Cases Flashcards
BUCKLEY V. VALEO
After Watergate, Congress tried to stop corruption in campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates
i. Limits on contributions
ii. Required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount
c. Holdings: 2 important conclusions
i. Restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns did not violate the first amendment
1. FECA enhance the integrity of our system of representative democracy by guarding against unscrupulous practices.
2. Government restrictions of independent expenditures in campaigns (using own personal or family resource) and limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment because they do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do. Restricting them does not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a burden on free speech and association.
Bluman v. FEC (Circuit)
- Facts: Plaintiffs are foreign nationals with temporary work visas who want to contribute to campaigns
- Holding: No. There are many other areas where foreign nationals can participate. We must preserve the basic conception of political community; foreign nationals may be loyal to home
US v. US Brewers Assoc. (1916) (District)
a. Facts: Prohibition of certain corporations contributing to elections.
b. Holding: There is a compelling government interest in regulating elections and avoiding quid pro quo.
Newberry v. US (1921)
a. Facts: Candidate unlawfully gave money to his own candidacy.
b. Holding: Constitution does not grant Congress the power to regulate primaries, only the authority to regulate federal elections (state legislatures set other regulations).
US v. Congress of Industrial Orgs (1948)
a. Facts: Establishing a PAC. Question on whether it is lawful for unions to make contributions or expenditures for concerns of corruption.
b. Holding: Congress did not intend for act to cover union newspapers
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978)
a. Facts: MA statute prohibiting banks/corporations from making contributions to influence the outcome of a vote that does not materially affect their holdings.
b. Holding: Violation of first amendment. The corporations have a right to political speech.
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990)
a. Facts: MI law prohibits expenditures in state elections from treasury funds. Corporations must use a separate, segregated fund.
b. Holding: Constitutional. It’s narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in protecting from corruption or the appearance of corruption
Emily’s List v. FEC (2009)(Circuit)
a. Facts: New regulations for funds received by political committees in response to certain solicitations must be treated as contributions under the FECA, and thereby must abide by federal limits.
b. Holding: Regulations are closely drawn to match the sufficiently important interests of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption by preventing the use of nonfederal funds for communications that my influence federal elections.
Citizens United v. FEC (2010)
a. Facts: Hillary film used for attack ads, not campaigning for or against, just educating voters,
b. Holding: Reversion to Buckley/Bellotti, overruled Austin. Government can require disclosure, but cannot suppress speech. Hillary was express advocacy (speech). Corporations can engage in independent expenditures
Speechnow.org v. FEC (2010) (Circuit)
a. Facts: Unincorporated nonprofit political organization intends to raise funds through donations and operate through independent expenditures to advocate for a clearly identified candidate, but not in cooperation with that candidate.
b. Holding: Outside groups can promote a candidate as long as they don’t coordinate. Limiting independent expenditures is unconstitutional. Continuing reporting is constitutional.
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock (2012)
a. Facts: State law placing limit on independent expenditures
b. Holding: Unconstitutional. Citizens United applies to state law
Nixon v. Shrink MO Gov. PAC (2000)
a. Facts: Is Buckley the authority for state contribution limits? Does Buckley set the amount?
b. Holding: Buckley is the authority for comparable state regulations, but the federal limits approved in Buckley do not define the scope of permissible state limitations.
Randal v. Sorrell (2006)
a. Facts: VT statute limits campaign expenditures by candidates and individual contributions to candidates
b. Holding: Buckley decided expenditure limits are unconstitutional, indistinguishable from Buckley. Contribution limits were unnecessarily low, challengers cannot raise enough money to win from small donations only.
Lair v. Motl (2017) (circuit)
a. Facts: Montana placed low limits contributions after seeing evidence of corruption
b. Holding: Constitutional, limits are indexed for inflation. Closely drawn to the goal of stopping potential corruption or the appearance of corruption.
McCutcheon v. FEC (2014)
a. Facts: Placing a limit on how much a person can give in total to all candidates.
b. Holding: Base contribution limits (to individual candidates) are constitutional. Aggregate contribution limits (to all candidates) are unconstitutional.
Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez (1996) (circuit)
a. Facts: Expenditure limits on public funding, but if your opponent is not publicly funded and reaches a certain threshold the limit is lifted.
b. Holding: Constitutional. This is narrowly tailored and not coercive.
AZ Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett
a. Facts: AZ law provides matching funds to candidates who accept public financing that gives an initial sum and then additional matching funds based on the amount spent by privately financed opponents.
b. Holding: First amendment prohibits linking funds to the amount of money raised by the opponent because it burdens political speech and is not sufficiently justified by a compelling interest. DOES NOT FORBID ALL PUBLIC FINANCING
NAACP v. Alabama (1958)
a. Facts: Alabama tried to prevent NAACP from doing any business in the state, subpoenaed membership lists.
b. Holding: NAACP members have the right to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others and doing so is protected by the 14th amendment. Freedom to associate is inseparable from the 14th Due Process clause. Mandatory disclosure of membership would interfere with free association, so the state’s interest is superseded by constitutional rights of members.
Burroughs v. US (1934)
a. Facts: FCPA requires detailed account of contributions made to or by committee.
b. Holding: Upheld financial disclosure and reporting requirements because Congress has the power to pass legislation that protects the integrity of elections.
McIntyre v. OH Elections Comm. (1995)
a. Facts: Ohio law prohibits anonymous distribution of campaign literature.
b. Holding: First Amendment violation. When a law burdens core political speech, apply exacting scrutiny, and uphold only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.
i. Information interest (transparency).
c. Scalia dissent: “I can imagine no reason why an anonymous leaflet is any more honorable, as a general matter, than an anonymous phone call or an anonymous letter. It facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very purpose of the anonymity.
Doe v. Reed (2010)
a. Facts: Petition to get state law extending rights to same sex couples, disclosure of signers is mandatory.
b. Holding: Constitutional. This is not expression, it is a procedure to get a law on the ballot. Public disclosure promotes transparency and accountability to an extent others cannot.
i. Anti-Fraud interest (guarding against bogus signatures)
ii. Information interest (transparency)
Ex Parte Yarbrough (1884) aka “The Klu Klux Cases”
- Facts: Violent beating to stop a black man from casting his vote.
- Holding: Congress has constitutionally granted power to protect election integrity. It is a federal crime to intimidate voters. “If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of delegated agents . . . it must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends, from violence and corruption.”
Harper v. VA State Bd. Of Elections (1966)
- Facts: State poll tax.
- Holding: Unconstitutional. Voter qualifications are not tied to wealth status. You cannot exclude those who cannot pay.
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections (1959)
a. Facts: Requirement of literacy test to vote
b. Holding: Constitutional because they are not “merely a device to make racial discrimination easy” (Congress prohibited tests in VRA)
Skafte v. Rorex (1976) (state)
a. Facts: Permanent resident denied the right to vote in school election.
b. Holding: Not a violation of equal protection. Being a citizen means you are part of a community of politics. States can give non-citizens the right to vote in local elections, but they don’t have to. (rational basis review, state has a rational interest in limiting participation to persons in the political community)
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. (1969)
a. Facts: To vote in school election: must be a US Citizen, resident of the district, and have children in the district. Exclusion for people who don’t own or rent property and people who don’t have children
b. Holding: Unconstitutional. Not necessary to further a goal. You don’t have to have a child in the district to have a stake in the outcome.
Richardson v. Ramirez (1974)
a. Facts: CA law excludes felons from voting even after their sentence is complete unless their right to vote is restored by court order or executive pardon.
b. Holding: Constitutional. Different from other voting restrictions, need not be narrowly tailored. Felons and noncitizens may be discriminated against in terms of election law.
Hand v. Scott (District)
a. Facts: Challenging felon disenfranchisement process:
b. Holding: FL arbitrary voting rights restoration process for felons violates the 1st and 14th Amendments. FL has to make new process.
Colegove v. Green (1946)
- Facts: Some IL districts are far greater than others.
2. Holding: Nonjusticiable political issue. “Ought not enter this political thicket”
Baker v. Carr (1962)
- Facts: Apportionment.
2. Holding: Apportionment is justiciable. 1 person, 1 vote.
Wesberry v. Sanders (1964)
- Facts: GA federal congressional districts, some have 2-3x more people represented. Vote of individual person was worth less.
- Holding: Congressional districts must have roughly equal populations, as feasible. Article 1 section 2–equal.
Reynolds v. Sims (1964)
- Facts: Challenge to apportionment in state house districts Alabama. One district had 41x as many eligible voters as those in another district in the state.
- Holding: Equal protection requires that state house districts should be roughly equal.
Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of CO (1964)
- Facts: CO law reapportionment for state senate policy is arbitrary.
- Holding: Equal protection requires districts to be substantially apportioned by population for state senate also have to be 1 person 1 vote. Counties are not sovereign, states are. Can’t be the same as US Senate.
Avery v. Midland County (1968)
- Facts: Districting for count borad by means other than population, skewed quite a bit.
- Holding: Violation of equal protection. There must be 1 person 1 vote. Must redistrict by population.
Salyer Land co. v. Tulare Lake Basin (1973)
- Facts: CA law restricts voting on land issues to landowners who may or may not be residents, power proportional to value of land.
- Holding: Constitutional. Landowners’ voting power is proportional to the value of their land. Not a normal governmental authority. School board still subject to 1 person, 1 vote.
Evenwell v. Abbott (2016)
- Facts: TX law draws by total population, not likely voter population.
- Holding: Not a violation, 14th amendment applies to people, not just citizens/voters.
Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004)
- Facts: PA state legislature passed redistricting plan that clearly benefitted Republicans. Claims that it violates Baker v. Carr.
- Holding: No majority opinion: Court declined to intervene. Not a problem for the Court to deal with. 1 person 1 vote, political gerrymandering doesn’t have a bearing on this issue.
AZ St. Leg. V. AZ Indep. Redistricting. Com’n (2015)
- Facts: AZ gave redistricting power to IRC instead of state legislature.
- Holding: Constitutional. No preclusion from an independent commission, created by initiative from creating districts. Legislature is broad enough to include this commission.
Gill v. Whitford (2018)
- Facts: Redistricting plan to benefit Republicans.
- Holding: Court declined to answer all of the key issues because the plaintiffs didn’t have standing to bring the claim. Injury, traced to the defendant’s conduct, and redress. No injury in fact.
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections (1969)
- Facts: Challenge to state election law changes because they were subject to VRA section 5 preclearance and hence, they argued not enforceable on election day.
- Holding: There is a private right of action based on the remedial aims of VRA. The statutory rules dealt with “a voting qualification or prerequisite for voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” so they are subject to preclearance requirement.
Beer v. US (1976)
- Facts: New Orleans’ reapportionment for city council. One district majority black population, but white voters outnumbered black voters. Trying to redraw plans to make sure African Americans couldn’t allect AA councilmen. Another plan makes two majority black districts, still not elected. Section 5 requires preclearance for changes that could affect voting rights of racial minorities.
- Holding: Nonretrogression: as long as there is progress, more opportunities for African Americans. If there is progress, that doesn’t make things worse, it passes the VRA. This new plan was valid where it had the effect of enhancing the voting power of racial minorities. 5 is applicable, but only violated if the plan discriminates in a way that violates the constitution.
Shelby County v. Holder (2013)
- Facts: States subjected to coverage where they have to get federal approval to change state election law because they previously held racist election/voting laws.
- Holding: Unconstitutional restriction on state power. The data used was old. Departure from equal sovereignty requires the showing that the statute is sufficiently related to the problem it targets. Things have changed dramatically in the last 50 years.
White v. Regester (1973)
- Facts: TX redistricting plan deviated from the standard, traditional population equality (9.9%) and used multi- and single-member districts. No indication of racially motivated means.
- Holding: Apportionment upheld because the small variation was permissible because it did not dilute the power of voters in larger districts and it was not motivated by race. The multi-member districts were struck down because when you combine single and multi-member districts and they effectively cancel out the black vote to elect who they want, the mix of them is unconstitutional.
Thornburg v. Gingles (1986)
- Facts: Black citizens in NC claimed that the plan created new districts where black people would not be able to elect the person of their choosing. VRA section 2 requires “discriminatory effect” not “discriminatory purpose”
- Holding: Unconstitutional. Some of the districts discriminated against black voters be diluting the power of their vote. Test to “Ascertain whether the minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to determine whether white votes sufficiently usually defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”
- Test: If the racial group is:
a. Compactness: Sufficiently large and geographically compact to be a majority in a single-member district.
b. Political cohesiveness: Minority is politically cohesive, vote similarly.
c. Majority Bloc voting: White voters usually block the vote of the minority’s preferred candidate.
League of LUAC v. Perry (2005)
- Facts: TX redistricting in 2003 with 2000 data was designed to maximize a partisan advantage, but it caused vote dilution of latinx voters.
- Holding: Nothing in the Constitution prevented redrawing, have to do it at least every 10 years. Gingles test, looking at state-wide percentages/propotionality. Constitution was not violated, but in one district the VRA is violated by not allowing Latinx voters a real chance to elect the candidate of their choosing, so they had to redraw to fix that district.
Bartlett v. Strickland (2009)
- Facts: Claim that state redistricting plan, as required by the VRA, was in violation of NC constitution. Minority group makes up less than 50% of voting age population in the potential district.
- Holding: VRA does not require states to redraw lines to allow a minority group to feasibly join with crossover voters to elect the minority’s candidate of choice when the minority is less than 50% of the voting population in the redrawn district. Crossover districts are permitted, but not required. First element of Gingles is only met when a compact group of minority voters could form a majority in the single-member district
Johnson v. DeGrandy (1994)
- Facts: Consolidation of vote dilution cases. Claims that redistricting plans unlawfully dilutes voting rights of minorities.
- Holding: No violation of section 2 where, in spite of continuing discrimination and racial bloc voting, minority voters form effective voting majorities in a number of districts roughly proportional to their shares in voting-age population. Totality of the circumstances. Court must assess the probative significance of the Gingles factors after considering totality of circumstances with arguable bearing on equal political opportunity. Dilution cannot be inferred from mere failure to guarantee minority voters maximum political influence.
Shaw v. Reno (1993)
- Facts: NC reapportion plan challenged because it only created one black-majority district, NC submitted new plan with 2, but one of the districts was drawn super weird.
- Holding: Although the reapportion plan was racially neutral on its face, the district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it was an effort to separate voters based on race.
AL Legislative Black Caucus v. AL (2015)
- Facts: AL legislature redrew districts by taking black voters out of their districts and making fewer black districts with higher percentage of black people within them.
as traditionally allowed by Courts, and tried VRA because it had negative impacts on equal representation of minorities. - Holding: In assessing whether a state was motivated by race, cannot use equal population as a defense to racial gerrymandering.
ANDERSON-BURDICK TEST
i. Does the state election administration law/rule impose a “severe” burden on voting rights?
ii. If yes, then strict scrutiny applies.
iii. If no, then Anderson balancing test applies
1. Burden on voter v. state’s interest
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Bush v. gore
- Facts: Contested Presidential race after ballots in Florida led to a lot of confusion. The ballots were to be recounted manually.
- Holding: Without substantial additional work, the recount cannot be done in compliance with equal protection and due process. Unfair in practice because there may be different standards across the state.
Pabey v. Pastrick (2004) (State Supreme)
- Facts: Unsuccessful mayor sought all absentee ballots to be announced invalid and called for new election.
- Holding: Based on evidence of fraud surrounding the absentee ballots, the election was tainted and a new election was granted.
Wexler v. Anderson (2006) (Circuit)
- Facts: Touchscreen, paperless ballots in some counties (no paper trail).
- Holding: A recount would not be a violation of equal protection and due process (this is not Bush v. Gore) because there are different procedures for counting in the counties that have different types of voting.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. (2008)
- Facts: Photo ID required for voting.
- Holding: Constitutional. Closely related to the state interest in preventing voter fraud, a neutral interest. Not a significant burden, so ANDERSON-BURDICK balancing. (ID not required in every state, but state can require).
Veasey v. Abbott (2016) (Circuit)
- Facts: TX law requiring ID to vote.
- Holding: Burdening the right to vote because of the stark racial disparity in the state of people with drivers licenses. Enacted with racist motivations, and had a racially discriminatory effect. (Basically, a poll tax in Texas)
Husted v. A. Phillip Randolph Inst. (2018)
- Facts: OH process of removing inactive voters: If you didn’t vote in 2 years, you are sent a registration form. If you don’t return it and don’t vote for 4 more years, you are removed.
- Holding: Constitutional. Only remove if they fail to return the registration. Does not bar them from reregistering. NVRA goals are to increase voter registration and remove ineligible voters.
Burson v. Freeman (1992)
a. Facts: TN statute banning campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place.
b. Holding: Constitutional. People have a right to express who you love/are voting for, but the state has a compelling interest in preventing voter intimidation and in protecting the public’s confidence in election integrity. Rare case, but first amendment free expression rights conflict with another fundamental right, the right to cast a ballot free from intimidation.
MN Voters Alliance v. Mansky (2018)
a. Facts: MN law prohibiting all political items inside a polling place on Election Day.
b. Holding: Too broad. The state must draw a reasonable line. The polling place is a non-public forum, but this law is not capable of reasoned application.
Rideout v. Gardner (2016) (Circuit)
a. Facts: NH prohibition on pictures of ballots.
b. Holding: Unconstitutional. The state cannot identify a case of intimidation even after small cameras have been around for many years. Not narrowly tailored. Political speech, so it is protected.
Silberg v. Bd. of Elections (2016) (District)
a. Facts: NY prohibition on pictures in polling places including the person’s face. Typically coercive.
b. Holding: Polling places are non-public. Constitutional.
U.S. v. Thomas (circuit)
- Facts: Election day voter payments conspiracy.
2. Holding: Sufficient evidence, circuit affirmed.
People’s Advocate v. Superior Court
- Facts: Attempt to adopt a law to say the next legislature cannot engage in deficit spending.
- Holding: No dead control by majority vote. Seeks to govern the content of future legislation. Unconstitutional.
Anderson v. Martin
- Facts: Statute requiring race on the ballot
- Holding: Unconstitutional because the state is trying to make voters discriminate/vote based on race. Irrelevant information is not valid on the ballot. PARTY ID IS RELEVANT.
Cook v. Gralike
- Facts: Stance on term limits on ballot.
- Holding: Accurate, but not permissible. Shouldn’t try to dictate the outcome of the election beyond procedure. Getting into substance of what the voters are voting for.
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut
- Facts: CT closed primary: must be registered in a party to vote in primary. GOP adopted a rule that permitted independent voters to vote in GOP primaries for federal and state elections.
- Holding: Closed primaries are unconstitutional because the burden the Party’s right to invite people to participate, and independent voters’ right to assembly.
Elrod v. Burns (1976)
- Facts: Deputy fired because he was not affiliated with the sheriff’s party.
- Holding: Government employee’s 1st Amendment rights may be restricted in the name of government interest, but no interest is served by this burden on 1st Amendment of deputies. When it affects your job, your speech can be restricted, otherwise not.
Heffernan v. City of Paterson
- Facts: Police officer got a campaign sign for his mother, and was demoted because his boss thought he was advocating for a particular candidate.
- Holding: Generally, dismissal or demotion of government employees is prohibited when based on engagement in constitutionally protected political activity. Because the boss was motivated by his mistaken belief that the officer was engaging in political speech, that is what counts.
a. Two kinds of gov. employees
i. Top set policy - Voters get to choose candidates and policies
ii. The rest execute and implement policy
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party (1986)
- Facts: WA state law requires minor party candidates must get 1% of the vote in the primary to get on the ballot for the general election.
- Holding: Nothing prevents the candidates from getting on the primary ballot, so they are not restricted. States have a right to aid in confusion when primary candidates get little support.
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party (1997)
- Facts: MN law prohibits candidate from appearing on ballot for one than one party, concern is that voter might vote twice.
- Holding: Not restrictive, states must enact laws to reduce election disorder.
State of Washington v. 119 Note No! Committee (1998)
- Facts: State law prohibits sponsoring a political ad with false information
- Holding: Government may not ban false political speech unless it involves election administration (false election date, location, etc)
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
- Facts: State law bans judicial candidates from expressing their views on political/legal issues.
- Holding: Burdens political speech, fails strict scrutiny.
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar (2015)
- Facts: FL law prohibits judges from soliciting campaign funds.
- Holding: Passes strict scrutiny, money could control ruling. Giving/not giving complicates the public perception.
Caperton v. Massey (2008)
- Facts: Motion for recusal where parties donated to campaign of that judge.
- Holding: Due process requires that a judge recuse himself from participation in this case. Need not find that the actually was biased. SCOTUS GOVERNS THEMSELVES.
