Cases Flashcards
Vosburg v Putney
Trespass does not require intent or foreseeability. Wrongdoer liable for all injuries resulting directly from wrongful act.
o Kick/tap of shin leads to permanent loss of limb due to preexisting condition.
Garratt v Dailey
Trespass requires intent, which is substantial certainty that the contact or apprehension will result
o Removal of chair minutes before plaintiff attempted to sit in it and broke her hip was not intended to cause harm. Defendant not liable.
Dougherty v Stepp
Every unauthorized entry to real property is a trespass, even if no damage is done.
Intel Corp v Hamidi
A trespass to personal property must interfere with possessors use or possession of or legally protected interest in property itself. Considers private servers personal property.
o Defendant not liable for sending unwanted emails.
Rockford Redi-Mix v Teamsters Local 325
If actor knows consequences are certain or substantially certain to result, he is treated as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.
o Defendant liable for taking trucks with cement in beds and leaving them unmixing to dry and ruin trucks.
Courvoisier v Raymond
If defendant is justified in tort he is not liable. Mistaken self-defense
o Jewelry shop owner who mistakenly shoots police officer after being robbed is not liable because he was justified in shooting the burglar, and he thought the police officer was the burglar.
Bird v Holbrook
Although property-owners may use some force to protect property, it must be reasonable in context of the property at stake and not intended solely to do unnecessary bodily harm. Property-owner failed to provide notice.
o Property-owner liable to plaintiff, who jumped fence to tulip garden to grab an escaped hen and was shot by a spring-gun.
Gortarez v Smitty’s Super Valu
An actor who detains a suspected thief is liable for harm done if mistaken. The force must be reasonable and not calculated to inflict serious harm. No use of force is justified until demand is made for return of property.
o Defendant liable for injuries when security guard put plaintiff in a chokehold, believing he had stolen a vaporizer.
Mohr v Williams
Any unlawful and unauthorized touching, except in spirit of pleasantry, constitutes assault and battery. An absence of ill-intent is not a defense. Indeed, even a benefit to plaintiff is unlawful if without consent.
o Doctor liable for operating on plaintiff’s ear, when he only had permission to operate on the other one.
Ploof v Putnam
Necessity justifies entry upon land and interferences with personal property that would otherwise be a trespass .
o Defendant liable for damages done when his employee untied the plaintiff’s boat from a dock during a storm, causing damage to the boat and the plaintiff and his family to have to swim to shore. Defendant does not have the right to protect his personal property at the expense of others’ safety.
Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation Co.
Compensation must be made for necessary taking of private property.
o Vincent had contract with Lake Erie. The default terms are that compensation is required for taking of private property. Parties can contract around. This is not necessarily applicable to strangers.
The Case of the Thorns: Hulle v Orange
A person is liable for conduct that cause damages unless he did everything he could to prevent it and could not have acted any other way .
o Defendant liable for trespass due to cutting thorns that fell on his neighbors property.
Weaver v Ward
The only excuse for trespass is it being utterly without his fault.
o Defendant liable for shooting fellow soldier in practice.
Scott v Shepherd
Trespass is the claim for an action that directly harms another person. Intermediate innocents who were justified in their actions do not make it trespass on the case
o Defendant who threw squib into marketplace liable to plaintiff who, through succession of other throws, was eventually hit in the eye with the squib.
Brown v Kendall
If injury was caused without fault, defendant is not liable. If defendant using ordinary care or plaintiff failed to use ordinary care, defendant not liable
o Defendant may not be liable for accidentally hitting plaintiff in the eye while attempting to break up their fighting dogs.
Fletcher v Rylands
Knowledge or ignorance of damage done is immaterial for liability. People have an absolute duty to prevent harm to others from potentially harmful things on own property unless caused by Act of God or other party’s fault.
o Reservoir owner liable for damages done to coal mining business for flooding of coal shafts, even though they didn’t know about the coal shafts.
Losee v Buchanan
Not liable for non-nuisance damages that are without fault or negligence to neighbor
o Not liable for casting a steam boiler upon plaintiff’s land
Ives v South Buffalo
No man without fault or negligence can be held liable for injuries sustained by another .
o Company not statutorily liable for workplace injury. Workers’ Comp law unconstitutional taking of property without Equal Protection and not a state police power.
Vaughan v Menlove
Ordinary prudence must be exercised to avoid liability for injury .
o Liable for failing to exercise reasonable care with hay on property. Reasonable care standard not reduced for dumb people.
Smith v Teller
To exercise the same standard of reasonable care, one with defective eye-sight must more vigilantly exercise caution through other senses or means.
o Blind person contributorily negligent for not using cane/seeing-eye dog.
Davis v. Feinstein
A blind person is not bound to discover everything that a person with normal vision would .
o Blind person using cane can collect damages incurred in accident.
Dellwo v Pearson
When participating in adult activities, children are held to the same standard of care as adults .
o Child driving boat liable for harm to plaintiff.
Breunig v American Family Ins
If one has forewarning about their own disability, they could be liable for harm resulting from it if they do not exercise the same standard of care as people without this disability .
o Defendant liable for damage she caused due to driving while hallucinating because she was known to experience hallucinations.
Gould v American Family Ins
When injured party can reasonably foresee danger from mentally disabled person, the mentally disabled person is not responsible for torts
o Caretaker could not collect based on injury from mentally disabled patient.
Bolton v. Stone (1950)
Plaintiff Stone hit by a cricket ball driven from adjacent Cheetham Cricket Club. Defendant not negligent because the costs of building a higher fence outweigh the benefits. Defendants took reasonable care. Factors include probability of event and costs if it occurs.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co. (1947):
Carroll Towing attempted to move barge, dislodging another barge Anna C which sank and held flour owned by United States. Liable for negligence due to failure to take safety precautions because the burden of taking such precautions is less than the probability of injury multiplied by the gravity of any resulting injury.
o Strict v. Fault Liability has no impact on behavior, only wealth distribution. Who has to pay?
o Cost-benefit analyses encourage siting hazardous/undesirable activities in poor areas.
o Administrability: only major actors can really undertake these analyses.
o Money spent on precautionary principle has better uses.
o Moral heuristics: we think of immoral actions as worse than immoral omissions
Cooley v. Public Service Co. (1940):
- Storm caused telephone cables to fall and scare woman using phone. She jumped and hit telephone cable which electrocuted her, causing traumatic neurosis and loss of sensation on left side. Defendant cannot have a duty to do something that requires nonperformance of another duty. Defendant is not liable because the alternative precautions that the plaintiff proposed would increase risk of electrocution to other people.
o Cost-benefit negligence rarely appears in jury instructions. People are not that responsive to cost-benefit liability.
o Should judges be social cost calculators?
o Some parties not fit to do cost-benefit calculations. Humans bad at perceiving risk.
o Difference between social costs and settlement costs. Each person who does not bring a suit subsidizes the defendant’s activities.
- Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goldman (1927):
Plaintiff widow sued for her husband’s death caused by collision with train at crossing. SCOTUS for defendant because plaintiff did not stop, look, and listen. Plaintiff contributorily negligent.
- Pokora v. Wabash Railroad Co. (1934):
Failing to get out of truck and check for oncoming trains does not make one negligent. Negligence should consider totality of circumstances. Standard of caution better than a rule. Getting out to check could have cause other dangers and may not have prevented this collision.
- The TJ Hooper (1932):
Two tugs left bay when there were no storm warnings. One barge sank the next day with cargo on board. The tugs lacked a radio that would have warned them of the storm and allowed them to come to shore. Although lacking a radio was custom, this does not mean it was reasonable.
- Trimarco v. Klein (1982):
Plaintiff shattered sliding glass bathroom door in multiple dwelling & injured by glass, which was not safety glass. A party is liable for negligence when a custom or accepted practice is coupled with proof that such custom or accepted practice was ignored and that this departure was the proximate cause of one’s injuries.
- Brune v. Belinkoff (1968):
Defendant anesthesiologist administered spinal anesthesia to plaintiff. 11 hours later plaintiff slipped and fell. Still felt numbness in her leg at trial. Custom dose but excessive according to some experts. Practitioner must exercise degree of care and skill of average qualified practitioner, not those in that area which no longer justifies inferior training/skill.
o Typically medical standard of care is custom not reasonableness.
o Costs of medical malpractice liability exaggerated. Biggest problem is third-party payer system.
- Helling v. Carey (1974):
Despite compliance with custom doctor liable for medical malpractice for failing to administer timely vision test, which caused loss of peripheral vision.
o Does this drive up the cost of care by requiring unnecessary tests?
o There is a huge mismatch between legit cases and claims. Only 2% of legit injuries are brought to court and only 17% of claims involve a negligent injury.
o 60% of awards taken up by admin costs.
o Defensive medicine to some extent beneficial but can do more harm than it is worth sometimes.
- Martin v. Herzog (1920):
Plaintiff struck by defendant’s car going around curve at night. Defendant did not keep right. Plaintiff did not have headlights on. Breaking safety standards imposed by law is breaking duty of reasonable care. Plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
- Tedla v. Ellman (1939):
Plaintiff Tedla hit by automobile while walking along highway which there was no walkway around. Although statute required them to walk along the left side of the road, this is was contrary to reasonable care so plaintiffs were not contributorily negligent. Statute does not wipe out common law duty.
o This law breaking is reasonable unlike not having headlights.
o Departure from statute is negligent only when losses are those statute intended to guard against.
o This is a mystery, while Herzog is the rule.
- Gorris v. Scott (1874):
Sheep washed overboard due to failure to comply with Contagious Diseases Act which was intended to limit contagions. Negligence per se must be on account of the consequences the law was intended to guard against. Not liable.
- Uhr v. East Greenbush Central School District (1999):
Law requires school authorities to examine students between 8 and 16 for scoliosis once per year. Plaintiff not examined in 8th grade and screened positive in 9th grade. Required surgery due to late diagnosis. No private right of action because right would be inconsistent with legislative scheme (law has administrative enforcement scheme). Factors include 1) whether plaintiff is of class law intended to protect, 2) whether right would promote legislative purpose, and 3) whether right would be consistent with leg. scheme. Affirmed dismissal on summary judgment.
- Bennett v. Hardy (1990):
Plaintiffs sue for age-hostile work environment after being terminated. There is an implied right of action because the legislature would not grant a right without enabling enforcement.
o Prosecutors can exercise discretion while private attorneys general can make people seem guilty despite less rigorous std of proof.
- J.I. Case Co. v. Borak (1964):
Merger of Case and American Tractor Corp enabled by circulating false and misleading statements. Plaintiffs allege breach of fiduciary duty and violation of Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Private parties have a right to bring suit for violation of the act. Purposes to protect investors implies private right of action.
o SCOTUS subsequently made it more difficult to establish implied cause of action.
- Alexander v. Sandoval (2001):
There is no private right of action in Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 because there are other means of enforcement.
o Congress is more explicit now about whether there is a private right to action.
o Dissent: Some intents to create private rights are implicit. At time Congress passed Title VI, Court has expansive view of public right to action claims.
- Howard v. Wal-Mart (1998):
Causation must be proved by preponderance of evidence, but only required to investigate to the extent that the value in damages warrants. Small cases do not warrant massive investigations; thin evidence sufficient.
o Problems with preponderance of evidence: 1) makes unjust punishment of innocent people certain (is it punishment though?) 2) violates principle that defendants should be treated as unique individuals, 3) defendants should not be held liable without actual belief by the jury
o The burden of production shifts from one party to another. Must produce sufficient evidence to support finding in your favor.
o The burden of persuasion rests on one party throughout the case. Must produce sufficient evidence to convince a judge that a fact has been established.
o Status quo bias? Burden on person contradicting the status quo distribution of costs.
- Byrne v. Boadle (1863):
Event itself is proof of negligence. Plaintiff hit by a barrel of flour that came out of window of defendant’s shop. He can’t provide any proof of negligence because he has no idea what happened.
- Grajales-Romero v. American Airlines (1999):
Grajales-Romero injured by collapsed check-in counter sign at airport when countertop came loose. Event itself was proof of negligence because 1) event would usually not occur without negligence, 2) caused by instrumentality completely within control of defendant, and 3) not due to any voluntary action by plaintiff
o Res Ipsa Loquitor: the thing speaks for itself; permissible inference rule—juries who infer negligence from the event should be permitted to do so.
- Ybarra v. Spanguard (1944):
Plaintiff had surgery, felt two hard objects at top of his shoulders, anesthetized, and had sharp pain in shoulder and unable to lift arm. Res ipsa loquitur here because defendant better positioned to produce evidence than plaintiff. Burden shifts to defendant.
- McDonnell-Douglas v. Green (1973):
Plaintiff alleged fired due to discrimination. Alleged prima facie case and so did defendant burden shifts back to plaintiff to prove that the reasons defendant gives for firing are pretextual
- Butterfield v. Forrester (1809):
Plaintiff thrown down by his horse and injured because defendant put up a pole across the road leaving free passage on another street and plaintiff riding violently did not see it. Witness said clearly visible from 100 yds away. Plaintiff contributorily negligent and cannot get damages.
- Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975):
Both plaintiff and defendant negligent. Plaintiff recklessly tried to turn left across three lanes of traffic and defendant ran a yellow light. Plaintiff can collect under comparative negligence standard.
o Difficulties with comparative negligence: contributions for multiple tortfeasors, admin difficulties of assigning responsibility
o Juries were doing this work in damages even under contributory regime.
- Coleman v. Soccer Association of Columbia (2013):
Plaintiff jumped up and grabbed soccer goal post which fell on him and caused face fracture. Both parties negligent so plaintiff barred from recovery. It’s for legislature to change contributory negligence rules not court (but is it?)
- Murphy v. Steeplehouse Amusement Co. (1929):
Plaintiff thrown to floor by moving belt ride at amusement park and fractured his knee cap. Defendant not liable because there was nothing hidden or unnecessary about the risk. Plaintiff assumed the risk.
o Is notice sufficient for extremely dangerous activities? Are there risks too dangerous to be assumed?
- Lamson v. American Ax:
Employee assumed risk of workplace and could not recover.
- Maddox v. NYC (1985):
NY Yankees player injured while playing due to sliding in puddle. Plaintiff assumed risk because he had reason to know the danger of the conditions.
o Some courts treat amateurs and pros differently because maybe they don’t know about risks.
- Landings Ass. v. Williams (2012):
Plaintiff died while on a walk in the early-evening in her daughter’s neighborhood. Landings was a marsh and neighborhood association installed a lagoon drainage system. Had signs saying they removed alligators over 7 ft long (alligator was 8 ft), that they were not aggressive, and had a security system. Security heard her yelling and responded to the wrong area. Landings not liable because she assumed risk. (secondary assumption of risk)
o GA is a comparative fault case but assumption of risk doctrine erases Landings fault.
- Dalury v. SKI Ltd (1995):
Skiier collided with metal pole that formed ski lift waiting line maze. Waived lability for personal injury. Waivers may be invalid if 1) concerns a business suitable for public regulation, 2) party provides public service of practical necessity, 3) party presents itself as open to public, 4) essential nature of service causes unequal bargaining power, 5) standard waiver with no option to be protected from negligence by paying more, and 6) person or property placed under control of business. Waiver invalid because they are open to public.
- Marmet Health Center v. Brown (2012):
Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state law against pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
- LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M&SP Railway (1914):
The rights of one person to use his property cannot be limited by the wrongs of another. Textile company left flammable material near railway which caught fire when engine sparks flew onto it. Defendant liable and plaintiff not contributorily negligent.
o Baker/doctor and cattle/crops problems. Both parties cause damage to each other so who should have the entitlement?
o Calabresi: Causation is a seemingly neutral concept that allows pursuit of unstated goals.
o Hart and Honore: Causation is about common sense even if it is hard to define.
- NY Central RR Co. v. Grimstad (1920):
Grimstad died after falling off barge. His wife ran to get rope but did not see him when she returned. Sued for lack of life preserver. Not liable because plaintiff could not show there would be a different result if there had been a life preserver.
- Stubbs v. City of Rochester (1919):
Plaintiff had typhoid fever allegedly due to drinking contaminated water. City was negligent in contaminating water but tough to separate background incidence from cases the city caused. In the light most favorable to the plaintiff, reasonably certain the water contamination caused the plaintiff’s typhoid fever. Court just lets the jury decide what to do with it.
- Zuchowicz v. United States (1998):
Plaintiff developed pulmonary hypertension due to defendant prescribing an overdose of the drug Danocrine. She became pregnant after diagnosed with PPH and died 1 month after giving birth. Acts that increase the chance of a particular type of accident which then occurs are negligent and wrongful.
o Juries overweight imperfections of studies showing drugs are safe, have trouble weighing credentials of different experts and different types of data
o Judges determine whether studies are sufficiently scientifically valid.
o Causation disincentivizes adequate study of risks because it’s better for them not to know.
(Zuchowicz filled prescription at naval pharmacy)
- Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. (1983):
Health Coop decreased plaintiff’s chance of survival by 14% by failing to detect her cancer. Decrease in odds was a proximate cause of death. Damages should only be for premature death such as lost earning not death altogether.
* Joint and several liability: Any defendant can be held completely liable for all damages or may bring in others to apportion.
o Joint liability means defendant cannot sue other tortfeasors for their contributions.
o Several liability requires plaintiffs to get all defendants in court to recover fully.
- Kingston v. Chicago & NWR Co. (1926):
Northeast fire caused by defendant’s train and northwest fire with unknown cause converge and destroyed plaintiff’s property. Defendant liable for all damage because the fires were of equal size and no indication of natural origin, which means northwest fire not an intervening factor.
o Substantial factor instead of but-for.
- Summers v. Tice (1948):
Summers sued his hunting companions, one shot him in the eye and the other in the mouth, but unclear who did each. When both parties shown to be negligent, burden on defendant to apportion damages. They are joint tortfeasors so it would be unfair to require the plaintiff to prove who caused each injury—would allow each defendant to get away.
o Forces info-sharing.
- Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980):
A plaintiff can hold drug producers responsible for injury as result of her mother taking drug while pregnant even though plaintiff cannot identify manufacturer. Liable for their proportion of market share of drugs sold for miscarriage prevention.
o The defendants who supplied the product bear damages of the % of product sold by them to prevent miscarriages.
o Delay between taking drug and its effects prevents evidence conservation.
o These defendants make up 90% of the sales of this drug for preventing miscarriages.
o Dissent: Guarantees plaintiff wins because defendants cannot disprove they sold to this person. Falls disproportionately on defendants amenable to suit in CA even if national market share is less.
- Bostock v. Clayton County (2020):
Discrimination on the basis of sexuality is on the basis of sex, which is prohibited by Title VII. Sex is a but-for factor here.
o Alito/Thomas dissent: Majority changes both sexuality and sex here, which is not how counterfactuals regarding but-for causation is supposed to work.
o But-for is more inclusive than blatant sexism but still difficult to prove.
o There are no rules about what you change in the but-for counterfactual.
- Ryan v. New York RR (1866):
Defendant’s railroad spark caused fire to its own woodshed, and, despite diligent efforts, fire spread to plaintiff’s house. Defendant is not liable because this is a remote consequence not a proximate one.
o Most courts would not consider this remote today, but question remains about where to draw the line.
o Over-deterrence, crushing losses (relation to bankruptcy law and judgment proof), moral hazard
- Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough (1889):
Car speeding when tree fell on it. While speeding was a but-for cause of the incident, it was not a proximate cause of the injury.
o There is no crisis of generality here because the incident is described in terms most favorable to defendant and still awarded to plaintiff.
- Benn v. Thomas (1994):
A defendant whose impact, superimposed upon a prior latent condition, results in injury may be responsible for full disability, even when not foreseeable. Tractor-trailer ran into van causing bruised chest and fractured ankle, died 6 weeks later. Egg-shell plaintiff rule.
o Pros: Administrability, balances out robust plaintiffs, averaging alternative, protecting vulnerable
o Cons: Does not encourage info-sharing, disproportionate to moral culpability.
o How long should the time limit be for this impact?
- In re Polemis (1921):
While loading ship defendants dropped plank that struck hold, created spark, and started fire due to petrol and benzene on board. Liable despite unforeseeability. Multiple description crisis/levels of generality—depending on how you describe it, this could be case as foreseeable or unforeseeable.
- Wagon Mound Cases:
Oil negligently discharge from defendant ship caused fire that damaged dock and ships. Oil was in the water 2.5 days before oil caught fire due to welder’s sparks. In Wagon Mound I: Welders sue for dock damage. Defendant not responsible since not foreseeable. In Wagon Mound II: Shipowners sue. Liable because it was foreseeable. Harm must be within risk of negligent action—is this incompatible with the eggshell plaintiff rule?
- Brower v. NY Central RR Co. (1918):
Defendant liable for stolen property because this is a joint tort not an intervening cause. Defendant’s negligence caused collision with plaintiff and plaintiff’s goods spilled out and were stolen by thieves.
- McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Co. (1962):
Nurse put heat blocks directly on child tot warm her up after she nearly drowned. Child got 3rd degree burns. Plaintiff sues manufacturer who court held not liable since the fireman, who was trained on how to use, failed to warn the nurse and superseded any action/inaction by defendant.
- Nallan v. Helmsey-Spear (1980):
Absent lobby attendant is a proximate cause of injury when assassin shot Nallan in back.
- Palsgraf v. Long Island RR Co. (1928):
Defendant not negligent to plaintiff when guards assisted man in getting on train causing him to drop unmarked fireworks which sent scales at plaintiff. Duty must be in regard to a particular person.
- Wagner v. Int. RR Co. (1921):
Wrong that imperils life is also wrong to rescuer. Peril and rescue must be one transaction. Defendant could be negligent to rescuer. Cousin of plaintiff thrown out of train when rounding curve. Plaintiff got out and attempted to walk along trestle when he missed footing and fell off onto ground below. Conductor told plaintiff to walk on trestle and followed him with light.
- Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. (1964):
Where damages resulted form same physical forces whose existence required greater care than displayed and same general sort expected, un-foreseeability of exact developments and extent of loss does not limit liability. Liable for bridge damage when ice caused defendant’s boat to be separated from dock and float downstream, hitting another boat, which hit a bridge.
- Harper v. Herman (1993):
Defendant not liable because he had no duty of care to plaintiff. He had no duty of care because plaintiff was not deprived of normal opportunity for self-protection and had no reason to expect it from defendant. Plaintiff dived off defendant’s boat and was injured. Plaintiff and defendant had met that day.
o Takes the case from the jury by ruling no duty.
o Difficult to draw line between potential rescuers and non-rescuers.
o Factors for determining whether there was a special relationship include length of relationship, closeness, relative competency, and knowledge.
- Farwell v. Keaton (1976):
Siegrist and Farwell had a special relationship as companions on a social venture, so Siegrist had a duty of care to Farwell. Farwell was beat up and Siegrist drove him around for a while before leaving him in a car outside his grandparent’s house. Farwell died three days later. Evidence showed he had a great chance of survival if he was taken to the hospital promptly.
- Bullock v. Tamliami Trail Tours (1959):
Bus carrier liable to passenger for injury caused by third party or other passengers if injury could have been reasonably foreseen. Tamliami failed to take precautions to avoid danger. Should not have informed assailant of their presence on the bus and explained reason for asking them to move. Bullock was a black man from Jamaica sitting on the front of the bus. His assailant boarded the bus because he heard the driver telling the police about a black man riding in the front of the bus.
- Swenson v. Wasea Mutual Insurance Co. (2002):
Immunity to anyone providing emergency care, advice, or assistance without expected compensation at the scene or during transit to medical care. Protected by Good Samaritan Law. Swenson, age 13, injured leg when snowmobile collided with object. Tiegs attempted to rescue by driving her to hospital. While making U-turn, Tiegs’ vehicle collided with a tractor-trailer and Swenson died as a result.
- United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt (1922):
No duty of care to trespassers. Children were not induced/invited/tempted onto the land, so the landowners have no duty to them. United had a plant used for making toxic chemicals and tore the building down leaving only a basement filled with toxic water. Children went into the water and died.
o Traditionally, duty of reasonable care to invitees such as business guests, duty to warn of hidden dangers and refrain from willful wanton or reckless injury to social guests/licensees, and duty only not to willfully wantonly or recklessly injure trespassers.
o Recently, invitees expanding into licensees = greater duty of reasonable care to social guests
- Banker v. McLaughlin (1948):
Landowner had a duty or reasonable care to a child who entered his land because his pool was visible and tempting, accessible from place known to be frequented by children, known to be dangerous, and cheap to fill pool. 5 year old drowned in pool of water from hole used for dirt supply.
- Rowland v. Christian (1968):
Distinctions between invitees, licensees, and trespassors arbitrary. LOOOs owe reasonable care to all entering property Tenant liable for lack of ordinary care or skill if guest did not know about defects and not obvious. Factors include foreseeability of harm, degree of certainty of injury, moral blame attached to conduct, preventing future harm, burden of duty, availability of insurance.
o Many states have distinction between trespassers and non-trespassers.
- Strauss v. Belle Realty Company (1985):
Parties may have a duty of reasonable care to third parties not in contract but must be limited to reasonable extent. ConEd is also a defendant here and does not have duty of reasonable care to a tenant who suffered inury as a result of a power outage because no contractual relationship with ConEd. Liability would be endless—could be extended to people making deliveries or repairing equipment in building.
o Does the crushing liability concern substitute bankruptcy law for tort law?
o Liability on the utility would be regressive by raising rates equally for the rich and the poor.
- Kline v. 1500 Mass Ave Apt Corp (1970):
Landlord owes same duty of care to plaintiff that she was led to believe would be in place when she originally signed her lease (partially because there is an incomplete factual record). There is no liability for unforeseen/sudden criminal acts. Here, plaintiff was assaulted and robbed in her apartment building after asking landlord to take action because of the repeated crimes. The landlord is the only person who could’ve improved the safety. Security measures were reduced from her original lease-signing to her injury but costs reflected that every year in which she resigned.
o Denies low-income tenants option to pay less to have less security.
o Shifting costs from police to apartment renters.
- Ennabe v. Manosa (2014):
Since Garcia was charged for alcohol, Manosa is liable for Ennabe’s death. Manosa (under 21) held party at parent’s vacation rental without their consent and supplied alcohol for an entrance fee. Garcia escorted away from the party and then ran over Ennabe. Under CA law, no liability for alcohol providers who sell to tortfeasors unless the tortfeasors are minors and the unlicensed provider sells the alcohol.
- Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976):
Therapist negligent for failing to warn Tarasoff about his patient’s intention to kill Tarasoff. No duty to warn third parties unless special relationship between defendant and person whose conduct needs to be controlled or foreseeable victim. Here special relationship between therapist and person whose conduct needs to be controlled. Not required to accurately predict only to warn if they do predict.
o Some courts apply duty only to identifiable victims, others say no duty at all.
o Could deter therapists from taking these clients.
- Mitchell v. Rochester Railway (1896):
Not liable for fright where there is no immediate personal injury. Defendant actions not a proximate cause of her injury. Horse carriage came so close to hitting plaintiff without making contract that she fell, became unconscious and had a miscarriage.
- Falzone v. Busch (1965):
May recover for emotional injury if results from reasonable fear of immediate personal injury and fright resulted in bodily injury or sickness and these physical injuries would have been recoverable if the direct result of contact. Plaintiff’s husband hit by defendant’s negligently driven car, which also nearly hit her—making her ill.
- Dillon v. Legg (1968):
Liable for emotional trauma reasonably foreseeable even if not in zone of impact. Defendant’s negligent driving caused death of minor lawfully crossing road and mother witnessed but not in zone of danger.
- Metro-North Commuter Railroad v. Buckley (1997):
No liability for emotional distress without physical contact. Buckley exposed to asbestos at work at Metro-North. Contact with insulation dust does not constitute physical impact required.
- Diaz v. Eli Lilly (1973):
Spouse may recover for loss of consortium.
o Parents can recover for children. Children can increasingly recover for loss of parents if they cooperate. Unmarried couples traditionally cannot but some courts allow depending on exclusivity and degree of mutual dependence.
- People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (1985):
Defendant must take reasonable measures to avoid risk of causing economic damages to plaintiffs comprising an identifiable class who defendant has reason to know are likely to suffer damages. Identifiable is not the same as foreseeable. Here, a fire caused by ConRail caused municipal authorities to evacuate one-mile radius including airport terminal where plaintiff’s business based, causing cancelled flights, lost reservations, and lost operating expenses.
o Old Rule: Economic losses not recoverable unless accompanied by physical damages. Courts fear fraudulent claims, limitless liability, liability out of proportion to fault. Physical harm helps to show causal relationship. Exceptions for foreseeable losses and where defendant should’ve known about losses.
- 532 Madison Ave Gourmet Foods v. Finlandia Center Inc. (2001):
No compensation for purely economic damages. Office tower fell due to construction project, causing closure of businesses including Gourmet Foods for five weeks, making shoppers unable to reach stores.
o One justification is availability of business interruption insurance but insurers also often require physical damage.
- Baum v. United States (1993):
The National Park Service is immune from failure to perform a discretionary function even if discretion was abused. Discretionary functions involve judgment or choice, not mandatory or grounded in policy. The type of the material used in guardrail and maintenance was discretionary. Not liable for car accident in which Baum hit the guardrail, penetrated it, and fell to road below.
- Riss v. City of New York (1968):
City not liable for failure of police. Riss terrorized by rejected suitor for 6 months. Police did not help her. He calls her when she is at her engagement party and tell her it is her last chance. The next day someone he hired throws acid at her face, nearly blinding her. Then, police give her protection for 3.5 years.
o Liability would be crushing. Would enable judiciary to second-guess legislature and executive.
o Political accountability as an alternative.
o Constitutional torts: liable for violation of const interest
o Most officers have qualified immunity conditioned on use of discretion, in good faith, and within scope of duties
- Ira S Bushey & Sons v. United States (1968):
Conduct of employee is within scope of employment only if done to serve employer BUT employers must guard against risks expected in the course of employment. Coast Guard liable for seaman turning a wheel on a drydock that caused ship to fall and dock to partially sink because it was a foreseeable mistake.
o Employers liable even if they did nothing unreasonable or tortious. Does not vitiate employee’s liability. Employer could theoretically implead employee but rarely done because it is a bad look and/or judgment proof.
o Restatement includes: conduct “of the kind he is employed to perform” and “occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits”
o Intentional violence only included if foreseeable
- Spano v. Perini Corp. (1969):
Can be liable without fault if activity is substantially risky. Plaintiff owned garage wrecked by defendant’s blast when constructing tunnel.
o Corrects asymmetric info
- Fountainebleau Hotel Corp v. 45-25 Inc. (1959):
Property-owner not prevented from building in a way that would infringe “air and light” rights of neighbor.
o Would create a race to develop otherwise. Whoever gets their first has the right.
o Injunction entitlement to defendant.
- Ensign v. Walls:
Liable for nuisance even when plaintiffs come to the nuisance.
o Injunction entitlement to plaintiff.
o Inability to collectively act—no single party going to buy right to stop dog operation
- Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.:
Permanent damages rather than injunction appropriate if damages resulting from a nuisance are significantly less than economic benefits derived from party causing harm.
o Damages rule = conditional injunction, reserved for collective action problem where markets fail
o If injunction were applicable, just one plaintiff of hundreds of neighbors could prevent or capture value of settlement even though all others support the activity
o Holdout problem—each party wants to be the holdout to get the most money
- Leo v. General Electric Co. (1989):
May be special damage allowing private individual to claim nuisance. NY Dept of Env Conservation settled its claim against GE for discharge of toxic pollutants into public waters. Commercial fishermen have special damages because the pollution caused a ban on the sale of striped bass in NY.
- 532 Madison Ave v. Finlandia Center (2001):
Not a special damage because same type of harm as general public even if severity/degree different. Law firm and retailers sue for nuisance caused by building collapse. Alleged special damage due to forced closure of their offices.
- Rhode Island v. Lead Industries Association (2006):
Nuisance is unreasonable interference with right common to general public by entity with control over cause when the damage occurred. Not a aggregation of public rights. Healthy safety, peace, comfort, convenience are private rights not public. Defendant not in control of pigment when it harmed children.
- City of Santa Clara v. Atl Richfield Co. (2006):
Lead paint manufacturers could incur nuisance liability for their “intentional promotion of the use of lead paint on the interiors of buildings with knowledge of the public health hazard that this would create,” but not for their “mere manufacture and distribution of lead paint or their failure to warn of its hazards”
o Anything injurious to health, offensive to senses, obstructive of free use of property is a nuisance. Affects entire community or considerable number. Interference must be substantial and unreasonable compared to social utility. Not dependent on control of property.
- Camden County v. Berretta (2001):
Nuisance would consume tort law if lawful manufacture of non-defective products were a nuisance. Defendant does not control guns when they interfere with public safety.
- Spur Industries v. Del Webb:
If the public develops land in the vicinity of a public nuisance, the action creating the nuisance must be ceased by the party responsible for its creation, but said party is entitled to compensation. Option contract that allows Del Webb to stop pay to stop nuisance but prevents Spur from taking max value from Del Webb and creating a holdup problem. Worth a lot more to Del Webb than to Spur. Del E. Webb Development Co. was developing a retirement community for senior citizens on land it purchased adjacent to a plot owned by Spur Industries, Inc.. Spur was a company involved in the raising of cattle. Bilateral monopoly problem.
- Winterbottom v. Wright (1842):
No duty to nonparties of a contract. Supplier of mail coaches not liable to driver employed by Postmaster General.
o Would lead to infinite liability. Did not undertake public duty.
o Products liability costs borne by insurers, do not promote safety, raises prices, and does not compensate third parties.
- MacPherson v. Buick Motor (1916):
Car manufacturer liable to plaintiff injured when care collapsed even though the plaintiff was not the immediate purchaser. If a product is reasonably certain to place a limb in peril when negligently made and known to be used by people other than purchaser, there is a duty of care.
- Escola v. Coca Cola (1944):
Inference of negligence in res ipsa loquitor can give liability. Coke bottle exploded in plaintiff’s hand cutting and severing nerves, blood vessels, muscled. Alleged it was improperly filled.
- Temple v. Wean (1977):
Under strict liability for products, a product must be defective at the time it left defendant’s hands and be the proximate and direct cause of injuries. Temple operated a punch press at work when the machine broke closing on her arms. Not liable because Temple’s employer modified the machine.
- Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (2003):
In the absence of evidence showing a specific flaw in a product, a plaintiff may still recover damages based on strict products liability by showing that the product did not perform as intended, and excluding all other causes for the product’s failure that are not attributable to the defendant manufacturer or seller. In showing the defect was a substantial factor, the plaintiff is not required to prove the “specific defect,” but rather may demonstrate all necessary facts through circumstantial evidence. Here circumstantial evidence created a material issue of fact about cause of fire that should survive summary judgment.
- Barker v. Lull Engineering (1978):
A product is defective in design if it failed to performs as reasonably expected by consumers when used as foreseeable OR it benefits do not outweigh the danger ex-post (not ex-ante). High-lift loader not designed for use on moderate slopes. Remanded for application of correct rule.
o Ex-post test means not knowing about alternative designs or risks is not an excuse.
o Weird to use consumer expectations given that they are manipulable.
- Wright v. Brooke Group (2002):
Defective design = strict liability. Defective if manufacturing departs from intended design, foreseeable risks avoidable by reasonable alternative, inadequate instructions/warnings that could’ve reduced foreseeable risks. Ex ante cost-benefit test. Alternative had to be available at the time of design. Cigarette manufacturers.
- Liriano II (1998):
Duty to warn of dangers foreseeable modifications. Duty may apply even after sold because manufacturer is best positioned to learn about dangers and warn. If danger is obvious or person harmed participated in modification, they may not be liable. Liriano worked at a company which bought a meat grinder for Hobart, which sells meatgrinders with safety guards. The meat grinder for which the safety guard had been removed caught Liriano’s arm, requiring amputation. (Ruled Hobart negligent for 5% of damages, but his employer is immune due to workers’ comp so Hobart will pay 100%). Safety guard was cumbersome, so everyone removed it.
- Liriano III:
Risk of meat grinder is obvious, but availability safety shield is not, so warning should mention it. Liriano alleged prima facie case of cause-in-fact because wrongful act of defendant rends to cause this type of injury, so burden shifts to defendant who did not dispute causation.
- Hood v. Ryobi (1999):
Warning was adequate so not liable. Costs of encyclopedic warnings outweigh benefit. Ryobi saw had warnings not to remove blade guard but Hood removed because they prevented saw from passing through the piece. Warning only indicated the guard would prevent contract between fingers and blade not that it’d prevent blade from detaching.
- Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. (2000):
State law preempted here because it would conflict with federal law. DOT regulation required auto manufacturers to equip some but not all vehicles with passive restraints. State tort action claims defendant should have equipped care with airbags even though it complied with DOT standard. Since federal regulation sought a variety of devices whereas state tort law would require one standard device, it would be an obstacle to federal regulation.
- Wyeth v. Levine (2009):
No preemption here because not impossible to comply with state and federal law. FDA approved a drug and its labeling which failed to warn Levine of risks. FDA assertion that its regulation preempts state law deserves some weight but not deference because it is not thorough, consistent, and persuasive.
- PLIVA v. Mensing (2011):
Federal laws applied to generic drug manufacturers preempts state tort law because it is impossible to comply with both. The ability for PLIVA to ask FDA to change to a safer label is immaterial because they would have to guess whether FDA would have indeed changed it. (Drug consumers right to compensation depends on whether they had a brand-name or generic drug filled at the pharmacy, which they don’t control.)
o Warnings do make a difference. In 2009, FDA required a stronger warning and saw sharp drop in use.
- Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp v. Albrecht (2019):
- Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp v. Albrecht (2019): Preemption is a question of law for judges not a question of fact for juries. The judge may need to resolve some factual issues, like whether the manufacturer supplied the FDA with all relevant information, but the broader, substantive legal question subsumes those issues. Therefore, the judge alone should decide the preemption question.
- O’Shea v. Riverway Towing (1982):
In calculating pecuniary damages for personal injury, plaintiff gets her specific lost income at the time she was hurt and projected forward without removing taxes. Must take into account projected inflation and be discounted to present value.
o Collateral source rule: getting compensation through disability insurance does not preclude tort compensation.
o Taxes not removed because she could be double-taxed, it would be a tax-break for the defendant, taxes are subject to change.
o Workers bear the costs of workers’ compensation through lower wages.
- Feldman v. Alleghany Airlines (1975):
In calculating damages for a wrongful death, it is not appropriate to use a woman’s salary as the basis for valuing a period of childrearing. Feldman died in a car crash. Award based on value of lost earning capacity, lost capacity to enjoy non-remunerative activities, and deductions for living expenses. Loss of child-rearing years is loss of enjoyment of life’s activities not full earning potential.
- McMillan v. City of New York (2008):
Cannot reduce life expectancy input into award calculation based on race. Race is a social construct, and differences attributed to socioeconomics not natural differences. McMillan became quadriplegic in ferryboat crash due to NY negligence.
o Does becoming less tailored make it less discriminatory? Tort awards based on individual traditionally.
o Some state laws prevent only leveling down.
- McDougald v. Garber (1989):
Cognitive awareness required for recovery for loss of enjoyment of life. No distinction between loss of enjoyment of life and pain and suffering because nonpecuniary damages not calculated with precision and would have effect of increasing award.
- Kemezy v. Peters (1996):
Plaintiff does not have the burden of production related to defendant’s income for purposes of punitive damages. Defendant can produce evidence if they are low-income and want mercy. Placing the burden on the plaintiff would incentivize asking for punitive damages because they’d want to show how deep defendant’s pockets are for any damages.
- BMW v. Gore (1996):
Punitive damages can violate 14th amendment due process clause if they are excessive. Factors include degree of reprehensibility, ratio of compensatory to punitive, comparison between punitive damages and civil/criminal penalties for comparable misconduct.
- State Farm v. Campbell (2003):
14th Amendment due process requires notice of severity of penalty that a state can impose. Excessive punitive damages overturned. Punishes for nationwide policy rather than the one claim. A state cannot take jurisdiction of nationwide claims.
State Farm told its insured customers that their assets were safe and they had no liability for the accident that they were incredibly reckless in causing. State Farm refused to cover excess liability. Campbell and the families of people he injured pursued bad faith action against State Farm, giving 90% of award to them in exchange for not seeking satisfaction against Campbells. Nationwide policy of capping payouts to meet corporate fiscal goals.
- Phillip Morris v. Williams (2007):
Phillip Morris liable for misleading deceased that smoking was safe. Punitive damages 100:1 to compensatory. Punitive damages awarded by trial court are a taking without due process. Trial court failed to tell jury they could not punish for other injured claimants. Due process requires opportunity to present every available defense which they were not incentivized to do here nor were they being tried for the other injured claimants. Harm to non-parties can be a factor in reprehensibility but not through multiplier rule.
