Chapter 19 - Government Flashcards

1
Q

Define a pure public good

A

Has 2 properties:

1) Non-diminishability: any one person’s consumption of a public good has no effect on the amount of it available to others
2) Non excludability = either impossible or prohibitively costly to exclude people from consuming the good

not all goods provided by government are public goods… e.g. healthcare not non-diminishable as every min doctor is with one patient, takes away from another

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2
Q

Collective good (definition)

A

Goods that only have the non-diminishability property

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3
Q

willingness to pay curve calculation (WTP)

A

Each person must consume the same amount:

- aggregate WTP curve calculated by adding WTP through vertical summation

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4
Q

Lindahl Equilibrium

A

proposes that individuals should pay for the provision of a public good according to their individual marginal benefit

  • but should consume same amount
  • only determined if we know all WTP for all consumers
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5
Q

Free Riding (Definition)

A

Choosing not to contribute to the cost of the public good but exploiting the benefits (non-excludable)

  • free riding results in under provision of public goods
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6
Q

Economics of Clubs

A

MC = 0
- when MC is around the same as AC of expanding consumer’s share purchase and use of good

Shared ownership:
\+ decreases costs 
\+ not kept in continuous use
- initiative for arrangment 
- limits privacy and flexibility 

consumers can save $ by forming clubs
- demand for privacy increases with income, but even extremely costly goods can have shared ownership (e.g. private jets)

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7
Q

Majority Voting

A

order of preferences impacts the transitive/intransitive preference

Majority Rule voting schemes: Requires over 1/2 of voters to approve a collective action w/ N workers

need N/2 + 1 votes to win

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8
Q

Median Voter

A

Voter whose ideal s=outcome lies above the ideal outcomes of half the voters

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9
Q

Single Peakedness

A

preferences that exhibit a single most-preferred outcome.

  • As we move away from a voter’s most preferred option utility falls
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10
Q

Cost benefit analysis

A

MV can sometimes obscure important differences in the intensity with which different voters hold their preferences

  • CB attempts to take explicit account of how strongly people feel about each of the alternatives (Represented through monetary value)
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11
Q

MV or CB?

A
  • CB benefits people who are willing to pay therefore the poor may feel strongly but doesn’t translate to WTP
  • poor can be compensated through CB (also through tax redistribution)
  • with MV, poor can block projects (even if B >C)
  • with CB, small numbers like flipping a coin
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12
Q

Rent Seeking (explain)

A

Definition = prospective beneficiaries of a public programme have powerful incentives to lobby government in favour of it

1) projects approved even when B < C
2) When B > C largely, private parties willing to spend £££ to be chosen as its beneficiaries (As there are large gains)

Spend up to the chance of becoming beneficiary * total profit = for lobbying

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13
Q

Theory of competitive factor market

MP system

A

Each factor will be paid the value of its MP

in the LR payments add up to the total product available for distribution

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14
Q

Marginal Productivity System

A

Advantages:

  • MP scheme clearly identifies a feasible payment for every party is no small advantage
  • rewards initiative, effort and risk taking
  • harder and longer and more effectively a person works the more she will be paid

Rawslian Criticisms:
- those who do well in the marketplace end up with more while those who fail cannot even meet their basic needs

  • assumes all units of a factor = homogenous
  • abundant talent not vital, right talent!

suggests veil of ignorance:

  • no one knows which rules of distribution would work
  • most would choose equal share as they are risk averse and this eliminates risk of doing poorly
  • w/o rewards national income < w/ rewards
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15
Q

Negative Income Tax (Milton Freidman)

A

Array of current programmes will be replaced with one programme
- Minimal adequate SOL and someone w/ no income would receive cash

adv/dis:

  • eliminates costly overlapping bureaucracies of current programmes
  • if min pay large enough to live on then inevitably will induce many people to stop working
  • limit max NIT payment to payment well bellow annual earnings equivalent of full time employment at min wage (desire to find a better job)

Public Jobs

  • for disadvantaged
  • “employer of last resort”
  • unskilled find gov jobs > attractive than private sector
  • digging up holes to fill them?
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16
Q

Samuelson Condition

A

MRS(a) + MRS (b) = MRT

  • everyone consumes while MC = MB

contrasting to efficiency condition where:
MRS(a) = MRS (b) = MRT

17
Q

Double peaked

A

No stable outcome

- majority rule voting doesn’t ensure stable outcome

18
Q

Median voter theorem

A

Different peak preferences

outcome = person with median preference (most preferred option)
- could be socially best outcome if median voter = efficient outcome

19
Q

Question for: if people individually decide what to consume/produce within a society

A

Find average product of the activity and compare to the constant wage to other activity.

People will be willing to match total earnings

  • can calculate total earnings
20
Q

Question for: Socially Optimal number for consumption/production

A

Find the MP of one activity and earnings.

  • Compare remainder to other activity
  • can calculate total earnings
21
Q

Why is there a difference between equilibrium and social optimum?

A

Individual decision makers fail to account for the negative externality imposed to society

22
Q

If monopoly produces at social optimum price and quantity what would they charge as per unit tax?

A

Nothing.

No tax required as they already produce at socially optimum level

23
Q

Social optimum emissions fee

A

Set fee equal to the value of MC = MB at social optimum

24
Q

WTP socially optimum level

A

Find aggregate WTP curve through vertical summation (i.e. add the WTP’s, P = skdQ)
- Then equate this to MC

  • If WTP is > TC then the public good is at optimal quantity
25
Q

Nash Equilibrium

A

Neither party can gain a higher outcome by deviating given that the other party sticks to their outcome

26
Q

Utilitarian approach to income distribution

A

Income should be distributed evenly across individuals

  • would reduce individual incentives to exert effort and invest in skills
27
Q

Rawlsian approach to income distribution

A

should maximise the income of the poorest person
- veil of ignorance: prevention of knowing talent and abilities everyone would fear of being disadvantaged so maximise income of poorest one