Ch8 Flashcards
all instances of subjects accessing objects are secure
state machine model
designed to prevent unauthorized, insecure, or restricted information flow
information flow model
prevents the actions of one subject from affecting the system state or actions of another subject
noninterference model
dictates how rights can be passed from one subject to another or from a subject to an object
Take-Grant model
table of subjects and objects that indicates the actions or functions that each subject can perform on each object
access control matrix
subjects have a clearance level that allows them to access only those objects with the corresponding classification levels; enforces Confidentiality
Bell-Lapadula
prevents subjects with lower security levels from writing to objects at higher security levels
Biba
relies on auditing to ensure that unauthorized subjects cannot access objects and that authorized users can access objects properly
Clark-Wilson
Access Triple
3 parts of Clark-Wilson model include: subject, object & program (interface)
what models enforce integrity
Biba & Clark-Wilson
what model focuses on integrity
Goguen-Meseguer & Sutherland
what model focuses on secure creation and deletion of both subjects and objects
Graham-Denning
what models are built on the state machine model
Biba & Bell-Lapadula
what is the only model to address confidentiality
Bell-Lapadula
what model prevents conflicts of interest
Brewer & Nash
what are the 3 types of composition theories
Cascading
Feedback
Hookup
Input for one system comes from the output of another system
Cascading composition theory
One system provides input to another system, which reciprocates by reversing those roles
Feedback composition theory
One system sends input to another system but also sends input to external entities
Hookup composition theory
the mode a process runs in when it is confined through the use of memory bounds.
Isolation
restricts a process to reading from and writing to certain memory locations
Confinement
are the limits of memory a process cannot exceed when reading or writing
Bounds
combination of hardware, software, and controls that form a base that enforces the security policy
TCB Trusted Computing Base
imaginary boundary that separates the TCB from the rest of the system. TCB components communicate with non-TCB components using trusted paths.
security perimeter
logical part of the TCB that confirms whether a subject has the right to use a resource prior to granting access.
Reference Monitor
collection of the TCB components that implement the functionality of the reference monitor
security kernel
core security component that must be designed and implemented
into an operating system. used to prevent an active process from interacting with an area of memory that was not specifcally assigned or allocated to it
memory protection
both a specification for a cryptoprocessor chip on a mainboard and the general name for implementation of the specification. used to store and process cryptographic keys for the purposes of a hardware supported/implemented hard drive encryption system
Trusted Platform Module TPM
