CH 13 FINAL Flashcards
Perfect competition and monopolistic competition are similar in that both market structures
include
A) price-taking behavior by firms.
B) a homogeneous product.
C) no barriers to entry.
D) very few firms.
C) no barriers to entry.
A competitive market structure differs from the monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic
competition structures in the
A) producers’ ability to set price.
B) profit maximization condition.
C) amount of long-run profit.
D) entry conditions.
A) producers’ ability to set price.
Monopolistic competition and monopoly have all of the following in common EXCEPT
A) P > MC.
B) firms are price setters.
C) barriers to entry.
D) MR = MC.
C) barriers to entry.
What is the aspect of imperfect competition that is most distinct from perfect competition?
A) free entry/exit
B) perfect information
C) differentiated products
D) zero profits
C) differentiated products
In which of the following market structures are firms’ strategies dependent on individual
rival firms’ behaviors?
A) oligopoly
B) monopolistic competition
C) perfect competition
D) Both A and B.
D) Both A and B.
If a cartel is unable to monitor its members and punish those firms that violate the agreement,
then
A) the member firms will each act as price setters.
B) the cartel will prosper in the long run.
C) the market will become a monopoly.
D) the cartel will fail.
D) the cartel will fail.
A typical firm in a cartel will hold which of the following attitudes?
A) If everyone cheats, I’m better off, and so is everyone in the cartel.
B) If I alone cheat, I’m better off; if everyone cheats, I’m worse off.
C) I can never do better for myself than following agreed-upon cartel rules.
D) If I suspect others are planning to cheat, I’ll do best for myself by deciding not to cheat.
B) If I alone cheat, I’m better off; if everyone cheats, I’m worse off.
There are only two firms in an industry with demand curves q1 = 30 - P and q2 = 30 - P.
Both have no fixed costs and each has a marginal cost of 10 per unit produced. If they behave as
profit-maximizing price takers, each produces 10 units and sells them at a price of 10 so that
each firm makes zero economic profits. If they form a cartel, their inverse demand curve is
A) Q = 30 - P.
B) Q = 60 - 2P.
C) P = 60 - 2Q.
D) P = 30 - Q/2
D) P = 30 - Q/2
The Cournot Model of Oligopoly assumes that
A) firms decide what quantity to produce.
B) firms make their decisions simultaneously.
C) firms do not cooperate.
D) All of the above.
D) All of the above.
Suppose two Cournot duopolist firms operate at zero marginal cost. The market demand is
p = a - bQ. Each firm will produce
A) a/b.
B) a/2b.
C) a/3b.
D) a/4b.
C) a/3b.
In the Cournot model, a firm maximizes profit by selecting
A) its output, assuming that other firms keep their output constant.
B) its price, assuming that other firms keep their price constant.
C) its output, assuming that other firms will retaliate.
D) its price, assuming that other firms will retaliate.
A) its output, assuming that other firms keep their output constant.
In the Cournot model, the output that a firm chooses to produce increases as
A) the total output of other firms increases.
B) the number of firms in the market increases.
C) the number of firms in the market decreases.
D) its marginal cost increases.
C) the number of firms in the market decreases.
Suppose a market with a Cournot structure has five firms and a market price elasticity of
demand equal to -2. What is a Cournot firm’s Lerner Index?
A) .1
B) .2
C) .5
D) 1
A) .1
Suppose Cournot duopolists firms (A and B) face the same market demand curve, and
initially have identical costs. Firm A figures out a way of reducing its marginal cost. At the new
Nash-Cournot equilibrium,
A) firm A’s price falls.
B) firm A’s output expands and firm B’s output contracts.
C) firm B’s profits expand.
D) the price charged by both firms increases.
B) firm A’s output expands and firm B’s output contracts.
The Stackelberg model is more appropriate than the Cournot model in situations where
A) there are more than two firms.
B) all firms enter the market simultaneously.
C) one firm makes its output decision before the other.
D) firms will be likely to collude.
C) one firm makes its output decision before the other.