CAUSATION- lec 11

Question 1

Causal pluralism

Answer 1

The view that, though there are causal relations in the world, we should not be
looking for any one ‘X is causally related to Y iff….’ biconditional to characterize all of them

This is a negative account of causal pluralism: it tells us what a causal pluralist does not think.
And when it comes to saying what causal pluralists do think, we in fact find a variety of pluralist
views.

Question 2

Two concepts’ pluralism

Answer 2

One possible pluralist view that is easily characterized using the materials already in place in this
course is the view that there are just two concepts of causation – the concept of difference-
making and the concept of production – and it is a mistake to try to eliminate either

Question 3

‘two concepts’ pluralist can explain both why our intuitions might waver about each of these
cases, and why there seems to be more of a tendency to recognize a causal relation in the second
case, even though both are cases of double prevention:

Answer 3

Intuitions waver because in each case the event in question is a difference-maker with respect to
the outcome, but there is no production mechanism linking the two events.

(So the ‘difference-
making’ concept applies but the ‘production’ concept does not.)
Intuitions lean in different directions even though both cases are cases of double prevention
because there are features of the examples that make the absence of a production mechanism
more salient in the first case than the second.

Note that there is a lot of room for exploration concerning the relation between the two concepts.
For example, a ‘two concepts’ pluralist might say any of the following:

1) ‘X causes Y’ is true as long as at least one concept applies.

2) There is a gold standard for ‘X is a cause of Y’ claims: that both concepts apply. If one applies
without the other, ‘X causes Y’ is not really true (the weaker ‘X causes* Y’ is true instead).
3) There is a relation of relative depth between the concepts with respect to significance for
causal explanation. Where we find a counterfactual relation, we will be happy to make a
preliminary judgment of causation, but will then want to look for a production mechanism that
explains why the counterfactual relation holds

Question 4

Amiable jumble pluralism

Answer 4

A second possibility is to say that the concept of causation operates like a ‘syndrome’ (or
‘cluster’) concept: there is a list of criteria we have in mind when we are asking whether X is a
cause of Y. Here is one possible list:
- difference with respect to whether Y happens
- difference with respect to how Y happens
- instantiation of a regularity (when X happens against background conditions C (which hold in
the situation at hand) Y always/almost always follows).
- spatio-temporal contiguity
- presence of a mechanism that makes sense in push-pull terms.
The suggestion will then be that X is a cause of Y iff an appropriate selection of these conditions
are met: no single condition is necessary; various combinations count as sufficient.

Different versions of this kind of view come apart with respect to which conditions get on the
list, and how it is determined what counts as an ‘appropriate’ selection of conditions in any given
case. (For example, the suggestion might be that for ordinary everyday life the counterfactual
conditions are jointly sufficient, but that for the purposes of causal explanation in science a
mechanism is required (or the other way around…).)

Question 5

Specific causal relation pluralism

Answer 5

This is the view that statements of specific (‘special’) causal relations –
- X pushesY
- X crushes Y
- X scrapes Y
- X burns Y
… and so on are semantically prior to the general ‘X causes a change in Y’