Ch 9: Governance and Westminster Systems

Question 1

Define executive

Answer 1

definition: major centre of political power, the administrative arm of government whose role is to ensure that the legislative and policy intentions of parliament are given practical effect. In Australia, the executive dominates the initiation and passage of legislation and controls the execution of policy

Other definitions

constitutional executive: the Governor General (GG) in Council – the only body directly given executive authority by the Australian Constitution

political executive: Prime Minister (PM) and the Ministry

administrative executive: a general term for the public servants, political advisors, officers of statutory authorities and any other group whose role is to implement policy decided by the democratically elected representatives

Question 2

Define accountability

Answer 2

accountability: political accountability is the requirement that all public officials, both elected and appointed, should be directly or indirectly answerable to the people. Westminster type democracies such as Australia feature an accountability process referred to as the chain of responsibility

Question 3

What are democratic expectations of politicians?

Answer 3

• to act in the public interest and not be personally or politically corrupt
• to give a truthful account of their actions and their intentions to vote
• to be law-abiding and not to offend community standards in their personal behaviour

Question 4

Describe Westminster expectations and standards

Answer 4

parliamentarianism: doctrine that political authority (executive) is held by legislators on behalf of voters. Legislators choses and can dismiss the executive

• describes how a parliament makes and unmakes government, also expect that individual members of the executive, who are judged to have failed in their responsibilities, can be dismissed by parliament
• they are conventions and not legally binding

Westminster standards

• PM and Treasurer are members of the Lower House
• executive is collectively responsible to the lower house – therefore it is chosen and can be dismissed by the HoR
• the GG acts on the advice of the PM and cabinet
• ministers are collectively responsible for cabinet decisions – cabinet decisions are made in secret and all ministers are publicly loyal to those decisions
• ministers are individually accountable to the parliament for their own probity and propriety and will resign over a vote of no-confidence
• public servants be politically neutral and provide confidential advice

Question 5

Discuss the strong dissatisfaction of voters in Australia

Answer 5

• strong community support for democracy in Western Nations but commentators still see dissatisfaction with politicians’ behaviour of both, elected representatives and Government, this has led to a growing indifference and apathy about democratic Government
• dissatisfaction with politicians: widespread disillusionment among Australians over the conduct of politicians and in turn, the effectiveness of Parliaments - public opinion polls: 1970s, 20% had high honesty, now, only 7% believes so - Hugh MacKay: 1998 Social researcher, reported Australians regard politicians with a mixture of distrust, cynicism and disinterest
• Australia has a parliament-focused system of Government - direct relationship with voters and parliament. Individual legislators and parliament as a whole are directly accountable to citizens via regular elections

Question 6

Define parliamentary privilege

Answer 6

definition: special rights that giver parliamentarians immunity from ordinary law to allow them to carry out their activities operations without fear of prosecution in the courts. The most important is the right of free speech in parliament. Parliament can apply sanctions for misuse of these rights by members of parliament or by others – makes parliament itself for enforcing these standards within parliament

Question 7

What are parliament’s powers under privilege?

Answer 7

• empowers citizens to appear before parliament to give evidence and produce documents for scrutiny
• parliament can impose fines and in some case, terms of imprison, on MP’s or other citizens who they judge to have abused the rules of privilege
• i.e. 1950s: HoR imprisoned 2 people that they judged had tried to intimidate a MHR

Early 1990s: WA parl. imprisoned ex-public servant who used the petition process to make libellous allegations about an MP

Question 8

What are the issues of privilege and the impact of Privileges Committees?

Answer 8

• arguable that parliament has become a “Coward’s Castle” where citizens can be slandered with impunity and not face the consequences for the slandering
  e. g. 2002 Senator Heffernan made unfounded allegations on HC judge, Kirby (Used Parl. Privilege): Documents identified as forgeries and was censured by unanimous vote in senate
• parliament is unwilling to use its powers and it seemed effectively up to political parties to impose discipline on their own ministers
• Privileges Committees of both houses main concern is the right of reply of people named in Federal Parliament, dealing with very little on breach of Parl. Standards. Since mid-1980s: those who perceive that their reputations/image has been damaged by statements in Parliament have the right to reply back to those statements. Committee can incorporate them in Hansard and also checks whether the publication is of public interest and the reply isn’t defamatory
• Senate Privileges Committee - has the power to recommend more stringent disciplinary action in relation to cases like the Heffernan Incident. Although true, the incident never considered by the committee, thus highlighting the debate in the need for a MP’s code of conduct
• criticisms of Privileges Committees
  
  • traditional processes of Parliamentary privilege accountability seem to be too limited/insufficiently enforced
  • Parliamentarians are unwilling to hold their colleagues accountable. Government often actively avoids accountability
  • no consensus in Parliament as to what rules should be applied
  • example: in 2010 Senate Privileges Committee scrutinised a claimed Parliamentary standards breaching - examined witness to the Economics Committee, Godwin Grech. Found that Grech, a public servant, gave evidence to the committee which breached/mislead it. Decided that Grech’s mental state meant he was not in contempt with Parliament. Also, senators in opposition who has “prearranged” the hearing was also not in an offence.
• recent scandals highlight misuse of electoral and other allowances, corrosive Parliamentary tactics and undue influence of lobbyists - has led to many Parliamentary discussions and sometimes adopting codes of conduct for Parliamentarians: Generally broader in application than conventions of ministerial responsibility

Question 9

Describe codes of conduct and their application to Australia

Answer 9

• seeks to ensure that MPs are accountable and that their behaviour is ethical
• this goes beyond illegals actions (e.g. fraud, bribery, corruption) which lead to community outrage and intervention of law enforcement agencies and bodies (e.g. Corruption and Crime Commission), includes
  
  • conflicts of interest and failure to declare interests
  • avoidance of legitimate scrutiny (failure to table documents, misleading or incomplete answers to Q’s)
  • misusing Parliamentary Privilege
  • misusing personal entitlements/resources
  • gaining advantages (e.g. Post-Parliamentary employment) or misusing the influence that results from their public office
  • acting to prevent the proper functioning of Parliament or actions that reflect badly on Parliament.
• parliamentary codes of conduct have been adopted in the Federal Parliament and in all states except SA (becoming increasingly common in democracies)
• still debatable as to whether or not they provide an effective level of accountability
• examples: NSW and QLD: have ethics mechanism where both individual MPs and Comm. can seek advice on ethical issues raised in their work
• Scottish and Canadian Parliament: appointment of commissions for Parliamentary standards who maintain an MPs register of interests, provide PD and advice to MPs and even hear/ investigate complaints from the public on Parliamentarian behaviour
• NSW and WA: Anti-corruption bodies have power to investigate serious allegations of unethical behaviour by MPs - still up to Parliament to take disciplinary action

Question 10

Compare CMR and IMR

Answer 10

Collective Ministerial Responsibility - cabinet decisions are made in secret & cabinet must be publicly loyal to those decisions

Individual Ministerial Responsibility - Ministers are individual responsible for their department & will resign on a vote of no confidence ie. can’t mislead Parliament, politically corruption public servants must be politically neutral and provide confidential advice

Question 11

Define CMR

Answer 11

definition: a political convention that is part of Westminster system of responsible government. In Westminster style parliaments, the government is the party/coalition that can demonstrate majority support in the lower house of parliament. If a government cannot maintain this support it must resign

Question 12

What are the standrds of CMR?

Answer 12

• Government selected by Parliament (Majority support in Parliament to gain office) – in reality chosen by voters, giving mandate to govern
• Government can be dismissed by Parliament if there is no longer majority support (in a successful vote of no confidence), last time this occurred was in 1941
• executive stands and falls together - “speaks with one voice” and if any minister is unable to publicly support a cabinet decision, they must resign (Cabinet Solidarity)
• parliament will actively scrutinise the Government to “keep it honest”

hung parliaments are the exception where minor parties or independents hold the balance of power in the lower house.

Question 13

Describe cabinet solidarity

Answer 13

• the executive must present a united front to Parliament. No member of the executive can publicly disagree with government decisions and discussion must remain secret (cabinet meets behind closed doors and its discussion must remain secret – disagreements should be aired and resolved within cabinet) - if not the case, they must resign
• in operation:
  
  • few resignations have resulted from this convention

1981 Andrew Peacock of the Fraser Liberal Cabinet and Paul Keating Hawke Labor Cabinet 1991 - both resignations challenged their leadership (caused mainly by personality/ambition)

Stuart West (Hawke 1984): resigned because he couldn’t publicly support the cabinet decision to allow uranium mining

1990s: Gary Punch (Aviation Support Minister) resigned from the Hawke Labor Cabinet in protest over a 3rd runway project at Kingsford Smith Airport (Sydney) - Would increase noise levels in Punch’s electorate – “proved the rule”: that real resignations rarely occur, within 2 years, Punch was restored back to Ministry
* Cabinet leaks/Tensions/Divides: although resignations are almost non-existent, division and disunity in cabinet is not uncommon. It reflects personal ambition, individual enmities or divided political loyalties and also declining PM authority. Ministers tend to leak “unattributed” stories to the press which are critical of other cabinet ministers and of government policy
e. g. 1998 Education Minister David Kemp: Howard Cabinet Confidential papers on future tertiary education funding were leaked (more radical suggestions). PM had to back away from proposed reforms due to backlash- showed someone within cabinet had leaked the documents

Question 14

Define IMR

Answer 14

definition: a convention of the Westminster System of responsibility parliamentary government. Under this convention, Ministers are responsible to Parliament for their probity and propriety. Ministers should resign from their post, if censured by a majority vote of parliament A censure motion can be moved if it is alleged that a minister has lied to Parliament, corrupt or otherwise not met the standard of Parliament.

Question 15

What are the standards of IMR?

Answer 15

• not mislead (lie) Parliament
• not be personally/politically corrupt - using their position for personal gain or to gain unfair electoral advantage for themselves/party
• avoid any conflict of interest between their private actions and their official duties
• not bring Parliament into disrepute - e.g. engage publicly in any ‘immoral’ behaviour that is unacceptable to the community
• take responsibility for problems in their Departments - e.g. any incompetence/corruption of senior pub. servants and major policy fails

Question 16

What are the outcomes of IMR?

Answer 16

• censure motions: can be used to call for a minister’s resignation on the basis of an alleged failure to meet required standards. Although they may be highly unlikely due to government majority, concept of IMR is still very much so prevalent in modern day politics i.e. 2000 Howard
• public demand and scrutiny from the media/opposition can expose and highlight breached of IMR which can force ministers to resign
• Prime Minister (although rare) can also require a minister’s resignation. Only really occurs if the issue is causing serious damage to the reputation of the Government and weakening possibility of next election success
• electoral pressure: greater significance in “swinging voters” thus making election outcomes unpredictable - demographic shift: Aus. more cynical of political leaders so governments must be sensitive to their opinion poll ratings

Question 17

Describe ministerial codes of conduct effect on IMR

Answer 17

• intention: to reinforce accountability of ministers and minimise potential political damage to the Govt. from breaches of IMR. All recent federal governments have developed and published Ministerial Codes of Conduct
• focus: standards are set by the PM and thus, making the executive accountable to the PM in relation to these codes. Recent codes have focused on personal honesty of ministers - prohibiting specific forms of political corruption, require ministers to be truthful when dealing with public/Parliament and provide specific guidelines to ensure that a minister doesn’t have any conflicts of interest - John Howard Codes 1996 vs. Kevin Rudd Codes 2007
  
  • Rudd: more prescriptive about shareholdings of ministers - no investments in their area of responsibility except arms length arrangements (e.g. via superannuation companies ). Ministers must deal openly with lobbyists and can’t be employed in their field 18mths after retiring from parliament
  • Howard Code (amended 1999): - req. ministers couldn’t be traders in relevant shares but didn’t require that all such investments be sold.
• neither code requires ministers to take responsibility for the actions of their departments

Question 18

Describe the effectiveness of IMR

Answer 18

• currently, the convention of IMR no longer operates in a formal sense, responsibility is to the PM, not to the Parliament or to the electorate. In the past, PMs have been inconsistent in the way they enforce their own codes. Their decisions often have been motivated by political considerations, not a commitment
• has been particularly prevalent in our political system since the 1990s - some have just come under intense pressure but still retained their minister positions

e. g. Keating (1993-96) 3 ministers forced to resign: Alan Griffiths, Ros Kelly, Graham Richardson
e. g. Howard’s first term (1996-98): 7 forced resignations of the ministry - next 9 years, only 2 resignations, a few weren’t reappointed in ministerial reshuffle as a result of controversy e.g. Rudd 2009: Defence minister Joel Fitzgibbon was forced to resign

• first term Howard Government - most resignations resulted from failures of financial accountability by ministers or from failures to declare conflicts of interest
  
  • 1997: Travel Rorts Affair- Federal Politicians reimbursed for personal spending on “living away from home” expenses incurred when away from electorates. Several politicians submitted claims containing errors and were excess of real expenses. Although politicians concerned claimed that errors were of errors and repaid/oversight the money, high media/public reaction constituted personal corruption - John Sharp: Minister of Transport resigned and didn’t recontest seat - 2 more were forced to resign in this case
  • Prosser Example (1997) - Geoff Prosser: Minister for Small business resigned after accusations of conflict of interest and misleading Parliament. Alleged that he contacted a major retail corporation to encourage it to set up a prime outlet in a shopping centre he was developing. Implication: minister used influence of public office for private advantage. Response by minister: Business matters were independently managed and allegation was false, phone records showed he made contact suggesting misleading of Parliament
• 1998: Second Howard Code - result of Prosser led to Howard’s 1996 Ministerial Standards to prevent conflicts of interest between private business activities and their official responsibility
  
  • mid 1998: Warwick Parer, family trust was a major shareholder in a very profitable mining coal venture when he was Minister for Resources and Energy. Was clearly in breach of current ministerial guidelines then, although subsequently changed to exceptions family trusts. Claims that Parer’s long-standing friendship with PM saved him from forced resignation. Guidelines reviewed and now required to resign only if “maliciously” breached rules rather than “innocently
• response to suggestions of breaches by the opposition:
  
  • Michael Wooldridge Health Minister (Late 1998) Alleged that several radiologists had purchased multi-million dollar magnetic resonance imaging machines just before Government benefits were extended to cover their use - Provided radiologists with a huge “windfall” financial benefit. Appeared that they had advanced knowledge of the policy change - Info could have only come from the Health Minister or his Department - Wooldridge rejected any personal accountability for situation - Inquiry by CW Auditor General concluded that radiologists almost certainly had inside info. - Led to open question of Health MIn. responsibility although was not require to resign
  • 2000: PM set up an assistance package for workers made redundant by the financial collapse of a textile firm. Arrangement was an exception to government general “Hands off” approach to business failures. The effect was reduced liability of the textile company to legal action by creditors. PM Brother, Stan Howard was a director of textile firm involved, government rejected the criticisms
• resignations and personal behaviour - in past, perceived breaches of community standards ie. immoral behaviour led to resignations however rarely occurs
  
  • 1970s: John Gorton (PM) and Jim Cairns resigned due to extramarital affairs
  • 2009: NSW Health Minister John Della Bossa resigned extramarital affair
• IMR and Department Errors: Ministers no longer take ultimate responsibility in Parl for their departments. Serious problems of administration or even corruption usually doesn’t result in resignation other standards
  
  • e.g. 2000: Minister for Aged Care, Bronwyn Bishop faced media criticism for mismanagement of her department of Aged Care, didn’t resign and argued that problems were a result of failure of newly created public sector accountability so it was not her responsibility. The procedure is public service is directly accountable to its clients i.e. not the ministers fault
  • 2008: ALP launched a very large fiscal stimulus to counter impact on AU for GFC - e.g. Building the Education Revolution, Pink Batts Scheme - Ministers responsible were strongly criticised for maladministration in these programs - Opposition called for resignation of Julia Gillard (Ministry covered education) and Peter Garrett (Environment) - Both denied serious maladministration - long convention that ministers don’t resign in response to claimed or real errors made by the departments they head-up
• inconsistency in IMR: the decision to hold a minister responsible and force resignation is made by the PM not by Parliament. Where there is a government majority, ministers will always survive over censure motions - however, severe media/public scrutiny may make them a political liability. Judgement is ultimately up to the Prime Minister – which is not a clear cut one, at different times the same offence can have different consequences
  
  • Reith Example - Peter Reith: Min. for Employment, Workplace relations and Small Businesses - Personal Corruption: Gav his son use of a ministerial use only phone card, ran a 50,000 bill - Reith pressured to resign -> he paid back the money but didn’t accept responsibility and wasn’t asked to resign by the PM - claim: Reith was too senior and too valuable a member of cabinet for PM Howard to lose, esp. as an election was approaching -> Reith promoted to minister of defence
  • Tuckey Example - 2003: Wilson Tuckey a member of the outer ministry apparently survived pressure to resign in short term - Tuckey sent multiple critical letters to SA minister for police seeking the cancellation of a $183 traffic fine incurred by his son - 44yr old truck driver - Wrote in his ministerial letterhead thus acting as a federal minister - Parliament - justified his action by claiming that he was representing his son as a constituent - false as son didn’t live in his constituent, Tuckey admonished by the PM but not asked to resign - In Ministerial reshuffle, he lost his portfolio
  • discretion of PM: 2007 - 2 Howard Ministers resigned. Minister for Ageing, Santo Santoro had to due to actively trading in shares in biotech company with interests related to his portfolio and Minister Ian Campbell
• it is possible for a leader to ignore a successful vote of no-confidence by parliament. However, to do so may be at a significant political cost
  
  • 1998: AG Denver Beanland QLD refused to resign, seen as potential factor in National’s defeat

Question 19

What is the effectiveness of parliamentary procedures that allow for accountability?

Answer 19

• Question Time: allows backbenchers to ask questions of the PM and other ministers. Questions may be “On notice” or “Without Notice”. 1 hour of every afternoon that Parliament is sitting is allocated to this procedure, effectiveness:
  
  • relatively ineffective means scrutinising of the executive, Ministers may give evasive or irrelevant answers
  • Dorothy Dixer: arranged question from a Govt. backbencher that allows a minister to highlight their achievements
  • question time received the greatest attention from the media, generally focuses more on the performance of the politicians involved than on the substance of Q’s
  • reflects more so the reality of the HoR: adversarial atmosphere of modern party politics, Parliamentary debate is more a joust between the Govt. and Opp. than a place of constructive deliberation/scrutiny
  • 2010: Minority Gillard Government agreed to adopt some Parliamentary reforms to processes - ie. private members’ business and Question Time - Committee modified to increase legislative role of House committees (all contentious bills now previews by general purpose comm. before intro into house) - Committees carry out key investigations (e.g. Regional Australia Comm. report on water policy) - Q time length of Q’s and Answers reduced to ensure opposition, cross benchers and Government backbenchers could ask more Q’s. In short term: culture of the House has not changed - still a “bear pit” of adversarial conflict
• debates: debates that allow for scrutiny of the executive are either dominated by party contest or fail to have major impact. Most discussions apart from Question time and Committee reports go unreported by media
  
  • debates on Matters of Public Importance: go unreported
  • Grievance and Adjournment debates: often occur very late at night when few politicians remain in chamber and most go unreported
  • Censure Motions: generally strongly debated but party solidarity ensures they’re always defeated

April 2000: Labor Opposition brought a censure motion against PM Howard over issue of Aboriginal Reconciliation. Received almost no media attention and partisan voting ensured motion was lost: 70-66

Question 20

Define committees and their accountability role

Answer 20

a group from either/both the HoR and Senate who can debate on proposed bills and examine delegated legislation. They can investigate specific policy issues & supervise the administration of Parliament itself. Can also be part of accountability processes - traditionally, one purpose of committees has been to seek to ensure financial accountability of Executive.

Accountability roles

• debate proposed bills and examine delegated legislation
• investigate specific policy issues
• supervise the administration of parliament itself
• seek to ensure the financial accountability of the executive

Question 21

What are the strengths and weaknesses of committees?

Answer 21

Strengths

• can have some impact on the scrutiny of the detail of government financial actions

Weaknesses

• committees often divide on party lines
• restricted by the executive’s unwillingness to answer questions and the convention that public servants subpoenaed to give evidence cannot comment on government policy
• too often can be manipulated or ignored
• committees of the HoR are less dominated by adversarial politics than debate in the chamber, but they are restricted by the executive in the scope of their investigation and will always reflect party divisions on crucial issues

Question 22

Describe the estimates committee

Answer 22

• budget process is a major focus of accountability in the HoR, providing members with the opportunity to raise issues on any area of government policy
• Senate committees have been more active than those in the HoR, it often requires a more direct government response and occurs twice a year when the government’s budget estimates are examined

Features of process

• Senate refers the estimates statements (ie. Portfolio Budget St.) to its 8 standing committee
• all hearings conducted in public
• ministers and relevant senior public servants are expected to attend and answer questions
• 4 days generally is allowed for this process
• verbal answers are expected but matter can be “taken on notice” and be dealt with a further round of hearings

Limitations of estimates committee

• over time, estimates sessions have been used by non-govt. senators to prove into issues of Government policy, not just expenditure plans
• governments have resisted this trend, attempting to manage the responses by public servants

Question 23

Describe other significant committees

Answer 23

• Select Committees: established to inquire into a controversial bill/issue concerning executive accountability - e.g. Impact of the GST, Children overboard controversy, SIEV X disaster, Indigenous policy and Climate Change, Medicare, Mental health
• Standing Committees: appointed for life of a Parliament and usually re-established in successive Parliament and work as investigatory/scrutiny committees - e.g. SC on Regulations and Ordinances
• Domestic/Internal Committee: functions are concerned with powers/procedures of the House/administration of Parliament
• Legislative Scrutiny Committees Scrutiny of Bills Committee - Examines proposed laws before debated by the Senate - Doesn’t usually recommend specific changes but highlights provisions that may offend its criteria
  
  • SC on Regulations and Ordinances - examines delegated legislation to ensure it validly effect the original enabling legislation and that provisions of regulation don’t conflict with personal rights and Parliamentary propriety - Committee examines around 2000 every year and identifies hundreds of problems including injustices in regulations - Most matters concern executive actions taken by officers of the public service but also concern federal courts as their operational rules are created under the authority of the legislation that set them up - Works in bipartisan manner since est. in 1932, senate hasn’t rejected a committee recommendation that a legislative instrument be disallowed
  • Legal and Constitutional Affairs - examines bills to ensure that they don’t conflict with human rights. As AU has no all-embracing national human rights protections - often very conservative - Focused on things like property rights and Common Law Legal Rights
• References Committees - inquire into and report upon various general matters referred to them by the Senate - Can range from very broad and comprehensive to quire specific - Examination can require evaluation of policy areas and Assessment of implementation within and across allocated portfolios - e.g. Legal and Constitutional Affairs Comm. inquired into matters such as potential for an Australian Republic, Access to legal aid, progress towards aboriginal reconciliation

Question 24

Describe the role and issues with the Auditor General

Answer 24

Auditor General: an independent officer of the Parliament and conducts expert and unbiased financial and performance audits of the Public Service, based in the Australian National Audit Office

Role

• provides an oversight of the performance of the Commonwealth administrative agencies
• conducts expert and unbiased financial and performance audits of the public service and reports to the parliament
• in Westminster systems, Auditor Generals are respected as apolitical and independent figures that therefore are able to “depoliticise” difficult decisions

Issues

• executives can be very sensitive to the implied criticism of their policies that are made by negative AG reports
  i. e. 1990s: conflict between VIC premier and State AG led to VIC parliament restructuring the role of the AG and creating new Audit Office - involved reduction of AG powers and according to commentators, weakening accountability standards. The changes were reversed after change of Government
  2007: Rudd critical of “abuse” of Government advertising by Howard government. Claimed that hundreds of millions of dollars spent on “public information” advertising was really political campaigning. New Rudd Government established a set of government advertising guidelines this role was handed to AG
  2010: modified the guidelines and transferred role to a committee made up of 3 senior public servants - ie. the Independent Communications Committee. The old guidelines of government advertising were exempt from general guidelines under “extraordinary” and “compelling reasons” - de-appointed the AG as a public advertising watchdog which limits its accountability on Parliament

Question 25

Describe other financial oversight bodies and potential reforms

Answer 25

• Charter of Budget Honesty Act (1998): can require the Treasury and/or the Department of Finance to cost government and opposition election promises during an election campaign. There is a danger that such arrangements makes administrators the centre of political controversy – an example of the problems of using an independent government body to resolve a political issue. Opposition parties have claimed this process if biased in favour of the government. They have delayed submitting policies until immediately before the day of the election and also have made statements implying that particular senior public servants were incompetent to assess the costs of their policies
• suggested reforms: Parliamentary Budget Office (PBS). Based on the US Congressional Budget Office (CBS) which is a large and expensive body that provides budget analysis and forecasting to the US Congress and effectively allows Congress to double check the budget policy of the Parliament. In Australia, such a body could provide advice to the opposition, minor parties and independents in the Federal Parliament. Could provide useful advice to the Estimates Committees. On the other hand, it could inadvertently become embroiled in an argument over the ‘honesty’ of government economic forecasts and tend to undermine respect for the independence of public servants in the existing Treasury and Finance Departments

Question 26

What is the traditional role of the public service and what are expectations of the public service?

Answer 26

• ensuring the efficient administration of policy and legislation passed by parliament
• developing and administering delegated legislation
• providing policy advice to ministers

Expectations of the public service

• subordinate and loyal to the government in general and to the government of the day
• politically neutral and impartial
• providers of anonymous advice that could be frank and fearless, ministers accepted responsibility for all policy based on this advice

Question 27

What are criticisms of the Westminster model of public service?

Answer 27

• inefficient: structure lead to ‘empire building’ which created a large and inefficient bureaucracy
• out of touch with community i.e. through permanent merit-based employment was claimed to create a remote, narrowly based body that did not understand the concerns of ordinary Australians
• wielded too much power over government policy

Question 28

What are recent public service reforms?

Answer 28

these reforms have focused reducing costs, creating new management styles and career structures, and establish new avenues of accountability (New Public Management). To an increasing degree political advisers have been employed to supplement the public service.

• efficiency reforms and corporatisation: internal reform of the public service which have increased efficiency and also lead to a changed relationship of public servants with the government and with the community
  
  • several existing Heads of Departments were sacked
  • costs were cut through ‘downsizing’ the public service
  • functions were ‘contracted out’ i.e. the Commonwealth Employment Service was abolished and its administrative functions were given to CentreLink and its employment services have been contracted out to private organisations
  • a Senior Executive Service was created that emphasised ‘transferrable management skills’ rather than individual department based expertise
  • employment in senior positons became contract based and public service jobs were filled through open applications
• new accountability processes: creation of the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1970s), freedom of information laws (1980s), administrative tribunals covering areas such as immigration, refugees and health. These modifications changed the relationship between the public service and the community
• expanded role of political advisers
• changing focus of loyalty: the Australian Public Service Act (1997) signalled the government saw little difference between managing the public service and running a private enterprise business. These changes were claimed to politicise the public service and discourage senior officials from offering unpopular advice to a government. It has also been suggested that government departments see the minister as their main client, creating a culture that leads to errors as policy success is given higher priority than good administration
  
  • emphasised the public service’s direct accountability to the government of the day (in contrast to the 1922 Act that emphasised its responsibility to the Commonwealth not to the party in power)
  • made it easier for a PM to hire and fire, and remove senior officials they felt uncooperative.

Question 29

What are the costs and benefits of public service reform?

Answer 29

• costs:
  
  • damage to the old public service ethos of community service and the ability of departments to provide advice based on detailed, specialised knowledge
  • contract based employees are argued to be less able to provide ‘frank and fearless’ advice
  • Westminster chain of responsibility has been greatly weakened as ministers do not accept accountability to parliament for the actions of their departments
• benefits:
  
  • increased government access to a broader range of expert advice and administrative experience
  • more cost effective delivery of government services
  • greater access of public service clients to complaint and dispute procedures
  • innovation of whistle-blower protection

Question 30

What are the pros and cons of reliance on advisers?

Answer 30

• pros
  
  • provide a minister with a loyal team – committed to the government’s political agenda and help develop policy and strategies that fit the government’s overall direction
  • senior advisers may also play a useful function in liaising with public service departments on behalf of the minister
• cons
  
  • increasing power wielded
  • can shield ministers from unwelcome information and contacts, intimidate public servants. Gives advisers authority to act in the minister’s name but then denying responsibility for their actions
  • role creates chaotic lines of communication
  • disrupts accountability processes – placing the actions of ministers beyond the scrutiny of parliament

Question 31

What are the problems revealed by the ‘children overboard’ scandal?

Answer 31

• 7 October 2001: a refugee boat was intercepted off Christmas Island, the Immigration Minister and PM claimed that the refugees on the boat had thrown their children into the sea as a deliberate tactic to force Australia to accept them as asylum claimants two days into the federal election campaign. Very soon after, rumours began to circulate that the evidence was misleading and the incident had not happened. The senior politicians involved denied they had misled the Australian people and also following the election period ‘caretaker government’ convention of sharing the information they had with the opposition
• two official inquiries were held into the incident. The People Smuggling Taskforce was a closed internal inquiry part of the DoPMC and reported that there was no evidence that children had been thrown overboard and concluded the then Defence Minister (who since left parliament) had erred by failing to correct the story. The second inquiry was an open and conducted by the Senate – there were no conclusive findings about matters of fact by it did find that the communications processes involving military officers, senior public servants and political advisors were flawed
• it highlighted serious weaknesses in the relationship between ministers and public servants. Since 1984 public service regulations have recognised the right of ministers to go beyond their traditional role of determining policy, providing resources and setting strategic diection for administration. Today they are often involved in internal departmental administrative detail. Advisers acting in the minister’s name can share this direct management role. It is also claimed this has created confusion in the minister-public servant relationship and that public servants (and senior military officers) have been politicised, becoming an active part of the partisan policy team of a minister

Question 32

What are suggested reforms of ministers, public service and advisers’ relationships?

Answer 32

• restoring the traditional managerial autonomy of the public service and ‘protecting’ senior public servants through 5 year contracts that only allow for their dismissal on the basis of incompetence or misconduct
• putting all instructions in written form to ensure their authority, accuracy and accountability and thereby creating a paper trail for audit purposes
• defining the roles of political advisers by regularising their terms of employment and creating accountability through a code of conduct – 2008: Rudd government created a code of conduct for all ministerial, including advisors. Like the code for ministers, the code covered the issues conflict of interest and honesty. It also made clear that ministerial staff had no authority to make executive decisions or to direct public servants