CH1 PUBLIC SPENDING AS DESIGNED FOR THE MEDIAN VOTER Flashcards
The Hotelling model
HOTELLING (1929)
- 2 ice cream vendors on the beach
- Are going to place themselves in the middle
The median voter theorem
Parties are going to locate themselves in the middle (Hotelling model) to appeal as many voters as possible = not in their interests to appeal minorities
(simplified model : assumes that parties only compete on one dimension)
The median voter - interests and author
MILTZER, RICHARD, “a rational theory of the size of government” (1981)
Below-average income : redistribution in their interest
Democracy good for the poor ? - theory
MILTZER, RICHARD, “a rational theory of the size of government” (1981)
Because of the robin hood effect, democracy tend to create more redistribution mechanisms than authoritarian systems
“Robin hood effect” - theory
MILTZER, RICHARD, “A rational theory of the size of government” (1981)
The more unequal the society the more political parties are incited to commit with more redistribution mechanisms
Limits to the median voter theorem - subject + authors + date
- Political partiy members : ALDRICH (1983)
- Targeting non median voters : DIXIT, LONDREGAN (1996)
- Political/electoral institutions : PERSSON, TABELLINI (1999)
The importance of political party members
ALDRICH (1983) : members constraining party manifestos
Parties have to keep their members happy
Cannot do whatever they want
Have to be credible: committing to more redistribution cannot always be credible
Democracy good for the poor? - empirically
Mixed evidence :
- Démocracies have allowed funding multiple social services (Latin America: education, health, Africa: education)
- Child mortality rates are a strong indicator of poverty : did not really decrease in the context of redistribution (ROSS - 2006) –> tends to help more the middle class than the poorest classes
“Robin hood effect” - empirically
Countries with a relatively flatting construction have the highest amount of redistribution = robin hood paradox
Targeting non-median voters
DIXIT, LONDREGAN (1996)
Promises of redistribution for relevant groups
Can be in the interest of the party to target non median voters like swing voters
Swing voters tend to be in the middle class
Director’s law
Most of redistribution mechanisms in public policies are designed to benefit the middle class
DIXIT, LONDREGAN + DIRECTOR’S LAW =
Biased Welfare State
Political/electoral institutions
PERSSON, TABELLINI (1999)
Parties do not behave in the same way in the context of a majoritarian system or a proportional one
- Majoritarian system : redistribution towards selected districts
- Proportional system : incentive for parties to design wider redistribution mechanisms + coalition governments
Plan chapitre
I. Foundations : the median voter and the size of government
- “median voter theorem”
- hotelling model, HOTELLING
- ” a rational theory of the size of government”, MELTZER, RICHARD
II. Expansion : the role of parties and institutions
- role of political party members, ALDRICH
- targeting non median voters, DIXIT, LONDREGAN
- political institutions, PERSSON, TABELLINI
III. Application : inequality as harmful for the environment
- the median voter and the environment, KEMPF, ROSSIGNOL
The median voter and the environment
KEMPF, ROSSIGNOL (2007)
- growth (generates pollution) VS environment
- redistribution either for growth or environment
- democracy : the median voter theorem apply - policies depending on conflicts of interests = the poorer in favour of economic growth / the richer in favour of the protection of the environment
- the more unequal the society, the more harmful for the environment : –> median voter favours growth
In this model, the key explanation for the existence of environmental policies is of an economic nature
Nuances to the median voter and the environment
- Unequal richer countries : more harm for the environment
- Equal poorer countries : more harm for the environment
The main explanation for a given country’s environmental policy is the level of economic development