given the choice, prefer the helpful square
  • this supports the idea of innate theory of mind
59
Q

TOM and 2-year-olds

A
  • 2-year-olds can understand that desires lead to actions (ex. If told that the character in a book would rather play with dolls than with trucks, they’ll state that if you give the character a doll and a truck, they’ll play with the doll – even if this doesn’t line up with the child’s own personal desires)
  • However, 2-year-olds cannot understand relationship between beliefs and actions
60
Q

TOM and 3-year-olds

A
  • 3-year-olds begin to understand relationship between beliefs and actions
  • Ex. They answer questions such as “Why is Billy looking for his dog?” by referring to beliefs (“He thinks the dog ran away”) as well as to desires (“He wants it”)
  • However, 3-year-olds’ understanding of the relation between people’s beliefs and their actions is limited in important ways. These limitations are evident when children are presented with false-belief problems
61
Q

theory of mind module (TOMM)

A

A hypothesized brain mechanism proposed by nativists; devoted to understanding other human beings.

62
Q

Perception of ASD from 3 different “camps”

A
  • Nativists propose that one reason why kids with ASD struggle to understand the social world is because the parts of their brain responsible for this are atypical sizes
  • Empiricists propose that psychological understanding arises from interactions with others, and that kids with ASD struggle to understand others because they don’t tend to interact with them
  • Information-Processors propose that kids with ASD (and very young kids) lack the information-processing skills needed to understand others’ minds