Chapter 1 Flashcards

1
Q

What does it mean to know?

A

Knowing is the relation between a person and a proposition

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2
Q

What is the JTB account?

A

Justifiable True Belief is part of the traditional knowledge

  1. P is true
  2. X believes that P
  3. X’s belief is justified

JTB proposes that these 3 are sufficient and necessary for knowledge

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3
Q

What does it mean for a set of propositions to be sufficient for X?

A

It means that the set of propositions are collectively enough for X. Each proposition is necessary for X.

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4
Q

What does it mean for a set of propositions to be necessary for X?

A

It means that the set of propositions are each individually required for X. Collectively the set of propositions may not be sufficient for X, but are nevertheless required.

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5
Q

Why do humans care about forming the right beliefs?

A

Humans wish to follow the right beliefs as a consequence of previous events in order to move in an “upward” direction, rather than choose the wrong beliefs which may lead to an undesired future.

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5
Q

What is epistemology

A

This field explores the optimal way to think, reason, and form opinions, and the best methods of justification

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6
Q

How is truth acquired

A

Justification can help make a proposition more likely to be true
Some believe if the “truth” is gathered through good methods, this makes it more likely to be true.
As such, most accept that justification is an important aspect of forming true beliefs

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7
Q

What is belief?

A

Belief is our psychological attitude towards certain propositions.

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8
Q

Doxastic attitudes

A

The collection of our attitudes towards certain propositions (believe, neutral, (withholding), non-belief) are called doxastic attitudes (greek word doxa means opinions)

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9
Q

Trepartite classification scheme

A

The three attitudes towards certain propositions

  • Believing
  • Neutral (withholding)
  • Non-believing
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10
Q

Epistemic evaluation

A

Justification linguistically is used to commend or critique someones beliefs

“A is justified” vs “A is justifiable”

is similar to

“A is commendable” vs “A is unwarranted”

Rational epistemic evaluation uses a rating system where 0 means no belief and 1 being very much believe (0 - 1)

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11
Q

Is justification and truth equivalent? (Do you need justification for something to be true?)

A
  • You don’t need justification for something to be true
  • A proposition can be true even if nobody believes it
    Eg.)

You don’t need to count every grain of sand on the beach to propose there exists some X which deems there are X number of grains of sand on the beach”

  • Something may be true simply due to the state of the world (metaphysical argument)

Eg.)

It is sunny outside may be true simply because it is sunny, not because someone saw that it is sunny (A tree falls over in the middle of the forest even if no one is there to witness so)

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12
Q

Tony’s argument (Epistemic Regress Problem)

A

P1: NY will have the best players
P2: NY has the strongest team
C: Therefor, NY will win the championship

While the propositions don’t guarantee the conclusion through deduction rules, it may be a reasonable non-deductive inference from P1 and P2 to the conclusion C.

A tree of reasons and justification may be as so:

    Belief(C)
    /        \
  /            \

Bel(P1) Bel(P2)

If we keep the tree going, we would end up with a regress of reasons

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13
Q

Epistemic Regress Problem

A
  • The problem is how exactly does the regress of justification continue? Does the tree infinitely regress downwards? is there a bottom? Are there cycles?

Solutions:

  • Infinitism
  • Foundationalism
  • Coherentism

Extra response:

Skepticism about the regress: None of the 3 above views solves the problem. As such there is no way inferential beliefs are justified as all 3 views fail. As such believe that justification can never be derived from inference

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14
Q

What is the problem of justification?

A
  • How do you show inferential justification is possible? (The same justification that is used from one belief to the next in the regress of justification tree)
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15
Q

Synchronic reasoning and the epistemic regress problem

A

Synchronic reasons mean the individual belief(conclusion) is being made off of reasons that are held at that time of the belief being formed.

Eg.) - Regress of justification tree is dependent on synchronic reasoning

As such, justification “makes sense” because at that given time the reasoning works. (If Tony’s team sucked, then his argument for the team winning would be not as justifiable. As such his belief is derived from synchronic reasoning)

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16
Q

Diachronic reasoning

A

Juxtaposed to synchronic reasoning, diachronic reasoning is when a current belief with affect a future belief.

For example, if someone holds a certain belief at one point in time, diachronic reasoning would involve exploring how that belief might influence or shape their future beliefs. This could involve considering how experiences, information, or events over time may lead to a modification or reinforcement of their initial belief.

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17
Q

Problems of infinitism

A
  1. Starting points are needed, as they are what lead to transmitting to higher nodes. Basic foundational beliefs (starting points) provide justificational “juice” to the upper beliefs, without no basic beliefs, then how do upper beliefs exist with no juice? or atleast where does this juice come from if not from basic beliefs?
  2. Infinite nodes would mean infinite beliefs, but surely no human has infinitely many beliefs
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18
Q

Responses to the problems of infinitism

A
  1. Starting points are not needed for justification. Just as the universe and time may be eternal with no starting point, So may justification be the same.
  2. One can be shivering (and hence cold) despite not assenting or noticing that they are. (Note this can’t be embraced by infinitism as it is justification acquired from a nondoxastic source and hence a foundational justification)

As such propositions can be justified despite having no belief in them (It is possible to not know something, but still it is justified and nevertheless true.)

As such, even if a person has no infinite beliefs, there may be still infinitely potential possible propositions a person is justified in having at a given time. (Dubiousness of this is whether there is any merit to these potential propositions ability to justify other propositions when they haven’t even been believed in yet/given a relation to the agent)

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19
Q

Infinitism

A

One solution to the epistemic regress problem.

States that the correct structure of a regress is endless. Will not have repeated nodes and the branches never end as there is always another branch beneath it.

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20
Q

Coherentism

A

One solution to the epistemic regress problem.

States that the correct structure of a regress is that some of the branches will circle back to other nodes.

The tree describes beliefs as a network of justified beliefs that mutually support one another.

The branches of this tree are bidirectional or reciprocal rather than unidirectional.

As such some nodes reappear earlier in the chain. Note that the tree isn’t infinitely long, but neither does it have any end points. Because it contains no endpoints (due to it looping back on itself) it agrees with infinitism that there are no endpoints

Also note that coherence requires logical consistency (no contradictions)

21
Q

Does the fact a set of beliefs are coherent (logically consistent) mean they are true?

A

No, it is not true. This is because just because propositions can be coherent yet still be not true (Such as conspiracy theories).

Just because a set of beliefs are coherent, doesnt mean the fact they are coherent actually “adds” any justification to them, at most maybe that it raises the probabilistic relations between them.

If someone creates a complex fantasy story (Eg.) Harry Potter) it doesn’t mean the story is true simply because there is logical consistency within the story

22
Q

Isolation Objection (Coherentism)

A

If a given belief is exclusively due to other beliefs (only comes from other parts of the doxastic system/regress tree) then it is isolated from phenomena outside of the doxastic system.

However if feeling or perception is outside this doxastic system, then the feeling of cold is irrelevant to justifying the fact you believe you are cold or not. This however, makes no sense.

  • Coherentism claims feeling hot/cold is not a belief
  • However to believe that belief doesn’t require perceptual input from the world makes little to no sense
23
Q

Does coherentism take into account when a person has unjustified beliefs and justified beliefs at the same time?

A

No, coherentism does not. Coherentism claims that the coherence of the system is what determines the level of justification. As such each belief has the same exact level of justification.

However normal people have a mixture of justified or unjustified beliefs, they are not all on the same level of justification as coherentism claims.

24
Q

Foundationalism

A

One solution to the epistemic regress problem.

States that the correct structure of a regress is that each branch will eventually reach an endpoint. This ending node represents a non-inferred belief (a foundational or basic belief)

Example of a non-inferred belief may be a “common sense belief” that is just inherently justified

25
Q

Under foundationalism, what does it take for a belief to be “justified” despite being non-inferred? (How are basic beliefs justified?)

A

Basic beliefs are self justifying. Meaning its mere occurrence logically entails the truth of its content. Eg.) “I am in pain”

However note the dubiousness of this, even if you “believe” you are in pain, this may not be enough to prove that you know how or why it is true, meaning it may not be justified simply by mere occurrence

26
Q

Roderick Chisholm’s take on self-justification (basic beliefs)

A

“What justifies me in thinking I know ‘a is F’ is simply the fact ‘a is F’” known as justification by reiteration.

Eg.) The belief “I have a belief”

It isn’t the believing that confers justification, but rather the belief as being true that confers justifiedness.

However, note that while this may work for mental states, it doesn’t work for third-person mental-state propositions. You can’t justify evidence that there is no life on the moon by reiterating there can be no life on the moon.

27
Q

Roderick Chisholm’s “self presenting”

A

A proposition is “self presenting” if it is capable of providing justification by mere reiteration. “Apprehended through self”

28
Q

Mediate Justification (MJ)

A

If a belief requires additional evidence, this additional evidence is known as “mediate” justification

29
Q

Immediate Justification (IJ)

A

If a belief doesn’t require further evidence (end point/basic belief) it is said to have “immediate” justification.

30
Q

What did William Alston described to have done in the text?

A

He surveyed debunkers for their explanation for why immediate justification doesn’t work and tried to “debunk the debunkers” by trying to prove immediate justification does work

31
Q

Which groundrules did William Alston set for his debates with debunkers?

A

Mediate justification is defined as “believing that P if and only if the agent is justified in believing that P by virtue of some relation that this belief has to some other beliefs that the agent has”

Immediate justification is defined as “believing P if and only if the agent is justified in believing that P by virtue of something other than some relation this belief has to some other justified belief”

32
Q

What were some of William Alstons critiques of debunkers

A

Claimed that debunkers didnt like that he set up strict definitions as the debunkers often relied upon “loose use” of the terms or vagueness, as well as using their own definitions

Claimed debunkers overthinked basic beliefs into not being basic. Described debunkers as ticket-takers who rather than just observe your ticket and let you in, they further ask you why, who, where you bought the ticket from before letting you in.

As such claiming debunkers were “inflamming” the level of justification needed in order to prove you “need” mediate justification. (Needing beliefs to be reflected upon in order to gain justification to make it be MJ, when there is no need as you already have justification before having to reflect upon a belief)

once again challenges this by claiming

33
Q

BonJour makes argument that belief is necessary for justification, not merely that the proposition is true. Alstons response to this?

A

Alston replies by claiming its just another level-ascend argument. Simply inflamming the level of justification when there is no need for it.

34
Q

Who was responsible for jump-starting the foundationalist picture of knowledge and justification?

A

Descartes was, with his original basic belief “cogito, ergo sum” (I think, therefor I am)

While foundationalists believe this is one possible endpoint, other foundationalists believe that even physical object propositions “there is a pear on the table” might be an immediate justified belief

35
Q

What is the perception/feeling benefit for foundationalists over coherentists?

A

Foundationalists may accept feeling/perceptions as a belief in the regress tree (specifically as an endpoint) while coherentists will not as it is outside of the doxastic system (Isolation objection)

36
Q

Problem of foundationalists being strict with IJ or MJ

A

Foundationalists believe that justified beliefs are either immediate or mediate, but not both (exclusive or). However this is not right as some beliefs can be both!

Eg.) An airplane is in the sky requires not only visual perception of the plane (basic belief), but background context (utilizing memory/other beliefs) that the thing they are looking at is in fact a plane

37
Q

Prima facie Justification

A

Prima facie justification refers to the initial, surface-level justification that a belief or proposition possesses based on its apparent features or evidence.

38
Q

Defeaters

A

Sources that undermine and “defeat” the justification. (Lower the amount of “justificational juice”)

39
Q

Boosters

A

Factors/propositions that add or support the proposition by adding “justificational juice”

40
Q

Ultima facie justification

A

Taking in all factors; all things considered. It is justification that involves considering all boosters and defeaters, if boosters are greater than defeaters, the belief is “Ultima facie justified”

41
Q

Cartesian foundationalism

A

Restricts basic beliefs to only those of first-person current mental states. Cartesian foundationalism starts with the individual’s subjective perspective. It emphasizes the immediacy and certainty of one’s own consciousness and mental states, but not that of our beliefs of the external world and of others. We can only be certain of our own consciousness, but can not be certain that others are not just philosophical zombies who merely claim consciousness but don’t.

42
Q

Justification by Explanatory Inference (JEI)

A

If hypothesis H purports to explain S’s evidence E, and there is no incompatible hypothesis H2 that provides a better or EQUALLY good explanation of E, then S is justified in believing H on the basis of E (S is justified in believing H on the basis of E if and only there is no incompatible hypothesis H2 that provides a better or equally good explanation of E)

Eg.) If given deer tracks on the snow, one may purport H that they were created by a deer, however recently there was a new toy that creates deer tracks that was trending recently and almost everyone has one (H2), As such one is no longer justified in H as H2 exists according to JEI.

43
Q

Explanatory simplicity

A

Similar to Occam’s razor, the simplest theory with fewer primitive notions is better. Simplicity, in this context, might refer to the number of entities postulated, the number of assumptions made, or the overall complexity of the theory.

44
Q

Coherence with background knowledge

A

Other things being equal, the theory that best fits with other theories should be preferred.

45
Q

Explanatory Depth

A

Other things equal, a theory with the most “illuminating” explanation should be preferred. (richness and completeness of an explanation).

It goes beyond merely accounting for observations; it delves into the underlying mechanisms, causal relationships, and contextual nuances, offering a more comprehensive and insightful account.

46
Q

Avoidance of Ad Hoc elements

A

Other things equal, a theory with fewer Ad Hoc elements are preferred

47
Q

Ad Hoc

A

Ad hoc elements within theories refer to additional components or assumptions that are introduced for the sole purpose of addressing specific problems or anomalies within the theory, rather than being derived from more fundamental principles or evidence. These ad hoc elements are often seen as modifications or patches to the theory in order to make it compatible with certain observations or to account for unexpected phenomena.

48
Q

George Berkly hypothesis of justification

A

Hypothesis of a nonmaterial thing (God or infinite mind) is the truth that gives justification for our inner experiences that justify the existence of an external world.

God -> internal experience-> external world

49
Q

Fallible vs Infallible inferences

A

An infallible inference is something that will always be true

An example of an infallible inference is deductive inferences (Eg,) rule of specification, modus tollens

There exist fallible inferences, such as inference to the best explanation

“I have reasons to believe I am best player”. This is fallible as how do we know it is true, it may not be true. How exactly do we recognize the best explanation? (Fallible means maybe true, maybe false)