Ch. 10- SHAFIROFF MEMOS Flashcards
Can Tom avoid liability under the lease on the ground that the lease was illegal (Illegal Lease Theory)?
Not having a window mandated by code is substantial because it could mean the difference between life and death in the event of an emergency, such as a fire. Moreover, to find that the lease in question was not illegal would subvert the intent of the legislature because if there is a housing code, it should be enforced—and this is one way of enforcing it, by not allowing a landlord to recover on the lease. To deny Lenore a recovery would send a powerful message to landlords: bring your premises up to code or forfeit a suit under a lease for that unit.
Nonetheless, the facts here are a far cry from the facts of the case that started this theory—Brown v. Southall Realty. In that case, one of the facts was that a toilet did not work—a basic accommodation of any decent unit. The absence of a window here may affect the amount of sunlight that comes in, but this is not a case where there is no window. Moreover, the concern for fire is purely speculative because the fact is that relatively few houses ever do catch fire. To base important policy on remote grounds does nothing but ultimately drive up the cost of housing for those who can least afford it.
Was the purpose of the lease frustrated when Tom could not sleep when she wanted to because of the fear of Frank’s activities and the master has only one window and not two?
To be able to sleep is clearly an underlying purpose because without sleep, the human body simply will break down. In this regard, sleep, along with food and water, is among the most important needs of a human, without which there is nothing. Similarly, the ability to have abundant fresh air and sunshine is important, too, for human emotional and physical health.
Nevertheless, with respect to Frank, it is not Lenore’s fault that Tom is so sensitive and she should not bear the brunt of it. Indeed, that Tom cannot sleep is more of an indication of Tom’s failings and problems than Lenore’s because for ten years there is a history of quiet—and history is the best predictor of human behavior. In short, that Tom cannot sleep is not a consequence of the underlying purpose of the lease being frustrated; it is a consequence of Tom’s own emotional problems which no landlord should have to suffer.
Did Lance breach the common law covenant of quiet enjoyment when his young stepson, Bob, jumped around Lance’s apartment and interfered with Tina’s ability to go to sleep and work at home during the day and Lance did not reveal this to Tina when she leased the apartment?
Under the common law, a landlord breaches the covenant of quiet enjoyment by failing to act when he or she has a duty to act, and this failure interferes with the tenant’s peaceful enjoyment of the premises. The duty to act can be found in the law, as when the landlord fails to disclose a known latent defect.
Did Lance breach the modern view of the covenant of quiet enjoyment when Lance’s four-year old stepson made noise and prevented Tina from sleeping and working at home?
Under the modern view of the covenant of quiet enjoyment as articulated by Reste Realty, a landlord cannot substantially interfere with the tenant’s peaceful enjoyment of the premises by any act or omission.26 The landlord’s omission or failure to act can be a breach of the covenant, irrespective of any duty in the lease or law, if the landlord had the power to control the interference.
Assuming that Lance did breach the covenant of quiet enjoyment, can Tina avail herself of the remedy of constructive eviction when she moved out six months after the breach?
A tenant is constructively evicted when he vacates in a timely manner after the landlord has breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Whether a vacation of the premises is timely is dependent on the totality of the facts and circumstances.
PREMISES:
Can the premises be deemed to be used for residential purposes when Tina used the premises to work at home?
The implied warranty of habitability typically applies only to residential units, not commercial ones.
Using the apartment for work should preclude Tina from asserting a breach of the implied warranty of habitability because the implied warranty of habitability was designed for those tenants—residential tenants—who are in an unequal bargaining position vis-à-vis the landlord, not commercial tenants like Tina who, being worldly in business, are more knowledgeable in economic and legal dealings and are able to fend for themselves.
Nonetheless, using the premises for work and habitation should not preclude the warranty from being available to Tina because even though Tina uses the premises for work, she still uses it as a place for habitation; she still lives, eats, and sleeps there. To deny Tina protection under these circumstances could end up denying legions of people from making use of the warranty because many people today work at home, either part or full time. To deny these people protection would throw us back to the time when tenants were at the mercy of unscrupulous landlords and provide tenants with few workable remedies. Thus, while there are many benefits to society to allow people to work at home (saving gasoline, reducing congestion on the roads, eliminating pollution), these would be wiped out by forcing tenants to choose between helping society or protecting themselves. Tenants should be forced to make such a choice.
FITNESS:
Did Lance breach the implied warranty of habitability when Tina’s sleep was disturbed by Lance’s four-year old step son?
The implied warranty of habitability requires that the premises be fit for human habitation.
With Tina not sleeping when she desired to sleep, the apartment was in fact not fit for human habitation because sleep for a human is as necessary as is food or water: a human will die without food and also will die without sleep. Moreover, the implied warranty of habitability recognizes that tenants do not pay for “land,” but for a “package of goods and services,” as was stated in Green v. Superior Court. Certainly one of these services must be the right to sleep when one wants to sleep because sleep is so essential.
On the other hand, while sleep is certainly important and may well be part of the “package of goods and services” that tenants expect, Tina did not have her sleep disturbed to any great extent: from 9 PM till 9 AM it was quiet, more than sufficient for an average adult to sleep.71 In this regard, the disturbance was nothing more than a trivial inconvenience and to invoke the implied warranty of habitability here fails to take into account what the underlying purpose of the doctrine was for: to maintain basic essentials of heat, hot water, plumbing, etc. To invoke it here would exceed the bounds of the doctrine and make the landlord a virtual guarantor of the tenant’s own subjective wants, irrespective of how unusual those wants are.
Thus, the apartment was fit for human habitation and the implied warranty of habitability was not breached.
FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE:
Was the purpose of the lease frustrated when Tina could not sleep when she wanted to and could not work during the day because of Bob’s noise?
The doctrine of frustration of purpose holds that when the underlying purpose of a contract can no longer be carried out due to unforeseen circumstances, through no fault of the party seeking relief from the contract, the one seeking relief is excused from performing.
Bob’s making noise from 9AM till 9 PM is unforeseeable because Tina inquired about who was to live above her and Lance gave an answer that was truthful, but in hindsight, not complete. As the saying goes, “you don’t know what you don’t know,” and there was no basis for Tina to inquire further. A tenant cannot be expected to foresee all, and to refuse Tina relief here would be akin to making her liable for not having clairvoyance.
On the other hand, because Tina had special peculiarities, she should be held to a higher standard to investigate. If Tina needs to go to bed at 7 PM and work at home all day, something most people do not do, Tina needs to have the burden to ask. She was the only one who knew of her specials needs and she is the one who should have the burden of asking about whether the apartment suits those needs.
Thus, frustration of purpose is not available to Tina.
INDEPENDENCY OF COVENANTS:
Assuming that Larry breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment and/or the implied warranty of habitability, will the provision in the lease, “All covenants in this lease or implied in law shall be independent covenants,” serve to nullify the remedy of constructive eviction or the remedy of rescission for the implied warranty of habitability when there is a total breach?
To allow Larry to effectively derail the underlying purpose of constructive eviction and rescission—to allow tenants to leave the premises and avoid further rent payments—would make for a de facto waiver of these doctrines and be in violation of public policy. If landlords could make these legal doctrines independent from the payment of rent, the net effect would be to wipe out the remedy of constructive eviction and heart of the implied warranty of habitability. Landlord-tenant law would then go backwards in time when the tenant’s only remedy was a suit for damages, not an attractive alternative to substandard housing. Tenants would have little recourse against a landlord who provides housing without the basics.
On the other hand, life is full of unattractive situations and it is not government’s place to trump the freedom that a competent adult has in the realm of contract law. Larry’s tenants agreed to the lease as it was written, and to ensure stability in the law of contracts, they should be held to the terms. Further, if one can waive constitutional rights (Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments), it seems nothing less than absurd that one cannot waive a property/contractual right.
